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Abstract
This dissertation examines how Canadians defined and conceptualized peace from 1945 to 1963.
Historically, Canadians have traditionally defined peace within the country’s dominant political
ideology, liberalism. Consequently, “liberal internationalism,” characterized by its support for
multilateralism and collective security, became Canada’s most widely accepted form of peace
activism during the postwar and Cold War period. The Canadian liberal internationalist
conception of peace was highly militaristic and was epitomized by the country’s membership in
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): a Western, regional military alliance committed
to preserving peace by force. There were, however, a small number of Canadians who found the
government’s definition of peace unsatisfactory and rejected the idea that military power was
necessary to attain or maintain peace. Yet, any Canadian who questioned Canada’s militarized
conception of peace, or espoused an opposing vision were labelled subversive, a traitor, and most
damning, communist.
This dissertation offers a new vantage point on the history of peace in Canada. Rather
than exploring peace through liberal internationalism, the study examines positive conceptions of
peace in Cold War Canada through the lens of collective biography. The study focuses on six
individuals: Abraham Feinberg, Brock Chisholm, John Humphrey, James Endicott, Ursula
Franklin, and Norman Alcock. Each individual envisioned a peaceful world that differed from
the dominant historical narrative in postwar Canada. In turn, the chapters highlight how
Canadian peace activists contested and questioned Canada’s dominant, militarized, liberal
internationalist Cold War conception of peace, and strove to remove the root causes of war and
create a new social order. In opposing the hegemonic definition of peace, activists and their
methods to achieve an alternative positive peace were deemed communist dupes by the
government, media, and most Canadians. Ultimately, the chapters reveal that peace activists
failed to realize their unorthodox visions of peace. Nevertheless, this dissertation will highlight
the previously denied and excluded experiences of Canadian men and women who contributed to
building a broad culture of peace in the postwar and early Cold War period; and in doing so,
puncture the persistent and dominant myth of Canada as a “peaceable kingdom.”
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Introduction
At the beginning of his book, The Glorious Art of Peace, John Gittings poses a seemingly simple
question: “What does peace mean?”1 Gittings’ question, however, has long confounded people.
There are many conceptions of peace, and as historians Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo point
out, these definitions have long been debated: “‘Peace’ has meant the ending of violent conflict,
but has also referred more generally to a state of harmony or a state of tranquility; moreover, it
might refer to (political and social) justice. Some have defined ‘peace’ even as a non-violent way
of life.”2 The end of the Napoleonic Wars marked the beginning of what is termed the modern
peace movement. In 1815, Europe’s Great Powers – Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and
France – signed a peace treaty at the Congress of Vienna to mark Napoleon’s defeat. Led by
politicians such as Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord Castlereagh and Austria’s foreign minister,
Klemens von Metternich, the Congress attempted to establish a new European balance of power.
In doing so, it hoped to maintain the political, social, and military status quo by thwarting
territorial expansion in Europe, preventing liberal/nationalistic revolutions, and restoring
traditional governments, such as the House of Bourbon in France, to power. In contrast to
Castlereagh and Metternich’s belief in the balance of power to maintain peace, French writer
Victor Hugo, dreamed of a United States of Europe. Speaking at the 1849 International Peace
Congress, Hugo outlined his vision for European brotherhood and peace:
A day will come when the only fields of battle will be markets opening up to trade and minds
opening up to ideas. A day will come when the bullets and bombs will be replaced by votes,
by the universal suffrage of the peoples, by the venerable arbitration of a great sovereign
senate which will be to Europe what this parliament is to England, what this diet is to
Germany, what this legislative assembly is to France.3
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John Gittings, The Glorious Art of Peace: From the Iliad to Iraq (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 1. In addition to Gittings’ book, there are numerous general studies that explore the history of
peace, including: Antony Adolf, Peace: A World History (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009); David P.
Barash, ed., Approaches to Peace: A Reader in Peace Studies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2000); David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2008); Harvey L. Dyck, ed., The Pacifist Impulse in Historical Perspective (Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press, 1996); Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace: Reflections on War and
International Order (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000).
2
Holger Nehring and Helge Pharo, “Introduction: A Peaceful Europe? Negotiating Peace in the
Twentieth Century,” Contemporary European History, Volume 17, No. 3 (2008): 278.
3
Victor Hugo, “The Second General Peace Congress, Paris, August 22-24, 1849,”
http://davidmhart.com/liberty/WarPeace/Books/Congress/index.html# (accessed August 12, 2017).
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Although Hugo’s concept of peace was visionary, his contemporaries viewed him as an idealist
and his vison of peace as dangerously utopian. The tension between the two concepts of peace
conceptualized by Hugo and the Congress of Vienna highlights the long struggle to define peace
and even more difficult, how to achieve it.
Prior to the twentieth-century, members of peace societies, groups, and organizations in
Europe and North America were commonly referred to as “peace advocates” or by other similar
terms. But in 1901, at the tenth Universal Peace Congress in Glasgow, the term “pacifism” was
coined to denote all “friends of peace.” Consequently, a “pacifist” was anyone who worked to
achieve or maintain peace, and actively opposed war as a solution to international problems. In
the period from the First World War (1914-1918) to present, the definition of “pacifist”
narrowed to represent those who unconditionally reject all forms of war and/or violence, and
refuse to participate in any violent conflict. Eager to claim the term “pacifist” for themselves,
conscientious objectors from the Great War acted as catalysts for this change in definition. With
the 1931 publication of A.C.F. Beales’ book, The History of Peace, the definition of pacifism
subscribed to by conscientious objectors became standardized and readily accepted in both
“scholarly and popular discourse.”4 Nevertheless, the term “pacifism” continues to be nebulous.
Historian Martin Ceadel created five war-and-peace theories to classify contemporary attitudes
to peace: militarism, crusading, defencism, pacific-ism, and pacifism. Most advocates of peace,
Ceadel argues, should be categorized under the term pacific-ism, rather than pacifism:
[Pacific-ism] holds that defencism is too pessimistic: war can be not only prevented but in
time also abolished by reforms which will bring justice in domestic politics too. … [I]ts
image of the international system is of a society, possessing norms and institutions
comparable to those of the domestic sphere. Pacific-ism rules out all aggressive wars and
even some defensive ones…but accepts the need for military force to defend its political
achievements against aggression.5

Yet because the word is “etymologically awkward,” many peace scholars have been reluctant to
embrace Ceadel’s “pacific-ism” classification. It is the diverse conceptions of peace and its
ambiguity that serves as a catalyst for this study.
My dissertation explores ideas of peace in Canada. In particular, it examines how
Canadians in the period from 1945 to 1963 defined and conceptualized peace in the aftermath of
4

David Cortright, Peace: A History of Movements and Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2008), 10.
5
Martin Ceadel, Thinking About Peace and War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 5.
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the Second World War and into the Cold War era. To understand conceptions of peace in the
postwar era, it is necessary to study how Canada and its peace movement defined the concept in
the first half of the twentieth century. Two studies are critical to understand how Canadians
conceptualized peace from 1900 to 1945: Thomas Socknat’s Witness Against War (1987) and
Victor Huard’s unpublished doctoral dissertation, “Armageddon Reconsidered” (1996). Both
authors argue that Canada’s first peace activists originated from the nation’s historic peace sects
– Quakers, Mennonites, Hutterites, Doukhobors, and Jehovah Witnesses. Strictly pacifist, these
religious groups “formed the backbone of pacifist dissent in Canadian society and would provide
the major resistance to compulsory military service in the course of the twentieth century.”6
These sectarian pacifists, however, made up only a minority of the Canadian peace movement.
Socknat and Huard both agree that most pre-Second World War peace activists framed
their activism within Canada’s dominant political ideology, what Ian McKay calls “the Liberal
Order Framework.”7 According to McKay, Canadian society at all levels is pervaded by the core
values of Victorian British liberalism: property, liberty, and equality. As Canada gradually
became a nation from the 1840s to the 1890s, McKay argues that liberalism and its main tenets
were so universally accepted, that “liberal assumptions [were] internalized and normalized
within the dominion’s subjects.”8 As a result, liberalism shaped Canada’s early peace movement.
Canadian peace activists embraced liberalism, and consequently, viewed the potential to make
Canada a better, more peaceful place. They believed that individuals had the ability to use
intellect and reason to transform society. Domestically, liberalism and peace became associated
with the social gospel and the progressive reform movement. Primarily a Protestant
phenomenon, the social gospel flourished in Canada from the 1890s to 1914. Social gospellers
hoped to build the Kingdom of God on earth through social justice and reform, and believed if
they actively pursued social change, they could create an ideal, Christian society. The social
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gospel’s “socio-religious” peaceful vision for Canada attracted many adherents, including the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU), who principally campaigned for the
prohibition of alcohol. Only then, the WTCU argued, would solutions to the problems of
unemployment, disease, and domestic abuse be realized, and a peaceful society established.
Canadian peace activists also believed that liberalism and its ideals were essential to
achieving peace globally. “Liberal internationalism” became Canada’s most widely accepted
form of peace activism from the late 1890s to 1945, embraced by much of civil society and to a
lesser extent the Canadian government.9 Prior to the First World War, the inherent relationship
between peace and liberal internationalism was best highlighted by a belief in arbitration to solve
the world’s problems. Groups such as the Canadian Peace and Arbitration Society, founded in
1905, argued that arbitration was the “rational solution” to domestic and international disputes.
Speaking at the Lake Mohonk Conference in 1909, future prime minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King (then Canada’s Minister of Labour), praised arbitration as the path to peace,
echoing those in the peace movement: “The greatest contribution to the cause of international
peace…will be the furtherance of industrial peace.”10 Advocates of arbitration were convinced
that their appeal to reason would prevail over ego and/or nationalism and thus, prevent conflict.
Arbitration was employed to settle over 200 disputes between states during the nineteenth
century.11 Unfortunately, the faith in arbitration and liberal internationalism to maintain peace
was shattered by rampant European nationalism and the outbreak of war in 1914. Over the next
9

For more on the relationship between peace and liberal internationalism in Canada from the period of
1900 to 1945, see: James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vols. 1 & 2 (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto
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four years peace became decidedly unpopular and unfashionable, as many Canadians abandoned
international cooperation in favour of “king and country.” There was, however, a small number
of religious conscientious objectors from Canada’s historic peace sects that condemned the
conflict and continued to espouse peace in the face of extreme militarism.12 Nevertheless,
between 1890 and 1914, it was the concept of liberal internationalism that primarily shaped
Canadian notions of peace, both nationally and internationally.
The same time period is critical to understanding how current peace scholars, peace studies
programs, and this study frame and define peace. According to Norwegian peace researcher
Johan Galtung, concepts of peace can be defined as either “negative” or “positive.” Galtung
argues that “negative” peace refers to the absence of war. Prior to the First World War, the
Canadian peace movement emphasized arbitration to avert war between nation-states and
ultimately, to preserve negative peace. In contrast, Galtung explains that “positive” peace entails
values and structures that both affirm and enhance people’s lives. According to peace scholar
David P. Barash, positive peace requires a complete rethinking of human relationships:
The pursuit of positive peace…leads to certain agreed principles, one of which is the
minimization of violence, not only the overt violence of war, but also what has been called
“structural violence,” a condition that is typically built into many social and cultural
institutions … Structural violence has the effect of denying people important rights such as
economic opportunity, social and political equality, a sense of fulfillment, and access to a
healthy natural environment.13

The Canadian social gospel and the reform movement epitomize the positive approach to peace.
In their respective pursuit of social change, gender equality, and other reforms, both movements
envisioned a peaceful society based on justice, tolerance, and abundance. And by recognizing
that violence stemmed first from society’s institutions and structures, and not from individuals,
each group attempted to “reveal the [primary] causes and effects of violence and the conditions
for peace.”14

12

For more on Canada’s conscientious objectors during the First World War, see: Amy J. Shaw, Crisis of
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14
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When the First World War ended in 1918, the conflict was labelled as the “war to end all
wars.” In the hopes that another war of its magnitude was never fought again, many people
believed that the international system required extensive reform. The European balance of
power, established at the Congress of Vienna, was denounced as one of the war’s main causes.
This did not, however, stop Britain or France from entrenching their spheres of influence within
the 1919 Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, politicians, citizens, and peace activists turned to
liberal internationalism to preserve (negative) peace, epitomized by the creation of the League of
Nations in January 1920. Initial League membership was open to all nations, except Germany.
The Soviet Union also did not join until 1934. Historian Martyn Housden notes that the League
Covenant focused largely on collective security to keep the peace and that articles 8 through 18
argued “the peaceful states of the world will combine their forces to counteract aggression
wherever it might occur.”15 The League obliged member-states to solve conflicts and disputes
through arbitration, disarmament, public treaties, and “severe sanctions.” Only as a last resort
would the League resort to armed force to discipline a hostile and bellicose fellow member. As
they had prior to the war, many peace activists adhered to the notion that states, including its
political leaders and citizens, were rational beings and would uphold international law to
preserve international peace.
Both Housden and historian Susan Pedersen, however, argue that the League was more
than an organization to “outlaw war,” but in addition, a concerted effort to establish positive
peace internationally. Housden writes that contemporaries often referred to the League as “the
organization of peace”16 due to its many humanitarian initiatives, from protecting minority rights
to managing the Armenian and other refugee crises in the postwar period. Similarly, Pedersen
notes that the League worked extensively to “set standards for…child welfare…set up research
stations to track epidemic diseases; and ran institutes and conferences to promote economic and
intellectual cooperation.”17 This “technical League,” committed to attaining positive peace, has
only recently been examined by historians, but flourished nonetheless throughout the interwar
period.

15

Housden, The League of Nations and the Organization of Peace, xviii.
Ibid., 4.
17
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University Press, 2015), 9.
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In 1921 the Canadian League of Nations Society (LNS) was formed. The LNS aimed to
educate Canadians about the League’s principles and work, to foster brotherhood among nations,
and ultimately, to maintain international peace. Initially the LNS failed to capture the country’s
imagination. By 1923 only 437 Canadians were paid members, but by 1928 a broad consensus of
support had formed in Canada for the League of Nations. At the end of the 1920s almost 14,000
Canadians belonged to the LNS and another 250,000 were affiliated corporate members.18
Historian Donald Page argues that the influence of the LNS was so great during the interwar
years that “in the process two generations of Canadians had absorbed something of the League’s
spirit and had learned more about international affairs from the Society’s efforts than from any
other source.”19 In Great Britain there was an even greater enthusiasm for the League of Nations
Union. With over one million members in 1933, the Union was one of Britain’s most important
interwar peace and pressure groups.20 According to historian Michael Howard, the League and
collective security were “regarded as a new ordering of international society, as a serious and
practicable alternative to the bad old ways of arms races and the balance of power.”21 Following
the First World War many nations believed international collaboration, in the guise of
intergovernmental organizations such as the League, would stimulate “transnational cooperation”
and consequently, establish a better, more peaceful world.
Although the war may have fundamentally changed preconceptions about peace, it did not
supplant most governments nationalist attitudes and feelings. Canada’s government was less than
keen on the League or collective security to keep the peace. Liberal Prime Minister Mackenzie
King worried that the dominion would be dragged into another European war and as a result,
Canada became increasingly isolationist in the 1920s and 1930s. King and other Canadian
politicians viewed the League commitment to collective security, in particular Article 10 of the
organization’s Covenant, as a burden: “The Members of the League undertake to respect and
18

Donald Page, “The Institute’s Popular Arm: The League of Nations Society in Canada,” International
Journal, Volume 33, No. 1 (1978): 43-49.
19
Page, “The Institute’s Popular Arm,” 65. The LNS, however, was only one of many Canadian
organizations to promote internationalist ideas in the interwar period. The Canadian Institute of
International Affairs (CIIA) was founded in 1928 and held regular conferences to discuss Canada’s role in
the burgeoning international community and as a member of the Commonwealth of Nations.
20
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84.
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preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political
independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression, the Council shall
advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”22 At the League of Nation’s
fourth general assembly, Canada’s representative, Sir Lomer Gouin, Minister of Justice,
proposed an amendment to Article 10:
It is in conformity with the spirit of Article 10 that, in the event of the Council considering it
to be its duty to recommend the application of military measures in consequence of an
aggression, or danger or threat of aggression, the Council shall be bound to take account,
more particularly, of the geographical situation and the special conditions of each state. It is
for the constitutional authorities of each Member to decide…in what degree the Member is
bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.23

The resolution failed to pass by a single vote, yet Canada was happy nonetheless. Because the
resolution was supported by the world’s great powers, both King and Gouin were confident that
in the future, Canada’s national interests would be prioritized over that of international concerns.
King’s approach to international affairs during the interwar years was at best cautious.
There was, however, one plank of the peace movement that the Canadian government supported:
disarmament. By the early 1930s, Huard notes that “proponents of disarmament were
ubiquitous”24 both inside and outside government circles. Disarmament was viewed as critical to
international peace and Canadian peace activists campaigned vigorously to reduce armaments
worldwide. The movement for disarmament was so popular in Canada that the International
Declaration of World Disarmament petition, circulated by the Canadian branch of the Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in 1930, was signed by over 500,000
nationally and another eight million people internationally.25 Postwar support for the LNS and
disarmament highlights the wide-ranging interests and activities of the Canadian peace
movement, in spite of the government’s lukewarm embrace of the League and other agents of
collective security.
22

James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression, Volume 1 (Toronto,
ON: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 7.
23
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24
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In the 1930s, Canada’s peace movement also began to incorporate ideas of socialism into
its activism. The political, social, and economic upheaval of the Great Depression left many
peace activists searching for avenues to create a just society based on positive peace. Groups
such as the WILPF embraced a re-invigorated social gospel movement, attracted to its vision of
social change and reform. The WILPF fought for gender equality and the elimination of
militarism in education, in addition to its support for the League and disarmament. Other peace
organizations such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), founded in 1930, were built on
the social gospel’s socio-religious foundations. Concurrently, more radical peace activists
rejected capitalism as the economic basis of Canadian and western society, and demanded an
equitable redistribution of wealth to the men, women, and children affected by the Great
Depression. These ideas directly challenged Canada’s “liberal order framework,” but were
accepted, to a degree, by a population weary of the Depression’s crippling effects, including
mass unemployment and a lack of adequate food, clothing, and housing.
The liberal internationalist concept of peace soon crumbled in the face of fascist
aggression. Beginning with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, a series of events
rocked the Canadian peace movement, bringing both the movement and its commitment to
liberal internationalism into disrepute. In 1934 the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments in Geneva collapsed because neither France nor Germany could agree on an
acceptable level of armaments that the other nation could possess. In 1935, Italy invaded
Abyssinia. This conflict marked the League’s first and only “full-scale collective security
action.”26 Despite Abyssinia’s repeated appeals to the international community, the League of
Nations refused to punish Italian aggression with more than economic sanctions. These
sanctions, however, were soon abandoned because countries such as Britain and Canada refused
to enforce them, and further, recognized Italy’s sovereignty over Abyssinia.27 Similarly, when
26

Housden, The League of Nations and Organization of Peace, 106.
According to historian Francine McKenzie, Canada played an important role in the Abyssinian-Italian
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27
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Nazi Germany remilitarized the Rhineland in 1936, the League failed to act. By 1938 the belief
that liberal internationalism, and in particular collective security, could achieve peace rang
hollow. Historian Thomas Socknat notes that several Canadian pacifist groups, including the
Canadian League for Peace and Democracy, abandoned its policies of non-violence and
international neutrality.28 Although the interwar peace movement had been popular and wide
ranging, most Canadian peace activists left the movement and argued for re-armament to combat
Europe’s fascist states. Those activists who did remain were further disillusioned by the failure
of Neville Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement to preserve peace. Many Canadians, including
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, were eager for security and publicly supported appeasement
and Chamberlain. Yet, as with the First World War, the peace movement’s belief in rational
thought, reason, and liberal internationalism had failed. Nazi Germany invaded Poland in
September 1939, precipitating the start of the Second World War.
From 1939 to 1945, Canada’s peace movement was again dominated by a small, select
group of sectarian pacifists. The majority of Canada’s 12,000 conscientious objectors during the
Second World War came from the country’s historic peace churches.29 Unlike the previous war,
Canadian conscientious objectors were given the option to perform alternative service. Work
camps were set up across Canada and conscientious objectors were paid fifty cents per day, plus
food and medical care. Men worked as loggers, miners, and farmers, while others were engaged
in building roads. Some men even joined non-combatant units overseas, such as the Royal
Canadian Army Medical Corps and the Canadian Dental Corps. Conscientious objectors were
treated fairly well by the government, but were still considered shirkers and cowards by the
majority of Canadians. The peace movement, largely ridiculed and derided by the country’s
citizens, was a small and splintered group by wars’ end. Ultimately, the dismissal of peace
activists during both the First and Second World War reveals a pattern that would continue in all
future conflicts, be they “hot” or “cold” – Canadians prioritized national interests over
international affairs in times of war and those who did not were labelled subversive.
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There is no major scholarly account of Canada’s post-Second World War peace
movement. Nevertheless, when Canadians think about peace and the Cold War, one name
immediately comes to mind: Lester B. Pearson. Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1957,
Pearson became Canada’s first and only recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. Pearson was
awarded the prize for the role he played during the Suez Crisis of 1956, in which Great Britain,
France, and Israel invaded Egypt over that country’s nationalization of the Suez Canal. He was
instrumental in creating the first armed peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency
Force (UNEF), that intervened in the conflict and helped preserve “peace” in the region. The
popular association of peacekeeping with Canadian foreign policy led it to become a
foundational plank in the construction of a dominant Canadian identity.
The common historical associations of Pearson, peacekeeping, and the Cold War paints
an incomplete picture of how Canadians defined peace from 1945 to 1963. In the immediate
postwar and early Cold War eras, Canadian conceptions of peace were characterized, again, by
the nation’s devotion to liberal internationalism – and that became known as Pearsonian
Liberalism. In addition to peacekeeping, Pearsonian Liberalism is characterized by its support for
multilateralism and international organizations, particularly the UN. In 1945, as in 1919, the
Second World War led to the belief that the previous international system was flawed and
needed to be replaced by an institution devoted to a rational, “higher internationalism.”30
Canada’s Department of External Affairs, however, viewed the UN in functionalist terms.
Pearson saw the organization as a “possible arbiter of peace”31 that could help achieve Canada’s
international goals through the promotion of multilateral cooperation, trade, and humanitarian
aid. Despite the cautious idealism displayed by Canada’s political elite, historian Adam
Chapnick argues that the end of the San Francisco Conference “marked the beginning of the
memorialization of a new Canadian identity in world affairs.”32 Canadian citizens in the
immediate postwar years generally regarded the United Nations as one of the best hopes for
peace. By late 1945 most Canadian newspapers extolled its virtues: “No true security from war
30
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need to be sought or expected elsewhere; that all the nation’s energies should be placed behind
the only instrument of collective security now available, however imperfect or embryonic it may
be.”33 And in 1947, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) instructed its UN
correspondent, King Gordon, to make daily reports from New York in support of the fledgling
organization. Canadians had a “visceral attachment” to multilateralism and the UN that became
critical to their national and international character.
The emphasis on maintaining peace during the Cold War via the UN, and in particular,
through the organization’s commitment to co-operation, arbitration, and international law,
provided credence to the myth of Canada as a “peaceable kingdom.” Over the last fifty years, the
term “peaceable kingdom” has become a metaphor for Canadian self-identification. Dubbed by
Canadian literary critic and theorist Northrop Frye in 1965, the “peaceable kingdom” initially
referred to a style of American pictorial art. It was soon, however, employed by historian
William Kilbourn in his edited anthology on Canadian identity, Canada: A Guide to the
Peaceable Kingdom (1970). Cultural critics and historians have since used the term to describe
the historical perception of Canada’s purportedly non-violent path to nationhood, built on
compromise and conciliation, rather than revolution and war. This interpretation has persisted
despite Canada’s involvement in the Riel Rebellions, the Boer War, the Two World Wars, and
the Korean War. Pearson’s Nobel Peace Prize, in addition to Canada’s consistent presence in
peacekeeping missions during the second half of the twentieth-century, as well as the country’s
affinity for the UN, has served to strengthen this self-identification. The association has become
so entrenched that Ian McKay and Jamie Swift contend that many Canadians today believe the
country to be a beacon of peaceful principles such as “multiculturalism, global peacekeeping and
global citizenship, regionalism, commitment to a strong social safety net, and a consensual,
collaborative, community-oriented approach to shared problems.”34
Most Canadians, however, have conveniently forgotten or overlooked the political and
social realities of the Cold War. Pearson and his peers were not “magnanimous internationalists.”
Rather, Pearsonian Liberalism and the Canadian conception of peace during the Cold War were
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pragmatic and consequently, upheld the domestic and international status quo.35 Historian
Michael K. Carroll argues that peacekeeping did not become a focus of Canadian foreign policy
until the 1964 White Paper on Defence.36 Instead, prior to its publication, Canadian liberal
internationalism was characterized by collective security. In the immediate postwar years there
was hope in Canadian political circles that the UN and the concept of collective security would
create a new, stable international peace. In contrast to the League of Nations where small states
were equal to the world’s great powers, in the UN, five nations hold the key to the success or
failure of collective security. The United States of America, Soviet Union, Great Britain, France,
and China comprised the five permanent members of the UN’s Security Council, and all
possessed the right to veto any resolution put before the Council. This right of veto, however, has
proved to be problematic. After the war suspicion emerged and developed between the western
capitalist powers - U.S. Britain, and France - and the eastern communist Soviet Union. Between
1945 and 1955 the veto was used a total of seventy-eight times in the UN Security Council,
seventy-five times by the Soviet Union alone, who felt that the United Nations had a western,
liberal bias.37 Despite the Canadian government’s strong desire to see the UN succeed, it quickly
realized that the organization’s collective security function could not overcome the ideological
differences of its members, and more importantly, reach unanimity on issues of security and/or
peace. Canadian politicians believed that political necessity dictated Canada and its allies search
for a new form of collective security, separate from the UN.
Victor Huard argues that Western policy makers learned one vital lesson from the Second
World War: appeasement did not work and that in the future any aggressive nation must be
stopped by force. Leading politicians from the U.S., Britain, and Canada, with the benefit of
hindsight, criticized the League’s pre-war notion of collective security as weak and reliant on
sanctions to deter military aggression. They argued that any future system of collective security
must include the “coercive force to impose, not simply maintain, the peace.”38 As a result, the
35
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Canadian, liberal internationalist conception of peace during the Cold War was highly
militaristic and epitomized by membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Founded on April 4, 1949, NATO was a Western, regional military alliance committed to the
collective security of its members and to preserving a “negative” definition of peace, and if
necessary, by force. In particular, NATO was created to combat a Soviet attack.
International peace, rather ironically, was at the centre of the Cold War. The UN was
created to build a better world and to ensure a better future. Its specialized agencies were formed
to defeat hunger, to provide safe and fair labour conditions, to promote cultural understanding
between nations, and to contain the spread of communicable diseases. But according to
American President Harry Truman, NATO was central to the West’s “new set of policies to
attain peace:”39 namely, the dominance of democracy, freedom, and the capitalist economic
system. In particular the organization attempted to achieve its goals through a massive
demonstration of strength. Louis St. Laurent, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs,
and Pearson, his Under-Secretary, played an integral role in the creation of NATO and this new,
militarized conception of collective security. On January 13, 1947, St. Laurent delivered the
University of Toronto Grey Lecture. St. Laurent’s address, “The Foundations of Canadian Policy
in World Affairs,” delineated the strategic importance of Canada abandoning its interwar
isolationism: “If there is one conclusion that our common experience has led us to accept, it is
security for this country lies in the development of a firm structure of international
organization.”40 Less than one month later, St. Laurent argued that NATO was critical to
Canadian peace and security: “The signing of [NATO] would place such a preponderance of
strength on the side of peace that it was highly unlikely that any aggressor, including Russia,
would try to make war after the signing.”41 Despite the clear and unmistakeable militaristic bent
to St. Laurent’s speeches, Pearson publically claimed that NATO was an “organizing force for
peace,”42 echoing President Truman’s characterization of the organization. Pearson was the
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author of Article 2 of the NATO treaty, also known as the “Canadian Article,” which encouraged
cultural, social, and economic collaboration among the organization’s members. The inclusion of
Article 2 in the final treaty, however, was largely an American sop to Canada. The Canadian
delegation, including Hume Wrong (Canadian ambassador to the U.S.), were well aware that its
fellow members viewed NATO, first and foremost, as a military alliance: “We are…the only
party…that really favours the inclusion of anything in the treaty about social and economic
collaboration outside a general reference in the preamble.”43 Yet, Pearson, Wrong, and other
Canadian representatives only lobbied for Article 2 because they believed it would appeal to the
Canadian public. They need not have worried. Only two members of parliament opposed
Canadian participation in NATO, while citizens almost wholly supported the military alliance
and its aggressive stance towards the Soviet Union and communism.
In spite of Pearson’s assurances, NATO’s muscular form of collective security was
partisan and threatened the peace it claimed to preserve. NATO exemplified the postwar, liberal
internationalist belief that peace equalled military superiority. The organization also highlighted
the longstanding notion that peace was linked entirely to the protection and maintenance of the
nation-state. NATO and its members spent billions of dollars building nuclear bombs and
equipping their militaries with these new, destructive weapons. Although Canada, initially, was a
non-nuclear nation, it contributed to Western “peace” by selling the U.S. and Britain uranium to
make nuclear weapons.44 This stockpiling of arms was meant, as St. Laurent’s speech indicated,
to deter Canada’s and the West’s enemies from attacking. But the West’s superiority of nuclear
arms exacerbated tension with communist nations and antagonized the Soviet Union in
particular. Pearson, however, maintained that Canada was not to blame for the increased
international hostility NATO, collective security, and the nuclear deterrent thus created: “We are
respected…because we try to play a constructive and conciliatory role in international affairs.
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We have no particular axe to grind; no selfish or destructive national purpose to serve.”45
Moreover, Pearson was a staunch defender of Western democratic and capitalist values, and
argued that it was the evil machinations of the Soviet Union that were responsible for the
creation of NATO and the West’s new conception of peace: “The North Atlantic Treaty was
born out of fear of the aggressive and subversive policies of Communism and the effect of the
policies on our peace and security and well-being; out of frustration over the obstinate
obstruction by Communist states of our security system.”46
Pearson’s anti-communism and support for NATO’s negative peace were not unique. All
major political parties in Canada – the Liberal Party, the Progressive Conservatives (PC), Social
Credit, and even Co-Operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) – officially championed the
Cold War’s liberal internationalist conception of peace, and thus, supported collective security
and the government’s preparation for a possible war with the Soviet Union. It is not surprising
that the Conservatives echoed the government policy. Party leader George A. Drew was
fervently anti-communist: “Communism is no political doctrine, but organized treachery.”47
More surprising was the CCF’s acquiescence. Since the party’s inception in 1933, leading CCF
politicians such as J.S. Woodsworth, a product of the social gospel movement, espoused pacifist
views. In 1939, for example, Woodsworth was the only member of parliament to object to
Canada’s declaration of war against Nazi Germany. Despite this anti-war tradition, the CCF’s
postwar leader, James Coldwell, expelled party members who opposed the creation of NATO
and also supported other Cold War policies. Coldwell had belonged to the pre-Second World
War Canadian peace movement, but had left, along with many others, because he felt that the
fascist threat posed by Hitler, Mussolini, and Franco had to be met with force. After 1945
Coldwell was not willing to appease the Soviet Union, as the West had appeased Germany in the
late 1930s.
But what motivated Canada and the West to espouse a militarized concept of collective
security during the Cold War? And why were Canadians happy to support this negative
45
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definition of peace? Tired of the instability created by the Great Depression and six years of war,
Canadians were hopeful that the postwar period would be both stable and harmonious. In the late
1940s, however, Canadians, including the country’s government, press, and other major
institutions, became increasingly worried about Soviet and communist ideological infiltration at
home and military aggression abroad. In July 1946, a spy scandal stunned Ottawa, the nation’s
capital. Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk in the Soviet Embassy defected to Canada with evidence
of two Soviet spy-rings operating nationwide. Furthermore, beginning in 1947 the Soviet Union
occupied, then annexed several Eastern European countries, including Romania and
Czechoslovakia. From June 1948 to May 1949, the Soviet Union triggered the Berlin Blockade,
blocking the flow of supplies and resources to West Berlin. These events frightened Canadians
and turned public opinion decidedly against the Soviet Union. In a speech to the Canadian
International Trade Fair, soon to be prime minister, Louis St. Laurent substantiated the fears of
the average citizen: “We are agreed, to begin with, that totalitarian communist aggression
constitutes a direct and immediate threat to every democratic country, including Canada. It
endangers our freedom and our peace.”48 Pearson similarly stoked the country’s fears during the
government’s 1949 Speech from the Throne: “There is no doubt that fear has gripped the world
again, fear arising primarily out of the extension of the brutal domination of revolutionary
communism, based on the massive and expanding militarism of totalitarian Russia.”49 But as
Pearson noted in his speech, Canadians were not alone in their ever-increasing fear of the Soviet
Union and its communist ideology.
In the few short years following the Second World War, the Soviet Union became the
avowed enemy of the West. Consequently, the Western, and by extension Canadian, conception
of peace focused on containing the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Canadians and
other Western nations, as a result, came to view the Cold War world in simplistic black-andwhite terms, including its division into two camps: The West, led by the United States, was
primarily democratic, inherently peaceful, and steadfastly anti-communist. The East, led by the
Soviet Union, was communist, totalitarian, and intrinsically militaristic. Society was conceived
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as a series of strict binary categories: capitalism/communism, democracy/dictatorship,
patriotism/subversion. Canada’s government and most Canadians were firmly committed to the
Western camp, and the word “security” became the “watchword of the postwar era.”50 In this
environment of increasing fear, that painted the people and nations as simply good or evil,
NATO was cast as the guarantor of a peaceful future. And Canada’s devotion to collective
security and a militarized, negative conception of peace was justified by government, media, and
citizen alike.
There was one exception to the Canadian government’s commitment to NATO and the
nuclear deterrent during the Cold War. In 1957 John G. Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservative
party was elected to office, ending twenty-two years of Liberal Party rule. Initially upon
becoming prime minister, Diefenbaker agreed to purchase nuclear weapons systems from the
United States for Canada’s armed forces in NATO and the North American Air Defense
Command (NORAD), established in August 1957. These weapons systems included, among
others, Honest John rocket launchers and two Bomarc-B anti-aircraft missile bases to be located
in North Bay, Ontario, and La Macaza, Quebec. Yet both the Honest John and Bomarc-B
systems remained inoperable unless fitted with nuclear warheads. Diefenbaker, in spite of the
military agreement with the United States, was wary of ceding Canadian sovereignty to the U.S.
Moreover, his Secretary of State for External Affairs, Howard Green (1959-1963), and Green’s
Under-Secretary, Norman Robertson, believed it was hypocritical to accept nuclear weapons,
while at the same time arguing for arms control and disarmament in the UN. Ultimately,
Diefenbaker reneged on the agreement to purchase American-made nuclear weapons and as a
result, revoked Canada’s military commitments to NATO and NORAD. In doing so,
Diefenbaker not only advocated a less militaristic, liberal internationalist concept of peace than
did his Liberal predecessors, but contested the West’s Cold War peace policies. His decision was
widely unpopular with most Canadians, including the political establishment. In her political
memoir, Memoirs of a Bird in a Gilded Cage (1968), Judy LaMarsh, former Minister of Health
and National Welfare, spoke for many Cold War Liberals when she criticized Diefenbaker’s
nuclear policy:
This immediate, soul-chilling, and irreversible threat [of the Cuban missile crisis] to Canada
found Howard Green and the Diefenbaker administration cowering and hesitating without
50
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response to the common danger and their commitments to North American defence. … My
sympathies are and were with the Americans who could not understand our apparent change
of heart in continental defence.51

Even within his own party, Diefenbaker was harshly criticized by his Minister of Defence,
Douglas Harkness, who supported the nuclear deterrent employed by NATO and the West to
deter the Soviet Union and maintain peace.
In 1963, however, Canada reconfirmed its NATO obligations, its belief in collective
security, and its support for the Western liberal internationalist conception of peace. On August
16, 1963, new Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson reversed Diefenbaker’s decision and
accepted American nuclear warheads for the country’s weapon systems in Canada and its armed
forces in Europe. As the Official Opposition in Canada’s House of Commons, Pearson and the
Liberal Party had passionately supported Canada’s negative, militarized definition of peace, but
consistently resisted nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. This position changed on January 12,
1963, when Pearson, campaigning for the upcoming federal election, made a speech, “The Only
Honourable Course,” to the York-Scarborough Liberal Association. Pearson indicated that if
elected to office, he and the Liberal Party would accept nuclear weapons for the country’s
Bomarc-B missiles. He argued that Canada “should end at once its evasion of responsibility by
discharging the commitments it has already accepted,” and that the “Canadian government
should also support any move for genuine collective control of all NATO tactical nuclear
weapons – a genuine nuclear deterrent.”52 Three weeks later a Globe and Mail editorial echoed
the message outlined in Pearson’s speech: “We cannot have it both ways. We cannot be in
NATO and not of it. We cannot accept the advantages of collective security without carrying our
share of the burden.”53 Once elected the Liberal Party, with few exceptions, remained
unwaveringly committed to the Cold War’s negative conception of peace that rested on
collective security and the nuclear deterrent.
Canada’s Cold War, liberal internationalist definition of peace and its focus on security,
not only manifested itself abroad, but at home as well. Although he writes in regard to the First
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World War, historian William Mulligan’s notion that “peace had a double meaning, of domestic
calm and social stability,”54 was true of the Cold War as well. Canada in the postwar era has
been described as a conservative society, one of “cultural quiescence, social conformity, and
political consensus.”55 As Ian McKay explains, the Canadian liberal order framework is a
“hegemonic project.” To question the framework’s core liberal principles, such as NATO or
collective security, McKay argues, is to question a “vast network of assumptions, institutions,
and values.”56 To safeguard Canada and its liberal traditions from communist infiltration, the
government and other institutions employed what historian Elaine Tyler May terms, “domestic
containment” or “domestic anticommunism.” In order to create a stable and secure society, and
to prevent communism from “spreading [its] poisonous influence through the body politic,”57 the
government emphasized the nuclear family as the foundation of Canadian society, built upon
socially constructed, normative gender roles. So-called “normal” women were expected to stay at
home, to be dutiful, dependent wives and mothers. Conversely, the normative masculine role in
the Cold War was the corporate, suburban breadwinner, who was characterized by his ability to
think rationally, his technical expertise, and his stoicism. A hyper-vigilant masculinity was also
constructed, designed to protect postwar society threatened by communism: the “Cold Warrior.”
If Canadians challenged these dominant gender roles, they were labelled subversive. To be
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subversive in Cold War Canada was to be communist and to be communist was to be a threat to
Canada’s national security
In fear of being labelled subversive, many Canadians exhibited unflinching deference to
government authority and accepted the status quo, ideologically and militarily, including the
government’s postwar characterization of peace and the peace movement as communist. One of
the great ironies is that the word “peace” became explicitly linked in the West with communism
during the Cold War. In the immediate postwar years, the Soviet Union, in an attempt to sway
international public opinion, began to characterize its foreign policy and way of life under
communist rule as innately peaceful. The Soviet Union sponsored and championed the world’s
largest peace group, the World Council of Peace, whose executive was comprised of dedicated
communists and/or communist sympathizers, such as its French President, Frederic Joliot-Curie.
As historian Lawrence Wittner notes the Soviets believed “a Communist-led peace
campaign…would bolster the popularity of Communist governments.”58
The Soviet Union’s Cold War peace policies, however, were not simply a public relations
campaign, but a direct response to the West’s militarized conception of peace, and in particular,
its creation of NATO. In the late 1940s and early 1950s the West had a military advantage in
regard to the number of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. The American consul in Hamilton,
Ontario, argued that the creation of international, communist-sponsored peace organizations was
a Moscow-backed plot to stifle Western re-armament, giving the Soviet Union time to rectify the
imbalance in nuclear weapons between East and West.59 Indeed, the Soviet Union hoped to
publically portray the West’s arms build-up as hostile and war-like, while building their own
nuclear stockpiles and consequently, adopting an almost identical, militarized conception of
peace to its avowed enemies. Consequently, in a heightened atmosphere of social, moral, and
political regulation, and amidst Western fears of communist aggression and infiltration, the word
“peace” became a highly politicized and polarizing term. During a special CBC broadcast,
Reverend W. Gordon MacLean summarized the negative, sinister connotations that the word
conjured in the minds of many Canadians: “There is a dangerous silence creeping around the
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world … It would appear the forbidden word to-day is the word ‘Peace.’”60 Any Canadian who
questioned the government’s negative, militarized conception of peace, or espoused an opposing
vision to NATO – including the individuals examined in this study – were labelled “fellow
travellers” or communist “dupes.” Canadian peace groups, like the Canadian Peace Congress
(CPC), founded in 1948, were accused of being communist fronts, subversive, and unpatriotic.
Because the Canadian peace movement challenged the West’s accepted definition of
peace, the government labelled the movement as an “enemy” of the state: a threat to Canada’s
secure and prosperous postwar society. Peace organizations, as a result, were covertly surveilled
by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Publically the Canadian government also did
much to discredit the peace movement, often identifying activists as “naïve,” “cowards,” and
“traitors.” In surveiling and negatively branding the peace movement, the Canadian state
highlighted its belief that peace activists failed to fit the country’s definition of a “liberal
individual,” and thus, were just in excluding them from the rights enjoyed by other Canadians. A
good example is the postwar persecution of Queen’s University professor, Glen Shortliffe. From
1948 to 1949, Shortliffe delivered a series of radio broadcasts for the CBC, in which he argued
that only co-operation and reconciliation between the West and Soviet Union could lead to
peace: “I think that peace depends upon our cultivating a different attitude toward our neighbour,
the Soviet Union … We have everything on our side – strength, the atom bomb, naval bases all
over the world, great material abundance at home. It seems to me that the first move toward a
reconciliation of the present threat to peace should properly come from us.”61 Shortliffe’s
comments did not sit well with the university’s administration and faculty who supported the
government’s liberal internationalist concept of peace. Principal R.W. Wallace chastised and
censored Shortliffe for his broadcasts critical of the government’s peace initiatives, embarrassed
by the deluge of complaints the university had received. Over time Shortliffe was marginalized
within his department and faculty. Moreover, he was investigated by the RCMP and was
forbidden to enter the U.S. to present work at academic conferences. Shortliffe’s case reveals
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how the government actively shaped public opinion in regard to who and/or what was
communist in Cold War Canada.
The Canadian government, however, was assisted in its construction and repression of
supposed Canadian communists by other elements of society. By 1947 both St. Laurent and
Pearson understood the importance of forming strong relationships with Canada’s press corps,
who they believed were instrumental in moulding public opinion in support of the government’s
Cold War policies. A 1951 internal memo from Canada’s Department of External Affairs reveals
the central role the press and media played in consolidating the government’s Cold War
definition of peace and other government attitudes: “Although the presence of newspapermen
may sometimes appear to create problems … it will often be in the Department’s interest to assist
the press so as to ensure an appreciation of the Canadian viewpoint.”62 The government and
media were so successful in shaping Canadian opinions that historian Robert Bothwell writes
that Cold War Canada was characterized by a pro-NATO, anti-Soviet unanimity: “Canadian
society tolerated certain kinds, even unpleasant kinds, of anti-communism because that society
was, with unusual unanimity, anti-Communist. The early 1950s witnessed a consensus among
Canadians.”63 Most Canadians undoubtedly shared the government’s conviction that the Soviet
Union and communism were a threat to Canada at home and abroad. Consequently, Canadians
were faithful, partisan members of the Cold War’s Western camp, committed to NATO and
collective security. Yet contrary to Bothwell’s claim, there were some Canadians who found the
government’s negative definition of peace unsatisfactory.
Most Canadians in the postwar era praised the country’s membership in NATO and its
consequent military obligations. There were, however, a select few who actively critiqued the
West’s militarized, liberal internationalist concept of peace and its commitment to the use of
force. Canada’s small and fractured peace movement argued that the creation of NATO marked a
“clear return to the balance of power:”64 an international system championed by the statesmen at
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and that had led to both the First and Second World Wars.
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Individual activists and postwar peace groups, including the Canadian branches of the
Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
“rejected the idea that military power was necessary to defend national interests and maintain
world peace.”65 Instead, these groups and individuals envisioned peace as a way of life – positive
peace – and not something to be maintained by fear through the nuclear deterrent and NATO.
Peace was not simply the absence of war, they argued, but required the minimization and
removal of “structural violence” that denied people economic, racial, and gender equality. These
individuals, who comprised the Canadian postwar/Cold War peace movement, imagined a
peaceful society based on social justice that not only tolerated difference but celebrated it.
To achieve their goal of positive peace, Canadian peace activists adopted an
internationalist approach to peace in the postwar world. Yet, their conception of internationalism
differed significantly from that of the state. Canadian politicians such as Lester Pearson took a
pragmatic, particularistic approach to internationalism. Politics dictated Canada’s membership in
NATO, its devotion to a militarized collective security, and ultimately, shaped its Cold War
concept of peace. In contrast, Canadian peace activists adopted a universalistic approach to
peace; they believed in the “higher internationalism” and the “idea of one world”66 represented
by the UN and other international organizations. All nations, activists argued, should co-operate
with one another to achieve peace, not just those who espoused similar political ideologies. Like
the early 1930s, the Canadian peace movement merged the ideas of internationalism and
socialism into their activism. In fact, social justice was central to the peace movement’s
commitment to positive peace. Activists were devoted to a society based on values such as
universal brotherhood, human rights, and education, rather than war and militarization.
Motivated by the Second World War, the Canadian peace movement focused its postwar
activism on removing the root causes of conflict and in creating a new social order. To ensure a
peaceful, reformed society, activists advocated the promotion and protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms, such as religious tolerance, racial equality, and the right to health care.
Radically, the peace movement argued that the state should play an expanded role in providing
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its citizens with the necessary tools and resources to lead improved lives. Whereas prior to the
Second World War, the liberal order framework prioritized individual agency, many Canadians
in the postwar period demanded that the government and state take on a paternal role and provide
citizens with universal benefits such as Unemployment Insurance, adopted by the Canadian
government in 1940.
From 1945 to 1948, peace in Canada was pursued primarily by individuals who
envisioned a better world. Multiple visions of positive peace, as a result, were conceived and
propagated during this time. Often Canadian activists sought to achieve their visions through
international organizations, but in particular the UN’s specialized agencies. Doctor and activist
Brock Chisholm, for example, hoped to use his expertise and medical training to attain peace
through the World Health Organization (WHO). Concurrently, Canadian peace groups and
organizations struggled to regain their strength and popularity in the immediate postwar years.
The Canadian branches of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and the
Fellowship of Reconciliation survived the Second World War, but failed to attract members
because they were both associated with the pre-war peace movement, and more specifically, with
the disgraced and reviled concept of appeasement. But individual activists were also soon
reviled. As the tension and fear that characterized the Cold War increased, the word “peace”
became politicized and peace activists, despite their positive intentions, were discredited. Victor
Huard argues that it was the peace movement’s focus on positive peace, in addition to an
unrealistic idealism and consequent naivety, that were to blame for the Cold War depiction of
peace as communist:
The leaders of [Canada’s postwar peace movement] …seemed not to recognize, or
acknowledge, that Soviet diplomatic clumsiness and intransigence often bordered sabotage,
particularly in the United Nations. And it was their continued faith in the efficacy of an
effective collective security function for the United Nations…long after others had realized
that the organization had no chance to serve such a function, which epitomized these groups’
failure to adjust to the new [cold war] realities.67

Most peace activists, however, were neither communist nor communist sympathizers, but were
falsely accused as such. Painted with the brush of communism, the movement and individual
peace activists lacked credibility.
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James G. Endicott, leader of the Canadian Peace Congress, best exemplifies the Canadian
Cold War narrative that equated peace with communism. The CPC’s founding coincided with the
beginning of a small international nuclear disarmament movement. But from 1948 to 1972,
Endicott, the face of Canada’s popular peace movement was regularly labelled a communist
“dupe” and persecuted for his activism and political beliefs. Organizational meetings were often
interrupted by hecklers and government-sponsored thugs, while his home was routinely
vandalized with rotten eggs and even fire-bombed. Members of the CPC were also attacked. In
1950, Endicott and the CPC endorsed the Stockholm Appeal, an international petition for nuclear
disarmament. Created by the World Peace Council, a Soviet-backed peace organization, the
Appeal was viewed in Canada as Soviet propaganda. As a result, CPC canvassers like Sam
Michnick were often subject to police intimidation. On August 26, 1950, Michnick was arrested
by Toronto police and brought to a local police station. Once detained, Michnick’s copies of the
Stockholm Appeal were confiscated and he was physically assaulted: “The two [police]men
simultaneously hit me many times in the face, on the forehead, on the top of my head, on the
sides of my head. … I tried to defend myself … My sweater was half ripped off me. My shirt
torn open. My pants half off. … Then one of the men said they ought to line people like me up
against the wall and shoot them.”68 Michnick, like most peace activists was not communist, and
only desired cooperation and goodwill between West and East. In response to the perceived
Soviet monopolization of the peace movement, peace activists throughout the Cold War tried, in
vain, to reclaim ownership of the Canadian peace movement:
Canadians have allowed the movement for peace to be exclusively identified with
Communism, and we must redeem the peace campaign from the Reds by fashioning one of
our own. … The word “peace” should no longer remain a virtual monopoly of people
regarded, rightly or wrongly, as Stalin-stooges. … If we forfeit the privilege and duty of
fighting against war-hysteria because the Reds have got there first, flaming cities and
mountains of dead will be the price of our indifference.69

Activists, however, failed to change public opinion. In fact, historians Reg Whitaker and Gary
Marcuse note that by the early 1950s the Canadian peace movement, like its British and
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American counterparts, reached its lowest ebb of popularity in the second-half of the twentieth
century.70
By the end of the decade, peace slowly became more acceptable in Canadian society. The
growing support for peace in Canada was mirrored worldwide. This trend in the late 1950s was
the result of increased nuclear weapons testing by the United States, Soviet Union, and Great
Britain. Subsequently, a greater awareness emerged of the devastating effects of radiation fallout.
Scientists conducting tests on victims in Hiroshima and Nagasaki concluded that survivors were
at a higher risk for contracting cancer and noted that they gave birth to children with multiple
defects. In response to the dangers posed by radioactive fallout, a large number of popular peace
groups emerged at this time to fight for complete nuclear disarmament. This marked the start of
the second wave of nuclear disarmament in the Western world: a significant change from the
previous five years when disarmament fell out of favour. In 1957 both the National Committee
for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in the United States and the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (CND) in the United Kingdom were founded. That same year in Canada, with the
assistance of Cyrus Eaton, a wealthy businessman, the first annual scientific Pugwash
Conference was held on nuclear disarmament. Other Canadian nuclear disarmament groups
founded at this time include the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards
(CCCRH) in 1958, later known as the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND);
the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) in 1959; both the
Toronto Committee for Disarmament (TCD) and the Voice of Women (VOW) in 1960; and the
Canadian Peace Research Institute (CPRI) in 1961. From 1957 to 1963 nuclear disarmament
dominated the peace agenda, although the Canadian peace movement’s activism continued to
blend ideas of internationalism and social justice, and to pursue positive peace.
Prominent Canadian intellectuals, including Claude Bissell, president of the University of
Toronto, and Pierre Elliot Trudeau, endorsed many of Canada’s newly formed nuclear
disarmament groups. Comprised primarily of white, middle-class, and university educated
individuals, these new peace organizations strove to appear respectable and were in constant fear
of being labelled “communist.” Many Canadians, however, continued to reject the peace
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movement’s mantra that “disarmament is not a dirty word; it is a dire necessity.”71 Public support
for co-operation and co-existence between the West and the Soviet Union, as nuclear
disarmament entailed, was deemed unpatriotic and treasonous. By the 1960s, the peace
movement had become increasingly radical, which did not help its public perception. Canadian
society witnessed its first wave of mass anti-nuclear protests. Although not intentional, Canada’s
nuclear disarmament groups mirrored the CPC’s activism of the 1940s-1950s, dedicated to an
active pursuit of positive peace through non-violent, direct action, including demonstrations,
boycotts, petitions, literature, and civil disobedience. This surge of activism by “nuclear
pacifists” included many women, who challenged the conventional and dominant gender roles of
the Cold War, and as a result, embraced both a public and political identity for the first time in
their lives.
By 1963, however, the prolonged international campaign for nuclear disarmament
slowed. The intensification of the Vietnam War now commanded the attention of the popular
peace movement. Nevertheless, many Canadian peace activists continued to protest the
manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons, the result of Canada’s decision in August 1963 to
accept nuclear warheads for its national weapons systems and armed forces abroad. The choice
to become a nuclear country highlighted the government and the country’s Cold War preference
for a militarized, liberal internationalist conception of peace. But it also highlighted the struggle
of the Canadian peace movement from 1945 to 1963, whose commitment to a positive peace,
illustrated by its devotion to internationalism, social justice, and reform, was rejected by most
citizens as unpatriotic and decidedly un-Canadian.
In 1904 English novelist Thomas Hardy wrote: “War makes rattling good history; but Peace is
poor reading.”72 Canadian General E.L.M. “Tommy” Burns corroborated Hardy’s claim sixty
years later in the foreword to the Israeli edition of his book, Between Arab and Israeli (1963):
“Other critics have found the writing of the book dull. I do not contest that. … Efforts for peace
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do not make as stirring reading as the chronicles of wars.”73 Nevertheless, Canadian historians
have written extensively about the country’s liberal internationalist foreign policy during the
Cold War that privileged negative peace. The Canadian historiography is replete with works that
explore liberal internationalism as a concept and how it shaped Canada in the second-half of the
twentieth century.74 Specifically, historians have explored the diplomatic and political
background that led to Canada’s adoption of Pearsonian Liberalism. Many of the studies are
biographical, examining the lives and careers of Canada’s Cold War mandarins who fashioned
the country’s postwar foreign policy, such as Escott Reid and Norman Robertson. Other works
that address Canada’s commitment to a muscular liberal internationalism are written by past
Canadian government employees, often former diplomats or members of the Department of
External Affairs. One such work is John W. Holmes’ twin-volume, The Shaping of the Peace:
Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957 (1979 and 1982). From 1943 to 1960,
Holmes worked sporadically for External Affairs, and during one seven-year period was
Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the department. Holmes’ study discusses the innerworkings of the department in regard to Canada’s participation in multilateral, intergovernmental
organizations such as the UN and NATO, the department’s response to issues such as the Korean
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War, and the department’s point of view in regard to peacekeeping. Like many of his colleagues
in External Affairs, Holmes revered the concept of Pearsonian Liberalism and viewed Canada’s
foreign policy as a beacon of hope and goodwill in a divided world: “All of them [Hume Wrong,
Arnold Heeney, Paul Martin, Lester Pearson] friends as well as mentors, and one prejudice
against which the reader should be warned is my difficulty in recognizing that any of them could
have been mistaken.”75
Many Canadian historians are critical of Canada’s Cold War foreign policy. Few,
however, disagree with the country’s pragmatic or “realist” approach to the Soviet Union. In the
foreword to Robert Bothwell’s The Big Chill, historian J.L. Granatstein argues that the country’s
militarized conception of peace during the Cold War, inspired by its devotion to liberal
internationalism, was the only logical response to an enemy that posed a serious threat to the
nation’s security abroad and its democratic traditions at home: “At no point were Canadians
seriously tempted to jump the fence, turn to neutrality or abandon the Western side. Public
opinion would not have stood for it; and, as this book suggests, given the nature of the adversary,
public opinion was right.”76 Canadian historians are thus guilty of perpetuating the binary
categories that characterized the Cold War: capitalism vs. communism, West vs. East, peace vs.
war, good vs. evil.
The Canadian literature contains few works that explore the primary international
organization, NATO, in which Canada implemented its militarized, negative conception of
peace. Erika Simpson’s NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics (2001) and
Sean M. Maloney’s Learning to Love the Bomb: Canada’s Nuclear Weapons During the Cold
War (2007), are two works that examine the relationship between Canada, NATO, and the
country’s largely tolerant postwar attitude towards nuclear weapons.77 Historians prefer to study
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Canada’s role and participation in the UN: a multilateral, international organization that is
viewed by most Canadians as a conduit for peace, not war.78 As Whitaker and Marcuse note,
most Canadian historians have “stressed [Canada’s] internationalist and peacemaking
role…downplaying the partisanship.”79 Works that examine Canada and UN peacekeeping
include Colin McCullough’s Creating Canada’s Peacekeeping Past (2016), a study that explores
the nostalgia Canadians attach to peacekeeping as a “prized foreign policy commitment as well
as national calling.”80 Most works on Canada and peacekeeping, however, focus on select
missions in which Canadian troops participated, such as Michael K. Carroll’s Pearson’s
Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1967 (2009). Similarly,
Canadian historians are keen to examine Canada’s Cold War policy on nuclear disarmament.
These studies highlight the government’s attempt to implement a policy of arms control that
would limit the number of nuclear weapons each nation would be permitted to have, and thus,
maintain the nuclear deterrent, preserve the balance of power, and ensure regional, collective
security. In contrast, the Canadian peace movement preferred universal disarmament to arms
control and the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the Canadian historiography
highlights Canada’s attempt to establish arms control as an altruistic endeavour, rather than
explore how it furthered the country’s militaristic, partisan behaviour. The depiction of Canada
as selfless is not surprising given the persistent, nationalist myth of Canada the “peaceable
kingdom.”
78

For readers interested in Canada’s role in the UN, relationship to peacekeeping, and Cold War policy of
disarmament, see: E.L.M. Burns, A Seat at the Table: The Struggle for Disarmament (Toronto, ON:
Clarke Irwin, 1972); Michael K. Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the United Nations
Emergency Force, 1956-1967 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2009); Adam Chapnick, The Middle Power
Project: Canada and the Founding of the United Nations (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2005; Fred
Gaffen, In the Eyes of the Storm: A History of Canadian Peacekeeping (Ottawa, ON: Deneau Publishers,
1989); Albert Legault and Michel Frontmann, A Diplomacy of Hope: Canada and Disarmament 19451988 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992); Joseph Levitt, Pearson and
Canada’s Role in Nuclear Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations, 1945-1957 (Montreal and
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1993); David Mackenzie, A World Beyond Borders: An
Introduction to the History of International Organizations (Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press,
2010); Colin McCullough, Creating Canada’s Peacekeeping Past (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016);
Colin McCullough and Robert Teigrob, Canada and the United Nations: Legacies, Limits, Prospects,
foreword by Lloyd Axeworthy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016); Kevin
A. Spooner, Canada, the Congo Crisis, and UN Peacekeeping, 1960-64 (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press,
2009).
79
Whitaker and Marcuse, Cold War Canada, 113.
80
Colin McCullough, Creating Canada’s Peacekeeping Past (Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2016), 3.

32
Canada’s postwar peace movement does not, however, fit into the myth of the “peaceable
kingdom.” The Canadian literature has made little room for non-state actors, particularly in
regard to peace. When the peace movement is acknowledged, activists are portrayed as “naïve
dreamers in quest of utopia,”81 who consequently threatened Canada’s national security. In
Peace With Freedom (1988), Maurice Tugwell equates the Soviet military threat abroad to the
supposed internal threat posed by the Canadian peace movement, whose idealism he deemed
subversive: “Clear heads recognize that wishful thinking is the enemy of peace, because it clouds
the intellect and distorts reality.”82 Similarly, Sean M. Maloney derides any Cold War support
for nuclear disarmament, taking particular exception to Howard Green, Canada’s Secretary of
State for External Affairs from 1959 to 1963: “Green apparently thought that God had put him
on earth to use Canada’s influence to rid the planet of nuclear weapons.”83 Green, however, was
an exception to the rule. Most Canadian politicians during the Cold War still advocated for arms
control rather than complete nuclear disarmament. Historically, the characterization of peace
activists as subversive, communist, or traitors remains largely unchanged over the past seventy
years. There are few books in the Canadian historiography that deviate from, or challenge, the
predominant Cold War paradigm that situates peace almost solely within Canada’s foreign
policy: its commitment to a regional, military alliance and the use of force to deter its political
and ideological enemies.
Historian Barbara Roberts wrote in 1989 that “Canadian historians have…recently turned
their attention to the Canadian peace movement.”84 There is little evidence to substantiate
Roberts’ statement. Some attention has been given to the relationship between Canadian women
and peace.85 As politician and activist Therese Casgrain notes in her memoir, A Women in a
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Man’s World (1972): “I had long been persuaded that women could contribute a particular sort
of energy to the establishment of peace.”86 Indeed, many women in Cold War Canada believed
that they possessed a unique set of skills and expertise, such as patience, tolerance, co-operation,
and empathy, that were critical to creating a peaceful world. As mothers these qualities were
valued in the private sphere, but usually dismissed as inferior to “masculine” values such as
reason, technical expertise, and fortitude in the face of danger. Nevertheless, in her chapter,
“Women’s Peace Activism in Canada,” Roberts argues that the notion of maternalism dominates
the female peace narrative: “Feminist-pacifists often suggested that women’s training for and
experience in mothering provided valuable knowledge about how to resolve conflict
peacefully.”87 By situating their peace work as concerned mothers and emphasizing the
conservative concept of maternalism, female activists throughout the twentieth century were
more acceptable to mainstream Canadian society. As a result, women played a significant role in
the Canadian peace movement, from the WCTU, to WILPF, to the Voice of Women, an allfemale peace group founded in 1960.
Female peace activists were more interested in achieving positive peace than simply
maintaining negative peace. According to Betty Reardon, female activists were uniquely capable
of achieving peace because they understood negative peace was not possible without first
attaining positive peace, and consequently, struggled to remove structural violence, including
gender inequality, from society: “Women’s visions, their strivings, sufferings, and frustrations,
are the very substance of the struggle for peace.”88 In campaigning for social equality, justice,
and reform, women’s peace activism was regarded as radical. As a result, like Canada’s male
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peace activists who strove to implement a vision of positive peace, female activists too were
labelled “naïve,” “dupes,” “subversive,” and of course, “communist.” In spite of the meaningful
literature on women and peace, further studies are required to fully understand the connection
between gender and peace, especially within the Canadian peace movement.
This gap in the literature is indicative of the general lack of works on the Canadian
movement and positive conceptions of peace. There are only three single-author, noteworthy
studies devoted to the Canadian peace movement and ideas of peace from 1900 to 1945. And
only two these works, Thomas P. Socknat’s Witness Against War: Pacifism in Canada, 19001945 (1987), and Amy Shaw’s Crisis of Conscience: Conscientious Objection in Canada During
the First World War (2009), are academic, published monographs. Shaw’s work, however,
studies a limited conception of peace – absolute, sectarian pacifism – over a short period of time,
revealing little about peace in Canada prior to, or after the First World War. With the exception
of a few other scholarly articles and edited collections,89 Canada’s pre-1945 peace literature is
underdeveloped.
There is no scholarly study of Canada’s post-Second World War peace movement. In
particular, there is a void in the Canadian literature on peace from 1945 to 1960. The most
commonly cited work on peace during the Cold War is Gary Moffat’s A History of the Peace
Movement in Canada (1982). Yet Moffat’s book is privately published, out-of-date, and lacks
academic credibility. There are also few works that explore the lives of Canadian peace
activists.90 Recent focus by historians on Canada and the 1960s has begun to highlight the era’s
multiple conceptions of peace.91 A number of works explore the connection between radical
89
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student politics and peace in the mid-to-late 1960s. A chapter in Bryan Palmer’s Canada’s
1960s: The Ironies of Identity in a Rebellious Era (2009), for example, examines the 1964
formation of the short-lived Student Union for Peace Action (SUPA) -- formerly known as the
CUCND. Palmer analyzes the disjointed nature of SUPA as it pursued joint policies of nuclear
disarmament and social reform. Other books with a post-1963 focus, such as Jessica Squires’
Building Sanctuary: The Movement to Support Vietnam War Resisters in Canada, 1965-1973
(2013), examines Canada’s reaction to American draft dodgers and the Vietnam War. The latest
study on Canada’s peace movement is an edited collection, Worth Fighting For: Canada’s
Tradition of War Resistance From 1812 to the War on Terror (2015), that attempts to
“underscore the consistent presence of an antiwar tradition in Canada from the late eighteenth
century to the present day.”92 Interestingly, the collection investigates many instances of war
resistance in the Cold War period, but also neglects the fifteen or so years following the Second
World War, with many chapters focused on peace and the radical turn of the mid-1960s. Because
there is no dedicated scholarly account of the peace movement in the postwar period, this study
endeavours to explore and examine Canadian conceptions of peace during the early Cold War.
Moreover, this study attempts to answer the questions: What inspired and motivated positive
conceptions of peace from 1945 to 1963? How did these alternate visions of peace challenge
Canada’s “liberal order framework” and its liberal internationalist conception of peace? And how
did Canadians respond to these visions for a better world?
This dissertation offers a new vantage point on the history of peace in Canada. Rather than
exploring peace through Pearsonian Liberalism and the state, the study examines positive
conceptions of peace in Cold War Canada through the lens of collective biography. The study
focuses on six individuals: Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg, doctor G. Brock Chisholm, lawyer John
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Humphrey, former United Church minister and popular peace activist James G. Endicott,
professor Ursula Franklin, and physicist Norman Z. Alcock. These particular individuals were
selected for two reasons. First, each represents a distinct approach to positive peace. The
biographical chapters offer insight into each individual’s conception of peace. They examine
their interaction with other peace activists and reveal how they attempted to achieve their
particular vision of peace in the face of immense government and societal discrimination. Read
together, the six biographies paint a composite picture of the Canadian peace movement during
this era. Second, the six individuals in this study were also chosen because they epitomize what
historian Jay Winter terms “minor utopians”93 – a so-called “articulate minority” who envisioned
a peaceful world that differed from the dominant historical narrative in postwar Canada. Each
individual had a unique vision of peace, but as a group, the peace activists advocate a tolerant,
open, empathetic, and just society. More specifically, their conceptions of peace encourage the
government and Canadians to open themselves to new ideas that might challenge, oppose, or
contradict their core liberal values. Further, in their attempt to realize positive peace, Canadian
activists “illuminate larger historical patterns and developments”94 locally, nationally, and
transnationally.
The biographical chapters are presented in chronological order, beginning in 1945. As a
whole, the chapters highlight how Canadian peace activists contested and questioned Canada’s
dominant, militarized, liberal internationalist Cold War conception of peace, and consequently,
how activists and their methods to achieve an alternative positive peace were deemed subversive
and communist by the government, media, and most Canadians. The chapters reveal that peace
activists failed to realize their unorthodox visions of peace. Yet as historian Mark Mazower
writes, “it is exceptionally easy to write the[ir] story…as failure.”95 Instead, by historicizing
peace, this study contributes to our understanding of internationalism during the Cold War,
reveals the role of nongovernment and intergovernmental organizations in maintaining peace,
and ultimately, highlights how peace is conceptualized and viewed today.
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Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg of Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto, is the focus of Chapter
1. Feinberg typifies the immediate Canadian postwar, peace activist. Outraged by the Holocaust
and the American nuclear bombings of Japan, the Second World War acted as a catalyst for
Feinberg’s vision of peace. He reasoned that a peaceful future was only possible if people lived
with each other in religious and racial brotherhood, which he actively pursued in the immediate
postwar years: “Brotherhood cannot be fashioned by proclamation; it must be woven from the
stuff of sacrifice, on the loom of social justice, for the common goal of peace in the atomic
age.”96 But Feinberg, like most peace activists in postwar Canada, faced serious resistance. His
desire for social reform was met with cries of “communist” and he was even dubbed the “Red
Rabbi” later in life. The contradictions within Feinberg’s vision of peace also contributed to his
controversial public persona in Canadian society. Although he championed brotherhood in
Canada, there was no room for either Germans or Palestinians in his brotherhood of man, a direct
contradiction of his Jewish faith.
Although religion played a fundamental role in Feinberg’s vision of peace, the subject of
Chapter 2, Canadian psychiatrist, Dr. G. Brock Chisholm, advocated a fervent, secular vision of
peace. In fact, Chisholm rejected organized religion and believed that the Church was a primary
cause of conflict and strife. Chisholm argued that peace was only possible if people achieved a
healthy mental state, unencumbered by the Church’s moral teachings. These radical beliefs
challenged the core values of many Canadians, making him and his vision of peace highly
unpopular. As a result, Chisholm, like many postwar peace activists, viewed the newly formed
UN as the best means to foster and promote peace. Selected as the first director-general of the
World Health Organization (WHO) in 1946, a specialized agency of the UN, Chisholm put his
vision of peace as mental health to practice. He wrote the organization’s constitution that
included a radical new definition of health that included mental health concerns, but left the
WHO in 1953, unable to fully stamp his vision of peace upon the organization. In spite of most
Canadians’ willingness to welcome peace activism within a UN setting, Chisholm’s bridge to
achieve his vision of peace, international public health, was largely ignored in Canada.
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The focus of Chapter 3, Montreal lawyer John P. Humphrey, also worked for the UN. In
August 1946, Humphrey began work as director of the UN Human Rights Division. Within his
first year at the organization, Humphrey was asked to write the first draft of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), one of the twentieth century’s seminal, historic
documents. Humphrey was convinced that there was an inherent connection between human
rights and peace: “We will have peace on Earth when everyone’s rights are respected.”97 His
vision of human rights as essential to peace was most clearly reflected in the radical nature of his
draft, which emphasized the legal protection of human rights under international law. More
importantly, the document promoted not only political and civil rights, but economic, social, and
cultural rights as well. Yet, the UDHR, in particular its inclusion of social and economic rights,
highlighted the Canadian government’s unwillingness to embrace a conception of peace that
differed from their highly militarized reliance on collective security. Not only did the
government view social rights as communistic, but their inclusion in the UDHR challenged the
authority of the state. The government, as a result, was unwilling to guarantee these new rights
for Canadian citizens.
It was, however, the CPC’s founding in 1948 that cemented the Canadian Cold War
connection between peace and communism. Under the leadership of former United Church of
Canada missionary, James G. Endicott, the subject of Chapter 4, the CPC came to represent the
Canadian peace movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Sympathetic to communist China
and the Soviet Union, Endicott was vilified by the Canadian government, press, and society as a
whole. Consequently, the peace policies and programmes of the CPC, such as the Stockholm
Appeal for nuclear disarmament, were dismissed as communist propaganda, and Endicott, as a
communist dupe. After Endicott accused the UN of instigating the Korean War (1950-1953) and
the United States troops of germ warfare, the Canadian government deliberated stripping him of
his passport and charging him with treason. Although Endicott escaped punishment for his
comments in regard to the Korean War, the damage was done: the positive definition of peace,
and those Canadians who espoused it, had lost all credibility by 1953. In the ten years since the
end of the Second World War, the Canadian peace movement had made slow progress towards
implementing their alternative vision of peace.
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By the late 1950s peace had gained a small measure of respectability in Canadian society.
New anti-nuclear peace groups were formed in response to the increasing nuclear weapons
testing by the U.S, Soviet Union, and their respective allies. Chapter 5, consequently, explores
professor and scientist, Ursula Franklin. A Quaker and feminist, Franklin’s vision of peace based
on a just society directly challenged Canada’s dominant, negative definition. As a Quaker,
Franklin was an absolute pacifist. She rejected Canada’s involvement in NATO, the concept of
collective security, and advocated co-existence with the Soviet Union, the “enemy” of the West.
As a feminist, Franklin asked the government to rethink the role of the state. She demanded
government transparency and greater access to information, especially in regard to the country’s
nuclear policy, which she argued disproportionately affected women and children. In 1960
Franklin joined Voice of Women (VOW), attracted to the organization’s philosophy that linked
peace and internationalism to female values, such as nurturance and inclusivity. Franklin, as
VOW’s director of research, implemented projects designed to pressure the government to adopt
more peaceful policies, especially in regard to radioactive fallout. One such project tested the
teeth of Canadian babies and children for strontium-90, a radioactive element increasingly found
in the environment as a result of nuclear testing. Franklin’s radical vision of peace put her at
odds, not only with the government, but with other members of VOW, who regarded her as
dangerous and subversive. Franklin, however, was not the only Canadian peace activist to
embrace science in search of peace during the Cold War period.
The sixth chapter investigates physicist Norman Z. Alcock and his vision of peace. In
1961 Alcock, fearful that the world would soon be obliterated by nuclear war, founded the
Canadian Peace Research Institute (CPRI). Alcock believed that the CPRI, utilizing science, but
specifically the social sciences, would provide a “bridge of reason”98 to create a warless world.
Inspired by American scholars Kenneth E. Boulding and Theodore F. Lentz, Alcock argued that
peace research/science was a panacea to the world’s problems. Yet from the outset, Alcock and
the CPRI lacked legitimacy in Canadian society, and was attacked, in particular, by the United
Church of Canada. On the one hand, the United Church bristled at Alcock’s belief in science as
the path to peace. Religion and morality, the church argued, were the only true avenues to
achieve international harmony and goodwill. On the other hand, the United Church reflected the
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prevailing government conception of peace as security, and was as anti-communist as the rest of
Canadian society. Increasingly desperate to appear legitimate, Alcock and the CPRI rejected any
association with other Canadian peace groups, further fracturing an already disunited Canadian
peace movement. By 1963 and labelled “communist,” Alcock and the CPRI were almost
financially insolvent, unable to implement any serious, academic peace research projects.
Alcock’s experience as a peace activist in the Cold War was not unique. By consciously rejecting
the government’s dominant conception of peace, Canadian peace activists rebuffed the country’s
liberal internationalist values, and were in turn, rejected by Canadian society. Consequently,
activists were unable to realize their positive conceptions of peace.
At first glance, it might seem curious to end this study in 1963. Most books that explore
Canada’s early Cold War period typically conclude in 1957. But as Lara Campbell and
Dominique Clement write: “Finding a way to periodize…is a complicated and fractious process.
Any attempt to impose structural unity on a topic or period is by nature arbitrary.”99 Indeed the
Canadian peace movement was active throughout the Cold War era, although its size and
strength fluctuated throughout the era. And the story of peace during this time period is vast.
Moreover, the peace activism of the individuals examined in this dissertation stretches beyond
1963. There are, however, political, social, and cultural reasons for this study’s unusual
periodization. Despite Lester Pearson and the Liberal’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons,
1963 witnessed a significant shift in focus for the Canadian peace movement. Many groups still
protested against nuclear arms, but few were solely preoccupied by disarmament. This shift in
the peace agenda was due to two reasons. First, in August 1963, the United States, Soviet Union,
and Great Britain signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, outlawing all atmospheric nuclear testing.
The second reason for the shift was the so-called “radical turn” of the Canadian and international
peace movements beginning in the early 1960s. Student peace groups such as SUPA began to
dominate the popular peace movement post-1963. SUPA branches and similar organizations
sprang up across the country on virtually every university campus. And rather than protest
against nuclear weapons, the Vietnam War came to dominate the peace movement for the next
decade. Ultimately, 1963, marked the end of one generation of peace activism and the beginning
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of another. This dissertation, however, will demonstrate that the societal changes often
associated with the 1960s – questioning the Canadian government’s Cold War policies and
radical peace activism – had their roots in the 1940s and 1950s.
Historically, Canada in the postwar, early Cold War period has been characterized as a unified
society, especially in regard to the country’s negative, militarized conception of peace. This
dissertation provides a new narrative of peace, revealing multiple voices that challenged the
liberal internationalist commitment to collective security to preserve peace, and consequently,
the Canadian Cold War consensus. Neither the Canadian peace movement, nor the definition of
peace in this era was static or monolithic. Although each individual in this study was anti-war
and opposed to nuclear weapons, the postwar peace movement was not dominated by a single
issue. Rather each activist explored in this dissertation envisioned peace uniquely, from
brotherhood rooted in Judaism, to human rights, to science as a cure-all for the world’s ills. The
short biographies of these six Canadians, read together, reveal a peace movement that actively
pursued positive peace, and that was dedicated to internationalism, reform, and justice in order to
create an “alternative social order.”100
The history of Canada’s postwar peace movement, unfortunately, has been largely
forgotten. Perhaps this oversight is because none of the individuals considered in this study were
entirely successful in their attempt to realize their conception or vision of peace. For political and
ideological reasons, peace became highly unfashionable during the Cold War and to espouse a
conception of peace that differed from the dominant Canadian definition of peace as security
exposed individuals and groups to ridicule and persecution. Consequently, Canadian peace
activists lacked the political support to attain their objectives. In their desire to look both
legitimate and respectable, activists also turned on one another, splintering an already divided
movement. In addition, individual activists were responsible for their own failures, their visions
of peace undermined by the inherent contradictions they contained. Nevertheless, this
dissertation will highlight the previously denied and excluded experiences of Canadian men and
women who contributed to building a broad culture of peace in the postwar and early Cold War
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period, and in doing so, puncture the persistent and dominant myth of Canada as a “peaceable
kingdom.”
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Chapter 1
Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg and the Brotherhood of Man:
1945-1961
Canada’s first prominent, postwar peace activist was in fact an American citizen. Rabbi
Abraham L. Feinberg (1899-1986) was born in Bellaire, Ohio, the son of Lithuanian immigrants.
In 1943 Feinberg was appointed rabbi at Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto, Ontario. Holy
Blossom was Canada’s second largest and second oldest Reform synagogue. Feinberg was a
highly respected religious figure in postwar Canada. Former Montreal mayor, Camillien Houde,
once dubbed him “‘the official voice’ of Canadian Jewry – ‘Le Cardinal des Juifs.’”1 Saturday
Night magazine named Feinberg one of Canada’s “Seven Greatest Preachers.”2 Feinberg’s
activism, however, shattered the staid image of most religious figures. He spoke publically on
current affairs and was not afraid to get involved in political controversies, especially in regard to
matters of peace. Feinberg is famously known for his opposition to nuclear weapons and the
Vietnam War. In the 1960s, Feinberg became Chairman of the Toronto Committee for
Disarmament, travelled to North Vietnam and met with Ho Chi Minh, and co-wrote the song
“Give Peace a Chance” with John Lennon and Yoko Ono during their Montreal bed-in.
Feinberg’s peace activism, however, was just as radical in the 1940s and 1950s, as it was
in the 1960s. The end of the Second World War revealed a deep disinterest in Canada’s
organized peace movement. Many Canadians blamed the movement and its policies of
appeasement and pacifism for the rise of Nazi Germany and fascist Italy during the interwar
period. Subsequently, peace groups such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) struggled to attract members. In
the absence of a strong Canadian peace movement, individual activists, including Feinberg,
endeavoured to build a better, more peaceful world with little governmental or public support.
1

Dorothy Sangster, “The Impulsive Crusader of Holy Blossom,” Maclean’s Magazine, October 1, 1950.
W. John Dunlop, “Canada’s Seven Greatest Preachers,” Saturday Night, August 1951. An informal poll
of 20 Canadian religious and lay leaders was taken by the author. The seven names that appeared most
frequently on the 20 ballots, along with Feinberg, included: Reverend Gerald Cragg (Erskine and
American United Church, Montreal); Canon F.H. Wilkinson (St. Paul’s Church, Toronto); Reverend
Earle C. Gordon (First United Church, Truro); Reverend E.J. Bailey (First Baptist Church, Edmonton);
Right Reverend Francis Carroll (Roman Catholic Bishop of Calgary); and Reverend Ian Burnett (St.
Andrew’s Presbyterian Church, Ottawa).
2

44
On December 30, 1945, Feinberg recorded the first episode of “The Brotherhood Hour,” a
weekly program broadcast on Toronto’s CFRB radio station. Feinberg’s missive to Torontonians
that cold Sunday morning clearly and succinctly outlined his vision of peace. He argued that
brotherhood, and only brotherhood (be it religious, racial, or ideological), could provide the path
to and the foundation for peace. Feinberg’s broadcast began by emphasizing why brotherhood
had become absolutely necessary in the postwar world: “Everyone seems to agree that the
splitting of the atom places the heaviest responsibility of all time on our generation. … We must
learn to treat one another as brothers, or perish. We shall hate and die — or love and live!”3 His
radio program was prompted by the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but Feinberg’s appeal
for brotherhood was equally motivated by the events of World War Two, specifically the
Holocaust.
Feinberg explained to his listeners why he, a rabbi, was the ideal proxy to ensure the
fruition of brotherhood among men. He believed that brotherhood, and thus peace, were
fundamental tenets of Judaism: “‘Peace on earth, to men of good-will’…uttered first by Jesus the
Jew, it sums up not only the essence of Christianity, but that of the mother-faith, Judaism as well.
… I think Jesus meant it as a challenge to active fellowship.”4 Consequently, Feinberg argued
that every person had to embrace brotherhood in their daily lives, only then could a genuine,
permanent peace be achieved:
Forgo your bigotries, stifle your hatreds, release your hearts from suspicion and arrogance!
… Yes, Brotherhood begins at home…. Brotherhood must be fought for, against our egoism
and smugness and self-righteousness; it must be won in the framework and on the level of
our day-to-day experience! … It isn’t an abstract term spelled with a capital “B” — but a
concrete potential reality, which we can bring to flower.5

Feinberg, as a result of his convictions, fought for religious, racial, and ideological unity
throughout the late 1940s and 1950s. One religious contemporary remarked that Feinberg
“believes ardently that there should be peace, and nothing will stop his speaking, writing and
living it.”6 Among other causes, Feinberg contested Ontario’s program of religious education in
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public schools, spoke out against racial intolerance within Toronto’s business community, and
championed the creation of the new state of Israel.
Feinberg concluded his broadcast by painting a simple, but stark choice between two
extremes: war and death or brotherhood and peace. Canadians, Feinberg warned, faced “atomic
annihilation or constructive cooperation. We shall be annihilated by the atomic bomb unless we
cooperate to construct an era of brotherhood.”7 Rabbi Feinberg’s vision for peace was rooted in
brotherhood, but it was not simply an effort to end violent conflict and achieve a negative peace.
His attempt to first diffuse and then erase the differences between Jew and Christian, white and
black, rich and poor, was a challenge to social action and reform. It was a call for fundamental
societal change in postwar Canada that many Canadians found unsettling and ultimately,
opposed. Consequently, Feinberg’s effort to create a long-lasting positive peace was viewed as
controversial. Much more problematic, Feinberg’s vision of peace contained the very
contradictions that it attempted to overcome. Occasionally his spirit of brotherhood became
exclusive rather than inclusive, undermining his moral authority and eventually, becoming an
obstacle to achieving the peace he claimed to embody.
Feinberg’s “Brotherhood Hour” argued that brotherhood was critical to attaining peace, but he
was far from the first to do so. The notion that brotherhood is the path to peace has a long
history. Historian Akira Iriye writes that “individuals and groups, no matter where they are, share
certain interests and concerns,”8 and that throughout history have attempted to achieve
brotherhood in a variety of different manners. Often brotherhood has been connected to the
concept of internationalism. In 1846, for example, American journalist Elihu Burritt created the
League of Universal Brotherhood (LUB), a peace organization with over 30,000 members at its
peak. Open to all people over the age of twelve, male and female, the LUB described itself as a
“forerunner in the progress of international society,” dedicated to a vast “WORLD SOCIETY,
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embracing the great and good, the rich and poor, young and old…for the abolition of war, and
the spirit of war, from the face of the earth.”9
Historian Mark Mazower notes that the two most famous examples of “fraternal impulse”
in the late nineteenth century also connected the concepts of internationalism, brotherhood, and
peace to one another. In the 1850s Richard Cobden, a British manufacturer and member of
parliament, argued that free trade was integral in “facilitating communication among men and
bringing peace to the world.”10 Cobden believed that free trade would materially benefit all
aspects of society, whereas economic tariffs would lead to isolationism and conflict. At the same
time, Italian activist Giuseppe Mazzini claimed, perhaps ironically, that nationalism was the path
to brotherhood. Mazzini maintained that international cooperation and peace were possible, but
only if the world was composed of “an international society of democratic nation-states.”11
Mazzini’s ideas were quite popular with twentieth-century politicians, including Woodrow
Wilson, who conceived the League of Nations to be a brotherhood of like-minded, sovereign
countries.
From a young age, Feinberg also linked the concept of brotherhood to peace. Unlike
Wilson and other contemporary politicians, Feinberg was initially inspired by his difficult
childhood. Feinberg’s family, both poor and a religious minority, struggled to find acceptance in
their small Ohio community: “My pals and playmates were the underprivileged minorities blacks, immigrants, Irish Catholics, Italians - all of us…looked down on with contempt by the
‘respectable’ people. … So I learned to regard all mankind as my brothers and sisters, and that a
person must be valued by what he or she is inside, not by colour or creed or the clothes he
wears.”12 This belief was reinforced after he witnessed the death of a young black boy as a child.
The boy had drowned when white bullies threw stones at him while swimming. That night
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Feinberg cried himself to sleep: “I vowed, I swore, that I would stand up and fight for the black
people, and all persons of colour, as long as I live.”13
Feinberg’s notion of brotherhood, however, was rooted primarily in religion. In 1924
Feinberg was ordained as a rabbi, following his graduation from Hebrew Union College in
Cincinnati, Ohio. Judaism was critical in shaping both Feinberg’s vision of peace and his
subsequent activism: “The Messianic dream of Judaism rests on the attainment of universal
brotherhood, truth and peace — the Kingdom of God, in whose behalf all mankind must labour
and strive together.”14 Feinberg firmly believed that to achieve peace, one could not simply
discuss the concept in the abstract and hope for the best. Instead, peace required an energetic and
enthusiastic pursuit: “Of all the numerous virtues, peace is the only one concerning which it is
prescribed that we must run after it. Seek peace - wherever you are…everywhere that it may…be
found.”15 Feinberg’s conviction to be active in his quest for peace, not passive, stemmed from
Judaism’s worldly, rather than other-worldly foundation.
Judaism is a religion about the here and now, committed not only to God but also to man:
“The Kingdom of God is of This realm, not the next. It will be established not by a superterrestrial authority divinely relegated to order the worlds, to destroy sin and the Law which
created it, but by the Messianic spirit God transmitted to all men, who must collaborate to
enthrone Him by the prior enthronement of love, justice, and peace.”16 The purpose of life,
Feinberg argued, was not to passively prepare for heavenly salvation after death, but to recognize
that there was a heaven and hell on earth. And this realization demanded that mankind do its
upmost to make this earth a paradise. Feinberg’s quest to “make this earth a paradise,” echoed
the message of the Christian, though largely Protestant, social gospel movement. The social
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gospel was a socio-religious movement that attempted to create the Kingdom of God on earth
and believed that peace was inherently linked to social justice. Interestingly, it was in the 1920s,
when Feinberg was completing his rabbinical studies, that the social gospel experienced a
renaissance and became intimately connected with the North American peace movement.
Focused on achieving brotherhood, Feinberg believed it was Judaism’s duty to face and confront
society’s social ills: “The ancient Hebrew prophets, for all time, have made it impossible to
sunder religion from social wrong. To them worship was not an end in itself - for serenity of
mind; it was a means for the service of mankind.”17 Feinberg’s conception of Judaism and the
rabbi’s role in society, however, disrupted the status quo and would eventually upset many of his
peers and colleagues.
Feinberg constantly worried that the Jewish community was eschewing its duty to social
justice and positive change. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, Feinberg accused New York
City’s Reform rabbinate18 of hiding behind a cloak of ritualistic dogma and custom, rather than
challenge and confront the era’s social ills. In 1927, only three years after becoming rabbi of
Temple Israel, one of New York’s largest Reform congregations, Feinberg was sufficiently
disillusioned to quit the ministry. Feinberg explained his decision in his farewell sermon. He felt
that the Reform movement had lost its way. It had become, he argued, more interested in
commercialism than in God: “The preacher has been forced to renounce his mission and become
a salesman, a clerk of pew rentals. He is made to fear loss in membership more than the wrath of
God. He must dispense religion as others sell automobiles and shoes — for a price.”19 Feinberg’s
farewell address did not spare the Reform rabbinate from condemnation. He argued that the
rabbinate was complicit in the commercialization of Judaism and had abandoned their duty to
brotherhood, social change, and making the world a better place. Feinberg addressed the
congregation: “Much of the fault can be traced to the conservatism of religious leaders
themselves. … If organized religion is to be more than a feeble voice in the wilderness, evoking
naught but its own echo, it must grapple fearlessly and honestly with every problem that
17

Radio Address – “Justice – A Challenge to Religion!”, Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg, Holy Blossom
Temple, Sunday April 21st, 1957, on “Message of Israel”, A.B.C. Radio Network, Feinberg papers, Series
A – Sermons, Speeches and Writings (Box 2), file – MSS COL #588, Radio Speeches on “Message of
Israel” program, 1937-1960, 2/4.
18
Reform Judaism, also known as Liberal Judaism, is one of the religion’s three main branches or sects.
19
Abraham L. Feinberg, “At Last! The Poet Prince of the Airwaves Tells All,” Maclean’s Magazine,
January 25, 1964.

49
confronts mankind!”20 Temple Israel and other Reform synagogues in New York, Feinberg
argued, had abandoned Judaism’s commitment to improving the daily lives of their
congregations. Feinberg believed that the city’s synagogues had become mere shells: beautiful,
expensive buildings with little or no substance inside.
Feinberg’s decision to quit the rabbinate was met with scorn and derision, especially
within the Reform community in New York City. One critic was Rabbi Jacob Cohn, who chided
Feinberg for his utopian, principled stance: “Rabbi Feinberg is an idealist and his remarks were
those of an idealist, and when he refers to commercialism in organized religion his remarks are
the remarks of the disillusioned idealist. Rabbi Feinberg was immature.”21 Rabbi Cohn’s
negative response to Feinberg’s vision of organized religion foreshadows how most North
Americans reacted to peace in the postwar period. Activists were criticized for having their heads
in the clouds instead of grounded in “reality.” By 1930 Feinberg no longer considered Judaism or
the Reform movement a “religion of the way - of march, movement, action, struggle.”22 He
decided to leave the rabbinate, rather than compromise his faith.
Feinberg subsequently began to explore his passion for singing. From 1931 to 1932
Feinberg studied opera at the American Conservatory in Fontainebleau, France. He returned to
the United States in 1933 and enrolled in Estelle Liebling’s School for Radio (which
foreshadowed the importance the medium would have on his future peace activism). It was under
Liebling’s tutelage that Feinberg adopted the stage name Anthony Frome, better known as the
“Poet Prince” of the airwaves. Frome sang nightly on the national WJZ-NBC radio network.
Because his broadcasts often followed American President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Fireside
Chats, the Poet Prince became a celebrity. At the height of his popularity, Anthony Frome was
selling-out movie houses and theatres, including a regular gig at the Paramount Theater on
Broadway. His singing engagements earned Frome $1500 per week at the height of the Great
Depression. In addition to monetary success, a fan club was formed, the Anthony Frome
Fellowship, with members from across the country. Many members of Feinberg’s family,
however, questioned his decision to switch careers. They argued he had strayed far from his
20

“Rabbi says Church is Bereft of Life,” The New York Times, March 2, 1930.
“Sees Feinberg Unfair in Religious Attack: Rabbi Jacob Cohn Declares,” The New York Times, March
8, 1930.
22
Radio talk – “Justice – A Challenge to Religion!”, Abraham L. Feinberg, Feinberg fonds, Volume 1,
file – “ABC Radio Talk, Justice – A Challenge to Religion!, April 21, 1957.”
21

50
Jewish faith. Feinberg’s mother, in particular, disapproved of his new profession. With virtually
her last breath, she reminded her son how far he had wandered from his life’s chosen path: “Abe,
my son, a rabbi, a rabbi! Now become a singer, a nothing!”23 His mother’s disappointment left
Feinberg feeling confused and torn between his two passions. But it was not his mother’s
chastisement that motivated his return to the rabbinate in 1935. What then motivated Feinberg to
reclaim his real name and to become a rabbi once more? How did he find his way to Holy
Blossom Temple and Canada in 1943, with a vision for a peaceful world inspired by Judaism and
rooted in brotherhood?
On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany. Almost immediately
Hitler and the Nazi Party began its systematic attack of Germany’s Jewish population. Feinberg
read a speech in The Times in which Hitler promised to “exterminate Jewish vermin.” He was
deeply disturbed by the article and had a long discussion with his wife Ruth. Feinberg
remembers telling her: “A Jew could not live, and any decent human being would not live, in a
Nazi-Fascist world.”24 Over the next few months Feinberg considered the plight of Germany’s
Jewish community and concluded that he had to return to the rabbinate. Feinberg secured a
position at Mt. Neboh Temple in New York, one of the city’s smallest Reform congregations.
Before he officially returned, Feinberg ensured that Mt. Neboh was not only committed to
preaching brotherhood, but to the alleviation of society’s social, moral, and ethical problems.
Feinberg rejoined the rabbinate in 1935 after Edward R. Cohn, president of Mt. Neboh’s
congregation, assured him that the synagogue desired to play “an important role in the
interpretation of current events”25 and welcomed his peace activism.
Feinberg worked tirelessly over the next ten years to highlight the reality of Hitler’s
words, actions, and deeds. He came to the conclusion that there was no greater evil than the
hatred spread by fascism. In his memoir, Storm the Gates of Jericho (1964), Feinberg recalls the
“fatal diseases” of Hitler’s Germany and how it helped further clarify his vision of peace:
Nazi-Fascism was the ultimate, lethal enemy for whose conquest all other skirmishes must
be forgotten. Its ingredients were intoxicating affirmation of the beauty of war; sublimation
of egomania through the hypostasized and hypnotized group; evasion of moral choice in
favour of an absolute Yes loyalty; substitution of an elementary functional test for the
sensitive assessment of human personality; repression of intelligence the more easily to
23
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manipulate feelings; adulation of the hero-leader; replacement of the individual worth with
barbaric herd values … dehumanization and degradation of the common man.26

Feinberg realized that the answer to hate was not dogmatism, but spiritual enlightenment within
oneself, in addition to ecumenical and all other forms of brotherhood.
By 1945 Feinberg’s vision of peace was fully formed. In the months following the
Second World War, he began to clearly articulate and emphasize the centrality of Judaism in
providing the blueprint for a better postwar world. Central to Feinberg’s vision was his
interpretation of Judaism’s sacred texts. The first of Judaism’s two sacred texts is the Torah.
Also referred to as the Hebrew or Jewish Bible, the Torah is known to Jews as the TANAKH and
to non-Jews as the Old Testament. The Babylonian Talmud states that the Hebrew word
“shalom,” or “peace” is the underlying principle of the Torah and all Jewish life: “The whole of
the Law is…for the purpose of promoting peace, as it is written, ‘Her ways are ways of
pleasantness and all her paths are peace.’”27 Yet, if the Torah was rooted in peace, Feinberg also
believed that the sacred text and Judaism was ingrained with love. Feinberg often cited the
biblical tale of Bezalel and Oholiab (Exodus 31:1-11, 35:30-36:1) to illustrate how love was a
necessary precondition to fraternal feelings. Bezalel and Oholiab, Feinberg argued, stood in
direct contrast to the jealousies and mutual fears that made peace so difficult to achieve. Chosen
from the tribes of Judah and Dan, Bezalel and Oholiab worked together to build the Ark of the
Covenant and God’s sacred Tabernacle: a sanctuary where all twelve tribes of Judaism would
live, work, and struggle in union. Feinberg believed their story was a blueprint for religious
union and peace in his time: “This earth of ours can be shaped into a Paradise, with enough to
clothe, feed, shelter, and bless every human being who dwells upon it. … But we lack the basic
blueprint…. Bezalel and Oholiab had it: wisdom of heart, love for one another, the readiness to
merge our skill, our strength, our will, our dream.”28 If there was one message that Feinberg
wanted listeners to take from his story of Bezalel and Oholiab, it was the interchangeable nature
of love and brotherhood within Judaism.
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Another Torah passage that Feinberg quoted frequently at wars end was Leviticus 19:18,
“Love thy Neighbour.” Known as the Code of Holiness by ancient Jewish sages, Feinberg
considered the passage, “You shall love your neighbor as yourself,” to be the “noblest five-word
sentence in the English language.”29 For Feinberg, love was not only the key to Jewish teaching,
but the essence of human relations. Love was crucial to how Feinberg envisioned creating
community and fraternity: “Love thy neighbour… the strange, unknown faces on the trolley, the
worker with a foreign accent…the newcomers on the next farm…a language, a ritual different
than yours - yes, the entire polygon…. That is your neighbour - and that is where the quest for
peace must originate.”30
Feinberg’s message of love was not inspired solely from the Hebrew Bible. The
innumerable examples of love and peace found in the Hebrew Talmud also aroused and moved
the rabbi. The Talmud is the second sacred text of Judaism: a record of rabbinic teachings
spanning 600 years beginning in the first century CE. Each section of the Talmud is central to
understanding the history of Jewish laws and customs and how they are still practiced today.
Feinberg argued that the Talmud, like the Torah, was critical in shaping his vision of peace: “In
rabbinic literature we read: ‘The world must be built upon love.’ This is the root principle of
Judaism. Love motivates godliness. … Love extends even to the wicked.”31 These values are
most clearly recognizable in the Talmud’s exhortation, “Hate not the sinner, but the sin.”32 Given
Judaism’s history of persecution, the Talmud’s foundational belief in love and forgiveness is
both profound and inspirational. Moreover, fellowship and compassion are equally apparent in
the Talmud’s urging: “Do not judge your fellowman until you place yourself in his position.”33
This declaration of empathy urges its readers to strip away the barriers between people that cause
strife and conflict. Only when humanity embraced empathy Feinberg argued, to share each
29
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other’s pain, would people be able “to live in others as in oneself,”34 and real brotherhood
achieved. Judaism’s two sacred texts are rooted in the understanding that peace must be
prioritized above all else in life. Feinberg used the Torah and Talmud in the immediate postwar
years to underline the moral authority of Judaism: its capacity for mercy, forgiveness, and
empathy.
Rabbi Feinberg’s vision of peace was ultimately inspired by his devotion to Judaism’s
Reform movement. Feinberg believed that the Reform movement, more so than the religion’s
orthodox and conservative sects, embodied the messages of love and brotherhood contained in
the sacred texts. Consequently, he believed that the movement was more likely to spread the
gospel of peace: “I firmly believe that…[Reform] Judaism is the most reasonable, and therefore,
rationally the most nearly true and acceptable religion I have ever encountered. I believe it bears
within itself the guide to a perfect world; if all men followed its precepts, evil on earth would
vanish.”35 As his first broadcast of “The Brotherhood Hour” in 1945 revealed, his belief in the
brotherhood of man was the path to peace. From the religion’s sacred texts, to its Reform
movement, Feinberg was convinced that brotherhood was Judaism “in its simplest and most
practical form.”36Armed with his vision for a peaceful postwar world, Feinberg spent the next
decades striving to realize this vision and to achieve brotherhood among all religions, races, and
nations.
Rabbi Abraham Feinberg was convinced that there was a right way and wrong way to work for
peace. In late March 1946 he offered his radio listeners a simple choice: “There are two ways of
expressing your wish. One way is deliberate, forceful, active pressure…. Either you want war —
or peace. Say it — and say it unmistakably! … The other way of decision is to do nothing — and
let things take their course. Be silent, neutral, inarticulate.”37 Feinberg chose the first course and
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actively pursued brotherhood in postwar Canada. He initially tried to achieve his vision of peace
through his radio program, the “Brotherhood Hour.” Although the program was inspired by the
dropping of the two atomic bombs on Japan, it marked Feinberg’s first postwar attempt to think
globally, but act locally. His weekly discussion ranged widely. He spoke about the spirituality
and love underpinning Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy. He chided the Canadian government’s
decision to allow officials from French Vichy to immigrate to the country, while at the same time
deporting Jewish refugees who lacked the proper documentation. General Dwight D. Eisenhower
was a constant topic of discussion on “The Brotherhood Hour.” Feinberg greatly admired the
general’s advocacy and activism, and argued that Eisenhower “dug deep into the heritage of
democracy which had become his inmost assurance, and brought forth — the law of practical
brotherhood. He knew, as well all should know…that people are joined by the same future.”38
His favourite subject, however, was the medium of radio. Feinberg believed that the radio was
the ideal vehicle to bring people together and achieve his vision of peace: “Here, then, is a lesson
in brotherhood. When you tune in on your radio, you are paying respect to a symbol of universal
fellowship - the fellowship of the mind. It recognizes no boundaries or barriers. … You bought
your radio at a store - but, essentially, it was given to you, by a world-wide brotherhood - of men
thinking, and searching, together, for truth.”39 Comfortable behind the microphone, Feinberg
took to Toronto’s airwaves only months after Japan surrendered to the United States to end the
Second World War. For five years Feinberg addressed Torontonians on the merits of cultivating
fraternity and community.
The editorial was another method Feinberg utilized to communicate his ideas and express
his desire for peace in postwar Canada. Beginning November 1, 1951, Feinberg wrote a weekly
editorial in the Jewish Standard entitled “The Rabbi’s Watch-Tower.” Feinberg often used the
newspaper to rebuke Toronto’s “in-groups” for rejecting the notion of ideological brotherhood in
favour of mutual distrust and conflict. One example was the notorious firing of Toronto’s
Symphony Six in 1952. In the midst of Senator McCarthy’s communist witch-hunts in the
United States, six members of Toronto’s Symphony Orchestra (TSO) were fired for having
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supposed ties to communist groups in Canada. Feinberg, a member of the TSO’s Board of
Directors, was the lone dissenting voice, and encouraged the other board members to dismiss the
unsubstantiated accusations against the six members. Feinberg recounted in his next editorial that
he had been “a minority of one”40 because the other members were worried that they too would
be painted with the brush of subversion and communism. After his support of the musicians was
publicized, Feinberg received threatening phone calls, anointing him “Abe Redman” and “Abe
Redberry,” among other, less savoury names. Callers were angry that Feinberg had questioned
Canada and the West’s ideological beliefs and customs. His comments risked upsetting the
postwar stability many Canadians craved and had grown accustomed to after years of conflict.
Feinberg was convinced, however, that loyalty to your fellow citizens was more important than
support for one political ideology or another. The opinions of a few bigoted, small-minded
citizens did not deter Feinberg and he continued to support the dismissed musicians.
Much of Feinberg’s postwar activism was dedicated to achieving racial brotherhood in
Canada. Throughout his years at Holy Blossom Temple, Feinberg was not afraid to highlight
Canada’s broad and wide-ranging cruelty to its non-white population: “Canadian selfrighteousness…closes its eyes to the cruel treatment of Japanese-Canadian citizens during the
war, callous immigration bars against Chinese families, cavalier indifference to the squalid
poverty and educational differences on some Indian reservations and a constant reluctance to
admit West Indians to our shores.”41 In Feinberg’s opinion, race hatred was not only a moral
menace, but a road block to peace. One group that Feinberg felt was under attack and deserved
particular attention was Canada’s black community: the country’s so-called “forgotten minority.”
Feinberg argued that Canada’s treatment of its black population was shameful. When a young
black boy was ejected from a public skating rink in Toronto, Feinberg issued a statement that
both condemned the act and highlighted its hypocrisy. The rabbi “reminded Canadians of other
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Negro boys not ejected from military cemeteries in Holland and dared the Mayor to explain the
differences.”42
On another occasion, Feinberg joined forces with Toronto’s black community and
demanded that the children’s book, Little Black Sambo, be removed from the Toronto Public
School reading list. Feinberg argued that the book’s harmful portrayal of black people was an
obstacle to creating a society based in empathy and fellowship. In support of the ban, Feinberg
informed his congregation: “Little Black Sambo in the public schools encouraged race prejudice
by creating a pattern of Negro minstrel show comicality in the minds of white children, and by
arousing a sense of persecution and emotional insecurity in colored children.”43 The Toronto
School Board’s (TSB) initial response was negative. The Board was keen to protect the rights of
Toronto’s white majority, rather than try to understand how the book negatively affected the
city’s black minority. The TSB eventually decided to ban the book from all its school classrooms
and libraries. Yet, it had taken months, with pressure from many interest groups, including
Feinberg, for the TSB to make its final decision.
It is Feinberg’s work in Dresden, Ontario, however, that best underscores his fight against
racism in postwar Canada. A town of 1700 people, Dresden’s 300 black citizens made up a
significant minority of the population. The black community were subject to a multitude of
restrictions. They were barred from eating at the town’s three restaurants, from getting their hair
cut at any of the five barbershops and salons, and from using the Legion. Journalist Sidney Katz
recounted: “Ironically, Dresden’s chief claim to fame is that it served as the terminus of the
‘underground railway’ granting refuge to scores of Negroes fleeing U.S. slavery 119 years
ago.”44 In 1949 Feinberg travelled to Dresden to interview the town’s citizens, challenge them to
renounce their Jim Crow laws, and encourage them to embrace racial brotherhood. Feinberg’s
mission was not welcomed by the town’s white population. Both the gas station attendant and
clothing store clerk accused him of being a communist “who just want[s] to sell their damn
papers!”45 One grocery store clerk, wearing a bible class button, explained that the townsfolk
were not racist, but were merely committed to capitalism: “We’re for free enterprise not
42
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socialism see? A businessman has the right to pick his own customers.”46 Each person Feinberg
encountered during his stay in Dresden preferred to maintain the era’s racial status quo, rather
than challenge their long-standing beliefs and practices.
On Feinberg’s return to Toronto, several wealthy and influential members of the
congregation at Holy Blossom Temple objected to his Dresden pilgrimage, and opposed his
exercise in racial brotherhood and peace. “Our job is Jews,” they stated. “What have we to do
with the Negro problem?”47 In response, Feinberg explained that Jewish people must embrace all
Canadians and that peace could only be achieved if there was partnership between each and
every race: “A formidable, frightening job — to tear out root and branch the whole psychic
structure reared on centuries of white overlordship and replace it with a constellation of attitudes
adapted to equality. But it must be done, and quickly.”48 Feinberg, moreover, believed that the
Jewish history and experience of racism and exclusion obliged them to help those in need. He
understood that Jews would not be free from prejudice, hate, and conflict, until all people were
free from such bigotry. Many of Feinberg’s congregants, however, supported his vision of peace.
Holy Blossom Temple had a long history of social activism. Feinberg’s predecessor, Rabbi
Maurice N. Eisendrath had also espoused love and brotherhood as the blueprint for peace, and
even had a weekly radio program called “Forum of the Air,” dedicated to social justice.
Ultimately, Feinberg argued that no matter the cause Judaism “must fearlessly champion certain
specific ideals and objectives. One is the absolute and permanent abolition of race-hatred in any
form.”49
Despite his devotion to eradicating racial injustice, the primary focus of Feinberg’s peace
activism in postwar Canada was combatting religious bigotry and promoting ecumenical
brotherhood. According to historian Irving Abella, Canada has a long history of Jewish
persecution, including “hundreds of anti-Semitic incidents that tainted Canadian society in the
years between the [first and second world] wars.”50 Canadian Jews during the interwar period
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were prohibited from public beaches, parks, and from many hotels and restaurants. Abella further
notes that Canadian anti-Semitism was just as bad following the Second World War. Returning
Jewish soldiers and other Jews were systematically discriminated against. The dean of dentistry
at the University Toronto publically stated that “Jews lacked the necessary ‘muscle dexterity’ to
become qualified dentists,”51 while public opinion polls “indicated that the majority of
Canadians preferred almost any type of immigrant – including Germans – to Jews.”52 Combined
with the genocide of approximately six million European Jews from 1939 to 1945, Feinberg,
believed that anti-Semitic forces posed a threat to peace in postwar Canada.
In June 1946 Feinberg addressed his loyal listeners of “The Brotherhood Hour” about the
“fellowship of faiths.” As was his custom, Feinberg’s broadcast left little to interpretation: “The
road to Brotherhood must begin with good will among religions - first.”53 To help strengthen
relations between Jews and Gentiles, Feinberg became the national director of the Canadian
Council for Christians and Jews (CCCJ) in 1947 – an offshoot of the American-based National
Council of Christians and Jews created twenty years earlier. The purpose of the organization was
broad: to eliminate religious prejudice everywhere it existed and in all its forms. Feinberg
believed that the CCCJ could “be a potent instrument for the internal, spiritual oneness of
Canada, a vehicle for the fulfillment of Divine Fatherhood, a bond of peace in a world sinking
into the gulf of discord and enmity.”54 But first Canadians had to recognize and acknowledge
that friction existed among religions in Canada. To help achieve its goal, the CCCJ, in
conjunction with its American counterpart, organized an annual Brotherhood Week. This event
attempted to build bridges between religious groups in Canada through sympathetic newspaper
articles, short films, radio programs, sermons from the pulpit, and presentations in schools and
colleges. Feinberg, however, argued that Brotherhood Week was only the start to spiritual
fraternity. It was not enough for different religions to simply preach love for one another, but
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rather Jews and Gentiles had to actively live in friendship to achieve a peaceful world. Were
Jewish and Christian neighbours courteous and kind to one another? Did they share a meal
during important religious holidays and celebrate their differences? Many Canadian Christians
never accepted Jews as equals or Judaism as equal to Christianity, but Feinberg kept his promise
to eliminate religious prejudice in the postwar world. Canadians were separated by class,
ideology, and race, but Feinberg was determined they would not be divided by religion as well.
The greatest obstacle to Feinberg’s quest for religious brotherhood and vision of peace
was the introduction of religious education in Ontario’s public schools. Proposed by
Conservative Premier and Minister of Education, George A. Drew, the Religious Education
Course or “Drew Plan,” mandated two half-hours of religious instruction per week. The
curriculum guide, Regulations and Programme for Religious Education in the Public Schools,
summarized the purpose of the course and the teacher’s objective: “ [To] bring home to the
pupils as far as their capacity allows, the fundamental principles of Christianity and their bearing
on human life and thought.”55 The implementation of the Drew Plan was widely lauded by
Ontario’s largely Protestant population, and in particular, its Protestant churches. Feinberg,
however, believed that religious education was divisive and a direct barrier to creating a tolerant,
inclusive, long-lasting peaceful society.
Feinberg’s dislike of the Drew Plan was, in part, the result of the ongoing “school
question” in Montreal, Quebec. For decades Jewish children had been forced to attend Protestant
schools and were subject to, as historian Harold Troper notes, “ham-handed Protestant religious
instruction by teachers with missionary zeal.”56 Montreal’s Protestant School Board resented the
presence of Jewish students in its schools, but opposed the creation of a separate Jewish school
board because it meant losing Jewish tax dollars. Protestant schools, as a result, refused to
accommodate the religious needs of its Jewish pupils and continued to impose so-called
“Protestant values” on all of its students. The anti-Semitism of the Protestant School Board,
however, paled in comparison to that of Montreal’s Catholic School Board. The notion that
Jewish students share the classroom with their Catholic peers was consistently opposed by the
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Church hierarchy.
In the face of widespread religious bigotry, Feinberg delivered a sombre sermon to his
congregation at Holy Blossom Temple on February 18, 1945. The sermon was entitled
“Religious Instruction in the Public Schools! The Ontario Plan – Good or Bad?”. The rabbi
began his address in a conciliatory manner:
I take up this issue with extreme reluctance. … Some have charged that the teaching of
dogmatic religion in the public schools has been fashioned with a definite, sinister design to
inculcate the habit of blind faith, as prelude to a Fascist, robotized mind-set. … I do not for a
moment associate the Ontario Plan with such a dark, diabolic purpose.57

Feinberg’s sermon, however, did not condone or support the Drew Plan. Despite his belief that
religion acted as the basis for peace, Feinberg argued that religious education in Ontario’s public
schools was, in fact, an impediment to peace because it acted as a barrier to ecumenical
fellowship: “At a time when barriers between all groups must be lowered if Canadian unity is to
survive, this plan raises them higher between the young, thus erecting more hazards to national
unity in the future.”58 Feinberg continued his attack against the harmful elements of the Drew
Plan in a series of three newspaper articles of the same name. He urged Jewish parents to
unequivocally reject Ontario’s new program of religious education: “The attitude Jewish parents
should take has become crystal-clear and unmistakable. I believe that in the vast majority of
cases, certainly, they should ask exemption for their children.”59 Feinberg’s congregation and
much of Toronto’s Jewish Reform community greeted his sermon and articles warmly, worried
that the Drew Plan would further marginalize the city’s Jewish community.
Feinberg’s quest to have the Drew Plan overturned or repealed was only just beginning.
On September 19, 1945, Feinberg addressed Ontario’s Royal Commission on Education (the
Hope Commission), on behalf of the Canadian Jewish Congress (CJC). The CJC was founded in
1919 and is “widely acknowledged as the political voice of the Canadian Jewish community.”60
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Feinberg declared before the Commission that Judaism and Christianity formed the foundation to
a peaceful, democratic society. But he also believed that religious education was undemocratic
because it could never be taught in an unbiased or accurate manner. Feinberg further argued that
religious education was undemocratic because it violated the separation between church and
state: “Such a course in the curriculum, taught during school hours on school premises…with
public funds, violates the separation of Church and State, which for a century has been
implemented as the basis of an all-Canadian school system in Ontario and the…the fulfillment of
democracy everywhere.”61 Feinberg, more importantly, stated that religious instruction
authorized and directed by the State “divides Canadians into a superior grade, consisting of those
who profess a standardized creed, and an inferior grade obliged to uphold a different
conviction.”62 It was not the state’s job to inculcate religiosity within society, he reasoned, but
the duty of the church, synagogue, and home. Feinberg concluded his introductory remarks by
stating that religious education emphasized differences rather than celebrate community, and as a
result, was divisive and an obstacle to ecumenical brotherhood.
Feinberg continued his report to the Hope Commission by closely examining the flaws
inherent to the Drew Plan. He also began to provide concrete examples to support his claim that
Ontario’s religious education curriculum was harmful. Feinberg once again addressed the
conflict between church and state. Because he and the CJC viewed state-sponsored religious
education as fundamentally undemocratic, they also believed the curriculum to be intrinsically
corrupted by Ontario’s Christian majority. Feinberg reasoned that the Government’s claim
religious instruction would be both “Christian” and “non-denominational” was self-contradictory
and therefore, impossible.
To support his assertions, Feinberg discussed the state-sponsored textbooks written and
published for Ontario’s religious education program. Feinberg argued that the textbooks,
published by Toronto’s Ryerson Press, a subsidiary of the United Church of Canada, perfectly
encompassed the Christian outlook and problematic nature of the Drew Plan. The textbooks, he
writes that “organizations sprouted up everywhere and everyone joined.” [Abella, A Coat of Many
Colours, 147]
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noted, were restricted to teaching the New Testament and failed to properly examine the Old
Testament (Hebrew Bible). Furthermore, the textbooks neglected to explain the importance of
Judaism in relation to Christianity, nor did they encourage ecumenical understanding between
Jew and Gentile. Feinberg had been given the opportunity to review the textbooks prior to the
Hope Commission, but had returned them to the Department of Education unedited: “I refused to
suggest changes in a text-book designed to teach Christianity, because that would have been
presumptuous. In the same spirit I had hoped that the creators of these text-books would not find
it necessary to calumniate Judaism in order to indoctrinate Christianity.”63 Feinberg’s faith in the
editors and Department of Education, however, was not returned and the textbooks were
published as is.
Feinberg was deeply troubled at the textbooks’ many defects, in particular their slander of
Judaism. In front of the Hope Commission, Feinberg reported that Christianity was painted and
portrayed as a superior religion to the inferior Judaism. Feinberg’s first criticism was that each
textbook did not acknowledge Judaism’s foundational importance to Christianity: “According to
the Guides, Jesus’ teaching was entirely novel and superior to contemporary Jewish religion. …
The Guides seem not to be acquainted… [with] the origin of Jesus’ religion in contemporary
Jewish religion.”64 Feinberg was particularly concerned how Judaism was misinterpreted in the
textbooks, specifically in contrast to Christianity. The Grade Three Guide painted Jews as
entitled and selfish: “They (the Jews) entertained no doubt that simply because they were
members of the chosen nation they would be allotted high places in the kingdom, and never
suspected that any change was needed in themselves to meet Him.”65 Feinberg, however, argued
that the claim Jews were greedy and self-centered was categorically false. Judaism prized
generosity and humility, argued Feinberg, citing passages from the Talmud and other religious
texts:
The facts are: Jewish literature is full of references to the great moral and religious effort
necessary to speed up the coming of the Messiah…or to acquire a “share in the World to
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Come” …. The complete inner change of man, called Teshubah…was one of the favourite
subjects of Jewish literature at that time.66

What greater proof could there be to disprove the claims of the textbook than Feinberg himself?
The Hope Commission only had to look a few feet beyond their desks to see the real-life
embodiment of a Jewish leader who actively lived religious brotherhood and peace, attempted to
tackle the social ills of his day, and hoped to create the Kingdom of God on earth.
Feinberg and the CJC pleaded with members of the Hope Commission to offer an
alternative program to non-Christian students, worried that the Drew Plan would encourage antiSemitism in children. The Commission stated that the Drew Plan provided students and
individual teachers with the option to opt-out of religious education: “No pupil shall be required
to take part in any religious exercises or be subject to any instruction in Religious Education to
which objection is raised by his parent or guardian.”67 Feinberg and the CJC, however, argued
that the Exemption Clause only exacerbated the barriers to knowledge and understanding created
by the curriculum: “The provision that pupils may be excused…subjects the children of a small
minority to the embarrassment of excluding themselves from a school exercise in which others
are called upon to share. The excluded child may become the object of reproach and
suspicion.”68 Again, they argued that religious education accentuated differences between
students, creating at the very least, a psychological obstacle between pupils of differing faiths.
By late afternoon their presentation was complete. Feinberg and other officials from the CJC
were satisfied with the audience they had been given, but did not hold out much hope for a
successful resolution to their brief.
The Drew Plan was not repealed. In fact, the regulation was only abolished in 1990.
Feinberg, as a result, continued his crusade against Ontario’s program of religious education in
the years following his report to the Hope Commission. In 1948 Feinberg once again publically
discussed the Drew Plan. Three years had not dissuaded him of the belief that religious education
in Ontario’s public schools was a significant barrier to his vision of peace. On December 12,
1948, Feinberg addressed the crowd at the CJC’s Central Region Conference held in Toronto. He
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declared that teachers were a symbol of truth and accordingly, had the inherent power to shape
their young pupil’s opinions. The rabbi then accused many of Ontario’s teachers of acting as
missionaries and trying to convert their Jewish students to Christianity: “In some instances,
teachers have apparently not been able to resist the opportunity offered by the program for
religious education in public schools to propagandize Christian doctrine among their Jewish
students who do not leave classes during religious instruction.”69 Feinberg’s accusation was
swiftly refuted by Dr. C.C. Golding, Ontario’s Director of Education, who noted: “The majority
of the students are entitled to this instruction, and the minority are protected. There is no attempt
to force the Christian religion down the throats of people of Jewish persuasion.”70
Feinberg did not back down. In late 1949 Feinberg delivered a sermon to his Holy
Blossom congregation entitled, “Religion in the Public Schools of Ontario,” in which he argued
that the missionary spirit of the province’s schools and teachers was alive and well. Feinberg
recounted the story of a Toronto principal who invited the Gideon Bible Society to his school.
Each child, including the Jewish students, were given a bible with their name inscribed inside the
front cover. They were then asked to swear an oath, promising to not only read the bible, but
“pledge to lead a life in Christ.”71 Rather than embrace difference and preach fraternity, the
principal attempted to assimilate the school’s non-Christian population and to remove a central
aspect of their identity. Feinberg argued that this incident was aggressive and hostile. He then
described a letter he had received from a concerned Jewish mother asking for his help and
guidance. Her young daughter had recently returned home from school one afternoon confused.
When asked what she had learned at school that day, the little girl preceded to tell her astonished
mother that the Jews had been responsible for Jesus’ death: “We Jews are bad. We killed Christ.
The teacher read about it from a book.”72 Feinberg used these examples and others to highlight
the anti-Semitism and harm engendered by the Drew Plan. He finished his sermon imploring the
government to be honest about its intentions for the religious curriculum. Feinberg beseeched the
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Ontario government to refer to the Drew Plan by a more accurate name, arguing that the
religious education course should be titled “lessons in Christianity” rather than the “religious
education” it purported to be.73 By doing so, Feinberg reasoned, ecumenical brotherhood would
not be achieved, but at least Jewish pupils would not be deemed irreligious and as a result,
persecuted.
The Government of Ontario rejected Feinberg’s call to respect religious diversity and in
doing so, scorned his positive vision of peace. This setback, however, did not stop him from
actively pursuing a “workable agreement” in the following decades on religious education in
Ontario’s public schools. Nor did it stop his fight for ideological or racial brotherhood. Through
his radio program, editorials, and other forms of activism, Feinberg continued to argue that “race
hatred, social prejudice, [and] religious bigotry, are the infections that eat away the fibres of
peace;”74 and that it was everyone’s duty to ensure that all people were placed on an equal
footing before the law. Nonetheless, there were inconsistencies in his vision of peace that
brotherhood provided the path to a better world. His thinking, and some of his actions, contained
the “very contradictions” his vision sought to overcome.
Due to Feinberg’s outspoken nature it was not unusual for him to make enemies. His postwar
peace activism, in particular, his defense of Toronto’s Symphony Six and Dresden’s black
minority had inspired much public backlash. The greatest criticism of Feinberg in the early
postwar period, however, was his relentless quest for religious brotherhood.75 His vision of peace

73

Ibid.
Radio talk – “The Common Man – Where Brotherhood Begins,” Abraham L. Feinberg, Feinberg fonds,
Volume 1, file – “Radio Talks, April 27/47, The Common Man – Where Brotherhood Begins.”
75
The worst attack on Feinberg occurred following his retirement from Holy Blossom Temple. By the
1960s, peace had become associated with communism. As chairman of Toronto’s Committee for
Disarmament, Feinberg was regularly criticized by Canadians for his peace activism. In 1964, Canadian
white-supremacist, David Stanley, published a pamphlet entitled, The Red Rabbi. The pamphlet contained
hateful, anti-Semitic statements that connected Feinberg’s Jewish faith and peace activism to
communism: “For over twenty years [Rabbi Feinberg has] constantly worked with others of his race for
the destruction of Christianity and Western Civilization. … Feinberg often displays the schizoid paranoia
common with his tribe…[and] is now the Kremlin’s Number One fellow traveler. Khrushchev has
promised to bury us, and Rabbi Feinberg is helping to dig the grave.” [Pamphlet – “The Red Rabbi,” by
David Stanley, Feinberg papers, Series B – Correspondence and Miscellaneous RE: Activities M-Storm,
1952-1984 (Box 8), file – MSS COL #588, “The Red Rabbi,” pamphlet by David Stanley, and
correspondence, 1964-1968, 8/11.] Although a minority of Canadians agreed with the sentiments
contained within Stanley’s pamphlet, most found the material despicable.
74

66
highlighted Canadian society’s institutionalized anti-Semitism, its intolerance of the “Other,” and
its reluctance to challenge the status quo. On Friday, December 1, 1950, Feinberg delivered a
sermon on the potential harm of singing Christmas carols in public schools. Christmas carols
were not an acknowledged component of the Drew Plan, but Feinberg’s criticism was guided by
his belief that singing carols was sectarian and thus, proselytizing and divisive:
The elaborate observance of the Christmas holiday in public schools represents a serious
compromise with principle. The public schools are not designed as instruments for the
teaching of religion. They are supported by all elements of the population ... Any
intrusion…however slight, violates the principle and purpose of the public school, which is
dedicated to the fellowship of children of every race and creed and to the construction of a
unified community in a democratic society.76

Feinberg’s sermon was published in the Globe and Mail. Condemnation for the rabbi’s
comments came fast and swift. Some complainants, such as Ward Two Trustee, Dr. E.R. Hardy,
argued that the majority of Canadians were Christians and could express their beliefs in any way
they saw fit, no matter the hurt it caused minorities: “This sort of thing disgusts me. After all,
this is a Christian country. If we were to go into the new country of Israel…we would not expect
them to take their festivals and observances out of the schools because we were there.”77 Trustee
E.L. Roxborough complained: “It is nothing less than nerve for Rabbi Feinberg – a man who has
been treated very well since he came to Toronto – to demand that we now drive Christmas out of
our schools.”78 Historian Harold Troper notes that Hardy’s and Roxborough’s response to
Feinberg reflected the opinion of many Canadians, who continued to view Jews as “outsiders” in
postwar Canada: “Many held fast to a vision of Canada as both a Christian society and an
outpost of British values in North America. On both counts Jews failed to measure up.”79
The most hurtful remarks towards Feinberg came from within Canada’s conservative and
orthodox Jewish communities. Leading the charge were three orthodox rabbis from Toronto:
Abraham A. Price, Gedaliah Felder, and Erwin Schild. The three men condemned their fellow
rabbi in no uncertain terms: “We wish to disassociate ourselves most emphatically from Rabbi
Feinberg’s statement and to point out that in this matter Rabbi Feinberg expresses only his
76

“Celebration Undemocratic, Keep Yule Out of School: Feinberg,” The Globe and Mail, December 2,
1950.
77
News clipping – “Reply to Rabbi Defend School Yule Exercises,” Toronto Daily Star, December 2,
1950, Feinberg CJA, file – “Press Clippings II.”
78
Ibid.
79
Troper, The Defining Decade, 8.

67
personal views. … [He] does not and cannot act as the spokesman or representative of Judaism
or of the Jewish citizens of Toronto.”80 The cruelest attack against Feinberg, however, came
from Ben Tovim of the Hebrew Journal. Tovim accused the rabbi of hypocrisy, arguing that
Feinberg’s statement about Christmas carols contradicted his vision for peace: “I…disagree with
the rabbi’s remarks…with all due respect to his office and to his convictions it must be said that
he has done a great disservice to the Jewish community. He has done irreparable damage to the
cause of good relations between Jew and Christian.”81 Tovim’s editorial, much to Feinberg’s
annoyance, directly questioned the rabbi’s commitment to brotherhood and whether or not he
was as intolerant as those he criticized. Troper again acknowledges that the three rabbis and
Tovim’s responses were typical of the era. Many Jews in the 1940s and 1950s felt immense
pressure to “tone down their Jewishness as the price of admission”82 to Canadian society.
In the face of increasing public animosity, Feinberg delivered another sermon that
attempted to explain the purpose of his original address. He had not actually suggested banning
Christmas carols from public schools. Canadian citizens, however, had made up their minds and
his second sermon had little effect on public opinion. Toronto’s Christian clergy and press took
the stance that the majority equaled right and consequently, that there was no need to
accommodate the city’s religious minority. They bristled at Feinberg’s suggestion they change or
adapt their established cultural and religious customs. And rather than disturb the status quo, the
majority of the city’s Jewish community hoped their silent acquiescence to insensitive social
practices would help ingratiate themselves with the Christian majority, and thus, offer them
greater opportunities in the future.
Was there any truth to Tovim’s accusations that Feinberg’s spirit of brotherhood and vision
of peace contained flaws and inconsistencies? Central to Feinberg’s memoir is the Yiddish
colloquialism: “Es is schver tau zein a Yeed…It is hard to be a Jew.”83 Jews have been
mistreated, the target of prejudiced laws and violent attacks throughout much of history. There is
no better example of this hatred against Jews than the Holocaust, during which most of
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Feinberg’s family that remained in Lithuania were murdered by the Nazis and their collaborators.
Feinberg was keenly aware that many people, including Canadians, were trying to forget the
horrors of the Second World War and still viewed Jewish people as “a problem.” In part, it was
this postwar amnesia that motivated Feinberg’s postwar peace activism. Feinberg was forced to
ask himself an important question once the war had ended: “If we are not for ourselves, who will
be for us?”84 If Jews did not demand justice for themselves, then who would?
This question reveals an important dichotomy between the concepts of love and justice
within Judaism, and consequently, the struggle between love and justice in Feinberg’s concept of
brotherhood. Feinberg was not an absolute pacifist and believed that “there are times when we
must fight back for survival.”85 He believed self-defense was a duty. Feinberg’s approach to war
and peace was not unique, but similar to that of other rabbis, who also argued that war was evil,
but could not be rejected altogether. These statements hint at the limits of love and fellowship
within Feinberg’s vision of peace. They also emphasize the importance the two concepts play
within Jewish history and Judaism. Without justice, Feinberg reasoned, love was a hollow,
abstract concept:
The charge has often been made that Judaism believes in stern justice alone, as the demand
of a vengeful God. Many passages from the Hebrew Bible are quoted to prove the cruelty
and vindictiveness. … True Judaism has never neglected justice in its hierarchy of values. …
But neither has it forgotten that love is the final seal and sign of God’s presence. The two
complement each other. Love is vague and sentimental unless it has the sure, hard instrument
of justice in its hand.86

One might argue, however, that Feinberg’s concept of justice in the immediate postwar years
was “arrogant” or without love.
Feinberg’s vision of peace was not devoted solely “to breaking down barriers in
Canadian society.”87 The rabbi also applied his notion of community to international relations,
just as many other peace activists had done for a century. Yet, in regard to postwar Germany and
the creation of the new State of Israel, Feinberg’s belief in fraternity was at odds with his concept
of justice. His stipulation to “Love Thy Neighbour” did not extend internationally to those who
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had wronged the Jewish community. Feinberg’s vision, consequently, became exclusive rather
than inclusive and a barrier to peace.
Feinberg’s first trip to Germany after the Second World War was in 1949. He returned
the next year for a follow-up visit, and on both occasions toured Dachau concentration camp
outside of Munich. Following each trip, Feinberg returned to Toronto feeling an acute sense of
sadness and grief. He did all in his power to “hate the sin, not the sinner” as the Talmud
instructed. But years later Feinberg recounted the struggle within himself in the wake of these
trips: “The persistence of this lachrymose mood caused me deep distress. If I began to despise
Germans in general, as a group, my soul would be anathematized by the Nazi curse no less than
the bodies of the Dachau martyrs were powdered by it.”88 Regardless of his desire for
brotherhood with Germans, there were instances when hate overpowered love. Feinberg was
convinced that Germany and the Soviet Union would form an aggressive military alliance
because Germany was only interested in power, and its citizens, at heart, were still Nazis.
“Germany is an old nation, dedicated to militarism and racial prejudice. It is arrogant and
completely unrepentant — a menace to the future of the world,” Feinberg wrote scathingly.
“Germans still walk with a click of the heels, and I have no confidence in their interest in
democracy.”89 Feinberg’s harsh remarks were published in a newspaper article ironically
entitled, “Need of Brotherhood to End Misunderstanding Emphasized by Rabbi.” His comments
highlight the type of racial thinking he hoped to eradicate in regard to Canada’s First Nations,
Asian, and Black communities. Even though Feinberg was adamant that brotherhood was
essential to achieve peace, his statements could only stifle the unity and love he demanded from
others.
On August 15, 1954, The Jewish Standard published Feinberg’s latest editorial, “West
Germany, Eleven Questions That Demand a Reply.” The eleven questions posed by Feinberg
included seven about Germany’s Jewish population and their relationship with the country’s nonJewish citizens:
(1) Are Germans generally repentant about their deeds under Hitler? (2) Is Nazism dead —
or being revived? (3) How do Germans feel about Jews? (4) Is the reparations agreement
with Israel and world Jewry being fulfilled in a mutually-cooperative spirit? (5) What
88
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about the Jews now living in Germany? (6) What are the chances for the resumption of
diplomatic relations between Germany and Israel? (7) How does the average German
react to the War Crimes trials at Nuremberg, and imprisoned war criminals?90

West Germany’s postwar government had resolved to compensate its Jewish population on many
fronts. In 1952 a deal was signed between representatives of Israel and West Germany on
reparations for Nazi crimes against Jews. In addition to financial restitution, the Bonn
Government rebuilt synagogues, created hospitals and old-age homes for its Jewish citizens,
created laws to prohibit anti-Semitism, and confronted German neo-Nazis relentlessly. Feinberg,
however, remained skeptical and somewhat cynical about Germany’s moral rehabilitation.
In the summer of 1959 he once again travelled to Germany hoping to find an atmosphere
of collective guilt and the population full of self-reproach. The purpose of Feinberg’s trip to
West Germany was to write a series of six articles for The Globe and Mail on his impressions,
observations, and experiences. An appropriate title for his forthcoming series would have been,
“I had some difficult moments.” His first article began in a courteous tone: “Germans are human
— only more so. … In fact, they are gracious and friendly. Nowhere does a tourist meet a more
charming people.”91 The article, however, soon revealed the troubling images that ordinary,
everyday life in Germany conjured in Feinberg’s mind. He reported that many of his daily
activities evoked pictures of the former Nazi leadership and the crematorium found at German
concentration camps: “A pudgy Bavarian village innkeeper who was my host one night looked
and waddled like Goering, and when he patted the blond curls of his little daughters I beheld
Hitler’s Number Two man fondling his dogs after a tour of the gas chambers.”92 The tone of the
other five articles was similarly dark and depressing. Feinberg was disappointed that most West
Germans he met did not share in the responsibility of the previous Nazi Government, although
some people were remorseful and embarrassed. To forget the past, as Feinberg claimed Germans
were doing, would have dire consequences: “The refusal of the average German to confront

90

Editorial – “West Germany, Eleven Questions That Demand a Reply: From a Rabbi’s Watch-tower,”
by Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg, The Jewish Standard, August 15, 1954, Feinberg fonds, Volume 3, file –
“Watch Tower, Aug. 15, 1954, West Germany Eleven Questions That Demand a Reply.”
91
Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg, “Could be Wiser for Jews to Forget, But Being Human, They Can’t…,”
The Globe and Mail, September 25, 1959.
92
Ibid. Other examples of images that flashed through Feinberg’s mind included: comparing his clean
hotel room in Frankfurt with the ovens at Dachau and the hairstyle of a matron that reminded him of the
human hair stored at Auschwitz.

71
himself and to grapple with the enormity of the Hitler period, his failure to absorb the
‘undigested past,’ has left a vacuum. Into that vacuum the barbaric credo of the past has begun to
penetrate.”93 Feinberg tried to focus on forgiveness and forging a relationship rooted in
brotherhood, but could not move beyond his feeling that Germany’s and Europe’s Jews had not
received justice and never would. His trip to Germany in the summer of 1959 did not change his
earlier view that the country and its people were fundamentally militaristic, and would always
pose a threat to the world. Feinberg’s vision of peace, as a result, excluded Germans.
Feinberg’s desire for Jewish justice in the postwar period was not confined to Germany,
but extended to the new State of Israel. At the beginning of the Second World War, Canadian
Zionists adopted a “militant approach” to fund a Jewish state in Palestine, sparked by Germany’s
treatment of Europe’s Jews. The United Zionist Council, previously known as the Zionist
Organization of Canada, launched a series of nation-wide fundraising and public relations
campaigns. One such campaign in 1948 was so successful that it raised approximately 10 million
dollars. Irving Abella writes that this was a dramatic about-face for Canada’s Reform movement,
which prior to the war denounced the CJC and other Jewish organizations for their “militant
Zionism”94 – although the country’s conservative and orthodox sects had long supported the
Zionist cause.
The renewed Canadian interest in Jewish (or Zionist) internationalism pleased Feinberg
greatly. As he noted in a 1972 article for the Globe and Mail, upon his arrival in Toronto in
1943, “I espoused Israel’s independence militantly in word and act.”95 Feinberg was a life-long
Zionist. His early enthusiasm for Zionism, however, is somewhat surprising. The leaders of
America’s Reform movement, like their Canadian counterparts, had condemned Zionism during
the interwar years. Nonetheless, Feinberg had long been inspired by the growing “Jewish
consciousness” of the early twentieth century. In 1928 Feinberg arranged a trip to Palestine and
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traversed the Valley of Jezreel on foot and horseback. This adventure to the Holy Land was the
culmination of a boyhood dream to visit the ancient Jewish homeland and to one day see it
renewed for its people.
Because he was committed to Jewish internationalism, it was Feinberg’s fervent belief
that the world’s Jews were a “barometer for the moral health or sickness of mankind.”96 His
vision of peace would not be realized until Israel had become an independent nation-state. It is
thus reasonable to conclude that Feinberg, especially in regard to his Zionism and the State of
Israel, believed that the twin issues of justice and peace were conflated: “Zionism is not a
contradiction of the mission ideal, but its fulfilment; the return to, and rejuvenation of, the
homeland is an instrument for universal service.”97 Feinberg, like Mazzini, Wilson, and countless
other peace activists before him, saw no irony in the compatibility of Israeli nationalism with
international co-operation and peace. The fulfillment of the Jewish State of Israel was akin to the
realization of Feinberg’s hope for international justice and his vision of brotherhood.
Feinberg was understandably ecstatic when Israeli independence was declared on May
15, 1948. He addressed the religious school of Holy Blossom Temple the following morning and
hailed the country’s birth. But war had broken out with its Arab neighbours over their objection
to Israel’s declaration of independence. Feinberg condemned the war and urged the nations to
put their weapons down. He counselled the region’s Jewish and Arab populations to embrace
religious harmony and accord: “May Islam and Israel, emancipated from oppression by others
and from suspicion between themselves, learn to link their destinies together, bound…by the ties
of ancient cultural kinship, by the realization of their common fate - and by mutual
understanding and brotherhood.”98 Feinberg’s tune, however, quickly changed. Without a speedy
resolution to the war, Feinberg’s plea for unity soon gave way to his incitement for stern justice
on behalf of Israel. He warned that the war in Palestine would not be a repeat of the Holocaust
and that Israel’s citizens would continue to fight with every fibre of their beings: “One stark fact
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must be recognized. The Jews in Palestine will not permit themselves to be slaughtered like
sheep.”99 Although justice did not always mean taking up arms, Feinberg believed in this case,
Israel was justified in doing so. These actions, however, negated any possibility of building a
Middle Eastern region steeped in religious fellowship and comradery.
As the war continued, Feinberg used history to defend Israel’s claim to Palestine.
Jerusalem, for example, has been the spiritual home to the Jewish people since the tenth century
BCE. But adherents of Islam and Christianity can also lay claim to the land, both of whom
consider the region sacred to their faiths as well. Historian Neil Caplan points out this shared
commonality between Judaism and Islam, and explains how each religion tries to use history to
their advantage: “Both sides evoke and reconstruct a largely mythical past, handed down through
generations by written texts and oral tradition, in order to prove that their ancestors were there
‘first’, that their forbears and descendants controlled the territory for extended periods of time,
and/or that the land in question was promised to them by God.”100 Palestine’s Arab population
made the same historical arguments as Feinberg to justify their presence in and ownership of the
region. Even Feinberg had to admit that while there was a connection between the people (Jews)
and the land (Palestine), the links between the two, at times, were tenuous: “Jews did not dwell
exclusively in Palestine, even during the six centuries before the conquest [70 CE]. … In the
period of Jesus, it is likely that two-thirds of the Jewish people lived outside the land.”101
Feinberg’s admission that Jewish people, even a majority, lived outside of ancient Palestine,
gives some credence to Arab objections over the new State of Israel. And if Jews could claim
ancestry of the region despite not living there, so could Muslim Arabs.
In other arguments over Israel, Feinberg never failed to mention that the United Nations
(UN) had been responsible for the state’s formation. The United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed a year prior to Israel’s independence. Despite only hearing
testimony from non-Palestinian Arabs (the Committee was boycotted by Arab Palestinian
leaders), UNSCOP recommended that Palestine be partitioned into two states: one Jewish, the
other Arab. The Jewish state would compromise 55% of the territory and its population would
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consist of approximately 500,000 Jews and 400,000 Arabs.102 Despite vehement protestations
from the region’s Arab leaders and population, the UN General Assembly approved UNSCOP’s
proposals (Resolution 181) by a vote of 33 in favour, 13 opposed, and 10 abstentions. Feinberg
was convinced that a new State of Israel would be, at long last, the affirmation of the November
2, 1917, Balfour Declaration. He argued, in line with the Declaration, that the formation of Israel
would establish “in Palestine a ‘National Home for the Jewish People’ without infringing on ‘the
civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities.’”103
The UN vote continued a historic pattern of extensive discord between Jewish and Arab
settlers in Palestine, and proved impossible to overcome. In an effort to protect their country, the
Israeli government frequently infringed on the civil or religious rights of its non-Jewish citizens,
reinforcing an existing atmosphere of tension, hostility, and conflict. Feinberg, however, argued
that Arabs should embrace the UN’s decision to partition the region, especially those who would
now live in Israel. He addressed his listeners of “The Brotherhood Hour” on the first anniversary
of Israel’s independence. Feinberg told his audience that Arab Palestinians should feel lucky and
fortunate to live beside and amongst its Jewish neighbours – highlighting his prejudice: “My
friends, the State of Israel, is the most dramatic and constructive event in the first half of the
twentieth century. It will salvage the Near East for the Arab people themselves, who have been
ground into indiscernible poverty and servitude.”104 Feinberg then returned to the theme of
fraternity to woo Israel’s Arab neighbours. He argued that Israel’s foundation was Judaism and
as a result, the country and its government embodied the virtues of love, forgiveness, and
inclusivity: “The State of Israel will preserve peace to the uttermost degree … [and] will point
the way to a better way and wider brotherhood.105 Feinberg’s opinion, however, was clearly
biased and he viewed the conflict in the Middle East through a narrow lens. Many people in the
region, particularly those Arabs whose rights had been denied, did not view Israel as a symbol of
brotherhood or the path toward international co-operation and security.
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Feinberg was quick to condemn those who he felt were an obstacle to Israel’s existence.
More often than not he accused the country’s Arab neighbours of unrestrained savagery and
consequently, blamed them for the continuation of discord in the region. Israel was a peaceloving nation dedicated to freedom, while its Arab neighbours were militaristic and repressive.
He was proud that “tiny” Israel, in the name of “international morality” had defeated its larger,
Arab enemies in the war of 1948-1949. Palestinian Arabs, Feinberg further argued, practiced
“barbarism”106 against the region’s Jewish population. To substantiate his claims Feinberg wrote
a contemptuous editorial about a violent and inexcusable incident that occurred in 1953. Israeli
citizens crossed into Jordan and killed 50 Arab residents in the town of Kibya. Feinberg’s
editorial condemned the murders, but only half-heartedly: “This punitive, primitive act against
the inhabitants of Kibya can be explained, but not excused! It was a physical tragedy for the
probably-innocent Arab victims at Kibya.”107 The editorial soon lost all semblance of
impartiality: Feinberg used the tragedy as an excuse to accuse Arab Palestinians of theft and
murder. He argued that Arab cries for justice at Kibya were an effort to cover-up their own
infiltrations into Israeli territory and an attempt to exploit world opinion: “Arab governments
intend…to undermine the morale of Israel by terror…and to provoke them into retaliation;
then…Arab diplomats could direct the world’s righteous condemnation against the Jews!”108
Feinberg blamed the victims for their own deaths and concluded that Israel had done everything
in its power to foster an environment conducive to unity and to attain peace. The Arab
governments, in contrast, had rejected negotiations in favour of maintaining antagonism between
the two sides. The only solution, Feinberg proposed, was “to insist that the Arabs demonstrate
maturity, and adjust themselves to Israel, and sit down at a peace conference.”109 More than any
other event in the Middle East, the Kibya incident reveals the contradictions within Feinberg’s
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vision of peace. Shaped by his childhood, the Holocaust, and many other anti-Semitic events,
Feinberg struggled to include all people and nations in his brotherhood of man.
One man who provided a more unbiased view of the Middle East in the postwar period
was Canadian General E.L.M. “Tommy” Burns. General Burns was the Chief of Staff for the
United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), initially formed in Palestine
following the war in 1949. From August 1954 to November 1956, his primary role as Chief of
the UNTSO was to act as a mediator between the two sides to ensure their fragile truce. Burns
immediately adopted an air of impartiality towards Jew and Arab alike upon his arrival in
Palestine. But as his book, Between Arab and Israeli (1963) revealed, this balanced view was
difficult to achieve: “Before I had been long in the Middle East, I learned that no matter how
hard one tried to be objective and impartial, if one accepted the views of one side on any matter,
the other side accused one of partiality.”110 During his time in the Middle East, both Jew and
Arab charged Burns with being biased on multiple occasions.
The General’s papers, observations, and experiences from Palestine repudiate many of
Feinberg’s assertions about Israel’s desire for brotherhood and its peaceful nature. Burns’
historical records, for example, refute Feinberg’s claim that Israeli colonists were simply goaded
into retaliation. The Chief of the UNTSO reveals that retaliation was central to Israeli military
strategy and policy in the region: “[Israeli General Moshe] Dayan calculates that the Arabs,
seeing themselves helpless to counter the drastic Israeli military retaliations, would be forced to
realize that they must make peace with Israel. If General Dayan and other Israeli political and
military leaders really believed that such a result would come about, they gravely
miscalculated.”111 Israel’s policy of retaliation only resulted in further retaliation and ensured
that the “professed peace” claimed by both sides never came to fruition. Burns’ papers also
suggest Feinberg’s statement that peace eluded the Middle East because of Arab unwillingness to
negotiate a treaty with Israel is false. Israeli officials were often loathe to negotiate with the other
side, as were their Arab counterparts. Israel openly disregarded the advice of Burns and other
UN mediators in Palestine throughout his tenure as Chief of UNTSO. On one occasion, Burns
scribbled a telling note in preparation for a meeting with UN representatives: “Israel has
withdrawn from MAC [Mixed Armistice Commission] meetings and refuses UNMO
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investigations, but still submits complaints.”112 These examples highlight the inconsistencies in
both Israel’s and Feinberg’s respective visions of peace.
Burns did agree with Feinberg, however, on one point. Although the rabbi was blinded to
Israel’s shortcomings, Burns concurred that the Arab governments were equally responsible for
the breakdown in peace negotiations. On November 1, 1954, an organized group of Egyptians
crossed into Israeli territory, laid explosives, and blew up two houses. In January 1955 another
group of armed Egyptians crossed the demarcation line and attacked two Israeli tractor drivers,
killing one of them. Burns quickly condemned the Egyptians under the General Armistice
Agreements signed in 1949 and explained to Egyptians officials that their commandos’ actions
were deplorable: “I felt that what the Egyptians were doing in sending these men, whom they
dignified with the name of ‘Fedayeen’…into another country with the mission to attack men,
women, and children indiscriminately was a war crime.”113 Burns also condemned Israel because
on both occasions they had retaliated to the earlier provocation. It is clear that neither side
showed restraint: one violent act after another was committed in the name of peace. And both
sides consciously acted to block the peace process. UN observers were prohibited from doing
their jobs, while national sovereignty was fiercely protected. Both Israel and its Arab neighbours
ultimately believed they were in the right, and contested the other’s devotion to peace.
Feinberg once wrote: “Yesterday is necessary but it cannot displace today or dictate
tomorrow.”114 Throughout his life Feinberg emphasized both the present and the future. He
tackled the social ills of his day with vigor. His peace activism engaged with current events and
he did not hide behind centuries of dogma and custom like many other religious leaders. Yet it
was history, in particular the Holocaust and the atomic bombings of Japan, that informed
Feinberg’s desire for justice for Germany’s Jews and the new State of Israel, and that shaped his
postwar quest for brotherhood and peace among Canada’s different races and religions.
In 1961 Rabbi Abraham L. Feinberg retired from Holy Blossom Temple, but his peace activism
did not end. Feinberg campaigned for nuclear disarmament, protested the Vietnam War, and
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fought for Grey Lib, the promotion and protection of rights for senior citizens. He even returned
to the airwaves in the late 1970s, hosting the radio program “Grey Lib Plus” for more than two
years. The bedrock of his legacy, however, is his early postwar activism. To ensure that fascism
never again reared its ugly head, or that the world did not succumb to nuclear disaster, Feinberg
explained that peace required brotherhood: “This peace that is so important can only be achieved
when men practice Brotherhood. Thus for those who want peace — to you I say “Brotherhood”
is essential.”115 Brotherhood as the blueprint for peace had a long history. Some activists felt that
free trade would lead to greater fraternity, while others believed the formation of
intergovernmental organizations would foster co-operation between states and thus, end conflict.
Feinberg’s concept of brotherhood was rooted in Judaism. Inspired by his faith to create the
Kingdom of God on earth, Feinberg defined the term “social activist clergyman.”116 He took to
the airwaves, wrote editorials, chaired organizations, and preached from the pulpit. Feinberg
challenged the country’s institutionalized racism and religious intolerance, but in particular,
tackled Canada’s widespread anti-Semitism.
Feinberg, however, struggled to achieve his vision of peace in postwar Canada. Many
Canadians opposed his call to upend the nation’s existing racial and religious hierarchies, and
were reluctant to confront and then remove “structural violence” from society. Feinberg often
received letters from the public telling him to stick to religion and to stop meddling in politics.
The rabbi wore the insults and name-calling as a badge of honour. Some Canadians also opposed
his Jewish internationalism and decried his unwavering defense of Israel. Citizens criticized his
inability to forgive Germany. In spite of any contradictions in his vision of peace, Feinberg had a
positive impact on peace in postwar Canada. His fight for racial and religious brotherhood forced
Canadians, but in particular, Torontonians, to challenge society’s institutionalized bigotry.
Feinberg returned to the United States in the late 1960s, confident that Canadian Jews were
viewed by their neighbours not only as citizens, but as fellow human beings: “Jews are
wonderful and terrible, good and bad, brilliant and stupid, material and spiritual, vulgar and
cultured, beautiful and ugly, gifted and commonplace - in brief, people.”117 Feinberg was
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impressed with the ability of most Canadians to think and act maturely: willing to discard
previously held prejudices and welcome ideas that differed from their own.
Feinberg was not the only individual in postwar Canada with a vision of peace that
differed from that of the Canadian government and the majority of Canadians. Yet, his case
study provides a compelling lens in which to view and understand the postwar peace movement.
Many Canadian peace activists would also embrace religion and the concept of internationalism
as critical to achieving a peaceful world. Similarly, their visions of peace would challenge
traditional Canadian values and consequently, would be dismissed by the government and public
alike. The next individual explored in this study also defied social conventions and was
subsequently ridiculed by most segments of Canadian society. He viewed medical
internationalism and the newly formed United Nations as Canada’s, and the world’s, best hope
for peace. Unlike Feinberg, however, his vision of peace was entirely secular.
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Chapter 2
George Brock Chisholm: An Iconoclastic Peace, 1945-1965
Dr. George Brock Chisholm was born on May 18, 1896, in Oakville, Ontario. He led a
remarkable life that included a storied career in the field of medicine. By the late 1930s,
Chisholm had become a nationally and internationally recognized leader in the burgeoning fields
of psychiatry and social medicine. In a nine-year span (1939-1948), Chisholm went from
establishing Toronto’s first private psychotherapy clinic to becoming the first director-general of
the World Health Organization (WHO), one of the United Nations’ (UN) most important new
agencies. During the intervening nine years, Chisholm was also Director-General of the
Canadian Army Medical Services during the Second World War and Deputy Minister of Health
in Canada’s Liberal government under Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King.
In spite of these high-profile appointments, the common refrain from Chisholm’s three
biographers is that the “good doctor” is forgotten by most Canadians. For medical historian John
Farley, Chisholm’s so-called absence from Canada’s history is a “national disgrace.”1 If
Chisholm is remembered by Canadians, it is as a “grinch,” rather than an esteemed doctor who
played an important role forming and protecting the world’s health during the postwar and early
Cold War period. In 2010, The Globe and Mail published a list compiled by Smithsonian
magazine outlining history’s “Top ten real-life Grinches.” Chisholm had the dubious distinction
to be ranked number one on the list: “In 1945, the Canadian psychiatrist and first director-general
of the World Health Organization said believing in Santa Claus makes children ‘easy meat for
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demagogues and mob orators.’”2 The Smithsonian list referenced a 1945 speech delivered by
Chisholm to parents and teachers at Rockliffe Public School in Ottawa in which he discussed
strategies to achieve peace in the new atomic age. His speech, which challenged one of Canada’s
foremost symbols and traditions, caused a wave of outrage across the country. For the remainder
of his life, Chisholm was remembered as a “Grinch:” even the doctor’s obituaries written thirty
years after his infamous speech, included candid references to his rejection of Santa Claus.
Lost from the historical discussion of Chisholm is his visionary peace activism. Chisholm
was one of Cold War Canada’s foremost peace activists. In the absence of a strong organized
peace movement in the mid-1940s, Chisholm embraced the UN and argued that the
intergovernmental organization offered the best chance to achieve a peaceful world. Many
Canadians also viewed the UN as a panacea for the world’s problems and shared Chisholm’s
hope that the organization would help maintain international peace. As a leading practitioner of
psychosomatic health, Chisholm believed that sound mental health lay at the root of a peaceful
world. Chisholm travelled across Canada and the world to speak to fellow psychiatrists,
educators, universities, public institutions, and parents on the intrinsic connection between
mental health and peace: “Ill health…is not only a result of war, it may also be a potent factor in
the causation of war. … Physical, mental and social wellbeing are not separable.”3 To avert illhealth, and thus war, Chisholm argued that people, but in particular children, had to develop into
mature world citizens. Chisholm, like many other Cold War policy makers, believed “children
were at the symbolic heart to reconstruct…[the world] in the aftermath of the Second World
War.”4 Consequently, Chisholm argued that children must be taught to make international
concerns a priority, rather than focus on local or national matters.
Chisholm’s vision of peace, however, was contentious, as was his “prescription” to
achieve his vision. Raised in a strict Presbyterian family, Chisholm became anti-religious as an
adult and argued that religion caused psychological problems that led directly to war. He
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believed that organized religion’s system of principles and values that dictated an individual’s
conduct (i.e. morality), was responsible for creating a prejudiced and bigoted society. Chisholm
was adamant that children should not be taught, or “indoctrinated,” with the same intolerant
belief system that had characterized both his and previous generations. As a result, Chisholm’s
vision of peace challenged many of Cold War Canada’s Christian values and institutions, and
rejected the notion that religion provided the path to peace. This same negative attitude toward
organized religion also proved an impediment to peace when Chisholm led the WHO, constantly
clashing with the Catholic Church over policy. Labelled an iconoclast by the Canadian
government, media, and Church alike, Chisholm’s peace activism was largely dismissed as that
of a crank. As a result, Chisholm’s visionary conception of peace as mental health quickly
disappeared from the country’s popular and Cold War imagination.
To understand why Chisholm believed mental health was critical to preserving peace, it is
necessary to first explore his early life and the evolution of the medical profession in the late
nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. Chisholm decided to become a doctor at a young age,
accompanying his uncle Dr. Justus Williams on house calls at the age of six. At this time,
medicine had already become an established “international endeavour.” Students throughout the
Western world flocked to new medical schools in North and Central Europe, and the United
States. The International Congress of Medicine, founded in 1867, met annually and the Index
Medicus was formed in 1879, cataloguing medical books and articles from across the world.
Scholar Andrew Scull notes that during this period “a self-conscious and organized group of
professionals…laid claim to jurisdiction over mental disturbance.”5 These doctors hoped to use
their training, expertise, and the concept of medical internationalism to make the world a better
place.
The importance, however, that Chisholm placed on the relationship between peace and
psychiatry stemmed from his participation in the First World War. As Scull writes: “On 28 July
1914, the world went mad. Or rather, Europe went mad and soon made sure that the rest of the
world shared in its insanity.”6 Chisholm enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) in
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1915 and ended the war as a decorated officer, winning two Military Crosses. He fought with the
48th Highlanders at Mount Sorrel, Hill 70, Vimy Ridge, Amiens, and the Canal du Nord.
Chisholm witnessed the psychological toll of artillery bombardment and battle on a soldier’s
mental health. Yet it was an event during his first few nights in France that stuck with Chisholm
for the remainder of his life:
He [Chisholm] was shocked and intrigued when he found himself looking after a fellow
soldier who was intoxicated; his amazement increased when this same man got tight again
and repeated the performance night after night. Soon realizing that this was typical behaviour
for many servicemen, he wondered why so many found it necessary to tamper with their
most important weapon — the mind.7

Chisholm came to the conclusion that behavioural patterns, in particular, what he considered to
be irrational behaviour, like drunkenness and war, were symptoms of mental and emotional
sickness.
Chisholm returned to Canada in 1919 and enrolled in medical school at the University of
Toronto. He graduated in 1924 and spent the next six years as a general practitioner in Oakville,
Ontario. Chisholm was happily married, professionally successful, and physically healthy. But
he was plagued by nightmares, the result of his wartime experiences: “I was extremely emotional
all through Varsity. It was the shock of all I had experienced during the war, coming on top of a
narrow Presbyterian upbringing.”8 After years of disturbing dreams, Chisholm committed in
1930 to specialize in psychiatry. The experience of Chisholm and other veterans of the First
World War had, to an extent, legitimized and popularized the field of psychiatry during the
interwar years. It was now understood that significant trauma often precipitated or contributed to
poor mental health. Psychiatric units were integrated into hospitals in an effort to remove the
stigma often attached to those who suffered from mental illness,9 and Sigmund Freud’s
“therapeutic approach” became widely accepted – or at least, well known in popular culture.
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Over the next few years Chisholm travelled to the United States, then to the United
Kingdom for further training in the discipline of psychiatry and mental health. In 1931 Chisholm
and his family moved to New Haven, Connecticut, where he studied at Yale University’s
Institute for Human Relations. The Institute’s rationale was “directly concerned with the
problems of man’s individual and group conduct;” its purpose was “to correlate knowledge and
coordinate technique in related fields that greater progress may be made in the understanding of
human life.”10 Two years later, Chisholm moved to the United Kingdom and completed
additional psychiatric training at two London hospitals: Queen’s Square and Maudsley. By 1934
Chisholm had returned to Toronto and opened the city’s first private practice in psychotherapy.
Studying abroad, Chisholm had become a devoted Freudian. Like other adherents to Freud’s
theories, he believed “neurotic disorders were caused by early childhood experiences — in
particular, by the repression of painful or undesirable experiences.”11 When Chisholm’s life from
1919 to 1939 is examined, the inspiration and motivation for his vision of peace become clear.
The First World War revealed to him the extent of man’s mental illness, highlighted by the
consistent patterns of irrational behaviour learned over time from parents, ancestors, and other
figures of authority. Furthermore, his classification as a Freudian and his work at the Yale
Institute for Human Relations confirmed his belief that mankind’s problems stemmed from
childhood, and that only with the help of psychiatry and other like-minded professionals, would a
mature adult population comprised of world citizens be possible.
Chisholm’s vision of peace and the role of psychiatry and/or psychiatrist in the creation
of a better world was confirmed by the Second World War. At the outbreak of war, Chisholm
was a private citizen, yet quickly rose through the ranks of the Canadian Army after enlisting.
The Armed Forces, perhaps to its surprise, but not Chisholm’s, was in need of psychiatric
experts. In early 1941 Chisholm published a pamphlet entitled, “A Platoon Commander’s
Responsibility for the Morale of His Men.” Cognizant of his own “shell-shock” following the
First World War, Chisholm encouraged officers to empathize with soldiers who were anxious,
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jittery, or scared, rather than condemn them as cowards for their natural, emotional reaction to
war. The pamphlet proved to be a popular teaching tool for Canadian officers, as evidenced by a
letter Chisholm received from military psychiatrist, Dr. William Line:
It occurs to me that I should mention to you the way in which your pamphlet is gobbled up
by various military districts. … General Constantine…asked for 500, which he now has. In
his letter he mentioned to Dr. Hincks in strict confidence that he understood that this
pamphlet had already been authorized as a text book for officers.12

Chisholm was appointed Director of Personnel Selection for the Canadian Army, the result of his
pamphlet’s success, and by September 1942 became the Director-General of Medical Services of
the Canadian Army.
As Director-General of the army’s medical services, Chisholm developed a psychological
test for potential recruits known as PULHEMS, where each letter of the acronym corresponded
to one aspect of a soldier’s overall health. PULHEMS stressed each recruit’s mental (M) and
emotional (S) well-being, unlike previous exams that focused only on physical attributes. As the
war progressed this type of test became increasingly important to the Canadian Army’s
“effective use of manpower,”13 as psychiatric casualty rates averaged approximately 15 to 30
percent of all Canadian casualties.14 Chisholm’s new exam proved so successful that the
Canadian Army adopted it in 1943, while the British and American armies soon followed suit.
As a result of his achievements, the Canadian government was interested in employing
Chisholm’s talents. On November 3, 1944, Chisholm resigned his post in the Army and accepted
the position of Deputy Minister for the new federal Department of National Health and Welfare.
This was a dramatic and remarkable rise for a man previously unknown outside of psychiatry
circles in Canada. Chisholm’s short career in the Canadian Army highlights the significance he
attached to sound mental health and its importance in creating a better world.
The dual fields of psychiatry and psychology gained widespread respect in the immediate
postwar years. The contribution of doctors such as Chisholm contributed to the belief that
psychiatry had played an important role in helping Canada and its allies win the war. As a result,
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historian Mona Gleason argues that Canadian psychologists believed that their insight “provided
a possible panacea for the new problems and challenges facing the country.”15 This notion was
reinforced by the success and popularity of Dr. Benjamin Spock. Trained in psychoanalysis,
Spock’s 1946 book, The Common Sense Book of Baby and Child Care, was an international bestseller. Chisholm, however, entered the postwar period embroiled in controversy, the result of his
unique vision of peace.
Brock Chisholm’s vision of peace was inspired by his experience during the First World War
and confirmed by the outbreak of the Second World War. But it was the American detonation of
atomic bombs over the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 that motivated
Chisholm to publically espouse his vision of peace (both nationally and internationally): “We are
not walking on eggs. We are walking on atomic bombs, and unless we find some way to live at
peace with each other the survival of the race is at stake.”16 Following the end of the war,
Chisholm was invited to speak at public meetings, professional conferences, and to various
organizations. On each occasion Chisholm gave the same speech, although he would expand on
several themes depending on the audience. Between talks to psychiatry students, he told a
surprised Donald McKerracher at the University of Saskatchewan, “You will hear the same
speech again, as I really have only one speech. Perhaps each of us has only one speech.”17 His
“speech” contained not only what he viewed as the obstacles to peace, but more importantly, his
vision to create a peaceful world.
The first time Chisholm gave his speech was in October 1945 to a group of fellow
psychiatrists at the sixth annual William Alanson White Memorial Lectures in Washington, D.C.
The title for Chisholm’s series of talks was “The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social
Progress.” These lectures acted as a template for all future speeches and formally established
Chisholm’s vision of peace.18 Chisholm began his first William Alanson White Lecture with a
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dire warning for the assembled audience. Mankind’s most consistent pattern of behaviour – war
– was now a threat to all people. The explosion of scientific knowledge in the twentieth century
had created weapons of unimaginable destruction, be they atomic or biological: “In the face of
this new status as world citizens we must accept the uncomfortable fact that we are the kind of
people who fight wars every fifteen or twenty years.”19 Chisholm’s warning was unsurprising
given his own direct experience with war. By the time he was 49 years old, Chisholm had
engaged in active duty in one world war and witnessed another. From 1915 to 1918 he fought on
the Western Front during the First World War, returning to Canada horrified at the war’s
destruction and waste of life. Chisholm could be forgiven after the Second World War if he
believed that “we in our generation…regard war as a normal state.”20
Chisholm later termed man’s proclivity for war “competitive survival.” At the 100th
anniversary dinner of the Community Service Society in New York City, Chisholm provided the
keynote address and expanded on his conviction that war between different groups of humans
had become routine: “The whole history of the human race is one of competitive survival, of
fighting for security, possession, prestige, power, control of others. It has been a long history of
multitudes of people guided and controlled in the interests of the neurotic necessities of the
few.”21 Although competitive survival had worked in the past, Chisholm argued that the concept
was now obsolete in a world of atomic and biological weapons. Reflecting on his lifetime
experiences, in particular the decisions made by a small group of statesmen that led to both the
First and Second World Wars (including the deaths of tens of millions of innocent people),
Chisholm’s address concluded that competitive survival was a system that only benefitted and
was acceptable to the “neurotic” and mentally ill. This conclusion troubled Chisholm, as both
wars had been widely supported in each and every belligerent nation.
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Chisholm’s remarks were a reiteration of what he had already proclaimed in his William
Alanson White Lectures: sound mental health was the key to a mature, and thus, peaceful
society. Chisholm believed that there were three basic requirements for a healthy world. First,
the elimination of fear and aggression. Second, a reasonable standard of living based on equal
economic opportunity. The third requirement, however, was the most important in regard to
Chisholm’s vision of peace:
There should be enough people in the world, in all countries who are not as we are and
always have been, and will not show the neurotic necessities which we and every generation
of our ancestors have shown. We have never had enough people anywhere who are
sufficiently free of these neurotic symptoms which make wars inevitable.22

How then did Chisholm envision man would achieve this mentally stable, mature, war-free
world? What was to stop each generation from simply following in the footprints of their
immature, mentally ill, war-prone predecessors? For Chisholm the answer was clear. Man must
use his mind, his intellect, and reason: “Man’s destiny on this earth seems to lie in the use of his
brain.”23 War could be avoided if people were taught to think for themselves, to be tolerant, and
to live co-operatively with one another. However, before this could happen, people would have
to change their established, immature patterns of behaviour.
After explaining why and how the human race was in grave danger, Chisholm presented
what he viewed as the major obstacles to peace. He quoted a long definition of maturity from
leading American psychiatrists, Edward A. Strecker and Kenneth E. Appel. Chisholm
highlighted sections of the definition to which he wanted the audience to pay particular attention:
“Let me repeat parts of this ‘The ability to size things up, make one’s own decisions, is a
characteristic of maturity … A mature person…above all he has the qualities of adaptability and
compromise.’”24 Chisholm believed that many people lacked the maturity to think clearly, act
rationally, and thereby, prevent conflict. And as he later noted in a 1948 Chatelaine magazine
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article: “Mature people…would never support a Hitler, or a Napoleon. … A neurotic can lead
only to neurotics and morons.”25
Chisholm proceeded to list the “psychological distortions” common to an immature
society characterized by strife and conflict. They included the inability to acknowledge facts or
think rationally, a lack of empathy, and the presence of prejudice and intolerance. He rhetorically
asked his fellow psychiatrists what could possibly possess people to act in this way: “The only
lowest common denominator of all civilizations and the only psychological force capable of
producing these perversions is morality, the concept of right and wrong.”26 For centuries,
Chisholm argued that parents, teachers, religious leaders, and politicians, in an effort to control
people, had caused widespread immaturity, unhappiness, and as a result, conflict, by imposing on
society the artificial neuroses of inferiority, guilt, fear, and sin. And the consequences, he
declared, were appalling.
One consequence of teaching right and wrong was the intolerance and prejudice
communicated through such teaching. Chisholm asserted that the constant teaching of morality
necessitated that some people were labelled “good” (usually white, Christian, middle-class
Westerners), while those whose class, race, religion, or ideology differed from or challenged the
societal norm were labelled “bad.” To be labelled or identified as “bad” or the “Other” in Cold
War Canada was to inflict on the accused a profound sense of exclusion, shame, guilt, and
inferiority. In one particular address about Canada’s impoverished First Nations communities,
Chisholm revealed the power of teaching “right” from “wrong.” Chisholm began by castigating
both the Canadian government and the Church for preserving Canada’s state of “national
neuroticism.” The institutionalized racism of government policies and Church teachings,
especially in regard to Canada’s indigenous population, had led to the widespread belief that
“good” Canadians had the right to exploit the nation’s natural resources and people for their own
benefit. Instead of emulating our predecessors, who forcibly removed Natives from their land
and killed them, Chisholm argued that we should be mortified by their behaviour: “The picture
25
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we are showing of North America to many of the world’s people…is one of unregenerate
exploiters of native people who aren’t ashamed of our ancestors, and show signs of thinking that
they were highly admirable in their behaviour.”27
Chisholm, however, worried that teaching morality had greater consequences than
normalizing prejudice. He fretted that Canadians, and in fact all people, had become obedient
and submissive to authority figures, and as a result, mentally feeble. In July 1946, Chisholm
wrote an important article entitled “Can Man Survive?” Published in The Nation, Chisholm’s
article highlighted how deference to authority crippled man’s intelligence. The article was not an
attack on the government or state per se, but rather questioned Western society’s inability to be
open-minded and tolerant of new or different ideas. “Our minds are not free to judge, to accept
or reject, by the use of pure facts,” Chisholm proclaimed. “Instead our prejudices, emotions, and
consciences become involved and affect our ability to see clearly and our decisions.”28 Chisholm
reasoned people were burdened with local loyalties and unconcerned for the well-being of others.
Old ideas were considered “good,” while new ideas were “bad.” Yet, as Chisholm pointed out in
his book, Prescription for Survival (1957), Western society, as a whole, is quite ignorant:
“Unfortunately we tend to regard our own living patterns as fixed and final and of universal
value and so we naturally think everyone should copy us. This is just not true.”29 Chisholm
argued that the concept of morality taught people to believe rather than to think and
consequently, attitudes and intellects were frozen in time. As Chisholm conveyed during his
1945 White Lectures, peace could only be achieved if people’s intellect was not set in stone and
they were given the freedom to think for themselves: “Intelligence, ability to observe and to
reason clearly and to reach and implement decisions appropriate to the real situation in which he
finds himself, are man’s only specific methods of survival.”30
Chisholm argued that the most important aspect to securing peace in postwar Canada and
the world was to teach children to think for themselves. By doing so, children would be liberated
from local taboos and prejudices and would be free to become citizens whose primary concern

27

Address – “New Complications in Growing Up,” Dr. Brock Chisholm, Annual Meeting of the Regina
Council, February 17, 1965, Chisholm fonds, Volume 5, file “407-420, 1965.”
28
G. Brock Chisholm, “Can Man Survive?”, The Nation, July 20, 1946.
29
Brock Chisholm, Prescription for Survival (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1957), 39-40.
30
Booklet – “The Psychiatry of Enduring Peace and Social Progress,” The William Alanson White
Memorial Lectures, by G.B. Chisholm, p. 8, Chisholm fonds, Volume 1, file “37-56, 1945.”

91
was the welfare of the world: “To produce a generation of mature citizens is the biggest and most
necessary job any country could undertake, and the reward in saving of misery and suffering
would be colossal.”31 The work of historian Tara Zahra reveals that Chisholm was one of many
postwar leaders, policy-makers, and organizers who viewed children as essential to the world’s
rehabilitation. Activists such French doctor Therese Brosse also argued that peace required
children to be raised as international citizens: “We must act quickly if we are to take advantage
of the special opportunities of the post-war period, for if the international aspirations of young
people…do not find satisfaction in healthy and unrestricted universality, they may once more
seek fulfillment in the limited field of restrictive groups and yet again endanger the world’s
equilibrium.”32 Brosse, like Chisholm, was a psychiatrist who viewed the field as critical to
transforming the world. And both doctors were part of a transnational movement to educate
children in internationalist rather than nationalist thought and practice.
Surprisingly, Chisholm’s White Lectures did not provide many details on how to raise
children to become peaceful, mature adults. His lectures, however, were clear that the patterns of
thought and behaviour taught to children must differ widely from those of their ancestors,
parents, and teachers: “We are the horrible example. We are the people who fight wars every
fifteen or twenty years. We must at whatever cost prevent our children and their children from
being as we have been.”33 Although Chisholm did not reject all “old” ideas, he was clear that
society had changed and that our thinking had to evolve too. No matter how painful or difficult it
was to accept this analysis, it was necessary to creating a more peaceful society.
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To fully understand how children were critical to Chisholm’s vision of peace, it is
imperative to examine his later speeches, talks, articles, and editorials. In “A New Look at Child
Health,” Chisholm discusses the first step to creating a mature generation and peaceful world:
I think it is clear to all of us that the first and primary necessity for finding security on the
part of the human being is complete security in small infancy. Complete security in infancy
does not depend even on adequate food supply or shelter. There is only one thing on which it
does depend to the most important degree: unquestionable, all-embracing, obvious love.34

Chisholm, like all proponents of Freud and psychoanalysis, stressed the importance of a healthy
relationship between parents and their children. Unconditional love, in particular from the
mother, Chisholm argued, was thus important for two reasons. First, he believed that love, or
lack thereof, would determine a child’s future relationships. If he or she were not loved, they
were doomed to develop into adults with difficulties, and most likely, neuroses. However, if the
child was loved, it would grow to see the good in everyone: “If a child loves himself he will love
others. The child will be prepared in school to accept people who lived in all spaces and at all
times.”35 He believed that a child with the ability to love would be more tolerant, open-minded,
and less likely to behave in ways that were bigoted and aggressive.
The second reason for Chisholm’s exhortation that parents love their child
unconditionally followed directly from the first. Psychoanalysis stressed the inherent connection
between “early childhood experiences and maternal attachment in the development of adult
personality.”36 Consequently, if children were exposed to love from a young age they too would
become both mature and peace-loving. Chisholm believed that mature children were not simply
concerned about the here-and-now, but how their actions would affect the future: “The small
child thinks only in terms of now…but he soon discovers tomorrow and yesterday…. Within a
short time the normally developing child should be able to control his desires of today to gain
something more important for himself in the future.”37 Thus, it made sense that children needed
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role-models whose patterns of behaviour they could emulate. Parents that stressed love and peace
would raise healthy, mature, peaceful citizens.
To provide love, however, was only the parent’s first duty in helping to bring Chisholm’s
vision of peace to fruition. The second step to peace was to ensure children were given the
freedom to think for themselves, to see facts clearly, and objectively. Parents, he claimed, should
not hide upsetting events from their children, no matter how ugly or hurtful they might be. It was
their obligation to tell their children the truth – all the time: “The parental responsibility may be
put briefly as ‘Don’t lie to children about anything.’”38 Chisholm’s commitment to the truth and
peace included the repudiation of all myths, fairy tales, and so-called “magics.” In a speech to an
Ottawa-area school association on November 5, 1945, Chisholm criticized parents for
personifying environmental phenomenon with human qualities. Chisholm declared to a shocked
audience: “Any man who tells his son that the sun goes to bed at night is contributing directly to
the next war.”39 For Chisholm, myths and fairy tales were the source of psychological distortions
and an obstacle to his vision of peace. In later years, Chisholm conceded that children could be
taught about myths such as the sun going to bed but with one major caveat, that their parents told
them they were myths beforehand. Only then Chisholm argued, could children distinguish
between reality and fantasy, and develop into mature adults.
The chief obstacle to Chisholm’s vision of peace, and the object of his greatest scorn, was
faith-based knowledge or “magic,” as he referred to religion. Chisholm claimed that magic
and/or religious observance was nothing more than obedience to established dogma, and the
affirmation of local taboos and prejudices. Chisholm seethed against the all-seeing God of
Christianity and other religions. He argued that religion, taught as an absolute truth, shackled the
imagination, and consequently, was a barrier to peace. He also maintained that God would not
save people from their bad behaviour. God had not saved Western society during the First or
Second World Wars and would not save it in the future. The only chance for future peace was for
people to use their intellect rather than their faith-based beliefs. This, of course, meant children
should be told the “truth.”
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Ironically, Chisholm’s exhortation that parents tell their children the truth reveals a
contradiction and inconsistency within his vision of peace. Chisholm once wrote that “no other
animal except man lies to its children. Man does constantly.”40 But he, like every parent, was
guilty of lying to his children. Unable to have a second child, Chisholm and his wife, Grace,
adopted a baby boy while he worked in London, England during the 1930s. Chisholm met with
the biological parents prior to the adoption, but later told his son, Sandy, that his parents had
been medical students killed in a car crash. If Chisholm believed that childhood myths and fairy
tales were the first step to war, did he not think that his story and lie would create a long-lasting
and debilitating psychological distortion in his son? Chisholm’s archival records do not provide
any clues as to how Sandy reacted to his parent’s lie. Nevertheless, Chisholm believed that
mental health was the basis for peace, and that only free-thinking children, raised with the
unconditional love of their parents (their minds devoid of the fantasy and escapism learned in
myths, fairy tales, and magic), could become mature world citizens.
There was, however, a final, third step to ensure his vision of peace became a reality.
Chisholm believed that children could only learn to be mature, internationally-minded citizens if
they were taught democratic values at home, school, and in the wider community. Despite his
own shortcomings, it is clear that Chisholm did not think most parents were capable of raising
mature children:
I think we can agree that relatively few parents throughout the world are capable of
recognizing the fact that many of their own attitudes and loyalties are outmoded, valid in
isolated communities only, no longer applicable in a changed world, and an active menace to
the peace of the world.41

Nor did he think that teachers or religious leaders were qualified. Teachers were “concerned too
largely with the inculcation of knowledge only,” while priests, ministers, and other religious
figures were “too often preoccupied with…the protection of their own exclusive faith and the
obedience of children to its particular rules, taboos and rituals.”42
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Chisholm concluded his William Alanson White Memorial Lectures with some advice
for parents and society as a whole. He encouraged parents to think about how they were
contributing to the present system of education, which he believed was designed to inculcate
local and national loyalties in children. Chisholm would expand on this point in later talks,
constantly probing his audiences, asking why parents always felt the need to be right: “We must
say to ourselves, ‘What is my authority? How do I know this, where did I learn it, how true is it,
what evidence have I got, who says so?’ If we do this we will find that many of the things we are
so certain about, many of our easy classifications, will break down.”43 By being self-aware and
questioning their beliefs, Chisholm argued that adults could recognize the validity of their
“sacred cows” and to what extent they were part of the problem of war or the solution to peace.
Chisholm then declared that raising children was the most important job in the world.
Why, Chisholm asked, were farmers given more extensive training than parents? “If your son is
going to raise pigs for a living he goes to a college for three…years to study under experienced
teachers. But if he is…raising children he commonly learns nothing ... Surely the rearing of
children is greatly more important, and more complicated, than the raising of pigs.”44 As a result
of these observations, Chisholm lamented the woeful unpreparedness of parents to raise children
to become mature adults.
Who was qualified to properly shape and educate the world’s youth, if most adults were
incapable of doing so? Chisholm reserved the final remarks of his White lectures to answer this
question. He stated clearly, and unequivocally, that only psychiatrists and other people working
in the fields of human science could be responsible for teaching future generations, and thus,
realizing his vision of peace:
If the race is to be freed from its crippling burden of good and evil it must be psychiatrists
who take the original responsibility. This is a challenge which must be met. … What the
world needs from psychiatry is honest, simple, and clear thinking, talking and writing. …
With the other human sciences, psychiatry must now decide what is to be the immediate
future of the human race. No one else can.45

He may have been pandering to his audience but Chisholm never wavered from this belief.
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Historian Christopher Dummitt reveals that Chisholm’s faith in psychiatry to provide the
blueprint for a mentally healthy, secure, and peaceful future was part of a larger postwar trend:
one in which a “slew of experts took on more and more significant roles in shaping…society.”46
Chisholm worried that governments, including Canada’s, did not employ enough “experts” that
specialized in human relations and that “without the extensive help of psychiatrists and
psychologists its is quite probable that mankind will not long survive the fearful changes which
are taking place.”47 Only psychiatrists, Chisholm maintained, could properly educate children to
become mature world citizens committed to ending war. And in the postwar period, Chisholm
was perfectly positioned as a government official to use his skills and expertise in pursuit of
positive change. But how did Canadians respond to his vision of peace?
In late 1945 Chisholm was a respected psychiatrist and government civil servant, serving as
Deputy Minister of National Health and Welfare. Large sections of Canada’s population,
however, disapproved of or opposed Chisholm’s vision of peace because it challenged Canada’s
traditional institutions, values, practices, and symbols. Chisholm’s vision, in particular, rejected
organized religion. His William Alanson White lectures argued that morality was the cause of
war and conflict: “The only lowest common denominator of all civilizations and the only
psychological force capable of producing these perversions is morality, the concept of right and
wrong.”48 Chisholm acknowledged during his lectures that his approach to peace would pose a
problem for conventional Cold War society: “The suggestion that we should stop teaching
children moralities and rights and wrongs and instead protect their original intellectual integrity
has of course to be met by an outcry of heretic.”49 Yet Chisholm could not fathom the extent of
outrage his White lectures would cause.
In the days, weeks, and months that followed Chisholm’s remarks there were calls for his
resignation. Many Canadians, but especially religious groups such as Quebec’s St. Jean Baptiste
Society, believed Chisholm’s vision threatened Canada’s Christian foundation. As historians
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Nancy Christie and Michael Gauvreau note, Christianity “retained and exercised a social and
cultural authority that was unparalleled among industrialized nations”50 in postwar Canada.
Consequently, Chisholm’s vision of peace was widely criticized by Canadian religious figures.
Ministers, priests, and rabbis viewed Chisholm’s lectures as a blow to their institutions and
beliefs. Reverend Doctor Willard Brewing of St. George’s United Church (Toronto, ON)
declared that Chisholm’s theories “sweep away all moral standards set down in the Old and New
Testaments … [and were] a broad frontal attack on Christian morality.”51
Chisholm’s vision of peace, however, was not only an affront to Canada’s religious
institutions and status quo. He also failed to understand that a majority of Canadians thought
Christianity “the only basis for individualism, democracy, and freedom in the modern world.”52
Most Canadians viewed religion, but specifically Christianity, as critical to achieving a warless
world, whereas Chisholm believed religion was a barrier to peace. A number of individuals, as a
result, equated Chisholm’s statement with Frederick Nietzsche and Nazism. In a long letter to the
editor of The Globe and Mail, Mary Brookfield Lowthian of Niagara Falls, Ontario, argued that
Chisholm’s beliefs were militaristic, atheist, and ultimately, fascist:
Chisholm’s theory…was expressed many times by Frederick Nietzsche … Signing himself
“The Antichrist,” he argued that before the German youth could become the god-men they
were destined to be, they would have to abandon all…the “effeminate” teaching of the
Christian Church. To Nietzsche, morality, religion, and truth should go into the discard. …
The Chisholm address would have been well received in Germany 25 years ago, before the
Nietzsche doctrine had reached its full fruition in Nazism.53

Other Canadian newspapers printed similar letters and editorials, all of which critiqued
Chisholm’s lectures and vision in equally severe terms. It was agreed that Chisholm was a
radical iconoclast and a threat to Canadian society.
Public opinion was overwhelmingly against Chisholm, but his fiercest critics were
Canadian Members of Parliament. MP’s took turns during the House debate period to attack
Chisholm’s vision of peace. Progressive Conservative MP, Herbert A. Bruce (Parkdale) stated
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that Chisholm had “shocked the Christian conscience”54 of Canada. Paul-Edmund Gagnon
(Chicoutimi), an independent MP, focused on what he believed to be the inherent danger of
Chisholm’s ideas:
Doctor Chisholm…who is unable to distinguish between good and evil, does not deserve his
present position [as Deputy Minister of Health] and…should be replaced by some one
intelligent enough to respect the faith of those who believe in God. It is a disgrace that we
should have civil servants…devoid of moral principles…and we should not hesitate, through
decency and concern for public morals, to dismiss him so as to prevent him from spreading
throughout Canada…his subversive ideas and from flaunting his atheism.55

Gagnon’s remarks were seconded by other francophone MPs, such as Wilfrid Lacroix
(Independent Liberal, Quebec-Montmorency). Chisholm’s most vocal critic was Independent
Liberal MP, Jean-Francois Pouliot (Temiscouata). Pouliot took every opportunity afforded him
to vilify the doctor, including Chisholm’s work during the Second World War. On one occasion
in the House, Pouliot referred to Chisholm as “that most nefarious man…a most incompetent
man, a cruel man.”56 And only a few weeks later he rose in the House again to criticize
Chisholm: “When I think of war criminals there is one I have to denounce to-day, and denounce
bitterly. It is that man Chisholm, who made soldiers suffer so much during the war.”57 Based on
Chisholm’s comments about morality and organized religion, one might understand the anger of
a devout Catholic such as Pouliot or Gagnon. In spite of the attacks made against him, Chisholm
did arguably more than anyone in the Canadian Army during the Second World War to advance
military and public awareness of the soldier’s mental health and to improve morale amongst the
men.
Although few in number, there were some Canadians who supported Chisholm’s White
lectures and his vision of peace, in particular, his peers and colleagues in the fields of human
relations. In the midst of calls for him to resign as Deputy Minister of Health, several medical
groups wrote to Prime Minister Mackenzie King on his behalf, including the Canadian National
Committee for Hygiene and the Canadian Association of Scientific Workers. The most
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influential group to support Chisholm, however, was the American Psychiatric Association. They
sent a telegram to the prime minister signed by seven leading American psychiatrists:
The principles enunciated by Maj.-Gen. G. Brock Chisholm in his William Alanson White
Foundation lecture in Washington, D.C., in October, 1945, are in our opinion in accord with
the thinking of psychiatrists in the United States ... Unless children are trained so that they
can experience reality and from that experience come to appreciate truth, we will never have
a generation of adults with the understanding and conviction needed to end wars. We need
education in truth, not training in prejudice.58

The telegram highlights that most psychiatrists across North America supported Chisholm’s
remarks and affirmed his vision of peace. But more importantly, the telegram confirms the
widespread belief in the era, at least among so-called experts, that psychiatry, and health
professionals in particular, were “the harbinger[s] of peace.”59
It was not, however, only Chisholm’s White lectures that Canadians objected to.
Chisholm’s vision of peace not only questioned the organized religion’s concept of morality, but
challenged traditional symbols such as Santa Claus. On November 5, 1945, Chisholm addressed
the Rockliffe Park Home and School Association. In order to illustrate his point that children
needed to be free from fantasy to make informed, rational decisions in adulthood, Chisholm
condemned the myth as one step from war: “Any child who believes in Santa Claus has had his
ability to think permanently destroyed. … [Such a child] will become the kind of man or woman
who develops a sore back when there is a tough job to do and refuses to think realistically when
war threatens.”60 His talk to the school association was not the first time Chisholm had advised
parents reject the myth of Santa Claus. In April 1945, he had told the parents and teachers at St.
George’s School in Westmount, Quebec, that following the Second World War, peace would
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require “the sacrifice of Santa Claus.”61 Chisholm’s statements in Quebec went overlooked, but
amidst the controversy surrounding his Washington lectures, his remarks in Ottawa became
newsworthy.
In contrast to Chisholm’s rejection of morality, his Santa Claus comments became the
object of ridicule, rather than anger. The Victoria Times wrote a tongue-in-cheek editorial
entitled “St. Nicholas and the Atom.” The author agreed with Chisholm that the world had
become a dangerous place to live, but then mocked him for his hyperbole and exaggeration:
“Apparently the unseen presence of both Saint Nicholas and the atom bomb is almost too much
for this planet to bear.”62 Canada’s parliamentarians also had fun at Chisholm’s expense. In the
midst of a discussion about income war tax, Arthur Smith (Progressive Conservative, Calgary
West) was asked by John H. Blackmore (Social Credit, Lethbridge): “You still believe in Santa
Claus.” Nonchalantly, Smith replied, “Unlike General Chisholm, I do,” and continued to make
his point on taxes.63 The one exception was Liberal MP David Croll (Spadina), who applauded
Chisholm’s courage to challenge the status quo: “I too read his speeches. … I thought they were
imaginative and…thought-provoking. … It is invigorating to know that in our departments there
are men of vision, men who are not afraid to face up to the truth, who are not fearful of new
frontiers or afraid to reach for new horizons.”64 No other MP stood in defense of Chisholm or in
support of his vision of peace.
The responses to Chisholm’s speeches reveal a pattern that would repeat itself for the
remainder of his life. Each time he articulated his vision of peace, he contested the traditional,
time-honoured symbols, institutions, and beliefs of postwar Canada. Many Canadians, but not
all, condemned Chisholm’s rejection of religious morality and Christian iconography, but in
doing so, ignored the crux of his “speech.” Yes, he was an iconoclast and believed that man was
“incurably religious.” Yet Chisholm’s vision of peace, to educate children to become mature
world citizens free from local loyalties was lost from the conversation (or rather, accusations).
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Chisholm championed a new way of thinking, a new way of looking at the world, and a new way
of living in the world. Although embraced by a small section of society, primarily medical
professionals and social scientists, Chisholm’s detractors condemned him for defying convention
and were unwilling to accept his vision of peace.
Brock Chisholm had refused to resign his government post in the immediate aftermath of his
White lectures and Santa Claus speech. Maclean’s Magazine reported that Chisholm “wouldn’t
undertake to keep quiet in the future, and he wouldn’t resign. If the Government wanted him to
stay they must take him as he was - vocal. If they wanted to get rid of him they must fire him. He
wouldn’t quit to make things easy for them.”65 On July 24, 1946, however, Liberal Justice
Minister Louis St. Laurent, rose in the House of Commons and announced the resignation of
Chisholm from the Department of National Health and Welfare. There was scattered applause
from the sections of the House who had, for months, called for Chisholm to be fired or to resign.
St. Laurent then quietly noted that the former deputy minister had been appointed executive
secretary of the Interim Commission of the World Health Organization. But how did Chisholm
come to work with the WHO? And more importantly, how did Chisholm use the WHO to
implement his vision of peace?
At the San Francisco Conference in May 1945, attending government representatives
discussed the formation of a “global health organization.” This was not a new or unique idea.
Three international health organizations had been founded in the first half of the twentieth
century: the Pan American Sanitary Bureau (1902), Office International d’Hygiene Publique
(1907), and the League of Nations Health Organization (1920), whose mandate was the
“international prevention and control of disease.”66 It was decided at the conference that a
Technical Preparatory Committee (TPC) would be formed and tasked with the creation of the
World Health Organization, a specialized agency of the UN. Chisholm, while still Deputy
Minister of Health, was chosen by his boss Brooke Claxton to be Canada’s representative to the
TPC. The Committee consisted of sixteen members from the UN’s Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and convened under the chairmanship of Dr. Rene Sand of Belgium. The primary
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role of the TPC was to prepare a draft constitution for the International Health Conference to be
held in New York City from July 19-22, 1945. Chisholm left an indelible mark on his fellow
TPC members. Historian Amy Staples notes that Chisholm led a small group of “visionaries”
who viewed health as critical to achieving peace, and argues that their vision for the WHO was
animated by a medical “internationalism based on professional ideology and the apolitical
standards of science.”67 The TPC was so impressed by Chisholm’s contributions to various
plenary sessions that they elected him rapporteur and chairman of the group. As chairman,
Chisholm was responsible for writing the first constitution of the WHO.
Chisholm’s performance at the subsequent International Health Conference in New York
was widely lauded. Reporting to the Canadian government, Dr. Ernest Cote, the Canadian
alternate from the Department of External Affairs described Chisholm as “by far the strongest,
the most conciliatory, patient and acceptable person at the conference.”68 Delegates were
particularly impressed by the constitution he had drafted. Chisholm was adamant that the health
sciences, and thus the WHO, “promote cooperation” and “international teamwork” to ensure a
high standard of living and peace for all people. It was an easy decision for the Interim
Commission to appoint Chisholm executive secretary while it waited for twenty-six nations to
ratify the new constitution (only then could the WHO be officially created). Chisholm resigned
from his government post with immediate effect, happy to escape the controversy in
Ottawa/Canada that had engulfed him and his vision of peace.
As Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission, Chisholm ensured that the fledgling
health organization began to implement the policies set forth in its proposed constitution.
Chisholm successfully organized a plan and response to contain an outbreak of cholera in Egypt.
He also prepared and organized international programs to confront tuberculosis, syphilis, and
malaria. In April 1948, Byelorussia became the twenty-sixth country to ratify the WHO
constitution and the organization became an officially recognized, specialized agency of the UN.
At the World Health Assembly, held later that year in Geneva, Switzerland, Chisholm was
elected the first director-general of the WHO by a landslide vote of 46 to 2. The WHO, writes

67
68

Ibid., 123.
Farley, Brock Chisholm, 25.

103
Staples, “was now ready to develop its own brand of internationalism, an internationalism deeply
embedded in the nature of the health profession.”69
Chisholm’s vision of peace was integral to the WHO’s core beliefs, values, structure, and
work. In fact, his preamble to the WHO’s constitution formed the organization’s philosophical
underpinnings, including the adoption of a new, radical definition of health: “Health is a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and
infirmity.”70 This positive definition of health matched Chisholm’s positive definition of peace.
In addition, the preamble stated that the focus on total health must begin in childhood: “Healthy
development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to live harmoniously in a changing
total environment is essential to such development.”71 And it concluded with the declaration,
“The health of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security.”72 The WHO’s
constitution perfectly encapsulated Chisholm’s vision of peace. It emphasized the importance of
mental health, accentuated the significance of early, healthy development of the child, and
stressed the importance of social well-being to live in peace with one another.
To achieve the WHO’s new, positive definition of health, Chisholm believed two things
were necessary. First, health (as he defined it) had to become a fundamental human right and was
included in Chisholm’s preamble to the WHO constitution: “The enjoyment of the highest
attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without
distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition.”73 By incorporating
the right to health in the WHO’s founding document, Chisholm believed he had created “the
Magna Carta of health.”74 The notion that every human had the right to health was radical, yet
also innovative. Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which guaranteed
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everyone the right to a reasonable standard of living and health, was signed two years after
Chisholm helped author the WHO constitution.
Second, Chisholm argued that his definition of positive health could only be realized if
the WHO emphasized social medicine – better known today as humanitarian medicine. Medical
historian, S.W.A. Gunn defines humanitarian medicine as a sub-field of health that “goes beyond
the usual therapeutic act and promotes, provides, teaches, supports, and delivers peoples’ health
as a human right.”75 Proponents of humanitarian medicine believe that health encompasses the
individual and their environment, including their mental hygiene, food, housing, and the
availability of services such as medical care. Chisholm was a strong devotee of humanitarian
health. During his time at Yale its Institute for Human Relations became North America’s
leading advocate of social medicine. Chisholm believed that doctors could no longer focus
merely on disease.
Chisholm, as a proponent of humanitarian medicine, supported a “horizontal” rather than
a “vertical” approach to health. The horizontal theory treated health as interconnected with all
aspects of life. Treatment thus had to be broad and varied. Full health could not be achieved
without first understanding the culture in which the patient lived and worked. The vertical theory
of health, however, treated disease as a single, specific entity. As a result, treatment focused
exclusively on the disease and did not consider the patient’s environmental factors. Chisholm
was partially successful in persuading the WHO to concentrate on social medicine. The WHO,
for example, was the first postwar, intergovernmental organization to implement policies to help
combat issues of mental health. Although mental health only accounted for one percent of the
WHO’s budget in 1952, Chisholm believed that “the adoption of a mental health programme
must be regarded as a truly historic step…to bring this new field of medicine into the area of
inter-governmental action.”76 Chisholm was particularly proud of the WHO experts sent to
countries such as Finland, Norway, and the Philippines to consult and advise on various mental
health programs, including one program dedicated to juvenile delinquency and another on
psychiatry in industry.
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Chisholm’s desire to make social medicine the core of the WHO’s health programs met
with resistance. Most Western nation members in the WHO favoured the “vertical” approach to
Chisholm’s “horizontal” approach. The 1940s and 1950s witnessed significant advancements in
Western medicine. New innovations included antibiotics to cure and eradicate disease. In
addition, social medicine quickly fell out of favour during the Cold War. Social medicine, like
politics, sports, and other aspects of society, was caught between two opposing and polarizing
ideologies: capitalism and communism. As scholar Kelley Lee notes in his history of the WHO,
social medicine was viewed by Canada and other Western nations as inherently connected to the
Soviet Union: “In conservative circles…social medicine had a ring of ‘socialism,’ and was
closely associated with growing concerns about the rise of Communism.”77 Understood in Cold
War terms, Chisholm’s desire for a different, yet comprehensive approach to health and peace
was maligned in the West. In spite of Chisholm’s preamble and positive definition of health that
captured the essence of his vision of peace, most countries still favoured a vertical and/or
negative concept of health, just as they preferred a negative definition of peace. Chisholm failed
to institute social medicine as the foundation of the WHO.
Chisholm also struggled to staff the WHO with employees whose interests “transcended
national boundaries.”78 His vision of peace relied on the creation of emotionally and mentally
healthy children, raised to be mature world citizens. Yet it would take one or more generations
for this transformation to occur. This timeframe posed a problem to Chisholm’s work at the
WHO and an obstacle to his vision of peace. How could the WHO fulfill the vision, values, and
ideals contained within its preamble and constitution if it was staffed by men and women who
prioritized national loyalties over the international well-being? Chisholm’s solution to this
problem was simple and straightforward, but in actuality, extremely difficult to achieve.
Chisholm stated that every person hired to work for the WHO must embody the characteristics of
a world citizen.
Shortly after being elected the first director-general of the WHO, Chisholm wrote a
pamphlet that delineated the duties of the international civil servant: An Introduction to Service
with WHO (1948). This short guide was given to all WHO employees. To function as a world
citizen, Chisholm argued, required a number of qualifications. Chisholm declared that an
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international servant should have, at the very least, a rudimentary knowledge of history,
psychology, cultural anthropology, comparative religion, international law, political science, and
sociology. Beyond a strong intellectual capacity, Chisholm stated that the most important
attribute was the aptitude for social apperception and empathy:
Perhaps the first requirement is what the psychologist calls “social apperception” and also a
thing called “empathy.” Social apperception embraces sympathy, fellow feeling, an ability to
see the effects and to feel the effects on other people of one’s own action…. Empathy means
being able to feel from the point of view of another person…being able under difficult
conditions to appreciate his point of view and arrange to improve his situation from the
standpoint of his own emotional functioning.79

This prerequisite, in theory, demanded that international servants learn to live with attitudes, and
in cultures, that differed from their own. Chisholm claimed: “We must recognize all cultures,
including our own, as experimental. We are not entitled to go out and convert people to our
particular cultural attitudes.”80 In practice, most people, especially those from Western nations,
had been taught from birth that their way of life was superior to that of the “Other,” and believed
– if they thought about it at all – their position at the top of the social hierarchy was the result of
their natural superiority. Many people, as a result, would find Chisholm’s requirements to be an
international civil servant difficult to embrace. Moreover, to act counter to national interests
would potentially result in being fired or dismissed from their WHO job. Chisholm
acknowledged these concerns late in his career, but argued that “a cause as important as this
deserves its martyrs.”81 Mature international service, Chisholm believed, trumped individual or
national interest.
To help ensure WHO employees prioritized an international rather than national identity,
Chisholm required individuals to swear an oath. Before him each person declared:
I solemnly swear (undertake, affirm, promise) to exercise in all loyalty, discretion, and
conscience the functions entrusted to me as an international civil servant of the World Health
Organization, to discharge those functions and regulate my conduct with the interests of the
World Health organization only in view, and not to seek or accept instructions in regard to
the performance of my duties from any government or other authority external to the
Organization.82
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Ironically this prerequisite stifled his employee’s independent thought and in doing so,
contradicted a key component of his vision of peace. Nonetheless, Chisholm expected the
allegiance of each and every employee. Today, WHO staff are still required to recite the same
oath introduced by Chisholm almost seventy years ago.
Chisholm believed that peace required people to recognize and free themselves from their
own prejudices, but he did not always find it is easy to do so himself. Chisholm published two
books. The first, Prescription for Survival (1957), comprised his Bampton Lectures at Columbia
University and was yet another example of Chisholm’s well-publicized vision of peace. The
second book, Can People Learn to Learn? (1958), also explored and examined his vision of
peace. This book, however, included an additional introductory chapter entitled “The Nation,”
which examined several nations’ prejudices, taboos, and “sacred cows” that Chisholm believed
acted as obstacles to peace. Chisholm wrote each section of the chapter as if he were a member
of that particular nation or lived in that particular region of the world. In the book’s prologue,
Chisholm rationalizes his following “observations” as an act of social apperception and empathy:
“Let us try to put ourselves in the place and conditions of living of various people, attempting to
feel with them some of their preoccupations and to see world problems from their point of
view.”83 In the end, however, Chisholm succeeded in highlighting his own Western-based
prejudices. One particularly shocking statement was when Chisholm impersonated an Arab from
the Middle East: “We have felt justified for so long in being against governmental authority that
it is hard for us to become responsible and constructive. … Individual responsibility is still rare
among our peoples. … Very few of our people will willingly perform a full day’s work regularly
every day.”84 Equally insulting was Chisholm masquerading as an East Indian:
Though they destroy enormous amounts of food, cows and monkeys, to most of us, must be
treated with respect and allowed that indulgence. There is no value whatever in other people
telling us…that we should give up these ancient and illogical attitudes. Some of us know that
we should be much better off without these and other handicaps of the same type.85

By chapter’s end Chisholm had presented biased, prejudiced stereotypes about different
countries and their people from every continent of the world. In the guise of promoting
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internationalism, Chisholm’s book had in fact revealed an institutionalized racism, unknowingly
embodied by a lifetime of prejudiced teachings. In both Canada and at the WHO, Chisholm
castigated those people who automatically preserved traditional beliefs, values, and symbols, yet
his biases too were an obstacle to the peace he pursued.
Despite his own serious shortcomings, Chisholm had expected to find at the WHO an
enthusiastic audience prepared to fight for and implement his unique vision of peace. His single
five-year term as director-general of the WHO disabused Chisholm of this ideal. Contrary to
Staples’ argument that WHO employees adopted a broad “commitment to apolitical
internationalism,”86 Chisholm’s stint at the organization reinforced his belief that people had
been raised to view nationalism as their patriotic duty. Most of the WHO’s employees were not
“world citizens” and as a result, Chisholm found it difficult to implement his vision of peace
both inside and outside the organization.
Chisholm’s postwar campaign for population control elicited the greatest opposition to
his vision of peace. On becoming director-general of the WHO in 1948, Chisholm gradually
came to believe that overpopulation was a threat to the health and peace of the world – on par
with atomic and biological weapons. Advances in modern science/medicine ensured that more
infants survived childbirth and early adolescence. In an article for Maclean’s Magazine,
Chisholm claimed: “We, the peoples of the world, are now increasing at a rate of about thirtytwo million or so a year - about eighty-five thousand a day is our net increase.”87 Chisholm
argued that a growing population would result in more poverty and inequality. Families would
not have the money or resources to properly educate and raise mature children. He also reasoned
that an ever-expanding population would result in mass malnutrition and starvation: “More than
half of the world’s people are hungry, chronically hungry, have never had enough to eat in their
lives and never will have enough to eat in their lives. Hundreds of thousands of children are
dying now of starvation. At the same time we are increasing populations frighteningly at a really
dreadful rate.”88 Chisholm feared that overpopulation would lead to poor health, which would
result in conflict over resources, and eventually cause war.
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Chisholm announced that starving populations should not look to Western Europe or in
particular, North America, to help provide food to the hungry. He believed that North Americans
were shamefully complacent about the problems of the world. The simple fact, Chisholm
declared, was that the “human race is quite capable of feeding all its people, and that famines,
malnutrition and starvation are not necessary. … They occur only because the world’s well-fed,
prosperous people don’t care, and everybody knows it.”89 The only tenable solution to the
problems caused by overpopulation, Chisholm argued, was birth control: “There are many of us
— myself included — who doubt that a solution to the population problem can be found which
does not include the increased use of birth control.”90 Historian Matthew Connelly writes that
birth control – as a solution to the world’s problems – “enjoy[ed] a remarkable revival” in the
postwar period and that Chisholm was one of many “outspoken converts among the leaders of
the new United Nations agencies.”91 There were, however, several drawbacks and barriers to
Chisholm’s solution, including the global stigma attached to birth control, plus the neo-imperial
belief that Western elites knew what was best for developing nations, resulting in cultural
conflict.
Arguably the biggest hurdle to population control and birth control was the Roman
Catholic Church, with whom Chisholm consistently clashed in his attempt to implement planned
parenthood. In the early 1950s, Pope Pius XII announced that “the ban on contraception…was
divinely inspired and could never change.”92 This was not a new attitude of the Church. Catholic
leaders, religious and lay alike, for decades had attached an ominous stigma to birth control,
stating that access to contraception would lead to “race suicide.” To ensure that the Church
retained control over the minds and bodies of the world’s population, religious leaders
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strategically lobbied countless international organizations, and as a result, exerted immense
religious influence in the postwar period. Chisholm, not surprisingly, cited the Church’s
persistent interference in the duties of the UN’s Population Commission since its inception in
1946:
The Population Commission of the United Nations never makes effective recommendations
to the General Assembly because there is a taboo placed by the Roman Catholic Church on
any discussion of birth control. … Consequently millions of children are suffering from
malnutrition and will die early.93

As Chisholm and other advocates of birth control launched their campaign for population
control, the Catholic Church launched a simultaneous campaign to ensure that people worldwide
were denied access to birth control. Consequently, Chisholm believed that the Church’s
teachings and “sacred cows” were an obstacle to raising mature, globally-minded children – who
in turn, or so Chisholm argued, would “rationally” understand the need for birth control as a
panacea to one of the world’s dire problems.
Chisholm’s first direct confrontation with the power and influence of the Catholic
Church, however, occurred in Canada, outside the UN’s immediate purview. In September 1951,
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) aired a series of four talks entitled “Man’s Last
Enemy – Himself?” Chisholm delivered the first lecture, “The Origins of Hostility.” In a thinly
veiled criticism of the Church, Chisholm discussed the world’s ever-increasing population rate:
“Are you among those whose opinion, based on some authoritarian prejudice, prevents delegates
to the United Nations bodies…from tackling this problem?”94 Chisholm’s insinuation of Church
duplicity provoked one of his old nemeses in Canada’s House of Commons, Social Credit MP,
John H. Blackmore of Lethbridge, Alberta. Blackmore’s condemnation of Chisholm was long
and contemptuous:
Without qualifications the implication of… [Chisholm’s comments] is just as clear as the
moon in a cloudless sky. Obviously he is indoctrinating in favour of birth control. … See
how serious that is. This man, in advocating birth control…is not concerned at all about what
the Creator of the earth thought about this matter of birth control. … It is bad enough for
people to steal around the streets, to meet women on the corners and to talk contraception
and birth control. But to have a man [Dr. Chisholm] free to pour that doctrine premeditatedly
93
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over the airways of the C.B.C. is a monstrosity which strikes me almost petrified with
amazement.95

Because Chisholm’s endorsement of birth control contested the Church’s teachings and thus,
Canada’s traditional values, Blackmore’s reaction to the broadcast in 1951 mirrored his reaction
to the doctor’s speeches from 1946. Many Canadians shared Blackmore’s sentiments and
believed that contraception was a corruption of morality. Under pressure from religious
authorities and Canada’s political elite, the CBC did not allow birth control to be explicitly
discussed on its programming until the late 1950s. Despite the criticism, Chisholm never stopped
advocating birth control as the primary manner in which to solve the problem of overpopulation.
It was not long until Chisholm and the Catholic Church butted heads over his work at the
WHO. In October 1951, Chisholm announced at the annual meeting of the American Public
Health Association that the WHO would sponsor a birth control education program in India.96
The program’s catalyst was Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, India’s Minister of Health and a disciple of
Gandhi. Kaur approached the WHO and asked for the organization’s help conducting a study on
the rhythm method of birth control. The rhythm method requires women and men to practice
periodic abstinence. Also known as fertility awareness, the rhythm method tracks a women’s
menstrual cycle to detect ovulation and consequently, attempts to note the period women are
most likely to conceive. Chisholm had initially hoped to launch a comprehensive program in
which various methods of contraception were utilized. But as historian Matthew Connelly notes,
“the Vatican’s watchdogs…had Chisholm in their sights,”97 and the director-general was forced
to restrict his study to the rhythm method, an acceptable form of “birth control” to the Roman
Catholic Church. Nonetheless, the Church were concerned by Chisholm’s “agenda” and the
Vatican eventually forced the WHO to abandon its pilot project in India.
The short-lived program in India provides further insight into both Chisholm and the
West’s inherent biases. Just as the Catholic Church endeavoured to use faith as a means of
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control, Chisholm and other Western internationalists attempted to use science to shape India’s
population in their own image. Indians, however, balked at the WHO’s “one-size-fits-all”
approach to birth control, leaving Chisholm confused as to why the country’s population resisted
the rhythm method. He was convinced that overpopulation was a primary cause of poverty and
conflict, and thus rationally, he believed that Indians would embrace the technique: it would be
irrational not to.
In India the population is increasing by at least five million a year. The government is well
aware of this dreadful threat and is conducting an extensive campaign of education and
instruction to try to cope with it, but education without adequate methods of birth control is
not very effective. Unfortunately, the rhythm system of birth control, depending on periodic
sexual abstinence, had been shown by experiments assisted by the World Health
Organization…to be largely ineffective in an ignorant and superstitious population. The great
advantage, and limitation, of that method is that it costs nothing, except self-control.98

If Indians were not capable of rational thought and a little “self-control,” Chisholm reasoned,
how could they expect to raise a mature generation of children dedicated to peace? Chisholm’s
remarks highlight his own prejudices, but more importantly reveal the West’s ignorance of
Indian culture and society. Chisholm and the WHO “concluded that the [Indian] villagers were
ignorant and did not perceive the true value and potential of human life, the villagers did not
understand why the researchers did not see the value of sons to parents with no other form of
social security.”99 Chisholm and his medical colleagues may have been well-intentioned but their
inability to employ social apperception and empathy in their work resulted in frequent cultural
misunderstandings, and ultimately, a new form of colonization.
During the next year Chisholm continued to clash with the Roman Catholic Church over
birth control: Most notably at the fifth World Health Assembly held in Geneva from May 5-22,
1952. Catholic countries, including Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and Ireland, threatened to
withdraw en masse from the WHO over a Norwegian motion to convene an expert panel to study
the “medical aspects” associated with overpopulation. The motion did not pass, even though the
topic of birth control had not been mentioned specifically. The negative reaction of so many
countries reflected the Cold War pattern in which the Catholic Church “put pressure on
governments to prevent any resolutions or action by international agencies which might

98
99

Chisholm, Can People Learn to Learn?, 54.
Connelly, Fatal Misconception, 173.

113
encourage the practice of what were regarded as illicit methods of birth control.”100 Chisholm
left the conference discouraged, upset that many WHO employees were unwilling to challenge
the Church, to question the “sacred cows” they had been taught as young children, and
consequently, fully embrace his vision of peace.
In 1953 Brock Chisholm retired as director-general of the WHO. His term in office was defined
by a willingness to take action and an enthusiasm to adopt new initiatives. Robert Clarke’s article
“Two Billions Call Him Doctor” recorded Chisholm’s achievements at the WHO. They
included: overcoming a cholera epidemic in Egypt, the almost complete eradication of malaria in
Greece and Sardinia, providing China with tuberculosis x-ray machines, training local nurses in
Ethiopia, and standardizing the names of drugs across the world.101 In a short period of time,
Chisholm had accomplished much towards creating a healthier, more peaceful world. Chisholm,
however, also failed to achieve all of his goals. He was disappointed that many WHO members
did not embrace his new definition of health, share his passion for social medicine, or understand
the need for international civil servants to act as mature world citizens. Yet Chisholm understood
that it would take years, if not decades, for his vision of peace to be realized: “The fact is that the
peoples of the world are trying to do something now that they never had any idea of attempting
to do before in the history of the human race, and because they are trying to do these things for
the first time, it is not to be expected that their relatively primitive efforts should be successful on
the first occasion or undertaken without difficulties.”102 Chisholm’s positive concept of health
would ultimately inspire generations of doctors to pursue humanitarian medicine.
In retirement Chisholm continued to actively pursue his vision of peace, making over 300
appearances as a public figure.103 Time and again, Chisholm spoke of the need to educate a
mature generation of children to be international citizens, taught to question local beliefs and
customs. He stressed the critical role psychiatrists and psychologists must play if the world was
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to avert war. Only with their technical expertise could the world achieve mental and emotional
health, and thus, thrive. Chisholm, however, was never far from controversy. His vision of peace
still rejected organized religion, dismissed the concept of morality, and challenged other
traditional Canadian values, beliefs, and institutions. Outside of professional circles, Chisholm
never enjoyed the confidence of the Canadian government or public. As one news editorial
wrote: “Canadians are used to extreme statements by Dr. Chisholm.”104 Journalists such as Bruce
Hutchison suspected Chisholm was a communist because of his sensibilities towards war and
peace: “I had expected to find a flaming revolutionary, possibly a secret Communist, or at best, a
smug Pecksniff. … Instead, I found a mild, cheerful man of graying hair, pink cheeks, humorous
eye and chuckling speech.”105 Chisholm was not a communist, but an iconoclast and “truly a
world citizen.”106
Chisholm was not the first Canadian to work for the UN. He was, however, the first to
directly employ the intergovernmental organization as a vehicle to implement his unique
international point of view and alternative vision of peace. But he would not be the last. The next
case study also led and oversaw an important Division in the new UN. This man believed legal
internationalism, not medical, was critical to achieving peace and emphasized the importance of
international civil servants in the creation of a better world. Like Chisholm, his vision of peace
was not popular with many Canadians because it challenged the role and authority of the state.
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Chapter 3
John P. Humphrey and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: 1946-1966
In 1988, A.J. Hobbins, a law librarian at McGill University (Montreal, Quebec), unearthed the
original draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Searching for past course
notes, Hobbins found the draft among the personal papers of John P. Humphrey, a professor in
the university’s Faculty of Law. It was a remarkable discovery. The Declaration is widely
recognized as one of the most important legal documents of the twentieth century. Adopted on
December 10, 1948, by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the Declaration contained
thirty articles that included the protection of political, civil, and more controversially, economic,
social, and cultural rights (see Appendix 1). In the immediate days before its adoption, the
UDHR was described as “the international Magna Carta of all men everywhere,”1 and as a
“document of the greatest moral force.”2 After its ratification, the Declaration became critical to
the pursuit of national and international peace in the postwar and Cold War period. But why was
such an important document found amongst the private papers of a McGill law professor?
On August 1, 1946, John Humphrey, Dean of McGill’s Faculty of Law, was appointed
Director of the UN Division of Human Rights. Like many Canadians in the immediate postwar
years, Humphrey viewed intergovernmental organizations, in particular the UN, as one of the
world’s best hopes for peace. As head of the Human Rights Division, Humphrey became one of
Canada’s foremost postwar, peace activists. His work at the UN and subsequent activism had a
significant impact on how Canadians, including the government, thought about and attempted to
achieve peace during the Cold War. Humphrey’s role at the UN required him to support the
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newly formed UN Commission on Human Rights. Chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt, the
Commission included a drafting committee made up of three members whose job was to draft an
international bill of rights. Soon after its formation, however, the drafting committee found itself
deadlocked and asked Humphrey to write the first draft of the UDHR.3
In the spring of 1947, Humphrey worked tirelessly at the Lido Beach Hotel in Long
Island, New York, preparing an international bill of rights. He was assisted by Emile Giraud, a
French lawyer and head of the Research Section in the UN Division of Human Rights: but
Humphrey alone decided which articles would form his draft. Humphrey presented his bill to an
expanded drafting committee in June of that year.4 His draft declaration consisted of forty-eight
short articles preceded by a preamble of four principles that included the statement: “There can
be no peace unless human rights and freedoms are respected.”5 The articles contained in his draft
were a combination of “old” and “new” human rights (see Appendix 2). Articles 3 to 34
articulated traditional political and civil rights such as the right to freedom of belief, worship,
and religion (Article 14); the right to peaceful assembly (Article 19); and the right to vote in free
and fair elections (Article 30). It was, however, articles 34 to 45 that proved far more divisive.
These articles pronounced “new” rights, including the right to medical care (Article 35), the right
3
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to social security (Article 41), and the right to adequate food and housing (Article 42). Although
further drafts were completed in the eighteen months prior to the UDHR’s adoption, Humphrey’s
initial draft was used as the template.6 Indeed, the “new” rights introduced in his bill were
embraced by the drafting committee and most were included in the final UDHR.
Historians, however, have long downplayed Humphrey’s role in the UDHR’s creation.
Jay Winter writes that one “individual in particular must be credited for its form and much of its
substance. This person is…French jurist Rene Cassin.”7 Similarly, Mary Ann Glendon argues
that Cassin is largely responsible for the UDHR’s final shape: “Cassin preserved most of the
substantive content of Humphrey’s draft, but under his hand the document acquired an internal
logic and achieved greater unity.”8 The myth of Cassin as “father” of the UDHR is the result of
several factors. Cassin, as a member of the expanded drafting committee, had been asked by
Roosevelt to write a subsequent draft of the UDHR in late June 1947 (see Appendix 3). In 1958
Cassin’s draft was displayed at UN headquarters at the request of the French government to mark
the tenth anniversary of the Declaration’s ratification. Furthermore, in 1968 Cassin was awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize for his work at the UN, in addition to his role at the European Court of
Human Rights from 1959 to 1968. Upon examination, however, Cassin’s draft was almost
identical to that of Humphrey’s bill.9 Consequently, historians such as Samuel Moyn maintain
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that Cassin’s contribution to the UDHR “paled before that of the others,”10 but in particular
Humphrey, Roosevelt, and Charles Malik.
A close study of the UDHR and its drafting process reveals a new conception of peace
that Humphrey was instrumental in defining, and to a degree, popularizing, in the early Cold War
period. Humphrey believed that the UDHR and its ensuing Covenants were essential instruments
on the path to peace: “There is a fundamental connection between human rights and peace. We
will have peace on Earth when everyone’s rights are respected.”11 His vision of a peaceful world
based on human rights was revolutionary. Humphrey’s draft, inspired by his study of the law and
buoyed by his faith in internationalism and socialism, challenged the Cold War consensus. His
inclusion of “new” economic, social, and cultural rights were closely associated with socialist
political thought, and worse, communism. Humphrey’s draft declaration, as a result, contested
the era’s ideological status quo. In addition, the UDHR transformed the nature of international
law and challenged the role of state. The promotion and protection of social and economic rights
required states to fundamentally alter its relationship to its citizens. Canada’s government,
however, was resistant to instituting a comprehensive welfare state following the war. The
UDHR revealed Canada’s, and other countries reluctance, if not outright hostility to human
rights legislation, and exposed the Canadian government’s devotion to divisive Cold War politics
and policies.
To understand the revolutionary character of the UDHR, it is necessary to examine the
philosophical beliefs that inspired Humphrey’s draft and vision of peace. Contrary to Glendon’s
assertion that Humphrey had “simply compiled a list of rights,”12 in 1984 he revealed that two
particular philosophies formed the draft’s foundation: “The draft attempted to combine
humanitarian liberalism with social democracy.”13 According to scholars Joel Blau and Mimi
Abramovitz, the two philosophies are remarkably similar: “Humanitarian liberalism…reflects the
principles of social democracy and favours an expanded role for the state in order to reduce
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inequality and promote a greater sense of community among members of society.”14 At their
core, both philosophies are about providing people with rights, without distinction to race, sex,
language, or religion. The primary difference is that humanitarian liberalism focuses on
providing people “old” civil and political rights (although not entirely), while social democracy
emphasizes the promotion of “new” economic, social, and cultural rights. Humphrey felt that
both sets of rights were integral to an individual’s well-being and the maintenance of peace:
“The quarrel between equality and liberty is, of course, in modern terms, the quarrel between
socialism and liberalism. The great question is…which do you want most … My own
answer…is that I want some of both.”15 As a result of Humphrey’s core personal beliefs and
convictions, he resolved to include both “old” and “new” rights in the original draft of the
UDHR.
But how did Humphrey come to hold these two particular philosophical beliefs?
Humphrey’s draft is dedicated to removing the causes of social unrest and war, and ultimately, to
creating a better, more secure world. According to Humphrey: “Ever since I can remember, I
have always been passionately concerned with the idea of peace.”16 From the 1920s to the 1940s,
Humphrey pursued his passions of the law, internationalism, and socialism to achieve a lasting,
positive peace. Each of his three passions contained the seeds that led Humphrey to embrace
both humanitarian liberalism and social democracy, which ultimately shaped his draft
declaration.
In 1925 Humphrey graduated from McGill University with a Bachelor of Commerce. The
business world did not interest him and soon after graduating Humphrey decided to pursue a
degree in law. McGill’s Faculty of Law, however, required a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) as a
prerequisite to admission, requiring Humphrey to return to university that fall. He graduated in
1927 with the mandatory B.A. and was accepted to McGill’s Law program with an autumn start
date. It was during his political science courses with Stephen Leacock that Humphrey’s passion
for the law was kindled: “I gradually began to understand what it was all about and to recognize
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in the law one of man’s greatest intellectual achievements.”17 At the same time Humphrey’s
interest in internationalism was also sparked. On November 26, 1926, he wrote to his sister Ruth:
“I like law more every day. … I can think of no broader study than, perhaps, philosophy — and
law is especially interesting in this province for it is actually concerned with the evolution of
Canada as an international person (this applies to the whole Dominion) … You will think I am
enthusiastic — I really am!”18 In the next few years Humphrey’s interest in law, especially
international law, continued to grow. He went from being an average student his first year to
graduating second in his class in 1929. Upon graduation Humphrey spent the next academic year
in Paris, France, studying international law at the Haute Ecole des Etudes de Droit International.
Humphrey returned to Montreal in 1930. For the next six years he practiced corporate
law at the firm of Wainwright, Elder, and MacDougal. But he was bored. Humphrey’s interest in
international law had never diminished and he did not enjoy corporate law. In 1936, with the
help of a $2000 grant from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Humphrey spent
another year in France studying law. On his return to Montreal in 1937 he began teaching at
McGill University, including his favourite course, International Law and Organization. By the
late 1930s, Humphrey had developed the “missionary zeal,” as he called it: “There could, it
seemed to me, be no greater career than one devoted to the preservation of international peace
and the abolition of war.”19
His desire to utilize international law to preserve peace is evident in his best known, preUN article, “The Parent of Anarchy.” Humphrey’s article combined his passion for the law with
international relations. Humphrey later proclaimed that “The Parent of Anarchy” is the “the best
and most original article I ever wrote.”20 The article explored the state-to-state character of
international law and organization, and argued for the weakening of a state’s power/sovereignty
to attain peace. Humphrey argued for the promotion of individual rights and the strengthening of
an individual’s standing and influence under the law: “If the world is to escape otherwise certain
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disaster, various powers of government, including the effective control of all instruments of
international coercion, must be conferred on international organs. Nor can its control be effective
unless the powers of the international government extend to individual men and women.”21 At its
core, Humphrey’s article outlines the vision for peace he later advocated in his draft of the
UDHR. When Humphrey accepted his new role at the UN later that year, he sincerely believed
that “the promotion of peace is one of the principal objects of the legal order.”22
Humphrey’s article highlights his passion for, and belief in, the concept of legal
internationalism.23 He, like many lawyers during the interwar period (such as the University of
Cambridge’s Whewell Professor of International Law, Hersch Lauterpacht), viewed legal
internationalism as a vehicle to achieve peace between countries. Humphrey hoped that
intergovernmental organizations such as the International Court of Justice and the League of
Nations would successfully arbitrate disputes between states by standardizing international law.
Humphrey and his peers, however, were hardly the first to embrace legal internationalism, or
view international law as a means of securing a better, more peaceful world. The Institute of
International Law, for instance, was founded in 1873 in Ghent, Belgium. Moreover, historian
Mark Mazower notes that by 1914, “the single most influential strand of internationalism…[was]
the campaign for international arbitration.”24 Legal internationalism, however, had been largely
discredited by the failure of the League of Nations in the late 1930s to stop fascist aggression and
by the outbreak of the Second World War. Nonetheless, Humphrey and a small number of
international lawyers still believed that the world could achieve “peace though law.”25
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Humphrey believed at the beginning of the Second World War that Canada’s primary
goal should be to fight for a new international order. Peace was impossible, he argued, without
“some form of supra-national government…[and] at least an effective system of collective
security.”26 Humphrey further believed that this new international order must promote peace
through the instrument of international law. Consequently, he was excited to learn that the Allies
were meeting in San Francisco in 1945 to form a new organization designed to maintain
international peace and security: the United Nations. Humphrey wrote to the Canadian
Department of External Affairs and asked to be one of the country’s representatives at the
conference, but the government politely refused his offer. This rejection did not deter Humphrey,
who later became the first branch president of the Montreal United Nations Society (later known
as the United Nations Association). Humphrey gave numerous speeches as branch president,
outlining what he believed to be the connection between internationalism, the UN, and peace:
There was a time not long ago when it seemed that once hostilities would be at an end, we
would resume normal routines once more, confident that peace would be ours. But it has not
been as simple as that. We cannot yet sit back and relax…for there is still a battle to
fight…the battle for peace. … The responsibility for peace rests on people like you and me.
It is for this reason that a number of countries have set up societies for the advancement of
the cause of peace by organizing popular support for the UN. In Canada, this society is called
the UN Society in Canada. … [The United Nations Society] believes in only one ‘ism’. It
believes that the great issue before the world today is the issue of internationalism versus
disaster. If you too believe in internationalism…whatever else you may believe, your place is
in the Society. … And so today, because its aim is to create and foster a spirit of
internationalism in our community…it is providing a focus towards which ordinary men and
women can direct their energies in the fight for peace.27
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Humphrey never imagined that he would soon be working for the UN, an organization that
would allow his vision of peace, in the form of his draft declaration, to become a reality.
The United Nations Society was not the only organization Humphrey joined to promote
his interest in peace and legal internationalism. In 1945 he became a life-long member of the
Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA). The CIIA was founded in 1928 and organized
meetings across Canada to discuss a wide range of topics relating to internationalism, including
but not limited to: Canada’s role in international organizations such as the UN, the country’s
participation in worldwide conflicts, and ideas of global citizenship. Humphrey was particularly
impressed by the organization’s commitment to international activism, including the four-part
radio series “Can We Build a Lasting Peace?”, created in conjunction with the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation in February 1945. The CIIA’s membership, unlike that of the United
Nations Society, was dominated by Canada’s business, political, and academic elite.
Consequently, Humphrey was flattered to receive an invitation to address their annual meeting in
1949: “According to all the standards that I have learned to respect as an old member of this
organization, this invitation is probably the greatest honour that has ever been given to me.”28
His attachment to the CIIA and its pursuit of internationalism was so great that he left a dinner
with friends (whom he had not seen in over a year), to attend an organizational lecture: “Lester
Pearson gave a brilliant expose of Canadian foreign policy. He talked mostly about NATO which
is the big preoccupation in this country, referring only to the U.N. to write it off as merely the
verbal forum of the cold war.”29 Although he did not agree with Pearson’s speech, his decision to
abandon his friends mid-dinner makes it clear that Humphrey’s passion for internationalism was
no less enthusiastic in 1952 than it had been during his law studies.
Humphrey’s third pre-war passion was his ideological devotion to socialism, and the
most obvious inspiration for the inclusion of “new” rights in his draft declaration. By the early
1930s Humphrey was, in his own words, a “convinced social democrat.”30 He embraced the need
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for state regulation to rectify economic, social, and political inequality in Canada, motivated by
both the events of the Great Depression and the writings of George Bernard Shaw and other
socialist writers. In 1932 Humphrey joined the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR), an
organization of like-minded individuals. Founded in 1931-1932 by a group of Canadian leftwing intellectuals, including historian Frank Underhill and McGill law professor Frank R. Scott,
the LSR advocated social reform and a planned economy “under the socialist banner.”31
Principles enunciated in its organizational manifesto included: public ownership of utilities,
nationalization of banks, formation of agricultural co-operatives, social legislation such as
unemployment insurance, medicare, and a foreign policy of disarmament and peace.
Subsequently, the LSR established close ties to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
(founded in 1933), and produced two seminal works on social democracy in Canada: Social
Planning for Canada (1935) and Democracy Needs Socialism (1938). The LSR also bought the
journal Canadian Forum in 1936 as a means of raising awareness for their cause.
Humphrey acknowledged in his unpublished autobiography the important relationship he
formed with the LSR throughout the Great Depression and the beginning of the Second World
War (the organization disbanded in 1942). It is clear, however, that the value he placed on the
LSR was social rather than political:
In Montreal the L.S.R. was something much more than an intellectual wing of a political
party. It was also a group of friends, and our meetings were often social gatherings which
sometimes took the shape even of weekend hiking expeditions or outings in the Eastern
Townships. I regret in retrospect that I took no part in the more serious and lasting work of
the L.S.R., which included publication of some good books. Nor did I join or work actively
for the C.C.F. I was and remained very much on the periphery. 32

Why was Humphrey so hesitant to get involved in the work of the LSR? He believed in the
principles espoused by the group, but ultimately, could not look past the LSR’s disinterest in
international affairs. “My experience, even in Canada,” Humphrey confided to his diary, “has
been that socialists are so preoccupied with domestic questions that they have no energy and
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time left for what is happening in the international community.”33 Nevertheless, Humphrey’s
association with the LSR left an indelible mark on his core beliefs, values, and eventually, his
draft declaration: “But if I made no contribution the influence which this group [i.e. LSR] had on
me was important and lasting; and it stood me in good stead when I prepared the first draft of the
document which became the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”34 If Humphrey had never
joined the LSR, his 1947 draft would have looked remarkably different to the one he submitted
to the Commission’s drafting committee. It is possible, as a result, that some of the “new” rights
included in his draft would have been absent, stripping the document of its significance and
international impact.
When Humphrey joined the UN Division of Human Rights in 1946 his philosophical
foundations had been established. This clarity proved beneficial when he was asked to write the
first draft of the UDHR. A firm adherent of both humanitarian liberalism and social democracy –
the result of his three passions – Humphrey knew that his draft would include a combination of
“old” and “new” rights. Yet, as the senior UN representative on the Human Rights Commission,
Humphrey was also required to assemble and collect all documentation that might be pertinent to
writing the Declaration:
The Secretary-General is requested to make arrangements for: (a) the compilation and
publication of a year-book on law and usage relying to human rights, the first edition of
which should include all declarations and bills on human rights now in force in the various
countries ... (e) the collection and publication of plans and declarations on human rights by
specialized agencies and non-governmental national and international organizations.35

In June 1947, Humphrey presented the drafting committee with a document known as the
“Secretariat Outline,” in addition to his draft declaration. The Outline is a 400-plus page
document that lists every article included in Humphrey’s draft, forty-eight in total, including the
national constitutions, bill of rights, and texts that Humphrey used to prepare and write each
article. As a result, Glendon argues that the Outline and Humphrey’s subsequent draft “provided
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the drafting committee with a distillation of nearly two hundred years of efforts to articulate the
most basic human values in terms of rights.”36
The Secretariat Outline further reveals that Humphrey borrowed significantly from two
particular texts in the creation of his draft. The first text was an international bill of rights
prepared by the American Law Institute. The Institute was composed of 850 leading judges,
lawyers, and law professors, who published their bill in 1944 in the hopes it might be used in any
forthcoming peace settlements. The bill aimed to protect individual rights against arbitrary state
action in order “to win the peace.”37 The document was initially presented, unsuccessfully, by
the Panamanian delegation at San Francisco in 1945 and again to the UN General Assembly in
1946. According to Humphrey, this text was far superior to any other document that he collected
and read prior to writing his draft: “The best of the texts from which I worked was the one
prepared by the American Law Institute … It had been drafted in the United States during the
war by a distinguished group representing many cultures, one of whom was Alfredo Alfaro, the
Panamanian foreign minister.”38 Humphrey’s fondness for the Law Institute’s document is
evident by how many times it is referenced under individual articles in the Secretariat Outline.39
He used the text freely in regard to both traditional and new rights. Articles on the right to a fair
trial and the freedom to assemble peaceably were included in Humphrey’s draft as articles 6 and
19 respectively. Article 15 of the American Law Institute declaration enunciated the individual’s
right to various social welfare programs on behalf of the state: “Every one has the right to social
security. The state has a duty to…insure that there are maintained comprehensive arrangements
for the promotion of health, for the prevention of sickness and accident, and for the provision of
medical care and of compensation for loss of livelihood.”40 The same rights were articulated in
Article 41 of Humphrey’s draft: “Every one has the right to social security. The State shall
maintain effective arrangements for the prevention of unemployment and for insurance against
36
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the risks of unemployment, accident, disability, sickness, old age and other involuntary or
undeserved loss of livelihood.”41 The similarities between Humphrey’s draft and the American
Law Institute declaration are striking and the provenance unmistakable.
The second text that shaped Humphrey’s draft was a document prepared by the InterAmerican Juridical Committee and submitted to the UN Secretariat by the Chilean delegation.
The Inter-American draft, like its American Law Institute counterpart, is listed under a large
number of articles in the Secretariat Outline.42 The rights enunciated in these articles include the
right to personal liberty; freedom of speech and expression; the right to a nationality; the right to
medical care; and the right to public help to support one’s family. Although not utilized as
frequently as the American Law Institute text, Humphrey’s repeated use of the Inter-American
document highlights its significance to his draft, particularly in regard to his inclusion of
political, civil, and social rights. Years later Humphrey indicated how the Inter-American text,
and the other manuscripts he collected for the Outline, influenced his draft declaration: “Many
people and organizations had drawn up documents which they thought appropriate. So I took
copies of all of them…. I made a kind of synthesis of all the documents and threw in a lot of
things I especially cared about myself.”43 The content and substance of Humphrey’s bill was
ultimately inspired by his twin philosophies, formed during the interwar period, and by selected
human rights literature he collected prior to writing his draft. But what motivated the creation of
the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1946? And what motivated Humphrey to write such an
innovative and far-reaching document?
The UDHR’s creation was provoked by contemporary events. Historian Samuel Moyn
recently argued, contrary to popular belief, that the UDHR was not a response to the Holocaust:
“The now deeply ingrained assumption that the entire aftermath of World War II, and not least
the Universal Declaration, just might have been a response to the Jewish genocide is wrong.”44
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Instead, Moyn contends that during the 1970s human rights and historical Holocaust memory
became conflated in the popular imagination leading to the myth about the UDHR’s origins.
There is, however, despite Moyn’s assertions, evidence to suggest that the Holocaust provided
Humphrey and the Human Rights Commission with a burning sense of urgency to create a
declaration that would protect against any future systematic abuse of human rights. In late 1948
the members of the Human Rights Commission unanimously agreed that the atrocities
committed by Nazi Germany provided the primary motivation for the UDHR. Charles Malik,
Rapporteur of the Commission, stated that the “declaration had been inspired by opposition to
the barbarous doctrines of Nazism and fascism.”45 Peter Davies of the U.K. delegation noted: “It
should not be forgotten that the [Second World War] by its total disregard of the most
fundamental rights was responsible for the Declaration.”46 In numerous speeches and articles,
Humphrey echoed the statements of his UN colleagues, that the Holocaust and other Nazi
atrocities motivated the creation of the UDHR. During one particular interview Humphrey
observed that “in part, the outbreak of the Second World War was caused by the inability of
nations, and in particular Nazi Germany, to respect human rights. After the war, this became the
catalyst that brought about the reference to human rights in the UN Charter, as well as the
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and International Covenants.”47
Humphrey believed that respect for human rights and peace were inseparable, and maintained
that the violation of human rights was a direct cause of war and social unrest.
The Second World War, however, was not fought to defend human rights, as Humphrey
claimed in his unpublished biography. He deemed the war a struggle for individual values and
human dignity, rather than territory, which he felt had characterized wars in the past, including
the First World War: “This, unlike any previous war, was a war to vindicate human rights.”48 But
this is not the reason why Western governments declared war on Germany and its allies in 1939
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and 1941. Humphrey’s postwar argument conveniently ignores the notion that international law
prior to and during the Second World War governed relations between nations, not the
relationship between an individual and the state. National governments were not interested in
how another nation treated its citizens. Countries such as Great Britain, France, and the United
States declared war on Germany and/or Japan because international treaties had been broken or
they had been attacked directly. They did not declare war due to the ill-treatment of German or
Japanese citizens by their respective governments.
During the war Western countries publically condemned Germany’s treatment of
Europe’s Jewish population, but their actions did not match their words. In None Is Too Many
(1983), historians Irving Abella and Harold Troper examine how the Canadian government
systematically refused entry to Jewish refugees before, during, and after the Second World War.
By 1943 the Canadian government knew of the Nazi’s mass murder of Europe’s Jews, yet still
did nothing to help them immigrate to Canada. In reality, Frederick Charles Blair, the director of
Canada’s immigration branch from 1936 to 1943 actively blocked Jewish entry into the country.
In 1938, Blair, a xenophobe and anti-Semite, wrote a letter to a friend that highlighted his
intolerance and bigotry:
I suggested recently to three Jewish gentlemen…that it might be a very good thing if they
would call a conference and have a day of humiliation and prayer…where they would
honestly try to answer the question of why they are so unpopular almost everywhere. … If
they would divest themselves of certain…habits I am sure they could be just as popular in
Canada as our Scandinavians.49

In this prejudiced environment fashioned by Blair and his deputies, Canada admitted a paltry
5000 Jews between 1933-1945, and a further 8000 from the end of the war until 1948. Canada’s
anti-Jewish immigration policy was mirrored by their wartime allies: Great Britain accepted
70,000 Jews between 1933-1945, while the United States received 200,000 European Jews
during the same period of time.50 All three countries could have undoubtedly accepted more
refugees than they did. In spite of the West’s poor treatment of Jewish refugees, it is still clear
that Nazi atrocities motivated the creation of the UDHR.
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Historian Mary Ann Glendon notes that the UDHR had “positive roots” in addition to its
“negative roots.”51 In the early 1940s many people, including Humphrey, were inspired by
American president Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (FDR) commitment to preserving and
protecting human rights. Humphrey revered FDR’s State of the Union address to the 77th United
States Congress, delivered on January 6, 1941. Now known as the “Four Freedoms” speech, the
President outlined his vision for a peaceful future. FDR’s four freedoms included the freedom
from want, the freedom of speech and expression, the freedom from fear, and the freedom to
worship. His speech critiqued the American interwar policy of isolationism and highlighted the
danger Germany and other dictatorships posed to national security. During this speech, FDR
linked the freedom from fear to the Second World War, demanding a reduction in armaments
worldwide so that one country could not invade another. The freedom from want addressed a
domestic concern rather than an international one – although it was still a requirement for a
peaceful world:
The basic things expected by our people of their political and economic systems are simple.
They are: Equality of opportunity for youth and for others [;] Jobs for those who can work [;]
Security for those who need it [;] The ending of special privilege for the few [;] The
preservation of civil liberties for all [;] The enjoyment of the fruits of scientific progress in a
wider and constantly rising standard of living.52

For Humphrey and others, Roosevelt’s speech was not simply a war slogan but a call to
implement an “internationalist rights agenda”53 and motivation to become an untiring advocate
for individual human rights in the immediate postwar years and beyond.
Ultimately, the inspiration and motivation for Humphrey’s draft and the completed
UDHR were intrinsically linked. The philosophies of humanitarian liberalism and social
democracy both emphasized themes of justice, equality, and peace. These same values also
provided the foundation to Humphrey’s draft. His devotion to the law, legal internationalism, and
socialism was a commitment to creating a better world.
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Neither Humphrey’s draft declaration, nor his vision of peace was readily embraced in the
Western world. Many members of North America’s political, legal, and media establishment
deemed the UDHR revolutionary and as a result, subversive. In the politicized and polarized
environment of the postwar period, there was a public backlash against the creation of the
UDHR. The inclusion of “new” economic, social, and cultural rights in Humphrey’s draft and
final Declaration became the objects of both praise and scorn in a battle of Cold War ideologies.
This was due primarily to their association with communism and the Soviet Union. In the
postwar and early Cold War period, many elements of Western society, including the Canadian
government and media, publicly avowed traditional political and civil rights, while opposing
economic and cultural rights as socialist propaganda. According to Humphrey, by 1948 many
people considered the UDHR “a socialist instrument, since it enunciated and defined not only the
traditional civil and political rights but also economic, social, cultural rights.”54 But Humphrey
was pleased that his draft declaration had included economic and social rights, in spite of their
connection to socialism and communism. In a 1989 interview with the Montreal Gazette,
Humphrey declared: “The declaration talks about economic, social, and cultural rights…. Back
in 1948, a lot of people thought those ideas were pure socialism, and the conventional wisdom
was that the Russians had put them in. They didn’t; I did. And I’m rather proud of it.”55 It must
be noted, however, that Humphrey had plenty of support in the UN Commission on Human
Rights. China’s P.C. Chang, Chile’s Hernan Santa Cruz, and many other members of the
Commission ensured that “social and economic rights would have pride of place in the
Declaration along with traditional political and civil rights.”56 Nevertheless, there were many
people in the late 1940s who were unwilling to overlook what they believed to be the
unequivocal connection between “new” rights, Humphrey, and Soviet influence.
Humphrey’s fiercest critic in 1948 was Frank E. Holman, President of the American Bar
Association. Holman consistently criticized the Commission and Humphrey’s Division of
Human Rights as a whole. In September Holman made a speech to the California Bar
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Association that particularly upset Humphrey: “He [Holman] is reported as having mentioned me
personally as having admitted the ‘revolutionary’ character of the programme.”57 Holman’s
speech was printed, in-full, by the New York Times and ended with the assertion that
Humphrey’s “new” rights, and thus the UDHR, were radical and dangerous:
We are dealing chiefly with a missionary spirit on the part of social and economic reformers
to establish throughout the world their social and economic ideas … This program, if
adopted and approved by the [UN] member nations, will promote state socialism, if not
communism, throughout the world.58

Holman’s line of thinking, however, was far from unique in the late 1940s. A month after the
UDHR’s adoption, Humphrey’s friend sent him an editorial entitled “Human Rights on Pink
Paper.” The editorial had appeared in the January 17, 1949, edition of the Montreal Gazette. The
editorial implied, as its title suggests, that the UDHR and Human Rights programme at the UN
were explicitly linked to socialist values: “There was never a time when there was a greater need
for an international statement and enforcement of human rights. But it is questionable whether
human rights are to be given the greatest degree of security by being set forth on pink paper.”59
Both Holman and the editorial’s characterization of economic and social rights as revolutionary
would plague Humphrey for years to come.60
Despite the insinuations, Humphrey was not a communist or even a communist
sympathizer. Humphrey deplored the Soviet Union’s suppression of political and civil rights. In
1951 he recorded the details of a conversation with his boss at the UN about American foreign
policy in regard to the Soviet Union: “I replied that I would formulate and declare an American
foreign policy in the following terms. ‘We say to the dispossessed peoples of the world that we
will give them everything that the communists promise and something else besides —
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freedom.’”61 Other diary entries confirm Humphrey’s commitment to the Western camp during
the Cold War.
Humphrey believed the Declaration to be revolutionary, but not because economic,
social, and cultural rights were inherently connected to the Soviet Union and communism. He
never believed that “new” rights were better or more important than “old” rights. Rather, he
believed, as the philosophical underpinnings of his draft suggest, that “human rights are
indivisible.”62 Humphrey argued that it did not matter if the political and civil rights of citizens
were protected, if they did not have access to clean water, affordable housing, and food.
Humphrey was also fond of saying, “Where there are rights there are also duties.”63 And it was
this onus on duty that made his inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights in the UDHR
revolutionary, not their supposed connection to communism. Humphrey’s draft declaration
challenged the traditional mandate of national governments to its people, and this worried the
likes of Holman and the editors at the Montreal Gazette. Holman explicitly equated the
endorsement of basic human rights with the loss of individual liberty and freedom: “[The
UDHR] constitutes an agreement to adopt the New Deal on an international scale by committing
member nations to a paternalistic form of government which would attempt to care for all the
daily needs of the citizen and minimize the incentive for individual initiative and progress.”64
The Gazette feared similar consequences: “The [UN Human Rights] Commission has had its
own conception of what constitutes human rights. … It gives the individual citizen the right to
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demand and receive from his government a wide range of special paternalistic care.”65
Humphrey’s draft was part of a larger trend in the postwar period in which many citizens and
some politicians argued for the creation of national welfare states.
Prior to the Second World War governments, including Canada’s, were reticent to
provide their citizens with economic, social, and cultural rights. Canadians were simultaneously
wary of paternalistic, state intervention into their own lives. Canada’s federal government cited
economic concerns in providing its citizens with universal social programs, but the average
Canadian worried that social welfare legislation would challenge the era’s liberal order and
conventional gender roles. Men were expected to provide for their families financially, and
consequently, take on the role of the “male breadwinner.” To accept money or help from the
government was emasculating. Women, on the other hand, feared that government support for
their husbands and sons would create a generation of male slackers. Ultimately, Canadians
worried that the creation of a welfare state would undermine the family as the nation’s basic
social unit.
The 1940s, however, marked the beginning of a concerted effort by national governments
to make the postwar period a better, more peaceful place for all people. In Canada there was a
growing belief that the government had the means and responsibility to build a new social order.
In 1940 the government passed the Unemployment Insurance Act, a landmark in new, social
welfare legislation. Furthermore, Canada’s Committee on Reconstruction published the “Report
on Social Security for Canada 1943,” better known as The Marsh Report. The Report’s author,
Leonard Marsh, recommended that Canada implement a comprehensive system of social
security, but his ideas, with the exception of the adoption of the Family Allowances Act in 1945,
were too radical for the government and largely ignored. Nevertheless, historian Raymond Blake
describes the Marsh Report as “the most important single document in the history of the
development of the welfare state in Canada.”66 The country’s system of social security was
instead instituted piecemeal and “grew haphazardly” over a period of twenty-odd years following
the Second World War. Although Humphrey viewed the legal implementation of “new” rights in
the guise of social welfare legislation as fundamental to a peaceful world, the Canadian
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government, and many other Western states, were unwilling in 1948 to take on greater
responsibility and institute the radical, sweeping changes emphasized by the economic and social
rights in his draft.67
Equally revolutionary, Humphrey’s draft endeavoured to codify this new relationship
between the individual and the state in international law. Ironically, in doing so, the UDHR
challenged state sovereignty in addition to increasing government responsibility. International
law from the early 1800s had governed the relationship between two or more states, and
according to historian Mark Mazower “articulate[d] clear standards for state behaviour” in regard
to war and imperial conquest. Moreover, as Humphrey noted in a 1945 article: “Modern
international law is predominately a consensual law. By far the greater part of its rules have their
source in treaties the immediate basis of which at least is the agreement and hence the consent of
the contracting parties.”68 Individuals, therefore, were neither subject to nor protected by
international law. A state’s treatment of its citizens was their own business. Humphrey argued
that under this system of law “a government could deny its citizens the most fundamental rights;
it could discriminate against certain classes of its citizens.”69 The one exception was the
relationship between a state and the foreign nationals living within its borders. If a state
mistreated its foreign expats, another state had the right to so-called humanitarian intervention on
their behalf. Humphrey’s draft declaration, however, contested the traditional understanding of
international law that excluded protection of individual citizens from state abuse, and
consequently, challenged a state’s sovereignty.
The UN Commission on Human Rights was originally mandated to draft an International
Bill of Rights that included a declaration, a legally binding covenant, and measures of
implementation. Nations such as Panama and Great Britain were eager that a Bill of Rights
would impose legal obligations on states. However, by the time Humphrey was charged with
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writing the first draft of the UDHR, the Commission had committed, at that time, to only writing
a declaration with no legal authority. Humphrey’s draft, nevertheless, attempted to instill a
degree of legal power within the Declaration. According to Article 48:
The provisions of this International Bill of Rights shall be deemed fundamental principles of
international law and of the national law of each of the Member States of the United Nations.
Their observance is therefore a matter of international concern and it shall be within the
jurisdiction of the United Nations to discuss any violation thereof.70

Humphrey also recommended that three principles, which he believed essential to protecting
human rights at home and abroad, accompany his draft: the right of individual petition, the duty
of Member States to respect the rights contained in the UDHR, and furthermore, that each article
contained in the UDHR become part of international and national law. Much to Humphrey’s
disappointment, Article 48 and his three principles were ultimately rejected by the drafting
committee and Human Rights Commission. When the UDHR was adopted by the General
Assembly on December 10, 1948, it contained moral suasion and perhaps some political
authority, but it was not legally binding.
The world’s leading legal experts echoed Humphrey’s frustration. British jurist and
Whewell Professor of International Law at Cambridge University, Hersch Lauterpacht, bristled
at the UN’s inability to include legal responsibilities in the Declaration: “The practical unanimity
of the Members of the United Nations in stressing the importance of the Declaration was
accompanied by an equally general repudiation of the idea that the Declaration imposed upon
them a legal obligation to respect the human rights and fundamental freedoms which it
proclaimed.71 Despite the hostility of Member Nations to situate the Declaration within a
covenant, over time the UDHR transformed international law just as Humphrey hoped when he
wrote his draft. The relationship between the individual and state in regard to the law would be
forever changed. But how was this revolutionary change possible if the Declaration was not
binding on states?
International law originates from three legal sources: general principles of law, treaties,
and custom. Humphrey, in the years following the adoption of the UDHR, argued that the
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Declaration had become part of customary international law: “While the Declaration is not
binding, it has been invoked so often it has become part of the customary law of states.”72 This
statement begs two questions. First, what exactly does Humphrey mean by the “customary law of
states”? A statute of the World Court describes “customary law” as “general practice accepted as
law.”73 Customary law is believed to emanate from the “undifferentiated mass” (i.e. the people
of the world), rather than an authoritative body such as a municipal, provincial, or federal
government. International jurists believe individuals obey laws, or customs, because their
practice is widespread or thought to be binding on society. As a result, customary law can change
from culture to culture and over time. The ambiguous and anonymous nature of customary law
also made it difficult to identify the person or persons who were the source of such laws.
However, in the case of the UDHR, Humphrey argued that the source of customary law was
clear. He argued if people worldwide believed that the human rights and freedoms espoused by
the Declaration to be universally true, and acted accordingly, then they were true. The document,
therefore, was a potential source of customary law. But for this transformation to occur,
individuals, groups, and national governments had to cite the Declaration in their national
judicial systems and during the debates of multilateral, intergovernmental organizations.
When, where, and how was the UDHR cited that established the document as a central
element of customary international law? Humphrey, from the late 1940s to the mid-1990s,
delivered speeches and wrote numerous articles about his time and experience as Director of the
UN Division of Human Rights. Often he discussed at length the drafting process of the UDHR
and its subsequent legal significance. Humphrey explained how the Declaration had been
repeatedly cited in national and international legal cases and debates, and as a result, had become
part of international law. Humphrey, however, listed few specific examples to prove his point:
I could give you many examples of the material impact of the Declaration and explain how it
has affected the debates in the General Assembly of the United Nations, how it has
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contributed to the emancipation of the colonial peoples, how it has been incorporated into
national constitutions and other national legislation, how it has been cited in Courts of
Justice and how it has inspired men and women of good will everywhere.74

Despite the paucity of examples included in Humphrey’s writings, there are many cases that
illustrate his argument.
There are numerous instances of the UDHR being invoked in the debates of the General
Assembly and inserted into the arguments of the UN’s organizational documents. On April 25,
1949, for example, the Assembly concluded that the Soviet Union had violated articles 13 and 16
of UDHR, respectively, the right to movement and residence within each State, and the right that
everyone is entitled to marry without distinction to race, nationality, and religion. Another
example is the 1960 UN resolution entitled “Declaration on Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples.” This resolution declared that all newly independent Member
States must abide by the UDHR as a whole. There are also many examples of the UDHR being
cited outside the UN. The UDHR inspired the creation of international treaties and legislation,
including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (1950), and closer to home, Canada’s Bill of Rights (1960) and Charter of Rights of
Freedoms (1982).75
The most consistent appeal to the UDHR during the Cold War was in regard to South
Africa’s treatment of its black and minority populations. For many years different UN bodies
criticized and rebuked the country for its discriminatory policies. For example, on December 2,
1950, the General Assembly passed a resolution that condemned South Africa for its treatment of
people of Indian origin living in the country, and in doing so referred directly to principles
enunciated in the Declaration:
The General Assembly…having in mind its resolution…217(III) dated 10 December 1948
relating to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, considering that a policy of “racial
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segregation” (Apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial
discrimination…recommends that the Governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of
South Africa proceed…with the holding of a round table conference on the basis of their
agreed agenda and bearing in mind the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.76

Thirteen years later, the UN Security Council also passed a resolution denouncing South Africa’s
practice of apartheid – although in much stronger terms than the earlier resolution passed by the
General Assembly:
The Security Council, having considered the race conflict in South Africa from the policies
of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa…urgently requests the
Government…to cease forthwith its continued imposition of discriminatory and repressive
measures which are contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter and which are in
violation of its obligations as a Member of the United Nations and of the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights…[and] again calls upon…the Republic of South
Africa to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for
having opposed the policy of apartheid.77

The Security Council resolution, in addition to the admonition above, advocated that countries
threaten economic and trade sanctions against South Africa if it did not put an end to apartheid.
Importantly, the UN invoked the UDHR once again to interpret the behaviour of a state towards
its citizens as legal or unlawful. By voting for UN resolutions and declarations that uphold the
articles of the UDHR, or in creating international treaties inspired by the Declaration, a nation
accepts the World Court definition of customary law as “general practice accepted as law.”
Consequently, the UDHR became a source and embodiment of customary international law.
Historian Samuel Moyn argues, however, that it is not until the early 1960s that
international lawyers viewed the UDHR as anything more than “paper promises in the postwar
period.”78 Evidence suggests that Moyn’s assertion is correct. In the mid-1960s British jurist,
international lawyer and judge, Sir Humphrey Waldock addressed the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law. Waldock argued that the UDHR had become a legally
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binding document: “This constant and widespread recognition of the principles of the Universal
Declaration clothes it, in my opinion, in the character of customary law.”79 In a 1977 letter to The
New York Times, Erik Suy, legal counsel to the Under Secretary-General of the UN proclaimed:
“Whether it has the force of law or not, the Universal Declaration has exerted a powerful
influence on contemporary international law. Many…national constitutions adopted since 1948
have embodied an endorsement of the declaration and reflect its provisions, and numerous
conventions include or refer to its articles.”80 Humphrey’s close associate in the UN Division of
Human Rights, lawyer Egon Schwelb, also argued that the UDHR had achieved increasing
legality. Humphrey was, thus, one of many lawyers to argue that the UDHR had become part of
customary international law during the Cold War.
Humphrey alone, however, predicted the legal importance of the UDHR in 1948, when
those around him routinely dismissed its influence and merit. When the UDHR was adopted by
the General Assembly, UN delegates and delegations immediately acknowledged that the
Declaration represented mankind’s highest ideals, but concurrently dismissed its legal authority.
The UN representative most guilty of perpetuating this belief was, ironically, Eleanor Roosevelt,
the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission. In a December 1948 speech before the
Assembly, Roosevelt downplayed the importance of the document they had just agreed to adopt:
“In giving our approval to the Declaration to-day, it is of primary importance that we keep
clearly in mind the basic character of the document. It is not a treaty; it is not an international
agreement. It is not and does not purport to be a statement of law or legal obligation.”81
Humphrey was vehemently opposed to the position taken by Roosevelt in her speech, not only
because he felt it undermined the document they had spent two years creating, but because he
felt that the Declaration, in time, would become legally relevant.
As early as November 20, 1948, three-and-a-half weeks before the UDHR was signed,
Humphrey predicted that the Declaration would become an organ of customary international law:
79

John P. Humphrey, “The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” in The
International Protection of Human Rights, ed. Evan Luard (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967),
53.
80
Erik Suy, “Letters: On Human Rights Covenants,” The New York Times, April 1, 1977.
81
Lauterpacht, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 358; “180th Plenary Meeting, held on
Thursday, 9 December 1948,” UN document A/PV.180, General Assembly 3rd Session – Plenary,
September 21 – December 2, 1948, Paris, http://research.un.org/en/undhr/ga/plenary, Dag Hammarskjold
Library, http://research.un.org/en/undhr (accessed November 6, 2016).

141
On Friday evening I talked with Mrs. Roosevelt while she had some tea and sandwiches ... I
told her that I now think that the Declaration will prove to be more important than the Pact
[i.e. Covenants], that the distinction between moral force and legal binding force means little
in the present state of international organization, and that the Declaration will develop its
own implementation. I am firmly convinced in spite of my reservations regarding the quality
of work that is being done, that this Declaration will prove to be a tremendously important
instrument.82

Time did not dissuade Humphrey from his original premise: “My own belief is that, while the
Declaration is not now legally binding on States, it could become binding … If it is not yet
legislative it at least manifests a legal conviction.”83 Over the next two years, there are no less
than six entries in Humphrey’s diary that reiterate his belief that the UDHR would become a
notable tool of international law, or at least had the potential to become so.
Eleanor Roosevelt was not the only influential figure to disagree with Humphrey’s point
of view.84 In 1953 Humphrey received a letter from Hersch Lauterpacht, esteemed British lawyer
of international law. Lauterpacht congratulated Humphrey for a paper he had delivered to the
Society of Ethical Culture: “I admired your spirited defence of the legal character of the
Declaration. May you be right!”85 Lauterpacht had long supported the codification of human
rights within international law and in 1943 published An International Bill of Rights of Man. But
Lauterpacht was also one of the Declaration’s strongest critics. Three months prior to the UDHR
adoption, Humphrey noted the British lawyer’s negative attitude towards the Declaration:
“Lauterpacht delivered a brilliant but devastating talk to the International Law Association on
human rights. But he fails to appreciate the political difficulties in our work…. I am afraid that in
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spite of his good intentions he is colouring the thinking of many people against us.”86
Lauterpacht, however, continued his attack against the UDHR for the next five years, including
an unsympathetic article for the British Year Book of International Law. His primary argument
was that the “legal character” of the Declaration was weak because it was simply a UN
Resolution and not a legally binding Covenant. Humphrey was forced to agree with Lauterpacht:
“It is the sanction that gives the law its enforceable character. Rules that are not supported by
sanctions can be disobeyed with impunity: they are mere recommendations.”87 In the face of
such criticism, it is not surprising, as Moyn notes, that most international lawyers in the postwar
period “drew the obvious conclusion that no radical renovation of their discipline away from the
state was in the offing.”88 Humphrey remained convinced, correctly, that the UDHR had become,
or was on its way to becoming part of customary international law.
Humphrey attended hundreds of meetings during his tenure at the UN in which the
UDHR was discussed and debated. He quickly came to the opinion that the Declaration was a
revolutionary document and in 1984 wrote: “Looking back after many years, I can find no reason
for thinking that I was wrong in 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is now part of
the customary law of nations and therefore binding on all states. I do not remember anyone in
1948 who shared my views.”89 Humphrey’s vision of peace was radical and challenged the
notion that “peace as an ideal has been too often indissolubly bound up with the status quo as a
fact.”90 The nature and structure of international law was revolutionized. States were now
responsible for protecting and promoting the human rights of their citizens, and the types of
rights and freedoms the Declaration guaranteed were “new” as well. The economic, social, and
cultural rights that Humphrey included in his draft declaration were now legally protected by the
UDHR and embedded within other international treaties, conventions, and national charters.
These new rights were not revolutionary because of their association with socialism and
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communism as some people believed, but because they challenged state sovereignty, and were
the catalyst for a rights-based society that helped inspire the modern welfare state.
John Humphrey was a “man of action”91 and revolutionary ideas. But Humphrey’s struggle
against the status quo was not limited to his work on the UDHR: “I am on the side of the great
tradition in these matters, which is man’s long struggle against authority — wherever authority
has become insensitive, arrogant, or abusive, or is illegitimate, or is foreign…or because it has
lost contact or indeed never had any contact with the people.”92 Humphrey throughout his life
questioned and challenged authority. In the early 1950s, U.S. Republican Senator, Joseph
McCarthy (Wisconsin), led the House Un-American Activities Committee in a witch-hunt for socalled left-wing and communist “subversives” in American government and life. McCarthy’s
crusade soon reached the halls and corridors of the UN. Humphrey’s diaries from this time are
replete with his contempt for the investigation. He despised McCarthy and the Committee’s
attempts to trample his colleagues’ rights and freedoms:
I repeated my conviction that the Secretary-General [Trygve Lie] should conduct his own
inquiry, that the principle of guilt by association could not be admitted … I do not expect
that this advice will be followed. It seems that [American] Byron Price wants to dismiss
without further ado all those who have refused to answer the question whether or not they are
communists!93

Humphrey was livid that Lie and other high-ranking UN officials approved of and co-operated
with the Senator’s campaign of fear and repression. Although Humphrey’s socialist background
made him a likely target for false accusations and innuendo, he never wavered in his
condemnation of McCarthy and his supporters.
In spite of his radical work and constant suspicion of authority, Humphrey’s methods to
achieve his revolutionary vision of peace were rather conservative. His conservatism at times
proved stronger than his devotion to peace, sometimes to the detriment of the UN Human Rights
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programme. Humphrey, like Brock Chisholm, took his role as an international civil servant
seriously. He believed it was an international servant’s duty to be seen, but not heard. Humphrey
stated that it was also his obligation to remain neutral in UN matters and to act as the
representative of all member nations: “When engaged in UN business, I never thought of myself
as a Canadian.”94 His discretion resulted in dull, uninformative guest lectures and articles during
his time at the UN. On the fourth anniversary of the UDHR’s adoption, Humphrey was invited to
address The Society of Ethical Culture. He sheepishly explained to his audience: “Obviously, I
must avoid taking any position on controversial issues. … You will perhaps forgive me if I avoid
to express even a personal opinion on them.”95 Humphrey, writing to Lauterpacht a month later,
discussed the difficulties his speech had posed, but never expressed any significant regret over
the matter: “You may be interested in reading the text of a speech that I made in New York
recently about the human rights programme … it is extremely difficult for an international
servant…to express his views…frankly on such controversial matters; but perhaps you will also
read between the lines.”96 Rather than expressing his opinion and fighting for the programme of
human rights he worked so hard to establish, Humphrey worried incessantly about compromising
his “neutrality.”
Humphrey’ speech in New York reveals a pervasive pattern throughout his tenure at the
UN. Humphrey visited Romania in 1958 and his post-trip notes highlight the limits he felt an
international civil servant must observe: “It was the first time I had ever been in a communist
country. … I wrote down my impressions, beginning with a reference to the iron curtain, an
expression which, as a conscientious international official, I had always hesitated to use.”97 On
another occasion, Humphrey wrote to lawyer and professor, Elisabeth Mann Borgese, to
complain about a proposed panel at a conference he was to attend. “I did not realize that
Professor Tjordjevic would be reading a paper on human rights in Socialist societies, and I am
not sure whether this is a good idea,” Humphrey criticized. “Why not a paper on human rights in
the capitalist countries? … My experience is that one seldom gets objective discussion of such
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matters and that the meeting is apt to turn itself into a mud-slinging competition.”98 His
conservative temperament is exposed once again, unwilling to address the partisan politics of the
Cold War in fear he might upset one side or the other.
Humphrey’s motivation to act as an objective servant of the UN was strong, but
ultimately, the philosophical convictions that inspired his draft declaration proved greater.
Humphrey constantly struggled to remain neutral and impartial during his time at the UN.
Publically he adhered to the lofty ideals of neutrality required of an international civil servant,
but privately began to keep a diary to record all the opinions he dared not share at the UN. “I
began it [the diary] because, it then seemed to me, the Director of the Division of Human Rights
in the United Nations might have something to say.”99 Often Humphrey expressed his frustration
with his role as Director. He desperately wanted to join the debate in the UN Commission on
Human Rights or at the General Assembly. Humphrey also wrote about returning to McGill to
teach, worried that he was becoming “a spectator” and administrator (which actually was his job
from the start). In 1955 he even sought out Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold to request a
new, more active position at the UN:
I asked Hammarskjold today to find me another job where I could make a significant
contribution. I said that I was not the kind of man that he needed to implement his present
human rights policy, that I had come to the U.N. to do an important job, that I had done it
well whatever he might think of the [Human Rights] programme, and that I was not willing
to share the fate of certain officials who had become prisoners of insignificant jobs and who
continued to draw salaries while doing little more than routine work, if that.100

Humphrey, however, never followed through with his threats to leave. He was devoted to the
Human Rights Division and remained Director for the next eleven years until his retirement from
the UN in 1966. Humphrey might have had the “missionary zeal” when it came to his draft, but
his methods to achieve his vision of peace were undoubtedly conservative.
Despite Humphrey’s conservative approach, a number of countries, including Canada,
displayed a marked contempt for the UN’s human rights programme and his vision of peace. On
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his retirement from the UN in 1966, Humphrey publically outlined Canada’s poor record in
regard to human rights: “As far as I know, Canada has never taken any important initiative in the
United Nations in relation to human rights. It has supported — not always with great enthusiasm
— the initiatives of other countries.”101 Sixteen years later, he was even more forceful in his
condemnation of Canada: “I can tell you that there was no priority for the international
protection of human rights in Canadian foreign policy in the twenty years that I was at the UN.
Indeed I got no support whatsoever.”102 It was not until the late 1960s that Canada began to show
any interest in the UN’s promotion and protection of human rights.103
Canada’s poor, postwar track record on human rights at the UN was punctuated by a vote
in the Third Committee on December 7, 1948, three days before the UDHR’s official adoption in
the General Assembly. One by one member nations cast their vote either for or against the draft,
or abstained from the vote altogether. No one voted against the UDHR, but seven countries
abstained: Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Soviet
Union, Yugoslavia, and Canada. Humphrey was at first surprised by the Canadian abstention,
but his shock quickly turned to embarrassment and anger. He recorded the events of the day in
his diary:
I am afraid that I exceeded my prerogatives as an international servant when afterwards I
expressed my indignation to the Canadian representative. This has apparently caused some
talk because today I had the visit of a representative of the Canadian Press, sent to me
strangely enough by the Canadian Delegation, who wanted me to say for publication in
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Canadian newspapers that I had been shocked by the Canadian vote. I had to give him a
lecture on the status of an international official.104

Humphrey was soon relieved to learn that Canada had changed its mind and would vote for the
Declaration in the plenary session of the coming General Assembly. His relief at the Canadian
decision was palpable in a letter he later sent to Nik Cavell, Chairman of the CIIA Executive
Committee: “Speaking as a Canadian and no longer as an international official, I think that it
would have been a great tragedy if Canada had abstained in the final vote.”105 Nonetheless,
Humphrey still felt that it had been with “bad grace” that Canada had ultimately adopted the
UDHR.
Humphrey believed he knew the reason for Canada’s reversal after abstaining in the
Third Committee. He recorded the following passage in his diary on December 11, 1948: “The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has now been adopted … One of the worst contributions
was undoubtedly the Canadian — a niggardly acceptance of the Declaration because, it
appeared…the Canadian government did not relish the thought of remaining in the company of
those who, by abstaining in the vote, rejected it.”106 Humphrey would have been surprised to
learn that the Canadian delegation, and thus, the government, knew exactly the “bad” company it
kept, yet still chose to abstain. Two weeks before the vote, Lester B. Pearson, Canada’s Secretary
of State for External Affairs and head of the Canadian delegation, telegrammed the government
in Ottawa: “By abstaining we might find ourselves in a rather undesirable minority - including
principally the Soviet bloc and South Africa.”107 These associations were clearly acceptable to
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the Canadian government, at least in the short term. So, why was Canada willing to lump
themselves with such disagreeable allies in the Third Committee?
During the 182nd Plenary Meeting of the UN General Assembly, and only hours before the
UDHR was officially adopted, Pearson rose from his seat to explain why Canada had initially
abstained voting on the Declaration three days prior. His speech began, however, in praise of the
UDHR: “We regard this document as one inspired by the highest ideals; as one which contains a
statement of a number of noble principles and aspiration of a very great significance.”108 Pearson
then outlined Canada’s first objection to the document, its supposed ambiguous character:
The Draft Declaration, because it is a statement of general principles, is unfortunately…often
worded in vague and imprecise language. We do not believe in Canada that legislation
should be placed on our statute books unless that legislation can indicate in precise terms the
obligations which are demanded of our citizens, and unless those obligations can be
interpreted clearly and definitely in the courts.109

Both the delegation in Paris and government in Ottawa had long been concerned with the
UDHR’s apparently ill-defined text. Pearson next summarized Canada’s second concern with the
Declaration -- the draft’s lack of legal oversight: “It is our view that some of the difficulties and
ambiguities in this Declaration might have been removed had this document been reviewed by a
body of international jurists, such as the International Law Commission, before final action was
taken by the General Assembly.”110 Hoping to postpone the vote on the UDHR, the Canadian
delegation considered referring the Declaration to an internationally recognized legal body or
another organ of the UN. The delegation soon realized, however, that such a motion would be
defeated.111
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Pearson concluded his speech by describing the Canadian government’s primary
objection to the UDHR. He argued that the Declaration posed a fundamental conflict between
federal and provincial jurisdiction in Canada, but more specifically, that some of the UDHR’s
articles fell under provincial authority and control: “I wish to make it clear that, in regard to any
rights which are defined in this document, the federal government of Canada does not intend to
invade other rights which are also important to the people of Canada, and by this I mean the
rights of the provinces under our federal constitution.”112 Humphrey found Pearson’s claim
disingenuous and years later wrote:
A possible…reason for the Canadian abstention in the Third Committee may have been the
government’s fear that, if they voted for the Declaration, they might be accused of
trespassing on the jurisdiction of the provinces under the constitution. … it is difficult to
believe that it could have been a compelling reason. For in 1948 everyone agreed that the
Declaration would not be binding in international law and would not, therefore, impose any
legal obligations on member states.113

Despite Humphrey’s doubts about Pearson’s sincerity, in 1948 there was genuine concern
amongst members of the Canadian government that the UDHR would infringe on provincial
jurisdiction, and thus, put Dominion-Provincial relations in jeopardy.
The Canadian government and Pearson were in constant contact prior to the Declaration’s
adoption. Brooke Claxton, acting Secretary of State for External Affairs in Pearson’s absence,
would relay the wishes of Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and the Cabinet to the Canadian
delegation in Paris. In turn, Pearson would update the government in Ottawa on the Third
Committee’s progress. More often than not, the telegrams sent were in regard to the UDHR and
the constitutional difficulties it posed. One such telegram emphasized the government’s distress
in regard to provincial authority and human rights:
The provinces are jealous of their rights. Alleged encroachments by the federal government
on the jurisdiction of the provinces were matters of major issue in the provincial elections in
Ontario and Quebec this year. In the field of human rights the provinces' attitude would be
quite correct. We must, therefore, make it abundantly clear in every statement that any
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attitude taken will not (repeat not) constitute any interference whatever with the jurisdiction
of the provinces.114

The Canadian government believed that there were constitutional difficulties with articles 14-18
and 20-23, almost one-third of the Declaration’s thirty articles. These articles covered civil rights
(e.g. Article 17 - the right to own property); political rights (e.g. Article 21 – the right to take part
in government); social rights (e.g. Article 22 – the right to social security); and economic rights
(e.g. Article 23 – the right to equal pay for equal work). In each case the Canadian government
and delegation maintained that the rights and freedoms fell under provincial, rather than federal
jurisdiction; and consequently, argued that they could not, in good conscience, accept the
Declaration in its present form, even if it was not legally binding.
The government’s negative attitude towards the UDHR may have been, somewhat
ironically, Humphrey’s fault. On May 26, 1947, Canada’s House of Commons passed a
resolution to create a Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Committee met seven times over two months to hear
from prominent Canadian politicians, lawyers, and academics on the subject. Most of the
testimony revolved around the UN Commission on Human Rights and its draft of the UDHR,
which had been published in The Canadian Bar Review. Two themes in particular emerged from
the Committee’s sessions. First, it was agreed that the proposed UDHR posed constitutional
difficulties in Canada. L.D. Currie, Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, testified that “because a
Bill of Rights would doubtlessly affect both subject matters that belong to the Dominion and
subject matters that belong to the Provinces, the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada would
not be competent to enact a comprehensive Bill of Rights applicable to all of Canada.”115 The
second theme to emerge from the testimony regarded the UDHR’s lack of legal authority. E.R.
Hopkins, legal adviser to the Department of External Affairs, stated that the Declaration had no
legal standing, but that it exhibited “a moral force having the character of a strong
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recommendation.”116 Humphrey was then invited to speak before the Committee. Unaware of the
mood that surrounded the proceedings, Humphrey argued that the UDHR had, in fact, a greater
legal significance than originally thought: “A resolution of the General Assembly has no binding
effect on international law … [But] I think it [the UDHR] would be an element in the building
up of international jurisprudence. You cannot take it for granted that it would have no legal
significance at all.”117 Humphrey’s confident assertion likely helped to convince the Canadian
government of the UDHR’s unsuitability within a constitution which finely delineated between
federal and provincial jurisdiction.
Humphrey remained convinced that there were other factors, besides those offered in
Pearson’s speech, that were responsible for Canada’s decision to abstain in the Third Committee
on December 7, 1948. Historians of human rights argue that many countries in the postwar
period opposed the UDHR, and consequently, Humphrey’s vision of peace, because it contained
a new form of legal internationalism and international law that challenged state authority.
Glendon notes that thirteen countries, including Canada, made public complaints that the UDHR
legitimated outside interference in their domestic affairs, particularly the manner in which they
treated their own citizens.118 Countries feared, as Moyn writes, that other nations would capture
“the language of human rights” to publically shame and use against them.119 And in fact, both the
Soviet Union and United States employed human rights as a propaganda weapon. The Soviets
denounced the U.S. for denying its black population many civil, economic, and social rights,
while American politicians attacked the Soviet Union for its violent repression of many
traditional political and civil rights.
Few Canadian politicians worried that human rights would be employed as propaganda
against them. Most government officials believed that their country’s reputation on human rights
was exemplary: “In the relations of her two main races and in her acceptance of the people of
other races, Canada has a proud record. Canada's regard for human rights is not merely a matter
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of passing resolutions but of day-to-day practice of convictions which are held from one end of
the country to the other.”120 Yet, Pearson and other government officials privately believed that
human rights were not the right tool to promote peace because they would negatively impact
Canadian domestic and foreign policy.121 Both St. Laurent and Pearson maintained that the
UDHR would prevent the government from pursuing policies against Canadian communists, as
evidenced by a flurry of telegrams sent from Ottawa to the delegation in Paris. On October 8,
1948, Pearson sent a message to the Canadian delegates overseas:
It is our view that you should attempt first of all to secure a complete revision of the present
draft … Such a revision would have to exclude Soviet amendments if it were to be
satisfactory to the western world from a propaganda point of view. This could only be done
if five or six of the principal non-Soviet delegations were immediately to meet together
informally and hammer out an agreed simple Declaration and then press it through the
Assembly as a statement of the creed of the western world. All attempts by Soviet States to
amend it would have to be voted down. Such a Declaration might be a useful weapon in the
cold war.122

A few hours later St. Laurent sent another message to the delegates with further instructions and
observations. He argued that the Declaration was an embarrassment to the government because
the UDHR, theoretically, provided sanctuary to and protection for communists and other
undesirables in Canadian society: “I am particularly concerned about the use which could be
made of text of articles 17, 18, 19 and 22 as an undertaking not to discriminate against
communists because of their political views.”123 The rights and freedoms articulated in these
120

Telegram 294, “To Delegation to United Nations General Assembly in Paris from Secretary of State
for External Affairs,” Ottawa, November 25, 1948, document DEA/5475-DP-40, Volume 14 – 1948,
Chapter III – United Nations (Human Rights), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitcaecic/history/2013-05-03/www.international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/detailsen.asp@intRefid=9940, Canadian External Relations, http://www.international.gc.ca/historyhistoire/documents-documents.aspx?lang=eng (accessed November 6, 2016).
121
For more information on the government’s, but specifically Pearson’s negative response to the UDHR,
see: Jennifer Tunnicliffe, “Lester Pearson, Human Rights, and the United Nations,” in Mike’s World:
Lester B. Pearson and Canadian External Affairs, eds. Asa McKercher and Galen Roger Perras, 133-148
(Vancouver, BC: UBC Press, 2017).
122
Telegram 110, “Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to United Nations General
Assembly in Paris,” Ottawa, October 8, 1948, document DEA/5475-DP-40, Volume 14 – 1948, Chapter
III – United Nations (Human Rights), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-0503/www.international.gc.ca/department/history-histoire/dcer/details-en.asp@intRefid=9933, Canadian
External Relations, http://www.international.gc.ca/history-histoire/documents-documents.aspx?lang=eng
(accessed November 6, 2016).
123
Telegram 117, “Secretary of State for External Affairs to Delegation to United Nations General
Assembly in Paris,” Ottawa, October 8, 1948, document DEA/5475-DP-40, Volume 14 – 1948, Chapter
III – United Nations (Human Rights), http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/faitc-aecic/history/2013-05-

153
articles were, respectively: the right to own property and/or not to be arbitrarily deprived of said
property, the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, and the right to social security. The Canadian government believed that
the UDHR, if it were to be adopted, must serve some larger purpose than the simple protection of
human rights. Indeed, Pearson and other leading politicians thought it more important to pervert
Humphrey’s vision of peace to discriminate against alleged communists and win the Cold War’s
ideological battle, than to universally provide Canada’s citizens with fundamental human rights
and freedoms.
Much to Humphrey’s chagrin, Canada’s attitude towards human rights did not improve in
the years after the adoption of the UDHR. Because the Declaration had not yet become part of
customary international law, Humphrey’s next job was to produce a Covenant that legally
protected the rights and freedoms countries had recently agreed to respect in Paris. Almost
immediately it became apparent to Humphrey that Canada was not interested in supporting a
Covenant, in particular one that included “new” rights: “Perhaps the most significant aspect of
the debate in the Third Committee on economic and social rights…. One of the few countries
which seems to be opposed to the inclusion of these rights in any covenant is Canada.”124 In
conjunction with Belgium and the United States, Canada asked the General Assembly to remove
the social and economic rights included in the Covenant. American Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, argued that the inclusion of “new” rights in a Covenant would “impose ‘socialist
conceptions’ upon the United States.”125 As a result, it was decided in late 1951 that there would
be two Covenants: one for political and civil rights and another for economic, social, and cultural
rights.
Humphrey noted in his autobiography that the decision to produce two Covenants as
opposed to one was made for ideological reasons:
I knew…the real reason why some of the delegations were so anxious not to include the
rights in the covenant; for, while their governments might ratify a covenant on civil and
political rights, they did not want to be internationally bound to respect economic and social
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rights which had, for some of them, a socialistic flavour. If there were two instruments
instead of one, it would be possible to ratify the one and not the others.126

Humphrey’s statement was a direct reference to the Canadian, American, and Belgian
delegations who opposed the original Covenant. Canada’s behaviour in the Third Committee
(and later) suggests that it actively disseminated divisive Cold War politics and policies.
Nonetheless, it was not until 1954 that the UN Human Rights Commission completed its work
on the covenants. Despite Humphrey’s hope that producing two Covenants would help towards
their ratification, neither had been ratified by the time of Humphrey’s retirement in 1966, and
would not be until 1976 (the same year Canada finally signed both documents).
In little over five years as Director of the UN Human Rights Division, Humphrey
concluded that Canada was not serious about the protection of human rights. His diary reveals
the depth of his frustration: “Nothing could be less imaginative than the Canadian record in the
U.N. in relation to human rights. One would think that the delegation would have learned a
lesson in Paris. … Indeed, I think it is fair to say that there would be no human rights programme
in the UN if they [i.e. Canada] had their way.”127 Yet, Canada’s unwillingness to work with
Humphrey and the UN Division of Human Rights is not surprising. Both Humphrey’s vision of
peace and the UDHR were a direct challenge to the Canadian government’s authority. On the
one hand, the UDHR interfered in the government’s pursuit to legislate against communism. On
the other, the UDHR bestowed on individuals certain rights and freedoms: responsibilities that
Canada was not yet willing to provide its citizens. Pearson’s speech to the General Assembly
may have espoused peace, but the government’s actions in the Third Committee and towards the
Covenants tarnishes the myth of Canada as a “peaceable kingdom.”
In 1966 Humphrey retired from the UN and returned to Montreal to teach law at McGill
University. His work for human rights and peace, however, was far from over. The late 1960s,
early 1970s marked a turning point in the popularity of human rights. International lawyers no
longer viewed human rights as toothless, but as part of customary international law and critical to
decolonization and other movements. Humphrey founded the Canadian branch of Amnesty
126

Humphrey, A Great Adventure, 152-153.
John Humphrey, November 16, 1948 (Great Neck, NY), On the Edge of Greatness: The Diaries of
John Humphrey, First Director of the United Nations Division of Human Rights, Volume 2, 1950-1951,
ed. A.J. Hobbins (Montreal, QC: McGill University Library, 1996), 133.
127

155
International, was appointed to the Royal Commission on the Status of Women, and inspired a
generation of Canadian lawyers. In addition, he formed a friendship with Pierre Trudeau and
encouraged the Prime Minister to entrench a bill of rights in Canada’s constitution. The
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms marked one of Humphrey’s achievements and
contributed to his desire “to live on in the contributions that one makes to humanity.128 But it was
not until the end of his life that Humphrey was recognized for his impact on human rights and
international law. Three years after Humphrey’s death, prominent Canadian lawyer and
professor, Ronald St. John MacDonald, proclaimed that he was “undeniably one of the most
distinguished international civil servants of our time.”129
Humphrey’s 1947 draft declaration was an important step to creating a better, more
peaceful postwar world in the long run. Humphrey believed that the abuse of human rights and
fundamental freedoms was the primary cause of conflict and war. Conversely, he argued that the
promotion and protection of both “old” and “new” rights was the path to peace. Humphrey’s
vision of peace was revolutionary, transforming international law. When the UDHR became part
of customary international law, individual men and women were finally protected from the
human rights abuses committed by their governments. Yet, for Humphrey’s vision of peace, and
thus human rights, to succeed, “others would have to lose.”130 The UDHR challenged
government authority. The radical change in international law required governments to pass
ground-breaking social welfare legislation and facilitated the creation of a paternalistic, welfare
state. Moreover, the Declaration normalized outside interference into the affairs of individual
governments, reducing state sovereignty.
It is not surprising that few countries, including Canada, supported Humphrey’s
revolutionary vision of peace. Instead the battle for human rights and freedoms was long and
drawn out. In a polarized Cold War environment, Canada’s federal government, and others,
endeavoured to use both the UDHR and its Covenants as tools in its ideological crusade against
the Soviet Union and communism. Canada’s interest in human rights was secondary to the era’s
ideological struggle and the West’s “postwar agenda.” Humphrey himself was hesitant to use his
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influence as an international civil servant to promote his vision of peace. He was unwilling to
speak out of turn and sometimes refused to even express his opinion: “I must remind you…that I
am speaking as an international official and that I am not, therefore, a completely free agent. … I
am not a servant of one but of fifty-five governments.”131 But over time the UDHR was invoked
and cited so often that it gained a moral, political, and legal significance that few foresaw when
Humphrey wrote his draft declaration. Nonetheless, Humphrey, for the most part, was content to
work within the confines of the UN, an intergovernmental organization, to achieve his vision of
peace. It was not long, however, that Canadian peace activists turned to an ever-growing number
of international nongovernment organizations to realize their own unique visions of peace. Like
Humphrey, their visions would challenge the Cold War consensus, but unlike him, they were
willing to publically protest the Canadian government.
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Chapter 4
James G. Endicott and the Canadian Peace Congress, 19481963
James G. Endicott, the first national chairman of the Canadian Peace Congress (CPC), was the
face of Canada’s peace movement from the late 1940s to the early 1970s. As a result of his
highly public persona, Endicott was the subject of great scrutiny in Cold War Canada, much of it
negative. Little, however, has been written about him.1 Endicott’s postwar peace activism began
in 1947 when he independently organized a speaking tour across the country. He had spent the
majority of the previous twenty-two years in China as a Christian missionary for the United
Church of Canada. Endicott, however, had resigned from the church a year earlier, pushed out by
its hierarchy’s dislike of his “unorthodox” political views. In contrast to official Church policy,
Endicott publically supported Mao Zedong’s Chinese communists in their fight against Chiang
Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang government. His view was embarrassing to the United
Church which supported Chiang. But the Church was not alone in their defence of China’s
nationalist government. Canada and other Western nations sustained Chiang’s fight against the
Chinese revolutionaries financially, militarily, and ideologically. Canada loaned Chiang’s
government $60 million dollars to buy Canadian-made munitions and bombers. Consequently,
Endicott was an unpopular figure when he returned home to begin his tour.
In 1948 Endicott co-founded the CPC. The organization’s formation marked a significant
shift in the Canadian peace movement. In the immediate postwar years (1945-1948), individual
peace activists were at the forefront of the movement. Their unique visions of peace endeavoured
to rebuild Canada and the world. Lacking popular and government support for their peace
initiatives, these activists pursued peace on their own, within civil society groups, and as part of
international organizations such as the United Nations. With the CPC’s founding, large-scale
1
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national peace organizations and the tactic of mass protest came to dominate the peace
movement. The establishment of the CPC, more importantly, solidified a growing link between
peace and communism in Canadian society. An avowed communist sympathizer, Endicott’s
vision of peace was shaped by his personal beliefs formed during his time in China. Not only did
Endicott welcome communists and other so-called “undesirables” into the CPC, he argued for
Western co-existence and reconciliation with the Soviet Union, China, and other communist
nations. He also actively campaigned for Canada to abandon its commitments to NATO: “We
oppose regional pacts outside the United Nations, especially when these pacts may be interpreted
as military alliances against the Soviet Union and the new democracies.”2 In addition, his
controversial vision of peace rejected the manufacture and stockpiling of atomic weapons,
supported the decolonization of peoples in Asia from their Western colonial oppressors, and
promoted trade outside the “dollar block.” Endicott’s vision of peace was ultimately driven by
his commitment to co-existence, communication, and negotiation between West and East. Yet in
contrast to many of his contemporaries, Endicott’s vision was regarded as problematically
ideological, the result of his communist sympathies.
Endicott’s vision of peace and the CPC were viewed by most Canadians as the antithesis
of the nation’s liberal internationalist definition that equated peace to military security. In the
early years of the Cold War, Canadians increasingly viewed the Soviet Union and communism
as a threat to their security and well-being. To combat a Soviet attack abroad, the Canadian
government relied on a system of collective security, embodied by its membership in NATO and
that organization’s use of the nuclear deterrent to keep Canadians safe. To prevent ideological
infiltration at home, Canadians shunned and reviled any person who challenged or refuted the
government’s militarized, negative conception of peace. Endicott and the CPC adamantly
opposed the government’s foreign and domestic policies in regard to national security, and its
conception of peace. Despite his sincere devotion to achieving and maintaining peace, Endicott
was politically naïve, blinded by his personal prejudices. Labelled as communist, Endicott and
the CPC were reviled by most elements of society, but in particular, the Canadian government.
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Consequently, Endicott and the Canadian peace movement were rejected by Canadians as
communist agents during the Cold War.
James Endicott’s peace activism in the immediate postwar and Cold War period was the result of
three factors: his childhood upbringing, his pre-Second World War missionary work, and his
experience of war. At the heart of his vision of peace was religion and his close, personal
relationship with China and its people. Endicott was born in Szechuan Province, China, in 1898
to Methodist missionaries. During his childhood, every day began with family prayers. The daily
prayers were not grounded in theology, but in the stories of the Biblical prophets. Listening to
the story of Moses and his oppressor, the Egyptian Pharaoh, Endicott came to sympathize with
the poor Chinese peasants: “I learned from the Bible the story of God’s concern for the poor, not
a sentimental concern but a demand for justice and an end to oppression. I also learned of God’s
condemnation of the rich ... My Christian conscience forced me to be sympathetic with the
struggles of the people for a life of human dignity.”3 Endicott’s study of Moses and the other
prophets taught him that peace must be active and contemporaneous. Raised and grounded in the
social gospel of the early twentieth century, as a child Endicott strived to realize the Kingdom of
God on earth, a conviction that stayed with him for the remainder of his life: “I believe there is a
solution — a way to peace — but that everything depends on what you and I do to make that
solution possible. No one of us…can be morally justified in sitting on the sidelines while this
terrible world situation continues.”4 By the age of thirteen, Endicott and his family had returned
to Canada from China. Though only a young teenager, he was certain that he too would become
a missionary to fight for social justice and reform.
Endicott’s path to becoming a missionary, however, was interrupted by the outbreak of
the First World War. Despite the “pacifist tendencies” espoused by pre-war Methodism, Endicott
was not a pacifist in 1914. As historian Michael Bliss notes, “No churchmen in Canada worked
harder at hammering their ploughshares into swords than ‘the people called Methodists.’”5 In
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1916 Endicott enlisted in the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF), joined the Engineering
Corps, and saw front-line duty in France from January 1918 until the end of the First World War.
The brutal last one hundred days of the war left him with permanent psychological scars: “Even
now I sometimes have nightmare dreams of the horrible slaughter of young life in…1918.”6
Moreover, the final days of the war solidified Endicott’s belief that missionary work was his
life’s true calling.
On his return to Canada, Endicott enrolled at Victoria College, University of Toronto, to
become a minister in the Methodist Church and was ordained in 1925. Endicott soon became a
United Church missionary and was sent to West China, the place of his birth.7 The United
Church was eager for him to take up his position: “He is a young man of fine ideals, of
enthusiasm, of force, and of really quite extraordinary ability. His interest in the work of our
Church in the foreign mission field is profound and real.”8 Endicott, however, had doubts as to
his Methodist faith. In his private diary, Endicott imagined how he would have answered the
questions on the ordination examination had he been true to his beliefs and principles:
‘Do you believe in God the Father Almighty, maker of Heaven and earth?’ No. I believe in
Life as I see it and trust to the good purposes that are evident in it. I want humbly to commit
my life to those good purposes. … ‘Do you believe in the divinity of Jesus?’ No. Because
that word implies a scheme of thought in which the fall of Adam, the Virgin Birth, the
special incarnation…are bound up as if they were certainties. I pledge my life to the ‘beauty
and honesty and simplicity of Jesus.’ … ‘Do you believe in the Bible as the Word of God?’
No. I believe it is an ordinary history, full of mistakes but extraordinarily well written and of
immense value to all men as a source book for study. True religion and sound learning are in
no way completely dependent on it.9

Not surprisingly, Endicott did not answer the exam questions truthfully, but as the church wished
him to. Young, ambitious, and excited to fulfil his dream of becoming a missionary, Endicott and
his wife, Mary, set off for West China in 1925, eager to serve.
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Endicott’s first term in China ended in 1933. During his eight years abroad, he was
appalled by the economic distress and significant class divide that characterized Chinese society.
The beginning of the country’s civil war also alarmed him. When he returned to Canada at the
height of the Great Depression, he was also amazed by the social inequities and economic
turmoil that engulfed the average Canadian citizen. As a result of these troubling experiences in
China and Canada, Endicott was determined that any further missionary work would be
dedicated to creating a society based on social justice and peace. It was not long before he had
the opportunity to put his vision into practice.
Endicott returned to China for a second term beginning in 1934 and set about achieving
his goals. His missionary duties included working as an English teacher and as a university
professor. In 1939 Endicott became a special adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the
Nationalist government, and his wife, Soong Mei-ling. Specifically, he was asked to work on the
government’s New Life Movement, a program which was ostensibly set up to help build morale
and support the introduction of new social services in China. The Movement spoke to Endicott’s
social reform sensibilities. He did, however, have doubts as to Chiang’s sincerity and willingness
to implement the new social reforms. A number of repressive Nationalist policies disturbed
Endicott, including teachers being forced to join the Kuomintang party and the censorship of the
communist press. Nevertheless, having returned to Canada on furlough in 1941, Endicott sang
the praises of Chiang as a beacon of positive change and peace: “If you give him the tools he will
finish the job for us in the Far East. You can count on Chiang Kai-shek to lay the foundation for
democracy in China. He is clothed, in my mind, with the qualities of a Lincoln.”10
Endicott’s third and final term as a missionary in China began in 1944. The primary focus
of his activism and missionary work was the Chinese civil war, both its causes and
consequences. Over the next three years, Endicott came to view the Chinese Nationalist
government in a new, negative light. In contrast, he began to sympathize and empathize with
Mao’s communists and their plight. This period marked a significant shift in Endicott’s activism
and consequently, his vision of peace became rigidly ideological.
On his return to China, Endicott was recruited by the American Office of Strategic
Services (OSS), the American precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency. Officially, Endicott
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was an English professor at West China University in Chengdu. At OSS, however, he was
assigned to its Research and Analysis branch, given the code name “Hialeah,” and instructed to
gain knowledge of the history and nature of the Chinese communist revolutionaries. Endicott’s
work for OSS proved to be a turning point in his life. The job helped confirm his belief in the
relationship between social reform and peace, in particular the correlation between conflict and
the lack of adequate land, food, and housing. In addition, Endicott, as Ian McKay and Jamie
Swift point out, began “to see Marxism as a ‘philosophy and method of social change’
compatible with a more all-encompassing Christianity.”11
As an agent for OSS, Endicott spent many hours talking to the country’s peasants about
communism and their everyday lives. Maclean’s Magazine would later describe Endicott as
“closer to the Chinese peasant, more deeply aware of his hopes and fears and problems, than any
other foreigner and more than many educated Chinese.”12 Endicott’s intelligence work also
brought him into contact with many of the Chinese communist leaders, including Zhou Enlai.
Zhou was a close confidant of Mao and later became the first Premier of the People’s Republic
of China. After attending a meeting at which Zhou spoke, Endicott commented that “the
Communist Manifesto…began to make sense. … I began to see the reality of the social gospel in
China, the demand for justice for the poor and the meaning of public ownership of the means of
production so that the hungry can be fed and the naked clothed as was demanded in the 25th
chapter of Matthew.”13 Endicott, as a result of these interactions, began to understand the causes
of the Chinese civil war and why many peasants supported Mao. Approximately eighty percent
of Chinese society, Endicott believed, were “agricultural paupers,” slaves to the land and wealthy
agricultural landlords. And these peasants were, as was he, attracted to Mao’s promises to
abolish private ownership and promote egalitarianism. Inspired by their policies and beliefs,
Endicott increasingly met with Chinese communist leaders in the coming weeks and months.
Endicott was simultaneously disappointed by Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist
government. In his work for OSS, Endicott learned that the Nationalist government had
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conscripted five million men into the Chinese Army in the final months of the Second World
War. Two million of these conscripts had died, not from fighting, but from disease and
malnutrition as a result of their officers stealing their pay and food. Endicott also learned of
concentration camps where Chiang held political opponents, and in particular, communists. In a
1969 interview, Endicott argued that by 1944, “Chiang Kai-shek had become an outright
Fascist.”14 In the face of obvious corruption and oppression, Endicott came to believe that
Chiang’s Nationalist government simply paid lip-service to the ideas of democracy and peace.
Chiang, he reasoned, continued the civil war with Mao’s communist revolutionaries for the sole
purpose of consolidating his power over the entirety of the country.
Endicott felt that peace and progress were only possible in China if the Kuomintang and
Communists learned to co-exist. And the only way to co-exist, he believed, was through
negotiation and communication. Endicott was thus delighted on August, 27, 1945, when the
Kuomintang Party and Chinese Communist Party signed the Double Tenth Agreement. The
Chinese communists acknowledged the Kuomintang as the legitimate government of China and
the Kuomintang recognized the Communists as the legitimate opposition party. The Agreement
stipulated that a national congress be held to select a new, “joint” Chinese government. Neither
side, however, was dedicated to the peace agreement just signed. Historian Rebecca Karl writes
that “Mao and Chiang hated one another, and no trust existed between themselves personally or
between their parties.”15 The Kuomintang refused to let the Communists operate in liberated
areas of the country, while Communist soldiers assaulted Nationalist strongholds. As Mao told
his leading commander Lin Biao, “Everything is decided by victory or defeat on the battlefield
[;] do not put any hope on negotiations.”16 Nonetheless, Endicott, convinced of the Nationalist’s
despotism, and swayed by the social policies and “peaceful” intentions of the communists,
blamed Chiang for the breakdown of the agreement and the resumption of fighting in Manchuria:
It [the Chinese Communist Party] is rooted in the people and has come up the hard way,
having its members killed by the hundreds of thousands by the Kuomintang and its
subsidiary feudal warlords. It contains the most intelligent students of social needs of China
… The Communist Party does not fear the people … It trains them how to organize
themselves in order to achieve sufficient political power in local self-government so that they
14
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can improve their own lot. … The Communists are quite sincere in saying that with a
democratic government in China they will merge their army into the national army. At the
same time…they are sure that the KMT [Kuomintang] will do everything in its power to
keep its own military strength and force the Communists to give up theirs in the name of
political unity and facade democracy.17

Endicott argued that war made social reform impossible. And if Chiang was responsible for
continuing the civil war, Endicott reasoned, he was also responsible for keeping the Chinese
people in a state of agricultural feudalism.
In a drastic step, Endicott began to work closely – and publically – with the communist
underground, in particular with student cells at West China University. As a foreign missionary
Endicott was protected from government censorship and repression. Students gathered at his
home to study Marx and debate how best to protest against the Kuomintang. In December 1945,
Endicott agreed to speak at a student protest held at the university. His speech condemned the
recent killing of four students for protesting against the Nationalist government and praised Mao
as China’s best hope for social justice and peace. “I have inner peace in my soul,” declared
Endicott to the crowd, “because I am not only now fully committed to do the truth as I see it, but
I am not afraid of the truth.”18
Convinced of the Chinese Communist Party’s righteousness, Endicott’s speech marked a
second turning point in his life. The United Church of Canada, aware of and unhappy with
Endicott’s political inclinations, used his speech to the pro-communist rally as an opportunity to
sanction his activism. Most of Endicott’s missionary colleagues were pro-Kuomintang and fully
supported Chiang Kai-shek. The church’s Board of Overseas Missions (BOM) resented Endicott
and felt that his communist sympathies jeopardized the entire mission. Gerald Bell, acting
secretary of the United Church’s BOM, instructed Endicott to refrain from politics and to adhere
to the church’s anti-communist line:
What the radical students need today is sympathy and understanding, but they also need
temperate and balanced leadership and guidance. You will forgive me if I speak frankly, but
I cannot regard your speech to the student demonstration as coming within that category. …
It seems to me that you should face the situation frankly and make a choice between two
lines of action. First, retain your present position, but use your talents and abilities in giving
constructive leadership to the young people within the accepted framework of the Mission
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and the Church, or else cease that connection and seek to achieve your aims in a wider and
less restricted sphere.19

Endicott was unapologetic, certain that he and the Chinese communists were in the right.
Moreover, Bell’s letter exacerbated a crisis in Endicott’s faith – one that he had felt for some
time: “I must confess that I am suffering from what can only be called spiritual and intellectual
shock. … [T]he acquiescence, if not collaboration of the Christian leaders in the unchristian
teachings and practices has been quite startling to me. The almost complete indifference of the
church here to what may be called social questions has been very depressing.”20 Endicott made
the difficult decision to resign his ministry from the United Church on May 5, 1946, rather than
compromise his convictions. Later in life, he insisted that he never regretted leaving the Church
and argued that “the Chinese revolution changed me into a born-again humanist revolutionary.”21
At the time, however, Endicott’s point of view made him widely unpopular with the Nationalist
government. Fearing he might be imprisoned, or worse, Endicott returned to Canada in 1947.
For much of 1947 Endicott travelled across Canada on a speaking tour, discussing his
hope for peace in China and at home. At each stop, Endicott shared with his audience stories of
his work as a missionary, teacher, and agent for OSS. On most occasions he praised Mao and
declared Chiang and his government unfit to lead China, both politically and morally. He also
read an open letter to the Chinese Consul-General in Toronto, Hsiang Yin-tao, in which he
attacked the ruthless nature of Chiang’s rule: “Your government maintains itself by brutality and
terrorism in the rear of the civil war zone and by American arms and ammunition at the front. In
China it has become perfectly clear that the Kuomintang dictatorship at Nanking is no true or
legal representative of the populace.”22 In reply, Hsiang wrote that Endicott was nothing more
than a mouthpiece for the Chinese Communist Party. Hsiang also threatened legal action,
incensed that Endicott dare criticize Chiang Kai-shek: “I do not wish to make any more comment
than to remind Endicott that any one who is so indiscreet as to insult the head of a friendly state
is liable to a penalty and there are numerous legal precedents in the course of this civilized
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world.”23 Ironically, in making such threats, Hsiang managed to confirm Endicott’s negative
account of the Kuomintang. But most Canadians agreed with the Consul General’s sentiments.
They believed that the Chinese Communists were evil and responsible for the Chinese civil war.
Lost in the uproar over Endicott’s comments was his vision of peace, outlined in every speech of
his Canadian tour. After twenty-two years as a missionary, Endicott had returned to Canada with
a clear, but simple vision founded on three general principles: social justice, co-existence, and
negotiation through open communication. Endicott’s particular application of these principles
would define not only his future activism, but how the Canadian peace movement conceptualized
peace for the next decade. His return marked a turning point in the peace movement towards
mass protest and cemented the association of peace to communism in Cold War Canada.
James Endicott’s vision of peace was most clearly articulated in his work with and for the
Canadian Peace Congress (CPC). In the summer of 1948, four men met in Toronto to discuss the
dangers of war: Reverends I.G. Perkins and Gordon Domm of the United Church; Harry Ward,
an American theology professor; and Reverend James Finlay, president of the Canadian branch
of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR). They eventually decided that a Canadian peace
congress should be organized and that the best man to lead the new movement was the recentlyreturned Endicott. A Provisional Meeting to Establish a National Peace Congress was held in
Toronto from December 3-6, 1948. The conference was attended by 372 delegates from across
the country and Endicott delivered the keynote address, “A Call to Peace.” Endicott’s speech
argued that the goal of any peace organization should be to stop all wars and to limit the threat of
war between states. He maintained that the goal of the CPC would be to prevent war through
negotiation, cooperation, and peaceful co-existence – or rather, internationalism.24 Based on the
vision of peace outlined in his address, the conference passed the CPC’s provisional seven-point
platform, which included support for Canadian participation in the UN, arms reduction, and the
recognition of Israel. Conversely, the CPC platform opposed regional military pacts, war
mongering, Canadian arms shipments, and the inclusion of fascist Spain in the UN. On the
strength of this platform, Endicott embarked on an eight-city, three-month lecture tour of
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Western Canada to set up local peace councils and garner national support for the CPC. When
the CPC met in May 1949, there were peace councils in fifteen Canadian cities.
The first annual Canadian Peace Congress was held in Toronto, May 6-8, 1949, and
marked the four-year anniversary of VE Day and the surrender of Nazi Germany. At the
conference, Endicott’s status as national chairman of the CPC was confirmed. The congress then
turned to more urgent matters. The provisional CPC platform was cast aside in favour of a new,
ten-point declaration that once again emphasized Endicott’s three planks for peace. Point one of
the platform reaffirmed Endicott’s belief that negotiation was critical to avoiding war and
conflict: “Strict adherence to the policy of finding peaceful solutions for all problems which arise
between nations — economic, diplomatic and territorial — and the renunciation of war as an
instrument of policy as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations.”25 Critical to Endicott,
point seven established co-existence as a necessary pre-condition for peace. The CPC, unlike the
Canadian and other Western governments deemed co-operation between West and East,
capitalism and communism, as imperative in the fight for peace : “Declaration by the Parliament
of Canada that the present Western policy in world trade, which excludes large sections of the
world in Eastern Europe and in the Far East and prevents them from importing Western products
and exporting to the West, be condemned as harmful to Canada and to the other countries
concerned.”26 The platform’s tenth and final point reiterated Endicott’s notion that peace was
impossible without social justice: “Through cancellation of the huge sums allocated to nonproductive armaments, the release of public funds to improve the standard of life of the Canadian
people through better social legislation, public works and the stimulation of industry and
agriculture, so that employment in the armed forces and in war industries will not be the only
solution to economic depression.”27 The new CPC declaration also included original policies
concerning the prevention of Japanese and German re-militarization and support for
decolonization. As a whole, however, the 1949 declaration echoed the provisional CPC platform.
It condemned the formation of military alliances outside the UN (in particular, NATO),
denounced war mongering, and appealed for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.
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Endicott’s vision of peace and the CPC’s core principles remained remarkably consistent over
his twenty-three year tenure as the organization’s national chairman.28 For the next decade,
Endicott’s vision of peace would be the Canadian peace movement’s vision of peace,
inextricably linked in the popular imagination of Cold War Canada.
Endicott and the CPC, however, were not an entirely independent organization. Historian
Lawrence Wittner notes that a “Communist-led peace campaign”29 emerged in the late 1940s, the
result of the Suslov Resolution. Mikhail Suslov was the Soviet Union’s Head of International
Communist Affairs and helped construct communist policy worldwide: “The struggle…for the
organization and consolidation of the forces of peace against the forces of war should now
become the pivot of the entire activity of the Communist parties and democratic organizations …
[Communist parties should] work even more persistently to consolidate organizationally and
extend the movements of the partisans of peace.”30 The result of the Resolution was the
formation of the World Peace Council (WPC) and the World Congress of Partisans of Peace,
both communist front organizations whose policies closely aligned with communist ideology and
beliefs.
Given Endicott’s communist sympathies, he jumped headfirst into the postwar,
communist peace campaign. In April 1949, one month prior to the CPC’s first national meeting,
Endicott attended the WPC’s founding meeting: the World Congress for the Defence of Peace,
held at the Salle Pleyel in Paris, France. In addition to the Suslov Resolution, the WPC was a
direct response to NATO, and consequently, the West’s and Canada’s liberal internationalist,
militarized concept of peace. WPC chairman Frederic Joliot-Curie (a physicist, Nobel Laureate,
and staunch communist), declared to the conference’s attendees: “We are not here to ask for
peace, but to impose it. This congress is the reply of the peoples to the signers of the Atlantic
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pact. To the new war they are preparing, we will reply with a revolt of the peoples.”31 The
conference, made up almost entirely of communists or communist sympathizers, greeted JoliotCurie’s speech with great enthusiasm. By the end of the congress, Endicott had been elected to
the WPC executive and the CPC became one of 120 national members. In a 1952 article,
Endicott recalled what had initially attracted him to the WPC: “The world peace movement is the
greatest, most universal and most effective movement of the people of the world that has so far
appeared in history. This movement crosses all national boundaries. The password is peace. It is
for our day the true expression of man’s noblest aspirations.”32 But in reality, Endicott was
partial to the WPC because they shared the same values and ideological belief system.
It is not surprising that Endicott and the CPC’s vision of peace mirrored that of the WPC.
In an early organizational booklet, the WPC outlined its own three planks for peace: “The
different social systems in the world can co-exist peacefully … Differences between the nations
must be settled by negotiation and agreements acceptable to all … [And] internal differences
within a nation are the concern of its citizens in conformity with the right of all peoples to selfdetermination.”33 With the exception of Endicott’s desire for social justice, the two visions were
almost identical. The corresponding policies of the CPC and WPC were also alike. In the same
booklet, the WPC summarized its key aims for peace. Like the CPC, the WPC was in favour of
full participation in the UN, opposed to nuclear weapons, and supported trade and cultural
exchanges between West and East to promote mutual understanding. There were no principles
for peace on which Endicott, the CPC, and WPC differed.
The CPC and WPC also collaborated on specific peace initiatives. One such example was
a petition to ban the atomic bomb. According to Wittner, the late 1940s marked the first wave of
international nuclear disarmament and that, in particular, “Communist-led groups emphasized
the nuclear weapons issue.”34 In October 1949, Endicott and the CPC launched a Canada-wide
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petition to ban the bomb. The petition asked Canadians to endorse a world without nuclear
weapons:
On behalf of the Canadian Peace Congress, I am presenting you…a petition sponsored by the
Congress to urge our government to take the following action: 1. Urge in the Assembly of
the United Nations that the atom bomb be banned. 2. Press for the strictest international
control to ensure compliance of all nations in outlawing the bomb as a military weapon. 3.
Encourage research in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and its practical
application for the increased well-being of our people.35

The petition was Endicott and the CPC’s main contribution to peace in 1949 and proved to be a
success. In eight months approximately 200,000 Canadians signed the CPC proposal.
In March 1950 Endicott travelled to Stockholm, Sweden, for a meeting of the WPC
executive. Inspired in large part by Endicott’s success in Canada, the WPC executive decided to
introduce its own ban-the-bomb petition known as the Stockholm Appeal. Endicott sat on the
committee that drafted the Appeal, but it was Russian writer Ilya Ehrenburg who eventually
composed the petition’s final wording:
We demand the absolute banning of the atomic bomb, weapon of terror and mass
extermination of populations.
We demand the establishment of strict international control to ensure the
implementation of this ban.
We consider that the first government to use the atomic bomb against any country,
whatsoever, would be committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a
war criminal.
We call on all men of goodwill throughout the world to sign this appeal.36

The CPC quickly adopted the Stockholm Appeal at its second annual peace congress in May
1950. The Appeal, like the CPC petition, was highly successful. Over 500 million people
worldwide signed the Appeal, including another 250,000 Canadians. In total, close to half-amillion Canadians signed the two peace petitions over the course of seventeen months.37 The
Stockholm Appeal, however, was only the beginning of the working relationship between the
CPC and the WPC. Over the next twenty years, Endicott and the two respective peace
organizations continued to work closely to achieve their goals. Unfortunately, neither the CPC

35

Letter – James G. Endicott to the Hon. L.B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs), May 3,
1950, Endicott Family fonds, Volume 3, file – “Correspondence OUT, May-June 1950.”
36
Endicott, “The Stockholm Appeal, March 19, 1950,” in The Best of Jim Endicott, 55.
37
To be exact, 489,914 signed the CPC ban the bomb petition and the Stockholm Appeal. [Letter – James
G. Endicott to the Prime Minister and Government of Canada, February 13, Endicott Family fonds,
Volume 3, file – “Correspondence OUT, 1951”]

171
petition nor the Stockholm Appeal would have a positive political impact in Canada. Endicott’s
vision of peace and his activism were beset by inherent contradictions, the direct result of his
communist affinities.
James Endicott’s communist inclinations by the late 1940s, early 1950s were hardly a secret. He
fully supported the Chinese Communists in their civil war against Chiang Kai-shek and openly
encouraged communists to join the CPC: “This Peace Movement, which has its full share of
Christians, Jews, freethinkers, socialists, pacifists and all other kinds of human being, will not
classify any group as ‘morally untouchable’ and we have no objection to the communists coming
into the peace movement and stating their point of view.”38 Moreover, the CPC had an intimate
relationship with the WPC, a noted communist-front organization. It is not surprising then that
Endicott’s vision of peace and activism were directly shaped by his communist proclivities. He
believed that China and the Soviet Union wanted peace, whereas the West hungered for war. As
a result of this belief, Endicott applied different standards to communist and non-communist
countries. Although he rightly questioned Canada and the West’s aggressive and imperialistic
foreign policies in the postwar period, he refused to do the same for communist nations.
Endicott, like most Canadians at that time, had a binary vision of the world: capitalism vs.
communism, good vs. evil, etc. But his preference for communism rather than capitalism placed
him within the distinct minority at home. His ideological beliefs, and consequent biases, greatly
hurt him, the CPC, and the quest for peace in Cold War Canada.
Endicott had a great affection for China and its people. Shortly after his return to Canada,
Endicott and his wife began publication of their monthly, “The Canadian Far Eastern
Newsletter.” Sympathetic to the communist position, the purpose of the Newsletter was twofold:
one, to report on China’s “incredible progress” made under the communists; and two, as “a
means of serving China”39 from Canada. For the most part, the Newsletter had to rely on
Endicott’s communist contacts in China for its content. To his detriment, Endicott’s faith in the
communist leaders was absolute. During a 1950 peace rally, Endicott exclaimed that “the first
year of the People’s Republic of China has been a year of great achievements. … Floods have
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been controlled, famine abolished, railways restored and financial order restored after ten years
of chaos. … It has fully demonstrated the claims that it is honest, efficient and working for the
welfare of the people.”40 Endicott conveniently overlooked that China became a dictatorship
under communist rule and that the “‘truth’ became whatever Mao said it was.”41 Those who
supported the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and swore fealty to Mao were treated well.
Chinese citizens who opposed the government and did not follow the communist party line were
persecuted. Historian Rebecca Karl, for example, notes that the landlord-gentry class was
destroyed for opposing Mao’s scheme of land distribution: “Many individuals had been
executed, although most landlords, after admitting their historical crimes, were permitted to have
their own plots of land.”42 Because Endicott agreed with the communist’s social policies and
reforms, it did not matter to him that Mao had merely replaced Chiang as China’s authoritarian
ruler.
From 1952 to 1959, Endicott visited China three times to supplement the information he
regularly received second-hand. His perception of Mao’s communists and the so-called New
China after each trip was laudatory, and the Newsletter only reported positive stories. According
to Endicott, the peasants he “met” while visiting China were happy because of land reform, a
new surplus of food, and having to pay fewer taxes under the CCP. But Endicott was an
apologist for China’s more unsavoury policies. He could not fully grasp why the West would
criticize the CCP’s repression of civil liberties:
Critics of the new China set some effects of the zeal to achieve national solidarity: the
extensive political education in all walks of life, the urge for understanding and acceptance
of the Common Program…[and] the teachings of Chairman Mao and Marxist principles. The
critics lump this all together as “thought-control” … The more thoughtful do admit that the
threat of war from the U.S. … provides an urgency for speed in achieving national solidarity
and explains many restrictions and suspicions that lead to penalties, sometimes heavy and
sometimes unmerited.43
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Some of Endicott’s Chinese friends were imprisoned for opposing the communist government
and had been given intensive “re-education” in Maoism.44 They were not, however, spared his
sanctimonious attitude. In an interview with a Canadian journalist, Endicott remarked: “They are
wiser now and out of jail.”45 Endicott rationalized that the “unmerited penalties” of Mao’s
government were acceptable because they contributed to the greater good, to the building of
what he considered to be a better, more peaceful China.
The only time Endicott dared criticize China was when the country publically deviated
from the policies of the WPC. For many years there existed a distrust and suspicion between
China and the Soviet Union. In 1960 the political and ideological relations between the world’s
two largest communist nations became increasingly strained. Eventually the two countries drifted
apart in what became known as the Sino-Soviet split. A significant reason for the split was their
differing point of view on peace, but specifically, the notion of communist co-existence with the
United States. Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the Soviet Union, hoped to ease tensions and work
more closely with the U.S. In contrast, Historian Lorenz Luthi notes “Mao’s outright opposition
to peaceful coexistence [with the United States].”46 The CCP believed that peace could only be
realized if American imperialism was thwarted at every turn. Endicott, the CPC, and the WPC,
however, supported the Soviet position and advocated co-existence as the best means of
achieving peace: “China can’t go along with the Soviet views on peaceful co-existence. China
says disarmament is unrealistic. China doesn’t believe disputes can be settled by negotiation.
China is contemptuous of the UN. … I don’t accept the China view.”47 As a result of Endicott’s
public, pro-Soviet stance, he was not welcome in China until 1972 when he controversially
resigned as national chairman of the CPC. Nevertheless, Endicott’s affection for China never
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diminished during his thirteen-year exile and he remained an apologist for Mao until the end of
his life.48
Endicott’s admiration for the Soviet Union was second only to his respect for China.
During the postwar period, Endicott made multiple trips to the country and always returned to
Canada full of praise for Soviet life. Nowhere, he reported, did he see signs of war propaganda or
an “atomic psychosis.” Rather, Endicott stated that Moscow and other Russian cities were awash
with peace propaganda. Schools, libraries, stores, factories, and even the Metro, Endicott
claimed, were decorated with doves and other symbols and motifs associated with peace. His
exaltation of the Soviet government was often, however, excessive:
I see here with the new state which her [i.e. Russian] idealists are creating, as a greater giant,
reaching out her right hand to the exploited Balkans and her left hand to this disinherited
masses of China, and lifting them up to an intelligently planned and controlled civilization. I
consider that Russia, by making justice and equality practical politics, and by teaching the
youth a new morality in regard to man’s acquisitive instincts, has made the most important
contribution to the progress of the world since Lincoln freed the slaves.49

In addition to his approval of Russia proper, Endicott extolled the virtues of the communist
satellite states in Eastern Europe, where he ignored any form of Russian domination or
imperialism.
Similar to Mao and the Chinese communists, Endicott also made excuses and ignored the
systematic abuses of Russia’s government during the postwar and Cold War period. He failed to
criticize the Soviet Union for its forced labour camps, closed borders, and the lack of free speech
or elections which, ultimately, made peace impossible. Nor did he condemn the sale of arms by
Czechoslovakia to Egypt in the 1950s, but chastised the United States for selling weapons to
Israel. In 1957 Endicott declared the Israeli, French, and British invasion of Egypt “fifty times
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worse”50 than the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Endicott repeatedly indicated that it was not
within the CPC’s domain, nor was it the WPC’s duty to rebuke the Soviet Union for its foreign
or internal policy, even when it was repressive or militaristic: “It is not the purpose of this Peace
Movement to support or defend the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Neither is it our purpose
to attack it.”51 Instead of critically examining how both East and West were impediments to
peace, Endicott simply believed the East’s propaganda in their desire for peace.
Endicott felt no such qualms in regard to condemning the foreign policy of Canada and
its Western partners. Under American leadership during the Cold War, Endicott felt that the
West had entered into a state of “total moral breakdown.”52 The Marshall Plan, he argued, was
nothing more than economic imperialism, the perfect complement to the West’s military alliance,
NATO. Moreover, Endicott reasoned that American foreign policy would lead to war. It was
Canada, however, that drew his greatest ire. Canada, Endicott argued, was uniquely positioned to
act independently from the United States, especially in regard to peace, but rather, chose to
follow the aggressive, militaristic foreign policy of its Western allies.
According to Endicott, the Canadian government and its leading politicians were
hypocrites. They talked of peace, but their actions, he believed, were antagonistic and war-like.
Endicott denounced the government’s militarized definition of peace as security. He attacked
Canada’s membership in NATO and argued that its creation was a violation of the UN Charter,
but never articulated his rationale. Endicott instead proposed that Canada withdraw from the
organization and proclaim its neutrality. If the government truly wanted peace, he reasoned,
“there will be no need for military alliances and vast schemes of re-armament.”53 Endicott also
severely criticized Canada’s reluctance to condemn nuclear weapons. Canada’s decision to
mirror the U.S. policy of peace through armaments, Endicott wrote to Prime Minister Louis St.
Laurent, would not lead to peace, but only to war: “Your refusal to protest President Truman’s
H-Bomb decision seems to us to provide further evidence that your government is becoming
50
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merely an appendage of the United States government. A grave action affecting Canada’s
security has been taken.”54
The focus of Endicott’s wrath, more often than not, was Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Lester B. Pearson. Pearson’s public avowal of both NATO and nuclear weapons
confounded Endicott. How could Pearson, asked Endicott, support two policies that clearly, in
his mind, endangered world peace? Consequently, Endicott believed that Pearson’s record on
peace was poor, although he did praise Pearson’s contribution to resolving the 1956 Suez Crisis.
In the meantime, however, Endicott argued that it was Canada and the West’s negative definition
of peace, not communism, that was the chief threat to security in postwar Canada: “The World
Peace Council…has had full assurance from the Soviet Union that immediately after a firm
agreement to ban the bomb is made, the Soviet Union will agree to full and free inspection. The
stumbling block in this case in [sic] not the Soviet Union, it is men like Pearson.”55 These
comments angered Pearson. In response to the verbal attack, Pearson reminded Endicott that
communist nations would not tolerate the type of criticism that the CPC levelled at the Canadian
government: “A man who, professing honest motives and high ideals, goes among strangers and
maligns his country…is beneath contempt. In a Communist society he would be beneath the
ground.”56 In part, Pearson and other Canadians were angered by Endicott who exposed the gulf
between the government’s words and actions in regard to peace and war. Pearson and others, of
course, felt that they were doing all they could to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in
Canada.
It is the Korean War (1950-1953), however, that best highlights the contradictions within
Endicott’s vision of peace. Endicott and the CPC opposed the war in Korea and demanded that
both sides negotiate to end the war and learn to co-exist with one another: “There is not a single
conflict between nations that cannot be settled by negotiation and all conflicts must be settled
that way. This is the simple and profound policy that all people must grasp and hold on to for
dear life. … The war in Korea can be settled by negotiation, and it must be settled by

54

Letter – Dr. J.G. Endicott to the Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent, February 14, 1950, Endicott Family fonds,
Volume 3, file – “Correspondence OUT, Jan.-April, 1950.”
55
Document – “A Reply to the Hon. L.B. Pearson,” by Dr. James G. Endicott, Canadian Peace Congress,
Sudbury, May 15, 1951,” Endicott Family fonds, Volume 58, file – “Lester B. Pearson Correspondence,
1915-64.”
56
Ronald Williams, “Endicott’s Soviet Trip Toughens Ottawa Policy,” The Financial Post, May 6, 1950.

177
negotiation.”57 Endicott’s statement to a peace rally in Toronto’s Queen’s Park was reasonable,
measured, and one that many Canadians could agree with. But once again, Endicott’s ideological
sympathies clouded his judgement. Endicott argued that South Korea, and by extension, its
Western allies were responsible for initiating the war: “There is overwhelming evidence that
South Korea was planning an attack on North Korea and that its leaders openly boasted of doing
this. … I give it as my personal opinion that John Foster Dulles gave them the nod to go ahead
and attack. … The South Korean forces attacked on June 25 [1950] and advanced six miles.”58
The facts do not support Endicott’s claim that Syngman Rhee and South Korea were the
aggressors. Rather, it was North Korea’s armed forces that invaded the South outfitted with both
Soviet and Chinese weapons. Even Endicott’s biography (written by his son, Stephen), refutes
his claim that the South was culpable for launching the war: “The concrete evidence for
Endicott’s thesis about the origins of the [Korean] war was sparse.”59 Endicott was nonetheless
convinced of both South Korea and the West’s guilt for starting the war, and would remain so for
the rest of his life.
Endicott also deemed the UN intervention in the Korean War illegal. Due to the absence
of both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China from the Security Council (the
former was protesting the latter’s exclusion from the UN), Endicott argued that the decision to
intervene in Korea was nothing short of a betrayal of the UN’s founding principles. In particular,
Endicott blamed the United States for the UN’s involvement in the Korean War:
No nation must be allowed to dominate the United Nations Organization. … It is
because…one great nation, the United States, has sought to make its will dominate…that we
have a situation today where the United Nations has become an agency of war instead of an
agency for peace through compromise, democratic procedure and negotiation. All
these…were denied to the Korean people.60

The UN Security Council in 1950 was Western dominated, but its resolution on Korea was not
illegal as Endicott claimed. Canada, much to Endicott’s displeasure, fully supported the UN
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resolution and sent a combat brigade to Korea as part of the UN force. Endicott, however,
maintained that the “police action” conducted by UN troops in Korea was illegal.
Endicott also criticized the military leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, who
commanded the UN armed forces in Korea. Eager to bring the troops “home for Christmas,”
MacArthur urged an amphibious landing in North Korea in 1950. He then hoped to drive the
North’s forces to the Yalu River and crush them. The campaign was a risk and ultimately,
Chinese troops intervened on behalf of North Korea and almost defeated the UN forces.
Nevertheless, Endicott was apoplectic. He considered MacArthur’s strategy and tactics to be
criminal. At the Second World Peace Congress held in Warsaw (1950), the WPC passed a
motion calling for MacArthur to be tried as a war criminal: “We demand that a competent
international court be appointed to examine the crimes committed during the war in Korea, and
in particular the question of the responsibility of General MacArthur.”61 Endicott and the CPC
quickly endorsed the proposal. MacArthur, Endicott believed, was no better than a dictator.
Endicott then accused the General of lying about the Chinese attack on UN forces: “It is
deliberate propaganda that China has intervened with a large army in Korea. It is propaganda
designed to cover up U.S. aggression against China. As of December 1, there was no large
Chinese army in Korea. … It is a hoax just slightly bigger than they tried to put over when they
started the Korean invasion.”62 When Chinese participation in the Korean War became
irrefutable, Endicott excused the Chinese attack as self-defence.
It was in 1952, however, that Endicott returned from a trip to China as Canada’s “Public
Enemy Number One.”63 In February Kuo Mo-jo, vice-president of the WPC and president of the
Chinese Committee for the Defense of Peace, messaged Joliot-Curie and accused U.S. forces of
conducting germ warfare in Manchuria: “The U.S. armies of aggression, in a treacherous effort
to wipe out the civilian population of Korea, as well as the armed forces of the Korean and
Chinese people, have spread…large quantities of insects carrying the germs of plague, cholera,
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typhus, and other contagious diseases.”64 A month later, Endicott was invited by the Chinese
Minister of Health, Madame Li Teh-chuan, to investigate these claims. The Chinese argued that
American forces, using the Korean War as a smokescreen, were committing acts of atrocity on
its citizens. On April 1, 1952, Endicott sent the following cable from Shanghai to Pearson in
Ottawa: “PERSONAL INVESTIGATIONS REVEAL UNDENIABLE EVIDENCE LARGE
SCALE CONTINUING AMERICAN GERM WARFARE ON CHINESE MAINLAND URGE
YOU PROTEST SHAMEFUL VIOLATION UNITED NATIONS AGREEMENTS.”65 Endicott
then held a press conference in Mukden, China. Broadcast by Peking Radio, the Canadian press
reported that during the press conference, Endicott accused Canada of aiding and abetting UN
and American germ warfare.
Endicott’s attack on the UN had only just begun. On his return to Canada, Endicott and
the CPC held a large peace rally at Maple Leaf Gardens on May 11, 1952, at which
approximately 10,000 people attended. He used the rally as a platform and opportunity to
double-down on his allegations of germ warfare: “I declare that germ warfare has been tried out
on a large scale against the women and children of China and that this is a crime against and an
offence against the laws of God and man.”66 He later published a booklet entitled, “I Accuse,”
that attempted to provide details to support his accusations. Endicott detailed his meetings with
Chinese farmers whose crops were purportedly destroyed by infected insects, and with Chinese
scientists who explained to him how scraps of bombs found in farmers’ fields contained bacterial
culture. Endicott also claimed to have touched, with proper medical supervision, an infected
spider. Lastly, he pointed to statements from American servicemen to support his claims;
captured by the North Koreans, the G.I.’s declared that they had been trained in Japan for germ
warfare.
Yet Endicott’s evidence was problematic, at best. His booklet claimed that the proof for
germ warfare came straight from the top scientific minds in China. But the scientists, whom
Endicott interviewed, were hand-selected by the Chinese government. There was, moreover, no
independent scientific study to confirm or deny the germ warfare allegations. China refused to let
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the Red Cross enter the country to investigate or examine infected citizens. Endicott, typically,
made excuses for the government: “I will stand by everything I am saying about American germ
warfare and in the end I will be proved to have reported truthfully and accurately. … The reason
the Chinese refuse the Red Cross is that the gentleman in charge in the Far East is none other
than one who gave a clean bill of health to Hitler’s extermination camps in Eastern Europe.”67
Similarly, the peasants whom Endicott spoke to were not randomly chosen and he did not have
free reign to travel the countryside speaking to whomever he pleased. As a result, the anecdotal
stories contained in the booklet, but presented as fact by Endicott, must be taken with a grain of
salt:
The breadth of understanding of the ordinary people of New China was for me typified by
Chiang Da-Yung, a previously illiterate peasant in Nanking who had taught himself to read
in two years and whom I found reading a paper containing Professor Joliot-Curie’s appeal
against bacteriological warfare. He told me how he supported this appeal, and that he was
not afraid of America. It was a surprise to me to meet such a man who not only could read,
but who understood what the world peace movement meant.68

Endicott’s argument that Da-yung and other Chinese citizens were unafraid holds little credence.
If the Americans had attempted to spread disease in China, there would have been mass panic.
Or at the very least, panic among the peasants directly affected by the germ warfare. Canadian
historians Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse argue that the evidence to support Endicott and the
WPC’s claims of germ warfare is stronger today than ever before.69 But in fact, there is still no
actual evidence to support Endicott’s assertion. In spite of those that dismissed him and his
accusations, Endicott never relinquished the belief that UN forces, in particular American
soldiers, were guilty of committing germ warfare during the Korean War: “I won’t really feel
vindicated until the truth about the germ warfare is acknowledged by the Western
governments.”70
In the midst of the uproar over his comments regarding germ warfare, Endicott requested
a meeting with Pearson and the External Affairs Committee in Ottawa to present his findings.
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Three times Endicott was refused an audience. Pearson and the Committee did however, send
Endicott a questionnaire asking him to confirm or deny his statements, which in turn, Endicott
declined to complete. It was fortunate that Endicott did not meet with the External Affairs
Committee. In late April 1952, the Committee debated stripping Endicott of his passport and
Progressive Conservative politician, Gordon Graydon, even proposed quarantining Endicott and
other like-minded individuals:
[Graydon] Why could we not quarantine these people. We have quarantined the people in
Saskatchewan in an area of several hundred miles —
[Coldwell] But that was for foot and mouth disease?
[Graydon] I think that we could apply the foot and mouth regulations to some of these people
who go overseas on these suspicious missions. If the law is not tight enough should it not be
tightened so that we can quarantine these people?71

Cooler heads such as James Coldwell, leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation,
prevailed and nixed Graydon’s idea to quarantine communist sympathizers in Saskatchewan or
any other province.
At the same time Graydon proposed quarantining communists, Canadian
parliamentarians in the House of Commons implored the government to investigate the
“dastardly statement” made by Endicott in Mukden. But it was not until May 12, the day after
the CPC rally at Maple Leaf Gardens, that Endicott’s comments became the focal point of debate
in Canada’s House of Commons. Pearson spoke on behalf of the Liberal government. He noted
that the charges of germ warfare had been categorically denied by UN Secretary-General, Trygve
Lie. Pearson also remarked that Canadian scientists believed there to be no merit to the
allegations being made against UN forces. He then turned his attention to Endicott and called
him a “dupe” of Soviet propaganda and a danger to Canadian security:
A few of these people, of course, may sincerely believe that they are, if I may put it this way,
fisherman for peace. They are, in fact, merely bait on the end of a Red hook. They are
helping the Soviet government achieve certain imperialistic objectives which have nothing to
do with peace or freedom, but which require the weakening and eventually the destruction of
the friendly co-operation which has been built up between free states in the face of the
menace of Soviet communist aggression.72
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By late June, however, the Federal Cabinet decided not to pursue the matter any further. Stuart
Garson, Minister of Justice, explained the government’s decision to the House: “The freedom of
speech which Dr. Endicott has been so consistently abusing is the freedom of speech which all
Canadian citizens enjoy … in a free society under democratic government.”73 The government
believed it was more valuable to preserve the country’s “democratic traditions” than to make
Endicott a “communist martyr.”
Endicott’s decision to pursue charges of germ warfare against UN and U.S. armed forces
during the Korean War left his and the CPC’s credibility in tatters. His accusations highlighted
his communist sympathies and the contradictions within his vision of peace; in particular, his
quickness to condemn the West’s militarized conception of peace, while simultaneously
excusing communist bellicosity and belligerence. Canadians were infuriated by the double
standard that he employed in his activism, and as a result, he was criticized by the Canadian
government for his inflammatory statements and remarks. Although sincere in his desire for
social reform, negotiation, and co-existence, Endicott was uncritical in his treatment of
communist versus non-communist nations. He was a “dupe,” politically naïve and eager to
believe that those who talked of “peace” were genuine in their intentions. Endicott was correct to
question Canada and the West’s aggressive and militaristic policies, but he could not see that
communist countries were also a significant barrier to the peace he wished to achieve.
The government’s criticism of Endicott and the CPC in 1952-1953 was not new. In fact,
Endicott’s vision of peace and activism had precipitated criticisms of the Canadian peace
movement beginning with his return to Canada in 1947. Upon founding the CPC, James Endicott
believed that most people who hated “the scourge of war”74 would flock to his organization. But
his avowed communist sympathies were a major deterrent to prospective members. The
contradictions in his vision of peace led many Canadians to associate the word “peace” in the
immediate postwar and Cold War period as unpatriotic, un-Canadian, and most problematically,
as communistic. Perceived in this negative light, Endicott’s notions of co-existence and
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negotiation when applied to the Soviet Union, China, and other communist nations, were
subversive. Endicott was not a communist or even a member of the Labour-Progressive Party
(LPP), Canada’s official communist organ. But due to his beliefs and ideological bent, he and the
CPC were regarded and identified as communist. Consequently, Endicott and the peace
movement became a target for criticism in Cold War Canada.
Because Endicott’s communist sympathies and vision of peace challenged the nation’s
popular conception and definition of peace as security, the Canadian government was at the
forefront of the attacks levelled against Endicott and the CPC. Not one Canadian political party,
with the exception of the LPP, supported the peace movement. Politicians, such as Arthur L.
Smith, Progressive-Conservative (PC) MP for Calgary West, warned Canadians that Endicott
and the CPC posed a serious threat to national security: “If it be true — and I am perhaps stupid
enough to think that it is — that this cold war is a stalling for time for the shooting war that this
beast of Moscow is going to let loose on this world when it suits him, he will have…his
Endicotts commanding the fifth column legions right here in the Dominion of Canada.”75 Other
politicians such as George A. Drew, leader of the Progressive Conservatives and the Official
Opposition, critiqued the “godless” nature of communism and its disciples:
“It is a religion without God. … It is in all truth the anti-Christ pictured by the bible. I do not
wish anyone for one moment to think that I feel any less deeply about this matter than my
words would indicate. The depth of my feeling with regard to men like…Dr. Endicott…is
occasioned by the fact that I know of my own knowledge how false their interpretation of
communism in Russia really is.”76

Smith’s and Drew’s statements in regard to Endicott and the CPC were echoed by many other
politicians sitting in Canada’s House of Commons.
The peace movement’s fiercest critic in government, however, was Lester Pearson. At the
time of the CPC’s inception in 1948, Pearson was Canada’s Secretary of State for External
Affairs and largely responsible for shaping the country’s foreign policy. He was also largely
accountable for influencing Canada’s negative Cold War conception and definition of peace.
Unlike Endicott, Pearson viewed the Soviet Union as a “massive and fearful force, alien and
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menacing to many things we take for granted in our [Western] way of living.”77 Moreover, as a
political “pragmatist” Pearson understood the UN’s limitations in enforcing international
collective security. Consequently, in the late 1940s, Pearson, with the full support of Prime
Minister Louis St. Laurent, pushed for the creation of NATO – a regional military alliance – to
protect Canada and its Western allies from Soviet attack. Pearson argued that Canada’s security,
and thus peace, could be assured if it allied itself to the U.S., Great Britain, France, and other
democratic states, and built a formidable nuclear arsenal to combat Soviet aggression. In fear of
the Soviet military abroad and ideological infiltration at home, many Canadians respected and
admired Pearson’s militant stance against international communism. Pearson was unwilling to
accept Endicott’s alternative vision of peace as anything but communist propaganda and often
said as much in Parliament:
[T]he Canadian Peace Council, which has become, though some of its members may not
know it even yet, the agent of a foreign aggressive imperialism. … How can one explain, for
instance, a former minister of the United Church, now an undiscriminating supporter of
everything that emerges from the Communist higher command, who has nothing but harsh
words for the policy of good and honest men in the free world, but who finds it easy to
explain and excuse any and every manifestation of cruelty and persecution in Communist
countries, this man, who asks us to accept his credentials as a sincere Christian, who says he
is concerned only with peace and with the furtherance of the good life for all men.78

Endicott could not understand why Pearson chose to attack him and the CPC, blind to his
vision’s partiality. In response to Pearson, Endicott countered that there was nothing more
patriotic than to promote peace. Nevertheless, Pearson and the majority of Canada’s politicians
consistently criticized the CPC, which they viewed as a communist front organization and as a
result, a danger to the Canadian society and solidarity.
In addition to the government’s verbal attacks, Endicott and the CPC faced severe
criticism from the Canadian media. The association between peace and communism was everpresent in the postwar and Cold War press. To denigrate Endicott and the CPC’s vision of peace,
media outlets argued that Canada and the Soviet Union could not co-exist, and that in fact, to
advocate for a peace that differed from the government’s conception was a subversive act. In the
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span of a few short years, Endicott and the peace movement was buried under a flood of negative
press propaganda. Two articles stand out as particularly vicious. The first was an editorial in the
Winnipeg Tribune entitled, “A Letter to the ‘Reverend’ James Endicott.” The editorial begins by
making a comparison between Endicott’s peace activism and the betrayal of Jesus Christ:
“Judas’s price was thirty pieces of silver. What are you getting? What makes it worth your while
to disgrace your church, your country and your family? Does notoriety mean more to you than
your self-respect?”79 After accusing Endicott of spreading malicious lies, the editorial ends as it
began, by vilifying him: “You carry pestilence with you and breathe it on clean things. … We
hope that this is the last time we shall have to foul our paper with your name until we may
happily announce that you have gone to Russia permanently.”80
The second article, “How Dr. Endicott Fronts for the Reds” by Blair Fraser, was
published on July 15, 1952, in Maclean’s Magazine. Fraser’s account of Endicott and the CPC
was not much different from the countless other newspaper and magazine articles found in the
Canadian press at that time. The CPC was a communist “front” and Endicott was an instrument
of Canada’s sworn enemy: “For the moment…he is one of Communism’s major assets in the
whole world.”81 The article, however, was particularly vicious. Fraser even suggests Endicott’s
peace activism was akin to working with the devil: “He doesn’t look like a Communist agent. …
Everything in his environment befits a man who spent twenty-odd years in the service of Christ.
None of it explains why this same man should now be lending his talents and his influence to the
Antichrist.”82 Endicott was astonished at the ferocity of Canadians who opposed his vision of
peace. He was particularly surprised by Fraser’s red-baiting and smear tactics because the two
had spent several pleasant hours talking about Endicott’s life and peace activism prior to the
article’s publication.
In response to Blair’s article, Endicott wrote a letter of protest to Maclean’s editor, Ralph
Allen. Endicott argued that the magazine’s characterization of peace as a communist plot had no
place in Canadian society. Endicott teased Allen and dared the editor to guess at his and the
CPC’s ulterior motives: “Mr. Blair Fraser searched long but could not find the real sinister
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purpose behind the activities of the Canadian Peace Congress and myself as its chairman. I
would like to reveal to your readers what he could not find — the real sinister purpose of the
Peace Congress is peace.”83 Allen, however, was not moved by Endicott’s remarks. Moreover,
Allen was unrepentant and would not retract Fraser’s article. His magazine’s negative portrayal
of Endicott and the CPC was representative of how most Canadian news outlets viewed peace
and the peace movement.
Endicott and his supporters became subject not only to verbal assault, but also to physical
intimidation and attack. In Quebec the peace movement faced greater obstacles than in the rest of
Canada, the result of the province’s Padlock Law (1937). Officially known as “An Act to Protect
Against Communistic Propaganda,” the Padlock Law prohibited the use of any building or house
in Quebec to propagate communism. The law, however, was vague and did not specifically
define communism. The Padlock Law, consequently, was used as a pretext to stifle traditional
human rights and freedoms. On numerous occasions the Montreal police raided CPC meetings
held in private homes chaired by Endicott or other individuals. The police even prevented the
Montreal Youth Assembly for Peace from laying a wreath at the city’s cenotaph. Fed up with the
abuse of power by police in Quebec, the CPC passed the following resolution at the second
annual Canadian Peace Congress held in early May 1950: “We are alarmed by the threats to the
democratic rights of all Canadians contained in the actions of the police and government
agencies in Quebec in intimidating the owners of halls which makes it virtually impossible for
the peace movement to rent halls. … This Congress further demands the cessation of these
shameful acts.”84 Unfortunately, the resolution made no difference in how the police treated the
CPC and its local affiliates in Quebec. The Supreme Court of Canada declared the Padlock Law
unconstitutional in 1957, but the court’s decision came far too late for the CPC to be an effective
agent for peace in the province.
Police intimidation and harassment of Endicott and the CPC occurred outside Quebec
too. Beginning in 1950, every time Endicott returned to Canada from abroad he was subject to
detainment by airport staff. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers accompanied by
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customs officials searched his luggage, confiscated his papers, and forced him to undress.
Endicott often spent over two hours at the airport being questioned about his trip and peace
activism. The pretense for each search was the belief that Endicott’s communist sympathies
posed a security risk to Canada. Bitter from his experiences with the RCMP, Endicott released a
statement condemning the actions of Canada’s national police force: “On average I have made
three trips a year. Each time I have been met by two plain clothes officers with R.C.M.P. badges
and have been required to submit to search. … I feel, after four years of repeated searchings that
the term ‘reasonable grounds of suspicion’ has been thoroughly disproved.”85 The harassment of
Endicott, however, did not end.
Unable to find any evidence of wrongdoing or a crime, the RCMP turned to more
nefarious means to hinder and impede the activities of the CPC and peace movement.
Unbeknown to Endicott, the CPC had been infiltrated by the RCMP during the 1950s. And in the
early 1960s, Pat Walsh, a former undercover RCMP agent, wrote a series of articles for The
South End News (a far-right newspaper in Ottawa), that depicted his activities as a clandestine
member of the CPC. Walsh revealed that he had been elected to the organization’s national
executive three years running. The articles did not, however, reveal anything newsworthy about
the peace movement. They were yet another slander of the CPC as a communist “front” and
Endicott as “the No. 1 Commie stooge in Canada.”86 Yet, even before the articles’ publication,
Endicott wrote to an Ottawa journalist to firmly condemn Walsh: “I saw a press release from a
certain Pat Walsh, denouncing our movement. He says he was an R.C.M.P. agent infiltrated into
the Congress. As a secret police agent he did not try to get honest and accurate information, he
tried to smear us. He was on the National Council, made leftist, revolutionary speeches until we
kicked him out; then he quoted himself to prove what we were like.”87 It is evident that Walsh’s
articles were written for an audience convinced of Endicott and the peace movement’s guilt and
villainy.
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Throughout his career as a peace activist, Endicott was also the victim of physical attack
on numerous occasions. In 1952 Endicott received death threats over his allegations of germ
warfare in Korea. In fear for his life and that of his family, bodyguards were placed in front of
Endicott’s family home before his CPC peace rally at Maple Leaf Gardens. The following year,
Endicott was pelted with rotten eggs at a meeting of the Moose Jaw Peace Council. Seven
months later, eggs were smeared all over his house, and this particular attack was soon followed
by another. A CPC meeting being held at Endicott’s Toronto home was disrupted when a group
of men set fire to his house with acid and incendiary bombs. Both of these attacks were given
short shrift, labelled by Toronto police as “mysterious.” In 1954, a group of students from the
University of Toronto hung Endicott in effigy as he addressed a number of peace activists at
Massey Hall. The terrorization of Endicott, his family, and members of the CPC by ordinary
Canadians was the direct result of his alternative vision of peace.
The Canadian association between peace and communism affected both Endicott’s
personal and professional relationships. In the late 1940s, early 1950s Endicott lost many of his
close friends, many of whom were fellow members of the United Church. They cut ties with
him, afraid to be associated with a communist sympathizer and the leader of the Canadian peace
movement. There were, however, a few United Church ministers who chose to support Endicott
and the CPC, including Reverend Crossley Hunter of Trinity United Church: “I have a great
respect for Jim [Endicott], his fearlessness, and his passionate devotion to world peace.”88 But
like most institutions, the United Church reflected mainstream public opinion during the Cold
War, rather than act as a guide for the Canadian public. The church’s opposition to Mao’s
communists and support for the Canadian militarized, definition of peace led Endicott to resign
his ministry in 1946, failings he continued to criticize for the remainder of his life: “The
Christian churches could end our fears about world war if they were as insistent in the field of
public and international morality as they were in the field of theological purity.”89
A good example of the United Church’s role in maintaining the Cold War consensus was
its official resolution distancing itself from Endicott and the CPC. In September 1952, the United
Church of Canada held its 15th General Council in Hamilton, Ontario. High on the church’s
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agenda were the twin issues of Endicott and the CPC. Many United Church ministers arrived at
the Council eager that a clear statement be published in regard to the church’s relationship to the
peace movement. Reverend Morely Colling-Strathroy was one such minister who called
impatiently for an official church resolution: “I had a long distance call from a layman asking if
the council is not going to do something about Endicott. We should clear the air and dissociate
our church from contamination.”90 Morley would not have to wait long, nor would he be
disappointed. By an overwhelming vote of 375 to 3, and as Endicott watched from the audience,
the United Church resolved to disassociate itself from him and the CPC:
1. That the United Church of Canada believes in the right of every person to freedom of
speech, subject always to the rights of other persons accorded to them by law. While
recognizing that ‘liberty must be limited in order to be possessed,’ we affirm our
convictions that it is a wiser policy to err on the side of leniency than to suppress too
hastily.
2. That no individual member of the United Church of Canada ever speaks for the church at
large. With specific reference to James G. Endicott, we could call attention to the fact he
ceased to be a minister of the United Church of Canada when on May 5, 1946, he
voluntarily, on his own initiative, resigned his ministry in our church. Since that time he
has had no official relationship with the United Church of Canada other than that of a
private member. He therefore does not speak for, or in any way represent, the United
Church.
3. That the United Church of Canada sincerely believes in and ardently advocates world
peace, but unequivocally declares that the United Church of Canada has not been and is
not now in any way associated with the Canadian Peace Congress, and does not lend its
sanction or support to the said congress.91

There was some confusion following the General Council in regard to Endicott’s status within
the Church. Officially, Endicott, despite his resignation, was still an ordained minister and a
member in good standing at Trinity United. This upset many church members who felt that
Endicott should have been de-frocked. The United Church hierarchy, however, was content to
separate itself from such an unpopular figure, organization, and idea in Canadian society.
Most importantly, the attacks on Endicott and the CPC resulted in the dismissal of
legitimate peace initiatives in Canada, including the aforementioned CPC and WPC ban-thebomb petitions. The common refrain from government, press, church, and citizens was that the
petitions were communist propaganda. And almost universally, Canadians suggested that the
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focus of each petition should be the Soviet Union, not Canada or other Western nations. One
person who held this belief was Canadian member of parliament, G.T. Fulford:
I am afraid I could not conscientiously sign this petition myself and, therefore, could hardly
ask anyone else to do so. I am in hearty agreement that the atomic bomb is one of the most
devastating weapons ever conceived…but until Soviet Russia proves to the world that she is
sincere in her propaganda for peace by allowing a committee of the U.N. to inspect and
control all atomic development not only in Russia but throughout the rest of the world, I
cannot accept a petition such as yours.92

Another who shared these sentiments was Reverend H.D. Ranns, who wrote an editorial in The
Globe and Mail castigating Endicott and the Stockholm Appeal: “I firmly believe that this
campaign was first engineered by the Kremlin and is still being promoted to serve its interests …
With the deepest regret…I say to him [i.e. Endicott]: May God ‘confound your knavish tricks
and frustrate your purposes’ unless…you belatedly see the light and start to send your petitions
to the right location, Moscow.”93 But as historians Reg Whitaker and Gary Marcuse note,
objection to the peace petitions was as much for their substance, as their apparent communist
source.94 Canadians in the postwar period defined peace as security. And security could be
achieved by the West stockpiling greater numbers of atomic bombs than the Soviet Union.
Pearson and other Canadian government officials argued that the two peace petitions favoured
Russia, whose atomic program at the time was less advanced than that of the United States.
During one speech, Pearson made the argument that Canadians should refrain from signing the
Stockholm Appeal because the petition only proposed to ban atomic bombs and not all weapons.
He soon, however, came to the real reason for why he opposed the Appeal: “The purpose of this
Communist-sponsored petition demanding the total banning of atomic weapons now is purely
and simply to eliminate the most important deterrent weapon possessed by the West at a time
when the Soviet Union and its friends and satellites have such a great superiority in other types
of military power.”95 Echoing Pearson, Canadians contested the petitions for their imagined ties
to communism because they made Canada vulnerable to attack, or so they believed.
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There was nothing sinister about either the CPC petition or the Stockholm Appeal,
despite their communist origins and widespread belief they were communist propaganda. The
target of the petitions was not the United States but all countries. The two petitions called for all
atomic bombs to be banned and that disarmament should occur under “strict international
control.” The petition’s only failings were that communists around the world, including the
Canadian communist party, the LPP, supported them.96 Many canvassers in Canada were
members of the LPP, which in turn led to a campaign of police intimidation against anyone who
attempted to obtain signatures on either petition. But, as Endicott wrote to the editor of the
Vancouver Sun in 1950, he did not view communist support as a negative: “The Stockholm
Appeal is a good thing. If Communists also support it, that is no reason why Christians should
not. There would be no hope for mankind if such an appeal would enlist the support of only one
portion of humanity.”97 Most Canadians disagreed with Endicott’s point of view and the CPC
petition and Stockholm Appeal were largely dismissed as the tools of Endicott’s communist
masters. Ultimately, both Endicott and the CPC were treated abhorrently by the country’s
government, press, and citizenry because their vision of peace both repudiated and threatened the
dominant conception adopted by most Canadians during the Cold War. Yet Endicott was often
his own worst enemy. His vision of peace and consequently, his peace activism was beset by an
ideological double standard: Endicott was unwilling or unable to criticize the policies of
communist governments. Endicott’s personal beliefs and values were too hard for the average
Canadian to ignore and contributed to the public perception of peace as communist.
Ironically, twenty years after the germ warfare controversy, Endicott was forced to resign
as national chairmen of the CPC for his anti-Soviet attitude. In January 1972 Endicott argued that
Soviet policy in regard to China was wrong. Specifically, he believed that the Soviet’s dismissal
of the Chinese Cultural Revolution was a barrier to co-existence, and thus, peace. Although his
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voice had carried for over twenty-three years, Endicott had never publically chastised the foreign
or internal policies of the Soviet Union. For the Soviet hardliners in the CPC’s national
executive, Endicott’s position was tantamount to treason and he was forced to step down: “I have
to tell Newsletter readers that I have resigned my position as Chairman of the Canadian Peace
Congress. … Today I do not think anything useful for peace and progress will be accomplished
by any campaign suggesting ‘the total infallibility of Pravda and the total depravity of the
thought of Mao Zedong,’ which is the tune in some quarters.”98 Endicott, free to speak his mind,
condemned both the CPC and the Soviet Union in the years to come. He labelled the Soviet
Union as an “expansionist superpower” that hid behind proposals for nuclear disarmament,
rather than take positive action for peace. Without a hint of irony, Endicott criticized the CPC for
its one-sided defence of the Soviet Union: “The Canadian Peace Congress continues to say that
the Soviet Union can do no wrong. They defend every Soviet move. No one is going to take
seriously their commitment to peace.”99 No longer emotionally attached to the CPC or WPC,
Endicott was able to finally extend his vision of peace to all elements in society, whether
communist or non-communist.
In the immediate postwar and early Cold War period, James Endicott was Canada’s most
prominent peace activist. He was also, at one point, arguably the country’s most loathed and
reviled man. Leslie Millen, a former Baptist missionary in China once opined that Endicott was
“the greatest traitor Canada ever produced.”100 This negative characterization was the result of a
Cold War mentality that viewed communism as an ideological and military threat to Canada and
the West’s democratic way of life. Problematically, Endicott and the CPC’s vision of peace
embraced negotiation and co-existence between communist and capitalist states: “What is the
main requirement for world peace? All who seriously ponder this question can come to but one
conclusion: that all nations must agree to settle their differences by negotiations and agree to live
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peaceably side by side no matter what the social or political systems under which they live.”101
Additionally, the CPC welcomed people from all walks of life, including card-carrying
communists.
Endicott, however, was not a communist, nor was his vision of peace. Yet the CPC’s
association with the communist-led WPC and Endicott’s subsequent peace activism confused
many Canadians. He did not romanticize Canada as a symbol of peace and goodwill, but rather
reserved that designation for Mao’s China and Stalin’s Russia. Endicott could not bring himself
to criticize or condemn communist aggression and imperialism, even if it contradicted his vision
of peace. More importantly, Endicott thoroughly repudiated and reviled the Canadian definition
of peace as security. As a result, Canadians believed Endicott to be dangerously naïve and
viewed him and the CPC as vehicles to disseminate Soviet misinformation. His commitment to
peace was sincere, but he lacked the ability to objectively scrutinize the behaviour of communist
nations.
Despite his obvious flaws, Endicott was a “militant front for peace.”102 For twenty-plus
years he actively fought to achieve his vision for a better world, in the process losing friends and
making enemies. Ultimately, Endicott, the CPC, and peace movement were dismissed by
Canadians who were unable to ignore his ideological sympathies, his controversial comments in
regard to Korea and China, plus his refutation of the West’s definition of peace. Yet Endicott and
the CPC – despite their unpopularity – were undeniably at “the vanguard of the peace
movement.”103 In the late 1940s, early 1950s they were at the forefront of the first wave of
international nuclear disarmament. Their efforts not only paved the way for the second wave of
anti-nuclear protest in the late 1950s, but also the emergence of more respectable Canadian peace
groups in the early 1960s.
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Chapter 5
The Feminist Pacifism of Ursula M. Franklin, 1952-1963
Dr. Ursula M. Franklin died on July 22, 2016. She was 94 years old. At the time of her death,
Franklin was widely considered to be one of Canada’s leading public intellectuals. The list of her
awards, distinctions, and degrees is extensive: Franklin was a companion of the Order of Canada,
a member of the Order of Ontario, and was the recipient of the Governor General’s Award. In
addition to these accolades, Franklin was bestowed with over twenty honorary doctorates, named
the University of Toronto’s first female University Professor (the institution’s highest academic
position), and had a high school in Toronto named after her in 1995.
Franklin was also one of Canada’s foremost peace activists. Her vision of peace was
clear, succinct, and positive: “Peace is not the absence of war. Peace is the absence of fear. Peace
is the presence of justice.”1 To be free from fear, Franklin argued that every Canadian, indeed,
every person in the world, should be adequately fed, clothed, and housed. Moreover, Franklin
argued that people should be free from arbitrary arrest and/or imprisonment, and have the right to
live in a world free of nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction. To ensure that
Canadians lived in a just society, Franklin advocated that all people mattered equally and should
be treated as such, but in particular, supported the promotion of women’s rights. Her work for
peace was a life-long pursuit and in 2002, Franklin received the Pearson Peace Medal for her
decades long work towards her vision of a better world.
Franklin’s journey to becoming a leading Canadian intellectual and peace activist was
long and arduous. In 1945 Franklin was released from a Nazi concentration camp, and only three
years later, on completion of her PhD in experimental physics, emigrated to Canada from
Germany not knowing a single person in her adopted country. By 1952, Franklin had become a
Quaker/pacifist and joined the Ontario Research Foundation as the head of the organization’s xray laboratories. One of the few female scientists in a male-dominated profession, Franklin
encountered constant sexism but persisted to ensure that her work contributed to her vision of a
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peaceful world. It was not until 1960, however, when Franklin joined the Voice of Women
(VOW), an all-female peace organization, that her activism and public life began to flourish.
By the late 1950s, early 1960s, the Canadian peace movement had grown dramatically,
due primarily to the growing concern many citizens had about the nuclear arms race between
East and West. Responding to the increasing popularity of the peace movement and the fear of
atmospheric nuclear tests, VOW and a number of other Canadian peace groups were formed just
before or after the turn of the decade.2 As Director of VOW’s Research Committee, Franklin was
free to put her vision of peace into action. Her two early projects for VOW - a brief presented to
the federal government on radiation fallout monitoring in Canada and a public survey that
measured the amount of strontium-90 in children’s teeth - implemented Franklin’s vision of
peace from a uniquely Quaker and feminist perspective. Franklin, as a Quaker and member of a
historic peace church, was an absolute pacifist who rejected all forms of violence, and argued
that war was never the solution to international disagreements and/or disputes. As a feminist,
Franklin’s peace activism was rooted in her daily experience as a woman. Her activism
challenged society’s institutionalized sexism and misogyny, pursued new political roles for
women, and demanded political change. Michelle Swenarchuk, a close colleague and personal
friend, notes that Franklin consistently “asked questions that [were] different than those asked by
her male colleagues, and…provided different answers using language and imagery from
women’s experience.”3 Franklin’s federal brief and tooth survey are commonly believed to have
led to the international Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which outlawed atmospheric nuclear
testing on August 5, 1963. This belief may be overstating Franklin’s influence, but her research
into radioactive fallout undoubtedly contributed to greater Canadian awareness of the dangers
nuclear testing posed to the environment, food supply, and citizens. Franklin should be
remembered as an activist whose work, influenced by the dual “maps of pacifism and

2

Two Canadian peace groups founded at this time include the Committee for the Control of Radiation
Hazards (1959), later known as the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CCND), and their
student off-shoot, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. These two groups
followed the same organizational pattern of the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, formed in the
United States in 1957, and the United Kingdom’s Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, also founded in
1957.
3
Michelle Swenarchuk, “Introduction,” in The Ursula Franklin Reader, 2.

196
feminism”4 played a leading role in the peace movement’s attempt to create an equitable and just
Canadian society in the Cold War era and beyond.
When Ursula Franklin joined VOW in the early 1960s her vision of peace was clearly defined.
Peace was the absence of fear and the presence of justice. To fully understand how Franklin
came to her definition of peace, it is necessary to explore her life prior to her association with
VOW, beginning in Germany. Franklin was born in Munich on September 16, 1921, but soon
moved with her family to Berlin. Because her mother was Jewish, Franklin was forced to leave
university and sent to a forced labour camp during the Second World War. She survived the war,
as did her parents. Many family members, however, were not so lucky and died in one of Nazi
Germany’s many infamous concentration camps. In a 1994 interview with June Callwood,
Franklin noted that her survival was a catalyst for her later peace activism: “I never felt guilt so
much as I felt obligation [for surviving the war]. … I think some of the things I feel very strongly
about — in terms of public domain, of being useful, of being concerned about things that aren’t
just in my own interest — I think these concerns come out of that basic question, how does one
conduct a responsible life.”5 Following the Second World War, Franklin went back to university
and received her doctorate from the Technical University of Berlin in 1948. During her studies
she realized that she would have to leave Germany if she wanted to realize her vision of peace:
“There was no place for people who wanted a radical, profound change that would make a
repetition of the past impossible.”6 Franklin applied for and accepted a Lady Davis Post-Doctoral
Fellowship to study at the University of Toronto, leaving Germany and her parents for Canada in
1949.
In Canada, Franklin’s vision of peace began to crystallize and take shape. This was due,
in large part, to her decision to become a Quaker in 1952. Quakers, or the Religious Society of
Friends (Friends, for short), was founded by George Fox during the English Civil War (16421651). In the seventeenth century, the Quaker vision of the world rejected the formalism of
religion and its symbols of authority, be it a minister or an encyclical. Quakers argued that within
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every person rested an Inner or Inward Light, and that this light represented the living spirit of
God in Christ. Whether someone was caring and empathetic or selfish and greedy, the same light
of God shone within them. Consequently, Quakers reasoned that it was immoral to harm or kill a
fellow human being because it meant killing God. In a declaration presented to King Charles II
in 1660, Fox stated that violence and war were unacceptable in any way, shape, or form, and that
henceforth, Quakers would practice a non-violent, pacifist way of life:
We utterly deny all outward wars and strife, and fightings [sic] with outward weapons, for
any end, or under any pretense whatever; this is our testimony to the whole world. The Spirit
of Christ by which we are guided, is not changeable … [and] will never move us to fight and
war against any man…neither for the Kingdom of Christ, nor for the kingdom of this world
… Therefore we cannot learn war any more.7

Over time, some practicing Quakers accepted alternative military service during times of war,
but the Quaker Church has never officially sanctioned any war or conflict. As a result of her
Quaker beliefs, Franklin refused to label a person or country as an enemy, nor would she
condone militaristic solutions to international problems. Franklin, however, took the Quaker
refusal to bear arms and to kill during war one step further, condemning all forms of killing at all
times: “It is possible to kill by weapons, or by despair, or by hunger. If we define it as
unacceptable to kill people, then we say no to all those means of killing.”8 But it was not enough
to simply talk about or pray for peace.
Quakers, including Franklin, believed that a person’s actions must match their faith.
Central to Quaker belief is the notion that peace is a way of life. Although there is no principal
Quaker text, Quakers live by a set of guidelines known as “Advices and Queries.” These
guidelines emphasize the values of simplicity, understanding, sympathy, and patience. The most
important Quaker principle is to live life in the service of God and community: “Remember your
responsibility as citizens for the government of your town and country … Do not be content to
accept things as they are, but keep an alert and questioning mind. Seek to discover the causes of
7
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social unrest, injustice and fear … Work for an order of society which will allow men and
women to develop their capacities and will foster their desire to serve.”9 Quakers argued that the
Kingdom of God on earth was impossible without living a sacrificial life to achieve it.
Franklin stressed the concept of discernment to ensure that her life matched her Quaker
faith. She encouraged herself and other people to assess what was happening locally, nationally,
and internationally. Franklin urged people to live by the Quaker axioms “be present where you
are” and to “act your principles,” but also to question the reality that governments and the press
conveyed to the public.10 Because the context in which people live is not static but constantly
evolving, Franklin argued that a person’s actions must change to suit their environment, or
rather, the here and now. Throughout her life, Franklin remained committed to opposing the
causes of war (for example, greed and fear), and to fighting for social justice, equality, and
reform. Franklin thus believed that Quakerism/pacifism provided a map to her vision of peace,
but she was equally convinced that feminism did as well.
For much of Franklin’s life, she argued that the Quaker faith and feminist thought were
intrinsically linked, and insisted that feminism was critical to achieving peace: “The essence of
feminism and the women’s experience is that (it) integrates diversity, enhances co-operation, and
respects differences.”11 Franklin believed that society’s dominant patriarchal structures were
responsible for the world’s conflicts and problems. Women had unique patterns of relating to
people that were less competitive than men and Franklin reasoned that women were also more
open-minded than men, which made the acquisition of peace more likely. Franklin argued that
women, historically, had been left “outside the [public and political] decision-making process.”12
Women were expected to fulfill pre-determined gender roles and were given few chances to
officially express their opposition to war. To rectify this imbalance, Franklin emphasized gender
equality at all levels of society, both in the private and public spheres. Consequently, the
intersection of pacifism and feminism guided Franklin’s activism for the remainder of her life.
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Prior to joining VOW, the best example of Franklin’s pacifist and feminist beliefs in
action was her work for the Ontario Research Foundation. Franklin’s three years studying at the
University of Toronto on a Lady Davis Fellowship were an unqualified success and she was
quickly hired by the Research Foundation. From 1952 to 1967, Franklin worked at the
organization as a senior scientist, while also lecturing part time at the University. Franklin
encountered two particular problems with her male colleagues at the Research Foundation. First,
she was one of the few women at the time who worked in the fields of science and technology.
Franklin argued that she and other women had the ability to make significant contributions to
science. But in spite of her exceptional qualifications, she was not treated as an equal by her
male peers. This was not a new phenomenon, as for much of her life, Franklin as a woman, or as
a Jewish person in Nazi Germany, experienced first-hand the belief that some people mattered
more than others. Second, Franklin, following her Quaker faith, believed that scientific
knowledge must be applied for the greater good. Historian Mark Mazower notes that prior to the
Second World War, “science…provided an immensely popular vehicle for articulating
internationalist visions of the unification of mankind.”13 Franklin also believed in the power of
scientific internationalism and refused to use her work to further what she described as the
“threat system” employed by governments – both East and West – to instill fear in their so-called
enemies. Fear, she argued consistently, could never lead to peace. Many of Franklin’s male
colleagues at the Foundation, however, were content to use their scientific knowledge to further
nationalist and militaristic interests: “Belonging to a clan — I’m just not a good type for that. …
[T]hey have to put up with somebody who doesn’t do military research in a faculty where
everybody runs after military research. … The fact that I was different was for me a given and
not a horrible revelation.”14 In a few short years working at the Research Foundation, Franklin
became convinced that peace was only possible if people rejected all forms of war, devoted their
lives to equality and justice, and began to see the world through a feminist lens. And under the
umbrella of VOW, Franklin could begin to realize her vision of peace on a much grander scale.
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The Voice of Women was founded on July 28, 1960. Its formation was the result of a series of
articles written by Lotta Dempsey for the Toronto Daily Star. On May 1, 1960, the Soviet Union
shot down a CIA spy plane and captured its American pilot, Gary Francis Powers. Two weeks
later, Dwight D. Eisenhower, President of the United States and Nikita Khrushchev, leader of the
Soviet Union met in Paris for a series of summit meetings between the two nations. The spy
plane incident, however, caused the meetings to collapse after only one day, and destroyed any
hope for peaceful co-existence between the two countries in the near future. Dempsey, like many
Canadians, found the state of affairs between the United States and Soviet Union distressing and
called on all women to join together to stop the terror of the nuclear arms race. In late May,
Dempsey met with four women: Jo Davis, Helen Tucker, Dorothy Henderson, and Beth Touzel.
Together, the five women formed the Women’s Committee for Peace, which became VOW that
July. In her newspaper column, Dempsey announced the establishment of the new, all-women’s
peace group. She outlined VOW’s desire to organize Canadian women in the fight for peace and
explained the rationale behind the group’s creation, in particular, VOW’s wish to combine
women’s traditional, maternal role with a public, political one as well: “Women want
disarmament without fear. They want it badly enough to march, picket, spend hours on the
telephone after they have done housework and looked after children; to meet in neighbourhood
groups, write letters around the world and make door-to-door or country-to-country canvasses.”15
VOW’s message struck a nerve with Canadian women. By late 1960 there were over 10,000
members and within a year, VOW had established branches in every Canadian province and
launched sister organizations in a number of countries, including the United States, Australia,
New Zealand, Sri Lanka, India, and Japan.
VOW was one of several Canadian peace groups to emerge in the late 1950s and early
1960s. Alongside the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and Combined Universities
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, VOW was part of a growing international anti-nuclear
peace movement. VOW, however, was not the first all-female peace organization in Canada “to
stir the imagination and conscience of women to significant action.”16 Since the late nineteenth
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century, Canadian women had been involved in the peace movement; for example, the WCTU
and Canadian National Council of Women were active at the turn of the century protesting the
Boer War (1899-1902). In 1915 American suffragette and peace activist Jane Addams formed
the Women’s Peace Party (WPP). By 1919 the WPP had become the Women’s International
League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), dedicated to furthering “peace, internationalism, and
the freedom of women.”17 For almost five decades the Canadian branch of WILPF had opposed
war and struggled for gender equality in Canada and worldwide. At the start of the Cold War,
only WILPF’s Vancouver branch remained strong and active. Into this gap within the peace
movement stepped VOW.
VOW’s motto – “Construction, not destruction”18 – spoke to Ursula Franklin’s pacifist
and feminist sensibilities, and matched her vision of peace. During an interview with journalist
June Callwood, Franklin argued that VOW’s founding in 1960 was akin to kismet. “The VOW,”
Franklin stated, “came into my life at the absolutely perfect moment to keep me from just being
one of the boys and doing what everyone else did. It gave me an opportunity to put my
knowledge into a broader context, and I have always had an enormous feeling of gratitude and
debt for VOW.”19 Franklin was attracted in particular to the group’s platform for peace, which
rested on six key principles:
1. To unite women in concern for the future of the world;
2. To help promote the mutual respect and cooperation among nations necessary for peaceful
negotiation between world powers having different ideological assumptions;
3. To cooperate with other groups of similar purposes and programs;
4. To protest against war or threat of war, as the decisive method of exercising power;
5. To appeal to all national leaders to cooperate in developing methods of negotiations on
matters affecting their national security and the peace of the world, to appeal to all national
leaders to cooperate in the alleviation of the causes of war by common action for the
economic and social betterment of mankind;
6. To provide a means for women to exercise responsibility for the family of mankind.20
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First, VOW addressed Franklin’s pacifist position. The platform stressed non-violence, respect
for the Other, co-operation, and communication as the best means to solve and/or prevent
conflict. Second, VOW’s program also aligned with Franklin’s feminist thought. The
organization and its core principles emphasized a sense of fellowship among women and argued
that it would utilize their skills to give them a voice in the political process.
Franklin, a young mother of two children, was also attracted to VOW’s platform because
it appealed directly to her and other women’s sense of maternalism. The first leaders of VOW,
such as Helen Tucker, argued that women shared universal characteristics and interests, namely
the ability to care and nurture for children and family that were critical to creating a culture of
peace:
It is a fact of nature that the female of the species is the giver of life and instinctively
endowed with concern for the preservation of life, at least of the young and helpless. All
women share this concern for the family, the basic unit of society, regardless of the complex
structures of politics and economics … Her tools are maternal urges to feed, to protect and to
love. Her feminine contributions to life…are love rather than hate, gentleness rather than
might and cooperation rather than conflict.21

To great effect, VOW used the concept of maternalism as a tool to recruit members, attracting a
large swath of middle-class mothers and grandmothers to their cause. The group was not,
however, the first peace organization to use maternalism to attract members. Historian Akira
Iriye notes that motherhood had long dominated the “language of women’s peace movements.”22
Addams, in the formation of WILPF, had stressed a maternal feminist internationalism as critical
to achieving peace. Scholar Harriet Hyman Alonso writes that Addams recognized “that her
greatest political tool for organizing large masses of women was to appeal for the well-being of
their children.”23 By highlighting traditional gender roles, VOW made their pursuit of peace less
threatening than other Cold War organizations such as Endicott’s Canadian Peace Congress.24
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Indeed, at its outset, VOW was viewed by the Canadian public as an upright, reputable peace
group.
Franklin was convinced that VOW shared her belief that women could make a
significant contribution to peace in Canada and the world. It was not long before she accepted a
leadership position in the fledgling organization. In 1962 Franklin became director of VOW’s
Research Committee, and therefore, part of the organization’s national executive. For much of
her career, Franklin was concerned about the role scientists played in contemporary society,
particularly in regard to how they used their knowledge for peaceful or militaristic purposes.
Franklin’s dual passions of science and peace led to her interest in the new field of peace
research: the idea and concept that peace could be attained through scientific study. True to her
Quaker faith, Franklin was just as interested in the practice as she was in the process, eager to
translate “whatever results peace research would provide, into effective peace action.”25 Utilizing
peace research, Franklin hoped to develop new, more peaceful systems of living and governing,
and believed her position with VOW was the perfect vehicle for her budding activism.
Franklin’s first project on behalf of VOW was the preparation and presentation of a brief
to the federal government on nuclear/radioactive fallout monitoring in Canada. In the early
1960s, it had become clear that nuclear fallout was a major problem, not just in Canada, but
globally. Constant nuclear testing by the United States, Soviet Union, and other countries had led
to the release of hundreds of different types of radioactive substances into the atmosphere, which
subsequently fell to earth and polluted the environment. Long-lasting fission products such
strontium-90, caesium-137, and iodine-131 were being found with greater frequency in the water
people drank and the food they ate. Scientists agreed that this was a serious issue: “Relevant
medical fact seems to be that leading biologists now agree there is no threshold of radioactivity
below which the individual escapes scot-free. Any radiation at all does some damage to the
living organism.”26 It was never Franklin’s intention to study nuclear fallout. But at the behest of
her fellow VOW members, combined with the organization’s maternal feminist mandate,
does. … Vote for what is right. Vote for life.” [Advertisement - “One Issue Towers Above All Others
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Franklin began to study the consequences of fallout, particularly, in children: “We, as mothers,
do not wish to gamble the future health of our children because of present ignorance or lack of
concern. Without the data on fallout in food and environment — and their thorough discussion
— it is not possible to provide the protection that can be given to the most sensitive parts of the
population. As mothers, we feel that we have the right to be…overcautious.”27 Although many
members expressed a scientific curiosity about fallout, most demanded action because as
mothers, like Franklin, they feared for the future of their children. Thus began Franklin’s initial
foray into peace research.
The first step towards Franklin’s federal brief was to contact VOW president, Therese
Casgrain in October 1962. Her letter to Casgrain expressed the belief that VOW owed its
members a statement in regard to the ever-increasing levels of fallout in the world. Franklin’s
letter also proposed that she begin background research into the problem, looking specifically at
how Canada monitored fallout in comparison to the United States, the United Kingdom, and
West Germany. With Casgrain’s approval, Franklin quickly got to work on a survey of problems
associated with radioactive fallout.
Two short months later, Franklin addressed VOW’s Board of Directors and Provincial
Chairwomen with her initial findings. She began her speech by stating the obvious: the only
solution to fallout was the complete ban on nuclear testing. She reminded her audience, however,
that even if this were to happen, the constant testing of weapons during the previous years still
posed a serious health problem to the environment. According to Barbara Moon’s article in
Maclean’s Magazine, “What we can do about fallout,” and for which Franklin provided the data,
in 1962 alone the United States and Soviet Union combined to detonate nuclear weapons “equal
to all previous megatonnage since 1945.”28 It did not matter if a treaty to ban nuclear testing was
signed because the damage had already been done. Franklin then outlined how she obtained the
information for her study. As an employee of the Ontario Research Foundation, Franklin had
access to a wealth of information. She also had many contacts in the Ontario provincial
Department of Health, whose laboratories she could visit and were willing to answer her
questions. Franklin even spoke to Ontario’s Deputy Minister of Health on the problems of
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fallout. In the span of eight weeks, she had collected an enormous amount of data from Canada
and abroad. And Franklin’s findings were disturbing.
Franklin reported, much to her audience’s horror, that Canada received more radioactive
fallout than most other countries due to its northern locale. Canada, Franklin argued, was derelict
in its duties, failing to measure or survey fallout in any demonstrable fashion: “Considering the
general levels of contamination and the increasing spread of radioactive material throughout the
whole food chain, the number and types of measurements that are carried out by the Federal
Government are completely inadequate.”29 The only agency in Canada to carry out fallout
measurements was the Radiation Protection Division in the government’s Department of
National Health and Welfare. The Radiation Protection Division, however, did not check
Canada’s water supply or foodstuffs for radioactive elements, nor did it complete more than a
cursory review of the country’s milk. In comparison, the United States Federal Radiation
Council checked the nation’s water, milk, and published a radiation protection guide for U.S.
citizens. The United Kingdom was similarly thorough in its surveillance of radioactive materials.
Under these circumstances, Franklin suggested to the Board that VOW present to the federal
government a brief that outlined its fallout monitoring inadequacies and demand to know why
Canada lagged behind its neighbours in protecting the health of its citizens.
On June 24, 1963, Franklin along with new VOW president Kay Macpherson and other
supporters, travelled to Ottawa to present their brief on fallout monitoring in Canada to members
of parliament, including Minister of National Health and Welfare, Judy LaMarsh. The brief,
prepared by Franklin, was a thorough document that examined Canada’s fallout monitoring
system, particularly in comparison to other countries, and assessed the public health hazards
posed by fallout to the environment. It was a damning assessment of the Canadian government
and its apparent lack of concern about radioactive contamination: “We hold strongly that THE
DATA AVAILABLE THROUGH THE PRESENT CANADIAN MONITORING SYSTEM
ARE INADEQUATE AND COULD NOT SERVE AS THE BASIS OF ANY RATIONAL
ASSESSMENT OF THE HEALTH HAZARDS FOR THE CANADIAN POPULATION.”30
29
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Franklin’s brief was not simply a critique of the government and its fallout monitoring
system, but importantly also included five principal recommendations. The brief’s most
significant recommendation was to create a fallout hazards advisory body: “We urge the
Government to establish an independent advisory body on fallout problems, responsible to
Parliament to advise on the assessment of radiation hazards on the institution of countermeasures.”31 It was critical to Franklin that the government be held to account. The
implementation of an independent body would not allow the government to simply dismiss the
matter of fallout in the future. Another important recommendation was the establishment of an
effective public information bureau on radiation: “The regular and speedy publication of fallout
information, which should contain not only experimental data but sufficient interpretation to be
meaningful to the concerned citizen.”32 Unlike the United States or United Kingdom, the
Canadian public were, figuratively, left in the dark in regard to fallout. They had little to no
access to government information. Most people, Franklin reasoned could not answer the simple
question: who was responsible for ensuring that levels of radiation in Canada did not exceed
acceptable levels? Franklin’s brief argued that the lack of information hindered public debate and
created an atmosphere of stress and anxiety: “Panic and fear are essentially the fruit of ignorance
and misinformation. Withholding information from public discussion does not reduce the danger
of panic; it increases it.”33 Concerned with reducing the fear that surrounded nuclear weapons
and energy, Franklin was adamant that the government make its nuclear fallout information
public. Other recommendations in the brief included the extension of the government monitoring
system to include water and other foodstuffs, the delegation of some fallout monitoring to the
provinces, and the installation of milk decontamination equipment in dairy farms.
The brief did not achieve the results Franklin and VOW had anticipated; rather, they and
the document faced resistance and hostility. In the months following the presentation of the brief,
VOW and Franklin received a great deal of criticism. Many of the comments were sexist,
claiming that Franklin’s expertise, as a female scientist who worked with x-rays and thus,
radiation, was inferior to that of her male colleagues. One such example is a letter from C.K. Bell
31
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(head of the dairy section, Canadian Department of Agriculture) to E.T. Bell, national secretary
for VOW. C.K. Bell condescendingly explained that Franklin’s brief, at best, was amateurish: “I
have read the brief with interest, but I cannot escape the feeling that she failed to gain a proper
perspective concerning the hazards of fallout. I am much more impressed by the array of facts
marshalled by Dr. Gordon M. Dunning in the brochure ‘Foods and Fallout’, copy of which I
enclose.”34 He then commented that the Canadian scientists studying fallout were mothers and
fathers too, and that surely if fallout were dangerous they would do something about it. Bell’s
letter highlights the institutionalized misogyny that Franklin’s peace activism struggled to
overcome. While Bell defended the infallibility of the Canadian scientific community, which was
primarily made up of men, Franklin argued that the secrecy surrounding the effects of nuclear
weapons must be unmasked, and that scientists must be held accountable for their work. Yet in
preparing her brief, Franklin was prepared for such sexism. In her initial letter to Therese
Casgrain, in which she proposed the study on nuclear fallout, Franklin stated her desire to get the
facts right and to be taken seriously: “I am very anxious to get all the facts straight and
watertight, because we should not look like a bunch of hysteric females, getting worked up over
newspaper reports. I can handle the radiation data all right but I am very short of unbiased
medical advice.”35 Despite Franklin’s efforts to ensure the brief’s scholarly nature, it was still
dismissed as lacking credibility.
The brief, and Franklin’s fiercest critic, were not her male colleagues in Canada’s
scientific community, but the federal minister responsible for measuring fallout in Canada.
Although in attendance when Franklin and VOW presented their brief on radioactive fallout,
Minister of National Health and Welfare, Judy LaMarsh, downplayed their concerns, and even
obstructed their efforts for positive change. LaMarsh consistently resisted every attempt by
Franklin for a follow-up meeting citing her busy work schedule. When Franklin wrote member
of parliament, Colin Cameron, to intervene on her behalf, she must have been shocked by his
reply:
I have tried to elicit from Judy LaMarsh answers as to whether or not she has read your brief
… and received from her a very blunt ‘no.’ Later I encountered her…and tackled her again
pointing out that this is a very serious matter … To my astonishment she told me that not
34
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only had she not read your brief but that she had no intention of doing so. Her refusal seemed
to be based on some personal antagonism towards you.36

Correspondence between LaMarsh and other VOW members reveals that the Minister was angry
with Franklin and VOW for questioning the government’s and her competency in regard to
matters of nuclear fallout.37 Franklin eventually obtained a second meeting with LaMarsh, whom
she described “as warm and friendly as a hippopotamus on ice and just about as informed on
radiation matters.”38 LaMarsh, however, as a sop to Franklin, promised to put the VOW brief on
the agenda of the next Dominion Council of Health meeting.
In public LaMarsh was just as obstructive as she was privately. Less than a month after
her cursory meeting with Franklin, the Minister downplayed the VOW brief at the Founder’s
Day Luncheon of the Local Council of Women of Toronto. Before a captive audience, LaMarsh
argued that the brief was inflammatory, dramatic, and promised that she and the government
would never put the lives of Canadians at risk. To further reassure the women present, LaMarsh
categorically stated: “I should now like to strongly iterate that at the present time there is no
justification or need for taking special steps to try to reduce the intake of radioactive fallout
through the foods which we eat.”39 The Local Council of Women may have been assuaged by
the Minister’s remarks, but Franklin certainly was not. Nuclear fallout, Franklin believed, posed
a health risk to every Canadian and she would not stop until the government took tangible steps
to rectify the problem.

36

Letter – Colin Cameron to Dr. Ursula Franklin, July 31, 1963, Franklin fonds 2, Box –
Correspondence, n.d., 1959-1981, file – “Correspondence, 1963-1964.”
37
The extent of LaMarsh’s grudge against Franklin can be seen in a letter the minister sent to Diane
Campbell, a member of VOW. Campbell had originally written to LaMarsh concerned that the
government was not doing enough to stem radioactive fallout in Canada. LaMarsh’s response to
Campbell was as a direct slight to Franklin, to whom the Minister did not extend the same courtesy:
“Because of your interest in these matters I am arranging to have your name placed on the mailing list for
copies of the regular monthly report containing radioactive fallout data.” [Letter – “Judy LaMarsh to
Diane Campbell, August 2, 1963, Franklin fonds 1, Box 41, file 9 – “Correspondence around fallout
monitoring, 1962-1964] At no point did the Minister ever offer Franklin access to the same material.
38
Letter – Ursula Franklin to Colin Cameron, October 15, 1963, Franklin fonds 2, Box –
Correspondence, n.d., 1959-1981, file – “Correspondence, 1963-1964.”
39
Speech – “Speech Prepared for Delivery by the Honourable Judy LaMarsh, Minister of National Health
and Welfare to the Founder’s Day Luncheon of the Local Council of Women of Toronto, Thursday,
November 7, 1963, 1:00 pm, Toronto, Ontario,” Franklin fonds 1, Box 42, file 6 – “VOW early council
politics and action on fallout [primary correspondence], 1963.”

209
On November 9, 1963, two days after LaMarsh’s speech in Toronto and much to
Franklin’s surprise, the Minister established the Advisory Committee on Radiation Problems –
fulfilling the first recommendation of the brief. The new Advisory Committee was to be
independent, just as Franklin wished, composed of government and non-government industry
experts. LaMarsh’s announcement soon rang hollow, as the government dragged its feet, more
interested in good publicity than implementing any actual reform. More than a month later,
Franklin, understandably upset, wrote to member of parliament P.B. Rynard to ask for an update
on the status of the proposed Committee: “We have enquired from the Minister…but did not
receive any answer. None of the competent scientists that I know presently and who could be
asked to serve on this committee…have yet been asked. I begin to wonder whether there will be
any truly representative advisory committee.”40 There would, however, be no news in the future
and Franklin remained disappointed. Later, when Franklin and the Canadian Medical Journal
asked permission to print the monthly fallout releases from Ottawa, they were refused. LaMarsh
clearly did not feel that Canada had a fallout problem and in spite of her promise, believed that
the Radiation Protection Division in her department was meeting its mandate.
Franklin was determined to use her knowledge on fallout, as historian Lawrence Wittner
writes, to “promote an [international] interchange of information and ideas,”41 even if the
government was unwilling to do so. Integral to Franklin’s feminism and activism was the notion
of collaboration between women. Franklin argued that progress towards peace could only happen
if women supported one another in a patriarchal world. Within VOW, Franklin found a
community of like-minded women who empowered one another to work for peace, despite its
unpopularity among certain sectors of Canadian society. When approached by other women
working on the problem of radioactive fallout, Franklin was eager to help in any way she could.
In 1963 she spent a day with Diane Wright, the president of the Saskatchewan branch of VOW.
Wright hoped to present the Saskatchewan provincial government with a brief similar to the one
written by Franklin, who shared with Wright her research notes and any other information she
thought was relevant. On another occasion, Franklin wrote to J.S. Dawson, a member of VOW in
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New Zealand. Dawson planned on writing a report outlining the dangers that fallout from French
nuclear tests in the Pacific Ocean posed to her country. Franklin again offered to help her fellow
peace activist: “You have all our sympathy and whatever support we can give you. Please keep
on protesting and educating the public as much as you possibly can, and let us know what
information we can supply to you, within the limits of our abilities.”42 Franklin consistently
aided any and all women who requested her advice, or sought her support, and treated them as
her extended family.
Franklin’s brief to the government was the first step in her evolution to becoming a
leading, public Canadian peace activist. It is an ideal example of Franklin’s Quaker mantra: “If
you want peace, work for justice.”43 But her activism and the subsequent obstructions to her brief
reveal a deeper significance. LaMarsh’s actions highlight the government’s unwillingness to fix
a broken fallout structure. Unwilling to act transparently or provide its citizens with information
in regard to levels of nuclear fallout in Canada, the government preferred to appear “right” in
public, rather than admit it was derelict in its duties and to build a new system that embraced the
values of justice and peace.
At the same time Franklin was busy preparing her brief to the federal government, she
was contacted by Ethel Kesler of Montreal. In 1959, Kesler and other women who belonged to
the Quebec Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, began collecting children’s teeth for test
purposes. By 1963 they had sent approximately 6500 teeth to Dr. A.M. Hunt at the University of
Toronto. Hunt was using the teeth to study the amount of strontium-90 in the environment, a
radioactive element released into the atmosphere by nuclear weapons testing. The catalyst for
both Kesler’s activism and Hunt’s study was a 1958 report that stated strontium-90 had been
found in both Manitoba and Quebec’s milk supply. Despite Kesler’s success in securing teeth for
the study, Hunt needed more, so Kesler wrote to Franklin and VOW for help. Franklin,
immersed in her research into nuclear fallout, was happy to assist Kesler. She met with Dr. Hunt
and after a short meeting it was decided that VOW, under her supervision, would embark on a
national campaign to collect “baby teeth for peace.”44
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Prior to Franklin and VOW’s involvement in the campaign, Kesler’s collection of
children’s teeth had been restricted to soliciting dentists in Montreal. With Franklin’s support
and the backing of VOW’s provincial branches, teeth would now be collected in Vancouver,
Calgary, Winnipeg, London, Hamilton, Toronto, Montreal, and the Maritimes. Moreover,
brochures were sent to boards of education, dentist offices, and libraries outlining the new
program and requesting teeth. The brochure asked that each tooth donated be accompanied by a
form that indicated the location, age, and summarized the dietary history of the child in question.
Hunt was particularly interested to know if the child was bottle-fed, breastfed for less than three
months, or breastfed for more than three months. To entice a child to donate their tooth for
research, rather than save it for the tooth fairy, VOW gave each child a button “to wear showing
his or her contribution to science.”45 Subsequently, many children wore their VOW button as a
badge of honour in the schoolyard. Indeed, the baby tooth survey proved to be a hit with both
children and their mothers. During the summer of 1963 over 1,200 teeth were collected, a
number boosted by the presence of a VOW booth at the Canadian National Exhibition, where
children deposited their teeth in a special barrel. Within one year of printing their brochure,
Franklin and VOW had sent Hunt approximately 12,000 teeth. Why were Franklin and other
mothers so concerned about the presence of strontium-90 in the environment that they were
willing to donate thousands of children’s teeth to science?
Prior to the Cold War and the regular testing of nuclear weapons, strontium-90, a longliving radioactive substance, could only be found in trace amounts on earth. Yet as nations
conducted more nuclear tests, strontium-90 was found with ever-increasing frequency in the
ground, foliage, and as a result, in animals and other foodstuffs. Scientists were concerned that
people whose diet consisted primarily of meat and milk, especially from cows that had elevated
levels of strontium-90, would be particularly susceptible to fallout and its negative effects. This
was because strontium-90 acted like calcium when taken into the body with food, absorbed by
both bones and teeth: “Radio strontium is readily absorbed from the gastronomical tract and is
deposited in the bones where it is retained for several years. It is a source of beta radiation which
damages the surrounding bone cells and bone marrow, causing bone tumours and malignant bone
marrow changes. Strontium readily passes across the placental barrier and is also secreted in the
45
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milk.”46 That a mother’s breast milk may or may not have acted as a reservoir for strontium-90
was especially worrisome for scientists because young children were markedly more vulnerable
to nuclear fallout. While researching her brief, Franklin read medical articles that indicated
children, especially those under three years of age, were almost ten times more likely at risk from
internal radiation than adults: “Although the biological consequences of ionizing radiation are
still a subject of much uncertainty and speculation, it has been shown that children are more
sensitive to radiation than adults, as evidence by the fact that cancer of the thyroid gland can be
produced in children by a few hundred rads, a dose insufficient to produce malignant changes in
the adult.”47 Consequently, it was believed by Franklin and other women that strontium-90 posed
a very real problem to children, and in particular, to infants who were being breast fed. Thus, to
be on the safe side, and even before Hunt’s study was concluded, Franklin recommended that all
women use powdered milk to feed their children.
It was not until 1965 that Hunt published the results of the baby tooth survey. Hunt’s
report, prepared for the National Research Council, thanked VOW and Franklin personally for
their hard work in collecting almost 30,000 teeth to be tested for strontium-90. The report
showed that fallout levels were highest in Western Canada and lowest in Central Canada, in
particular, Toronto and Hamilton. Nevertheless, Hunt concluded that strontium-90 posed no
discernible danger to either Canadian adults or children: “The children’s teeth serves as a good
record of past fallout experience in the various cities. … I am happy to report that none of the
samples show activities that could be considered to be dangerous. In fact, there is a very wide
margin of safety.”48 Although Franklin appreciated Hunt’s efforts, she believed his methods were
flawed and the results of the study misleading. “Dr. Hunt made his survey when the fallout and
Strontium 90 count were low,” Franklin stated to the press. “To get an accurate correlation, there
should be a second study done on children born in 1961-1962.”49 Hunt indicated in his report
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that he would continue to collect and measure children’s teeth for strontium-90 throughout 1966,
but there are no records to suggest that he ever followed through with this promise.
In spite of the support Franklin and VOW received from mothers, the baby tooth survey
was negatively received by the Canadian government and by other so-called experts. Judy
LaMarsh, not surprisingly, was a vocal critic of the VOW campaign. In 1963 the Minister
argued: “A box full of teeth, with no idea where they came from, isn’t much help.”50 LaMarsh
had not taken the time to understand how VOW collected the children’s teeth and sorted them
according to Hunt’s instructions, though she could have simply read the organization’s brochure
to ensure a basic level of competence. LaMarsh, however, rejected any notion that increased
levels of strontium-90 in the Canadian environment were cause for concern. Nor did Dr. D.M.
Irvine, head of Dairy Science at the Ontario Agricultural College, see any reason to panic. Irvine
believed that the elevated levels of strontium-90 in milk were entirely acceptable, and as a result,
labelled the VOW baby tooth survey as frivolous, useless, and the concern of emotional women.
Both LaMarsh and Irvine would later be proved correct by Hunt’s report, despite Franklin’s
unwillingness to accept Hunt’s conclusions. Their criticism in 1963 was not based on any factual
information or data, but on a petty personal grudge and a sexist, narrow-mindedness.
Franklin and VOW’s baby tooth survey, like their federal brief, highlighted how the
political system, meant to protect Canadians, was in fact broken. During an interview in 2002,
Franklin observed how she became disillusioned with the Canadian government in 1963: “I
learned much too late, too slowly, something I hadn’t understood at the beginning. … I realized
that it was not us who were wrong. It was them who were wrong. Until I realized that their
system was dysfunctional. It doesn’t work. It has never worked and that it was time to stop the
nonsense and start to do something constructive.”51 Despite her anger, Franklin’s initial forays
into peace research were not entirely fruitless. Her brief to the federal government and baby
tooth survey demonstrated a significant link between peace, science, and the women’s
community in Canada. VOW’s peace initiatives, but specifically Franklin’s peace research
projects, allowed the group’s members to become better informed and educated about the
relationship between peace and science. As a result, these women firmly believed that their
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unique experiences and knowledge made it their responsibility to fight for peace. VOW’s
members were no longer willing to sacrifice the health of their children so that the men in
government could “play [their] war games and test their toys.”52 Franklin’s twin fallout projects,
moreover, cemented her belief that a just and equal society must be actively pursued. In the
future, Franklin would write several other federal briefs. One brief urged the discontinuation of
Canadian research into biological and chemical warfare, another advocated the termination of
Canadian manufacturing of American military equipment, and the third pressured the
government to reduce Canadian nuclear-power production. In the end, however, opposition to
Franklin’s vision of peace was not based solely on scientific or sexist reasons, but ideology.
The first time Franklin encountered ideological backlash to her vision of peace was within
VOW. On November 1, 1962, a VOW “peace train” led by Therese Casgrain (but not including
Franklin), travelled from Montreal to Ottawa to present a brief that unanimously stated the
organization’s disapproval of nuclear weapons and any attempt on the part of the Canadian
government to acquire them. The document’s language was uncompromising, as were the 300
women who presented it. Historian Candace Loewen notes that the VOW brief marked a new
organizational strategy of “staging ‘media events’ designed to influence public opinion.”53
Members of parliament, however, were somewhat startled by the brief’s tone and were unsure
what to make of the feminist, rather than simply feminine VOW members protesting on
Parliament Hill. Subsequently, MP’s contacted Jo Davis, one of the organization’s co-founders,
to protest their treatment by VOW.
Davis took particular exception to the “radical” political nature of the brief and the VOW
women who attended the rally in Ottawa. Without first consulting VOW’s national executive,
Davis wrote a provocative letter to every member of the peace group, calling for moderation and
collaboration with the government:
There are many people in this country who are concerned about the dangers of the world
today, but who wouldn’t dream of joining something they construe to be a ‘ban-the-bomb’
52
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organization. … [A]t the end of those first two years perhaps our greatest success of all was
this. We were the only peace movement I know of in the Western world that worked with the
active support, co-operation and advice of our political leaders.54

Davis continued her letter. She asked in mock disbelief if VOW members wanted to be part of “a
hard-hitting, ban-the-bomb movement, with the emphasis on protest, with our main energies
concentrated on issues such as no nuclear arms, civil defence and so on?”55 Her negative
characterization of ban-the-bomb peace groups was reminiscent of how the government, and
Canadian society as a whole, had dismissed Endicott, the CPC, and other earlier peace activists
as communist to delegitimize efforts that challenged the dominant Cold War conception of
peace. Davis, to end her letter, proposed a referendum in which she asked each member to reply
to the following three questions with a simple yes or no answer:
1. Do you believe that V.O.W.’s main emphasis should be to promote a climate of
international understanding, conducive to universal disarmament, through national and
international programs such as Peace Research, International Co-operation Year, Freedom
from Hunger Campaign, Overseas Volunteers, greater contact between women
internationally through correspondence, travel missions, etc.?
2. Do you believe that V.O.W.’s main emphasis should be in promoting discussion of and
support for more specific political objectives such as ‘no nuclear arms for Canada’, no civil
defence, no weapons testing, recognition of Red China, etc.?
3. Do you believe that V.O.W. will achieve greater success in the future and attract more
members by adopting a more militant posture, and staging public demonstrations, protest
marches and so on?56

As head of VOW’s Research Committee, Franklin, along with Davis, was given the unenviable
task of tabulating the various responses to the questionnaire.
There were, of course, quite a few members of VOW who agreed with Davis’ moderate
approach. J.J. Quirt of Stratford, Ontario, was one such member: “Thank you so much for doing
this — I hope you may rescue VOW from its recent trend. I have been growing increasingly
uneasy about being identified with it.”57 Another letter in support of Davis came from R.H.F.
Sutherland, whose wife was a member of VOW. Without his wife’s knowledge, Sutherland read
and replied to Davis’ letter: “I haven’t really paid much attention to VOW in the past. Your letter
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made me feel rather ashamed of that. … I sincerely hope that your conception of the role of
VOW will prevail.”58 There is no record of how Sutherland’s wife responded to the
questionnaire. Interestingly, Davis included this particular response in her tabulations, despite the
fact Sutherland, a man, could not be a member of VOW, and consequently, was unable to vote in
the upcoming referendum. Davis’ decision to include his reply was the result of many VOW
members, including Franklin, who disagreed with her point of view.
As a member of VOW’s national executive (and responsible for tallying the results of the
questionnaire), Franklin simply expressed her support for Therese Casgrain, aware that her
comments could be construed as prejudicing other members. At a meeting of the VOW Board in
December 1962, Franklin made a short, definitive statement on the Davis letter: “I would like to
express personally and strongly my confidence in Madame Casgrain and…[her] ability to guide
and execute the policies of Voice of Women.”59 Privately, Franklin was much more vocal,
willing to discuss why she strongly opposed Davis.
Members of VOW as a whole refuted Davis’ moderate approach for three distinct
reasons. First, many women disagreed with Davis’ unilateral decision to write a letter to the
entire VOW membership. Members were upset at Davis’ abuse of power, accessing the national
mailing list without permission, and forcing her outlook on other members unsolicited. One
VOW member in her reply to Davis, wrote: “I resent a private individual using the membership
list of National Organization, which the members respect, to influence the thinking of those
members. I consider it an act of bad faith.”60 Other members, in particular those who belonged to
VOW’s Toronto branch where Davis lived, pointed out that she had not been to an organizational
meeting, locally, provincially, or nationally, in over a year. If Davis was truly upset with VOW’s
direction, they argued, she would have been given a voice at any one of these gatherings to
express her opinions. Second, VOW members believed that the organization must take a firm
stand against nuclear weapons, even if it meant protesting the government. In her reply to the
questionnaire, Carol J. Jack argued: “For the VOW to sidestep the matter of nuclear
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arms…would be, in my opinion, a gross denial of responsibility.”61 In regard to peace, Ms. Jack
and other members were unwilling to sit on the fence, as Davis seemingly wished them too.
There was, however, one reason, more than any other, given in opposition to the Davis
ultimatum. Many VOW members were infuriated by the narrow black and white approach to
peace outlined in Davis’ questionnaire. In a letter to Davis, Manitoba president of VOW,
Rosamund Truelove, declared that VOW should not advocate only one type of peace activism,
but rather: “As I see it, the organization has two main emphases which are quite inseparable —
disarmament and constructive work for peace … We cannot limit ourselves to only your way or
only my way.”62 VOW’s original mandate included a pledge to both constructive peace
education and research, and complete nuclear disarmament – despite Davis’ argument to the
contrary. Historian Christine Ball points out that VOW, from its inception in 1960, “subscribed
to the practice of participatory democracy,”63 and was more than a simple political support
group. VOW was committed to actively pressuring the Canadian government to take a stand
against nuclear weapons, as this joint letter, bearing Davis’ signature, states:
This week one of the most critical debates in Canadian history is taking place in the House of
Commons. The vital issue concerns the question whether or not nuclear warheads should be
acquired for [the] Canadian Armed Forces. The spread of nuclear weapons statistically
increases the chances of nuclear war. … The hour of Canada’s greatness is at hand. To refuse
the bomb is not to adopt a position of isolationism or neutrality. It is a refusal to increase the
possibilities of nuclear war.64

Jean Lee of Toronto, and other members who responded to Davis’ questionnaire, reasoned that
the main emphasis of VOW was peace: “Peace on a personal, familial, organizational, national
and international level!”65 It did not matter, they argued, how peace was achieved.
In January 1963, the Davis referendum was held in Toronto during VOW’s Day of Study.
At the beginning of the day-long conference, Franklin reported the results of the Davis

61

Ibid.
Letter – Rosamund Truelove to Jo Davis, November 25, 1962, Franklin fonds 1, Box 38, file 5 –
“Study day and policy discussions around Jo Davis, 1962.”
63
Christine Ball, “The History of the Voice of Women/La Voix Des Femmes – The Early Years,” Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Toronto, 1994, 35.
64
Letter – VOW (Helen Tucker, Jo Davis, Muriel Jacobsen) to Editor, Globe and Mail, August 2, 1960,
Franklin fonds 1, Box 37, file 17 – “VOW peace movement, various records, 1960-1982.”
65
Document – “Dissenting Mail,” Franklin fonds 2, Box – Peace Material, file – “VOW correspondence
and other records, 1960-1961.”
62

218
questionnaire. The letters received revealed a broad approach to peace that indicated “every
action for peace was legitimate.”66 For her part, Davis presented a resolution that would ban all
political communications and briefs to the government and outlaw any public demonstration by
VOW. It was clear, however, that VOW had outgrown Davis and her moderate peace activism.
Members firmly disagreed with Davis’ belief that VOW should disassociate itself from the peace
movement to appear less militant and more legitimate. Almost unanimously, the members voted
to take a more direct and radical approach to peace in the future.
In defeat, Davis resigned from VOW, and in doing so, lashed out at those who she felt
were responsible for VOW’s new, unsavoury direction, in particular, Ursula Franklin. Following
the referendum, Davis wrote a second letter to the VOW membership. In her letter, Davis
attacked the VOW leadership, including Franklin. Davis claimed that Franklin had kept key
information from members, had refused outside arbitration, and had engaged the VOW
leadership in a clandestine cover-up of the questionnaire mail. Without any evidence to support
her accusations, Davis declared that “Co-operation with Government is stressed — protest is out.
Moderation is desired — extremism is feared. Concern at the way VOW was going is
widespread — relief that my letter could ‘put things right’ is very evident. The question now
becomes, why should this be suppressed, and whose interest does it serve to suppress it?”67 To
Davis the answer was obvious. Suppression of the questionnaire results was in the interest of
communism, especially those communists within VOW. Davis’ letter then purported to present
“facts” to support her claim that Franklin had once encouraged a leftist, totalitarian political
indoctrination of VOW members. Why else, Davis believed, would Franklin and other VOW
leaders support Canadian withdrawal from NATO? And if the readers of her letter had somehow
not understood its meaning, Davis closed with a flourish, denouncing Franklin and VOW as
communist and a serious risk to Canadian society:
The [VOW] movement begins to think and look like a Communist outfit … And the more it
proceeds in that direction, the more the moderates fall away, the more the extremism grows
and attracts its own kind, until the movement becomes overtly Communist, in fact as well as
in spirit. … All I can go on, though, is ‘By their deeds shall ye know them’ — and her deeds
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have been enough to suggest to me that Dr. Franklin is a dangerous influence in VOW, no
matter what else she is.68

The personal smears, red-baiting, and vindictiveness of Davis’ letter, however, did not come as a
surprise to Franklin. In fact, the letter only confirmed Franklin’s negative opinion of Davis,
whom she got to know quite well while tabulating the results of the questionnaire.
It was not long after the original Davis letter that Franklin came face-to-face with the
dishonesty of VOW’s co-founder. Davis consistently sent Franklin responses to the
questionnaire, so that the head of the Research Committee could sort through each member’s
answers. Although happy to send Franklin letters that supported her moderate position, Davis
frequently declined to send all of the dissenting mail, arguing that these letters revealed only
limited opposition to her point of view and were repetitive. Franklin on several occasions was
forced to write to friends, such as Elise Boulding, who had been duped by Davis: “This mornings
[sic] mail brought the copy of your reply to Jo D. — I think it is a wise and sensible letter … I
deeply regret that you…were drawn into this … The sad thing is that you have only half the
story, Mrs. D send [sic] you only half the mail etc. and I deplore the misuse of your kindness and
good faith.”69
Yet it was not only Davis’ lying that deeply disturbed Franklin. It became clear to Franklin
during their correspondence that Davis was a bigot. Franklin quickly realized that Davis held
prejudiced views of many Canadians, but especially of women that differed from her. Davis
deemed some women more desirable or worthy of membership in VOW than others. In one letter
to Franklin, Davis insisted that VOW should concentrate on recruiting only women that mirrored
her own educated, conservative, middle-class background:
I believe we have a special breed of Canadian woman in VOW — and again, the movement
was aimed at a special breed. … The ones I had in mind were…the ones with minds and
enough education to be aware and concerned about the world around them, not committed
one way or the other politically, probably rather cautious about ‘peace movements’ (with
husbands even more cautious!), but who would…do something.70
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Perhaps aware of the arrogant, intolerant tone of her letter, Davis qualified her previous
statement, noting that only French Canadian women, even those she might have deemed
acceptable otherwise, were predisposed politically and ideologically to support communistinspired ban-the-bomb movements, and consequently, should not be welcome in VOW.
Davis’ hatred of communists and those who sympathized with communism was deepseated. In a 1960 interview, Davis claimed that “politics are not involved” in VOW and that
“women see peace as an essential of survival not as a political issue.”71 Yet, a 1961 letter from
Davis to VOW members in Ottawa indicates that Davis, like the Canadian government, viewed
the peace movement as communist, and thus, inherently political: “You and Marge…seemed to
be so unaware of the history of most ‘peace movements’ in Canada … I enclose a list of
organizations that are known as ‘Communist fronts’”72 And in 1989 Davis revealed to Christine
Ball that communists had never been welcome in VOW. Conversely, Franklin viewed peace as
indivisible and argued that it could only be attained if it enveloped friend and foe alike: “Peace
will be there…for those we love and for all those we can’t stand. … Those of us who work for
peace will have to act and speak with clarity, stressing that the work we do is not only for
ourselves but for everyone.”73 In their interactions with one another, Franklin came to realize that
Davis represented the antithesis to her Quaker and feminist inspired vision of peace. The purpose
of VOW, Franklin believed, was to unite all women – active, passive, wealthy, poor,
francophone, Anglophone, communist, etc. – in the pursuit of peace, not only those women who
fit Davis’ preferred, liberal establishment. Jo Davis, Franklin argued, was only too happy to
perpetuate the “threat system” that the Canadian government and its definition of peace
employed to maintain its hegemony.
Franklin’s peace activism also faced considerable ideological opposition from the
Canadian government. Although VOW claimed to be non-partisan and had no official affiliation
with a political party, it was widely known that the organization – in its earliest years – supported
the Liberal Party of Canada and its leader, Lester B. Pearson. Maryon, Pearson’s wife, was even
an honourary member of VOW. The organization’s unofficial endorsement of the Liberal Party
was due to two reasons. First, the Liberal Party, unlike the left-leaning New Democratic Party,
71

Ball, “The History of the Voice of Women,” 202.
Ibid., 177.
73
Franklin, “The Indivisibility of Peace,” in The Ursula Franklin Reader, 77.
72

221
was viewed by VOW members as ideologically acceptable, and second, the organization
supported Pearson’s public, anti-nuclear weapons stance. Pearson wrote in November 1962 to
the members of the Liberal caucus: “May I assure you that I do not believe that Canada should
accept nuclear arms under national control by herself or by the U.S.A. On the contrary, I have
consistently argued that the nuclear club should not be enlarged.”74 In early 1963, however,
Pearson and the Liberals championed nuclear weapons for Canadian troops in NATO and its
BOMARC missile-systems located in Ontario and Quebec. In his memoirs, Pearson explained
his abrupt about-face:
We were members of NATO. NATO had an arsenal of nuclear weapons for collective
defence, even if these were under American control. These weapons formed a part of NATO
strategy. We had accepted that strategy and hence accepted responsibility for the use of
nuclear weapons as a part of that strategy. Even more, we supplied most of the uranium to
make those nuclear bombs. If we were immoral, we had been immoral from the beginning.75

Pearson’s decision was unacceptable to VOW’s new radical leadership and membership,
including Franklin. Even though it meant losing members and friends, Franklin, as her brief and
tooth survey highlight, would continue to protest the Pearson government (elected in April 1963)
and the militaristic orthodoxy of the state.76
Pearson’s pro-nuclear weapons stance and his fervent anti-communism, raises new
question in regard to both of Franklin’s peace research projects. Franklin’s federal brief on
fallout and the baby tooth survey were publically rejected for sexist reasons, masquerading as
scientific explanations. Privately, her twin studies were dismissed for petty, personal reasons
because Franklin dared question the authority and competency of a government minister and
department. However, like many of the individuals examined in this study, Franklin’s peace
activism was predicated on the belief that it was her patriotic duty to question, and if need be,
oppose the Canadian government. She felt it was her responsibility to create a “shadow cabinet”
that would attempt to shift public policy from war to peace. Moreover, RCMP files reveal that
Franklin despised the government’s red-baiting and attacks on other peace groups as communist:
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“She regretted very much the shocking and disgraceful actions of some groups of citizens against
organizations and individuals of different political persuasions.”77 Franklin, unlike many
Canadians, did not take sides in the Cold War and encouraged co-operation between the
country’s nonaligned peace movement and communist-led peace campaign. Historian Lawrence
Wittner notes that “among nonaligned peace activists…this remained the position of no more
than a very small minority.”78
With such staunch opposition to its programs, policies, and negative definition of peace,
the government’s rejection of Franklin’s peace projects was also clearly due to severe ideological
differences. Historian Robert Bothwell argues that “Canada, abroad, was Pearson.”79 It is not
surprising then that Judy LaMarsh mirrored and mimicked Pearson’s pro-nuclear, anticommunist attitude in her critique of Franklin’s twin peace research projects. Nor is it surprising
that LaMarsh described herself as a “good soldier” and highly partisan: “I always tried to do
whatever I was asked to do. It explains in large part my reputation for partisanship, which is
deserved. I make no apology for my partisanship. Had I not believed in my party (and my
Leader) and the things they stood for, I should not have put myself in the position of publicly
supporting them.”80 In addition, LaMarsh’s anti-communism extended to her staff. Jack McBeth,
her executive assistant, wrote a series of articles for the Ottawa Citizen that addressed supposed
“communist subversion” in Canadian society. But Franklin was not communist, nor was her
work. The purpose of her brief and tooth survey was to provide Canadians with information that
the government refused to publish. In doing so, Franklin hoped to educate women, encourage
public debate about nuclear weapons, create a more equitable society, and as a result, reduce the
fear that accompanied the nuclear age.81
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Over time, the government’s divisive and ideological approach to peace, including its
monopoly of information, led to a certain degree of cynicism in Franklin. Much later in life,
Franklin argued that 1963 marked a turning point in her activism and in her opinion of the
Canadian government: “That’s the sort of thing I would not have foreseen when we [i.e. VOW]
began. I believed then that the government was basically ill-informed but well-intentioned, and
now I believe that governments are well-informed and ill-intentioned.”82 Despite her
disillusionment with the political establishment, Franklin remained convinced that peace did not
equal the status quo. Her vision of peace could not be achieved through the build-up of nuclear
arms or maintained by the nuclear deterrent. Contrary to the government’s public mantra,
Franklin did not believe that the Soviet Union and communism were inherently evil or a threat to
peace, while the West, led by the U.S., was not inherently good or a beacon of peace. Rather
Franklin reasoned that “the price of peace is the happiness of our enemies.”83 Franklin, however,
realized that such a radical attitude required a comprehensive change in the way people thought,
behaved, and ultimately, defined peace. By challenging the government’s dominant conception
of peace, Franklin advocated a positive definition of peace, based in justice, that incorporated all
people.
Ursula Franklin’s peace activism did not end in 1963, but continued for the next fifty years until
her death in 2016. Throughout her public life, Franklin’s vision of a better, more peaceful future
was inspired by two alternative paths to peace. The first was her devotion to the Quaker faith and
its tenets, in particular, the belief that only pacifism and non-violence could achieve peace. The
second path to peace was Franklin’s avowed feminism. Women, she argued, valued the sanctity
of life and possessed qualities such as collaboration and cooperation conducive to peace. These
traits were the result of women’s historical experience: first, as mothers, and second, in their
daily struggle to overcome the entrenched “structural violence” of Western society that denied
women equal opportunities, pay, and treatment. Franklin believed that through a maternal
feminist internationalism, women were more likely than men to find creative, non-hierarchical
solutions to questions of war, and must be held up as the prototype for peace.
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Franklin, however, was not just a pacifist or a feminist, but a scientist as well. In this role,
Franklin’s work for peace was a testimony to both her Quaker faith and feminist philosophy. As
a senior scientist for Ontario’s Research Foundation and as director of VOW’s Research
Committee, Franklin became a “global feminist pacifist,”84 embarking on a series of peace
research projects to combat Canada’s institutionalized structure of threat systems: “Working for
peace…mean[s] we have to refuse the use of threats and the instilling of fear as means to achieve
a peaceful future. We cannot be less fearful if others, as a result of our individual or corporate
action, become more fearful.”85 Her federal brief on fallout monitoring in Canada and baby tooth
survey that measured the levels of strontium-90 in milk highlighted the reality that women and
children were more likely to be victims in a society that valued militarism more than peace.
Franklin’s peace research also emphasized how unpopular her dual maps of pacifism and
feminism were, and as a result, her vision of peace was in Cold War Canada. Male scientists
employed by the government unjustly questioned the results of her peace research projects for
VOW, upset that she challenged society’s conventional gender norms and hierarchies. The
Canadian government, interested in maintaining a structure of threat systems to reinforce their
power, resented Franklin’s willingness to question their authority and expertise, and detested her
inclination to critique their characterization of the “Other” as subversive and/or communist.
Franklin forced the government to ask: “What does it take, not to avoid war, but to promote
peace?”86
Franklin’s quest for peace is an excellent example of the Quaker phrase “speak truth to
power.” Concerned with the injustices that she and her neighbours faced, Franklin consistently
spoke out and acted on their behalf, while also criticizing the Canadian government for its failure
to fulfill its half of the civil contract. As Franklin noted late in her life: “I think in many ways,
the most important thing I did was to be there, to say what needs to be said, and to eliminate the
excuse ‘Had I only known.’ It may be that my contribution was to make it less likely and, in fact,
impossible to say, ‘We didn’t know.’”87 The next case study, Norman Z. Alcock, lived by a
similar mantra, ready to actively pursue peace in Canada and internationally. Alcock’s vision of
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peace, like that of Franklin, contested traditional Canadian beliefs and venerated institutions.
Yet, while Franklin used science as a means to realize her vision of peace, science was Alcock’s
vision of peace.
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Chapter 6
Norman Z. Alcock and the Canadian Peace Research
Institute, 1961-1965
At first glance, Norman Z. Alcock seems an unlikely candidate to launch a peace organization in
Cold War Canada or to become a “warrior for peace.”1 Alcock spent the majority of the Second
World War in England developing the radar technology that contributed to the defeat of the Axis
forces. Afterwards, he earned his PhD in Physics from McGill University and began to work for
Atomic Energy Canada at its Chalk River nuclear facility. Inspired by his work with radioactive
isotopes, Alcock then launched a high-tech company in Oakville, Ontario: Isotope Products. The
business was a success and eventually sold to a U.S. corporation. Unsure of what to do next,
Alcock spent his days at the local library reading books such as Theodore Lentz’s Towards a
Science of Peace (1955). Alcock, after months of study, came to the critical realization that there
was no protection against nuclear weapons being stock-piled at that time by the world’s great
powers and that “the causes of war must be found as a basis for finding ways to prevent [nuclear
holocaust].”2 Encouraged by his “revelation,” Alcock wrote The Bridge of Reason (1961), a
booklet that outlined his vision for peace. As the title suggests, Alcock proposed to build a
“bridge of reason”3 to lead mankind from war to peace. Alcock’s bridge, however, would not be
built by ordinary citizens, but by scientists. To implement his bridge of reason, Alcock founded
the Canadian Peace Research Institute (CPRI) in 1961 to research the causes of war and peace
through scientific study. The CPRI was a non-partisan, non-profit institution and was devoted to
the full-time study of issues such as arms control and disarmament, economic and social
development, international organization, and public opinion. Alcock was convinced that peace
research could rationally and objectively solve the world’s problems.
Public response to the CPRI was decidedly mixed. Praised in certain quarters, some
Canadians found Alcock’s vision of peace vague and abstract. Other Canadians deemed Alcock
and his scientific approach to peace dangerously naïve. The CPRI’s most vocal critics included
1
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Canada’s mainstream churches. The United Church of Canada, in particular, argued that peace
was not the business of scientists and even claimed that the CPRI was a “denial of the whole
Judeo-Christian tradition.”4 This antagonism is rather shocking, as the central tenets of a
peaceful society – empathy, love, tolerance, and concern for your fellow man – have been
expounded by churches for centuries. At every annual post-Second World War meeting of the
United Church’s General Council, its members dedicated themselves to the cause of peace,
noting “there is no more urgent nor important task for Christians.”5 The United Church,
however, scorned Alcock and the CPRI as would-be peacemakers. At the heart of this tense
relationship among science, religion, and peacemaking was the contest for legitimacy in
Canadian society. This polarizing struggle led to rigidity on the part of Alcock, the United
Church, and their respective approaches to peace. Rather than acknowledge that peace could be
achieved beyond their own particular definition, Alcock, the CPRI, and the United Church
rejected all conceptions of peace that differed from their own. This unwillingness to consider that
there could be another way to peace ensured that peace research and mainstream religion could
not co-exist, and resulted in their failure to successfully implement their positive conceptions of
peace in Cold War Canada.
Postwar Canada has been characterized as a time of widespread cultural, social, and political
consensus. By and large, Canadians conformed to the era’s dominant gender roles and the
country’s hegemonic, liberal political culture. This so-called unanimity was the result of a
national mobilization against elements in society deemed dangerous and subversive to the status
quo. In an environment enveloped by fear of the Other, the word “peace” became associated with
cowardliness, selfishness, defeatism, and most damning, communism. As Canadian journalist,
Bruce Hutchison noted: “As soon as any man talks about a study of peace he is suspect.”6
Beginning with the formation of James G. Endicott’s Canadian Peace Congress in 1948, virtually
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all subsequent peace organizations in Canada were considered “fronts” for communist
infiltration. From its inception, consequently, Alcock and the CPRI struggled to gain legitimacy
in Canadian society.
Alcock and his supporters worked tirelessly to dissociate the CPRI from communism,
fully aware of the negative ideological association attached to the peace movement. The CPRI’s
board of directors7 considered changing the organization’s name, in part because of a story
relayed to Alcock from peace researcher Johan Galtung, in which a Norwegian politician
exclaimed: “‘Peace research,’ what a horrible word! To ‘war research’ there could be no
objection.”8 Alcock explained to one interviewer, “the Canadian Peace Research Institute could
as easily be called the Canadian War Research Institute, since it seeks to find alternatives to war
as a way of settling arguments between nations.”9 Pierre Berton sympathized with the plight of
the CPRI in his column for the Toronto Daily Star, but conceded that its name hindered its
legitimacy with the Canadian public: “In Canada ‘peace’ is a controversial word. … I am
perfectly confident that if a word other than ‘peace’ had been used…public [support] would be a
much easier matter. … Naturally, the Institute has been labeled ‘Red-controlled.’”10 In the face
of overwhelming public scrutiny, Alcock worked diligently to gain the trust of the Canadian
public, yet would be repeatedly rebuffed by those with a vested interest in retaining the status
quo, including universities, the government, and the church.
To establish the credibility of peace research, Alcock claimed that the CPRI was a purely
educational organization and tried to associate it with a Canadian university. Alcock understood
the benefits of university funded and driven research, and how a small organization such as his
7
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could profit: “If lessons can be drawn from the physical sciences there is value in having
fundamental research done at universities by individuals and small groups.”11 He was
encouraged that his dream might become a reality when he and twelve leading academics were
invited by Principal Dr. Cyril James to meet at McGill University in Montreal, Quebec. For three
days in early June 1962, Alcock met with Pierre Trudeau and other leading public intellectuals to
discuss the burgeoning field of peace research. The invited guests debated possible projects that
the CPRI might undertake. At the end of seminar, Alcock had decided to focus the organization’s
efforts on four specific researchable projects: Literature Research, Study of Attitudes towards
Disarmament, Historical and Contemporary Study of Police Forces to Determine Criteria for a
U.N. Police Force, and Study of Sociological Inspection.12 Alcock’s report and subsequent notes,
however, provide few details on what these projects entailed, how the CPRI might achieve them,
or their significance. McGill ultimately declined to host the CPRI and the seminar led to nothing
more than an enjoyable weekend with like-minded friends. This result, however disappointing,
was far better than Alcock’s approach to Claude Bissell two years earlier (President of the
University of Toronto, 1958-1971). Bissell, a noted peace activist, dismissed the CPRI outright:
“I must confess that I cannot see any particular point in establishing an institute for the study of
means to promote peace. … Certainly this is a subject that must be of primary concern to all of
us in public life, and it may well be that your ideas have validity that at the present time I am
unable to see.”13 Although he did not say so explicitly, Bissell, as president of Canada’s largest
university, was undoubtedly worried about associating with any organization tainted by
communism. In the United States several peace research organizations found homes and
credibility in American universities (for example, Kenneth Boulding’s Center for Research on
Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan and Theodore Lentz’s Peace Research
Laboratory at Washington University), but Alcock and the CPRI failed to capture the
imagination of Canada’s academic community.
11
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Alcock and the CPRI also failed to gain the support of Canada’s government. Historian
Akira Iriye notes that “international organizations have existed side by side with…states for over
a century and have contributed to the making of the contemporary world.”14And in his booklet
The Bridge of Reason (1961), Alcock dismissed the idea that national governments, including
Canada’s, would not support the CPRI or any other peace research institutes: “It seems unlikely
that no national government would respond. National governments rather than resisting
will…welcome positive proposals for Peace Research Institutes if they are planned on a worldwide scale.”15 This belief was based on the large number of Canadian parliamentarians who
initially expressed their support and interest in the CPRI. The government had not promised any
financial support, but Alcock was convinced it was only a matter of time until they provided
monetary assistance. Alcock, in fact, forecasted that half of the CPRI’s original $4 million
budget would come in the form of subsidized government grants.
Alcock and the CPRI adopted a rigid position in regard to peace and peacemaking to
ensure the support of the Canadian government. Over the entirety of its existence, the CPRI
campaigned to disassociate itself from Canada’s “tainted” peace movement: a tactic adopted by
peace research institutes worldwide to guarantee credibility and legitimacy. Noted peace
researcher, Dr. Kenneth Boulding writes that “it has been a fundamental principle that the peace
research movement from the beginning is primarily a movement within the scientific community
and that it represents therefore activity which is sharply differentiated from protest and political
action.”16 Because of the suspicion associated with the word “peace,” Alcock insisted that the
words “peace research” be used when referring to the CPRI to ensure its neutrality. In one of his
first grant applications to the federal government, Alcock highlighted the CPRI’s non-ideological
convictions: “The Institute is a non-profit, non-partisan organization entirely supported by public
donations and foundation grants. It is not a peace action group but a scientific research
organization.”17 In a progress report to the CPRI’s board of directors, Alcock further distanced
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his organization from Canada’s supposedly communist peace movement: “The Canadian Peace
Research Institute does not seek to generate political pressure in any way. … The CPRI is not a
peace movement, nor does it seek to develop a peace movement in Canada. [It] is a research
organization.” 18 The CPRI, however, was unable to sufficiently demonstrate its professionalism
and failed to persuade the Canadian government, just as it had failed to win over the universities.
During the organization’s initial fund-raising campaign in 1962, the CPRI had anticipated
approximately $2 million in government grants, but in actuality received no support from the
Canadian government, financial or otherwise. Instead the CPRI relied – over the entire course of
its history – exclusively on donations from the Canadian public and the occasional grant from the
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) to employ four
full-time scientists. Two voluntary secretaries were tasked with completing the organization’s
day-to-day administrative responsibilities.
Ironically, in its attempt to ingratiate itself with universities and the government, Alcock
and the CPRI managed to alienate its only supporters: the Canadian peace movement. In 1962
peace organizations such as the Voice of Women, Fellowship of Reconciliation, and Combined
Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament helped the CPRI raise over $300,000. Twentyfive thousand Canadians, mostly upper-middle class and university educated, contributed to this
initial fund-raising campaign. Almost two-thirds of those who donated came from historic peace
sects such as the Quakers, or were atheist or agnostic; one in eight belonged to a peace
movement organization.19 Nevertheless, the CPRI criticized fellow peace groups in the vain hope
of gaining some shred of legitimacy with Canada’s power brokers. During VOW’s internal
conflict, for example, the CPRI fully supported the moderate approach of Jo Davis and deemed
the organization’s new leadership as too radical (i.e. communist). The CPRI’s rigid stance,
however, was widely unpopular with peace activists, including Ursula Franklin: “I am as sold on
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the idea of Peace Research as I always was — but not a la CAPRI [sic] — for me the emphasis is
on Peace, not on research at any cost.”20 Even eight years after the CPRI’s formation, Patricia
Alcock wrote to a prospective donor outlining the organization’s negative position towards the
peace movement: “We do not have any connections with the peace groups because this is strictly
a research organization. … The Voice of Women was magnificent ten years ago. … They are
more action oriented now.”21 By continually insinuating that the peace movement was “action
oriented” and communist, rather than research-based, the CPRI quickly lost the support of their
only public allies.
Without the backing of the federal government or universities, it is not surprising that
Canada’s mainstream churches, pillars of the Cold War consensus, did not support Alcock and
the CPRI. Most Canadian churches perceived communism as “Godless” and irreligious.
Reverend Gordon A. Sisco, a United Church minister wrote: “Regretfully, I have come to the
conclusion that there exists a fundamental incompatibility between Christian principles and
Communism which cannot be bridged. … It is…impossible to reconcile the Christian Gospel
with Communist philosophy.”22 But the Church’s primary concern with Alcock was the
identification of peace research as communist, or at least, as sympathetic to the cause. In a 1951
United Church Observer editorial entitled, “Encouraging Peace,” Reverend A.J. Wilson outlined
the Church’s suspicion of peace activists and peace related activities:
It is one of the great anomalies of the post-war world that the use of the word ‘peace,’ which
is a great Christian word, has come to have somewhat sinister implications. It was a master
stroke when the Communists seized on that word as one of their slogans. The desire for
peace lies deep in the hearts of people everywhere…. Yet so fearful are we of propaganda
that many who desire peace above anything else in the world are almost afraid to use the
word lest they be charged with subversive activities.23
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Wilson laid the blame for this culture of distrust squarely at the feet of communists. The United
Church, however, had to shoulder part of the blame. Its inability to question or challenge the
Cold War consensus contributed directly to the dismissal and ridicule of individuals and groups
who advocated for peace.
The best example of the United Church’s intolerance towards the peace movement was
its persecution of the Canadian Peace Congress (CPC) and its president, former United Church
minister, James G. Endicott (see Chapter Four). In 1945 Endicott was reprimanded by Dr. Gerald
Bell, acting secretary of the United Church’s Board of Overseas Missions, for daring to speak
out against the Chinese Nationalist government and in favour of Mao’s communists. Bell wrote
to Endicott, instructing him to adhere to the Church’s anti-communist policy. Rather than
conform to the burgeoning Cold War Consensus, Endicott resigned from the United Church
ministry in 1946. Two years later he founded the CPC. Almost immediately, the CPC was
labeled communist due to Endicott’s support of Mao and his refusal to proclaim Soviet Russia
the enemy. His resignation from the United Church, however, did not stop its General Council
from passing two resolutions in 1952 against him and the CPC. The first resolution
acknowledged Endicott’s right to free speech, but disassociated the Church from his peace
activism. The second resolution repudiated the work of the CPC, which they viewed as
communist and thus, subversive. This narrow conception of who could or could not practice
peace, led to the same ideological criticisms of Alcock and the CPRI by the Church ten years
later.
From the CPRI’s founding, both Alcock and the organization were deemed “Redcontrolled” by the United Church of Canada. The Church often accused Alcock of being naïve, a
dupe or stooge for communist infiltration and propaganda: a common charge against Canadian
peace activists in the Cold War. This charge of naïveté against Alcock and the CPRI routinely
graced the pages of The Observer, the Church’s bi-monthly magazine: “[Alcock] displays an
almost incredible naiveté. A trained scientist, considered very able in his own field of work, he is
a babe in the historical, political, moral, and psychological woods from which he proposes to
lead man forth.”24 Most readers agreed with the magazine’s negative assessment of peace
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research. There were, however, a select few who questioned the purpose and motivation of the
Church’s criticisms of the CPRI. W. Burchill wrote in support of Alcock and the CPRI:
I read with considerable dismay, the…article in your March 1st issue by Wilson Woodside.
… Mr. Woodside uses the disparaging term “naïve” to characterize Dr. Alcock and his
proposals. … What appears “naïve” to the smug and commonplace may merely be simple
truth. … What is the motive behind organizations like the United Church and many others
that spend time and money trying to discredit the Canadian Peace Research Institute, and its
directors?25

Burchill posed an interesting question: What motivated the United Church to discredit
individuals and organizations for attempting to reach a goal – peace – set out by the church
itself? Simply put, the Church wanted to maintain its authority and place in Canadian society. By
questioning whether there was another legitimate way to attain peace, and who or who could not
practice peace, Burchill challenged the entire foundation on which the United Church was built.
One way Canada’s mainstream churches attempted to preserve their power and influence
was to discredit those that dared challenge and defy it, like Alcock and the CPRI. Although some
ministers supported the Canadian peace movement, many Christian Canadians could “be
categorized as Couldn’t-Care-Less, Just-Not-Interested or Can’t-Afford-It,”26 and failed to back
the country’s peace organizations. Their objections to Alcock and the CPRI, however, revealed
more than mere indifference on their part. Arguably, the United Church was largely responsible
for creating the social and moral regulation of the postwar period. They taught their
congregations values such as obedience to authority and mobilized their support against people,
organizations, and ideas that challenged the status quo, especially communism. Consequently, if
peace was perceived as communist, then peace research, Alcock and the CPRI were a threat to
the Cold War Consensus. Alcock did more, however, than simply challenge the ideological
status quo. His goal to use peace research to attain a peaceful world challenged the Church’s
authority and religion’s place in Canadian society.
During the Cold War, the struggle for legitimacy between the proponents of science and religion
was manifested in the role each group wished to play in Canadian society, especially in regard to
peacemaking. There was a growing belief that science could solve the world’s problems, but in
25
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particular, war. Many people viewed science as a panacea because it favoured rational thought
over emotion. “Why science?” Alan and Hanna Newcombe asked. “Because science is objective
– it deals with facts, whether one likes them or not.”27 Or as Arthur Lawson, Director of the
World Rule of Law Center, articulated: “The nonscientific approach merely reacts blindly to the
environment, guided by nothing but instincts, emotions, prejudices, and superstitions.”28 Atomic
scientists were at the vanguard of this new science of peace,29 yet social scientists involved in
peace research were close behind in espousing science as the solution to war.
The social sciences, at their core, seek to better understand and explain the world. More
specifically, the social sciences endeavour to examine the way people interact with one another,
also known as the “social process.” As a result, social scientists attempt to use their expertise to
help create a better, more peaceful world. Historian Mark Mazower notes that since the 1850s,
there was widespread belief among educated professionals – statisticians, geographers,
psychiatrists, sociologists, etc. – that the social sciences were “critical…to promot[ing]
international cooperation…and help[ing] to set aside prejudices.”30 For men such as Brock
Chisholm, an original CPRI board member, “successful or unsuccessful operations … [in the
social sciences] will determine whether the human species will survive.”31 Johan Galtung, the
father of peace research, believed that once enough scientists were engaged in the science of
peace, formulae would be produced to reduce tension in trouble spots around the world: “What is
missing here is precisely a full mobilization of the academic forces, a mustering of a man’s
intellect in the same way as has been done to master the problems of somatic health, of
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utilization of natural resources, and…to master the problems of mental health.”32 Galtung was
convinced that it was only a matter of time until the social sciences found a peaceful solution to
war.
Did Norman Alcock feel similarly assured in the social science’s ability to solve the
world problems? In short the answer is yes. There is significant evidence to suggest Alcock was
doctrinaire in his view of social science as the answer to peace. In early 1961, Alcock addressed
a group of prominent men at the Empire Club of Canada: “We have the tools for making change.
These tools are the methods of science and technology. … The physical sciences have wrought
vast changes in the last two or three generations. We must now look to the social sciences…for
solutions to the problem of war.”33 On another occasion, Alcock wrote that “in a word, since the
scientific method has so quickly brought us to the brink, we must now turn to the scientific
method to lead us back to safety.”34 Alcock, however, could not explain how the social sciences
would help prevent war and achieve peace. Like Galtung, Alcock simply assumed they would
because advances in the physical sciences had cured many diseases: “It was [man’s] ability to
reason critically in the biological sciences which caused him to rid himself of his ancient
ailments…and to grow food in abundance. And it will be his ability to reason critically in the
social sciences which will bring about equal advances in the field of social diseases. The greatest
of these is war.”35 Alcock was convinced that the social sciences, and peace research in
particular, would lead the world back from the brink of nuclear holocaust.
A small section of Canadians also viewed the social sciences as the path to peace. One
such citizen was John H. Morris of Vancouver, British Columbia, who shared Alcock’s approach
to peace: “Methinks, as the saying goes that you have hit the proverbial nail right on the head.
The scientific approach is the only approach to world problems.”36 Despite the growing public
acceptance of peace as science and the scientific method of observation, hypotheses, prediction,
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and verification, Alcock also employed emotion to sway people to his cause. In a memo to CPRI
canvassers, Alcock instructed his volunteers how to answer certain questions the public may
have about his organization and their work. In response to the question, “How much should I
contribute?” Alcock played directly on the citizen’s fears of nuclear war, writing: “That depends
on the value you place on survival.”37 Nevertheless, Alcock and the CPRI’s crusade to make
reason prevail was gaining legitimacy, and this alarmed Canada’s mainstream churches.
The United Church of Canada worried that science and secularism had made inroads to
usurp the place of morality and religion in Canadian society. A statement in favour of the newly
founded CPRI from former Moderator, Reverend James S. Thomson, furthered Church anxiety:
“This is a…rational, down-to-earth program [of peace research] that can succeed.”38 Other
members also questioned the Church’s attempt to discredit Alcock, the CPRI, and peace
research:
At the present moment, none of us know just how much a Peace Research Institute can
accomplish. We do know that the Christian church has had 2000 years to change men’s
minds about the use of force without too much success. If scientists like Dr. Alcock can
accomplish anything, even a small amount toward a peaceful settlement of our international
problems, I say more power to them and I would hope that the United Church would march
along them.39

In response to the growing discontent, the Church urged its members to search for the answers to
peace in history, philosophy, and in particular, theology. The Church publically claimed religion
to be the answer to humanity’s problems, and above all, the answer to war.
To maintain its legitimacy and central place in Canadian society, the United Church
assailed the role of science and claimed religion as the only path to peace. Soon after the CPRI
was founded, Gerald W. Paul attacked Alcock’s vision of peace: “Beside over-rating the role of
reason, Peace Research misses the real problem - that of convincing people to accept the bridge
once it is available. … Only when individuals have a morality based on God as revealed in Christ
will men live at peace with another.”40 This message was confirmed when the United Church
Board of Oversees Mission sponsored a three-part lecture series entitled, “The Church
37
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Encounters the New Age.” Its featured speaker, Reverend Dr. Kenneth G. McMillan, argued that
science, although beneficial to society, could not provide the answer to all of man’s needs:
“Science can offer men a better life…. But the remedy for their material problems will not solve
the deeper problems of the human soul, which will become more vividly apparent as the remedy
is applied.”41 Dr. McMillan, however, did not simply dismiss science as a panacea to the world’s
great many problems. He reasoned that religion was critical to a fulfilling, peaceful world:
In all lands, sufficient believers of Christian character are found to demonstrate that the
Christian faith can produce the type of man who can further the legitimate aspirations of the
people for freedom, social justice and economic reform. The Church can thus make a
legitimate contribution at this period of nation building.42

Pleased with the public’s reaction to the three-day lecture series, the United Church leaders must
have been ecstatic when Czech Professor, Josef Hromadka – a communist – echoed McMillan’s
assertion that peace could be attained through religion: “They [the world’s citizens] recognize
that science and economics are not the answers to human problems…they see there is a spiritual
vacuum; they lack something.”43 These sentiments offered the Church reassurance of their
worldview and spurred it to greater activity.
In the aftermath of such effusive praise, the United Church pressed their criticism of
science further and attacked Alcock and the CPRI directly. The Church criticized Alcock and the
CPRI for their use of the social sciences to find solutions to war and peace. Alcock was
constantly asked how questions of war and peace, problems involving people, emotions, and
their biases, could be solved in the laboratory in the same way as, for instance, polio: “Anyone
who is in possession of his senses knows that a man cannot be measured as a tree is measured. A
scientist can measure a man’s height and breadth…[but] he cannot measure the man. … For man
is not a rational creature.”44 The church, however, was not unique in its criticisms of the social
sciences. Although elements of international society held the social sciences in high regard, they
were still often labelled as “half-baked,” especially in contrast to the physical sciences. In
response to his critics, Alcock emphasized his scientific credentials, but also explained that “the
social sciences are less developed than the physical sciences - but they are sufficiently well

41

Cited in Kenneth Bagnell, “New Faith for a New Age,” The United Church Observer, April 15, 1965.
Cited in Bagnell, “New Faith for a New Age,” The United Church Observer, April 15, 1965.
43
“Hopeful,” The United Church Observer, May 1, 1966.
44
Paul, “Dr. Alcock’s Bridge of Reason,” The United Church Observer, May 15, 1962.
42

239
developed to make useful applications possible. Psychologists have been most effectively
harnessed by business and industry for personnel testing, marketing, and industrial relations.”45
He further argued that the social sciences were vastly different from the physical and biological
sciences and should not be compared. Pressed even further, he turned to his standard line,
arguing that science was dispassionate, objective, had made revolutionary breakthroughs in the
past, and would continue to do so in the future:
The methods of science and reason…are the most powerful tools available to man. … It was
his ability to reason critically in the biological sciences which caused him to rid himself of
his ancient ailments and diseases…. And it will be his ability to reason critically in the social
sciences which will bring about equal advances in the field of social disease. The greatest of
these diseases is war.46

These stock answers, however, did not thwart Alcock’s detractors, but rather increased their
ferocity. He could not offer any tangible results from his peace “research.”
The Church’s primary, but informal criticism of Alcock and the CPRI was that peace
research was irreligious and ungodly. The Church argued that Alcock and his organization
promoted “scientism,” failing to make room for God in its research by arguing that the truth
consisted in what could be revealed by the scientific method. One Toronto Telegram article
expanded the Church’s critique: “Dr. Alcock’s science pretentiously usurps the place of morality
and the Church. For peace, it is argued, is a moral question, peace cannot be attempted until
religion is first restored to its rightful place as the guide to men’s actions.”47 Canon C. Hilary
Banks expanded on the argument of the Telegram piece. Like the newspaper article, he
suggested that morality must be central to all discussions of peace and war. But he also argued
that by ignoring the moral realities of peace research, Alcock was no better than a communist
practicing bad science, and offered him advice: “If the Canadian Peace Research Institute wishes
to protect itself from…imputation…it should take into its counsels experts in morals and
religion.”48 Banks warned Alcock that he and other religious leaders would continue to cast
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doubt on the legitimacy of the CPRI until it returned religion to its so-called rightful place in
society.
Most scientists, however, and others who supported peace research, saw their work as a
moral problem, not simply a scientific and technical one. By the 1960s, many branches of the
scientific community were involved in military development. Combined with the manufacture of
the atomic bomb fifteen years earlier, some people associated science with weapons and war. Yet
nuclear scientists, especially following the Second World War, realized the magnitude of their
war work.49 Prominent scientists such as Albert Einstein, Eugene Rabinowitch, Robert Jungk,
and Niels Bohr vowed to take an active role in solving the future problems of war and peace.
Collectively, these men were forced to ask themselves: what was the duty of the scientist? Most
answered that “it was the responsibility of the scientist to see that the application of research […]
be put to the benefit of mankind,”50 and that they had a social duty to discuss their work in a
truthful, forthright manner. When discussing the creation of the H-Bomb, for example, nuclear
scientist Hans Bethe highlighted the moral responsibility of science: “I believe the most
important question is the moral one: can we, who have always insisted on morality and human
decency between nations as well as inside our own nations, introduce this weapon of total
annihilation into the world?”51 Alcock also believed scientific work, and consequently, peace
research, was infused with questions of morality. In an article he noted that “once the fruits of
scientific discovery are applied to man’s needs, then I would maintain there is an ethical
problem…. Science is no longer amoral, but moral and immoral depending on the application.”52
The stated purpose of the CPRI was to find alternatives to war. Morality thus underlined
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forefront of the international nuclear disarmament movement. Like many Western governments, however,
they refused to work and collaborate with the communist-led peace movement.
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Alcock’s studies, revealing that he felt a similar social responsibility to the world as Einstein and
the nuclear scientists.
The peace research of Alcock and the CPRI was inculcated by questions of morality, but
did religion have any place in his work? Initially, Alcock seemed hopeful that religion and
science could work hand-in-hand to find peace:
Yes! Building attitudes for living together in one world will continue to be a huge task for
religion. Religion accepts science as necessary in man’s progress towards a truer, more
complete existence. We feel sure that it will recognize the advantage of science as an aid to
world peace as sympathetically as it accepts the work of science in medicine and social
research.53

A closer analysis of this quote, however, shows it to be misleading. Alcock expected cooperation and understanding from religious figures and institutions, but offered little in return.
Eventually Alcock came to a clear conclusion: the CPRI was scientific and therefore nonsectarian. It was the job of the Church, schools, and family to instill in Canadians the virtues
deemed by many to be the foundations for peace – love, mercy, and empathy. It was his job to
focus on the scientific aspects of peace: “The Peace Research Institute takes as its share of the
peace load the huge, technical problems which are beyond the scope of these institutions’
operation.”54 These sentiments had a damaging effect on the public perception of Alcock and the
CPRI. They convinced the United Church and many other Canadians that science, Alcock, the
CPRI, and peace research were ultimately godless and that they did in fact practice “scientism.”
His words also managed to persuade most Canadians that in the battle for legitimacy, the Church
was on the “right side” and peace research was on the “wrong side.” It meant that the CPRI lost
its struggle for legitimacy, and embittered Alcock towards those who opposed him, or could not
appreciate the value of the CPRI’s work.
To fully comprehend the United Church’s reaction to Alcock and the CPRI, and consequently
their contest for legitimacy, it is essential to understand their respective conceptions and
approaches to peace. This study has explored the peace movement’s positive conceptions of
peace and subsequently, most Canadians’ rejection of these alternative visions in favour of the
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West’s militarized, negative definition of peace. The debate between negative and positive peace
has a long history. According to historian Michael Howard, “mankind has been divided between
those who believe that peace must be preserved, and those who believe that it must be
attained;”55 or rather, those who advocated negative peace versus those who campaigned for
positive peace. This debate dominated the peace research movement during the Cold War. Yet as
Johan Galtung notes, most scholars came to realize that positive peace was impossible without
negative peace:
We mean by “peace research” research that is directed towards the understanding of (1)
conditions that may prevent international and inter-group violence, and (2) conditions for
furthering harmonious and creative relations between nations and other groups of people.
Thus peace research has two sides of any good definition of “peace,” as absence of war, as
non-war; and peace as a working, interacting relationship based on mutual exchange for
mutual benefit. 56

As a result, most peace researchers, including Alcock and the CPRI, hoped not only to preserve
negative peace by creating the conditions for the absence of war, but also to attain positive peace,
built upon notions of cooperation and integration, among others.
The principles of internationalism and science are at the heart of Alcock’s conception of
peace and inextricably linked. The term “internationalism,” like the word “peace,” has a wide
variety of definitions and interpretations. Alcock employed the term to “describe groups that
support the development of stronger legal and institutional mechanisms to ameliorate and
prevent armed conflicts,”57 but also as a means to improve human relationships and act as an
agent of social change. According to Alcock, science and scientists were ideally suited to this
task of amelioration and social change because they were “internationally minded,” and thus
open to working with people and governments of different national or ideological allegiances.
For example, at the Third Annual Pugwash Conference held in Kitzbuhel, Austria (14-19
September, 1958), the conference participants, all scientists, released the following statement in
regard to the relationship between science, scientist, and international peace:
We believe that, as scientists, we have an important contribution to make toward establishing
trust and cooperation among nations. Science is, by long tradition, an international
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undertaking. Scientists with different national allegiance easily find a common basis of
understanding: they use the same concepts and the same methods; they work toward
common intellectual goals, despite differences in philosophical, economic, or political
views.58

Alcock did not attend the Pugwash Conference in 1958, but would represent Canada at several
subsequent conferences throughout the 1960s. Alcock believed that the world was an
“interconnected whole” and argued that an “international scientists’ movement”59 was ideally
suited to finding the solutions to the problems of war and peace.
To preserve negative peace (as outlined in The Bridge of Reason and other organizational
material), Alcock envisioned the CPRI as the first in a worldwide network of peace research
institutes. Its role was to “stimulate hope and to give a practical plan to the now silent, moderate,
reasonable people of the world to set similar Peace Research Institutes in their own countries.”60
Alcock felt “that this is a chance for Canada to lead the world into the era of peace research, and,
we believe, peace.”61 To facilitate and encourage the establishment of peace research institutes
internationally, Alcock and the CPRI intended to set up a Peace Research Fund. Alcock hoped
that by 1964, through the assistance of the Fund, 20 or more institutes would be established.
Within five years, he anticipated 2000 scientists working on peace research in thirty countries,
including communist nations.
Once the international network of peace research institutes was established, Alcock
hoped it would work closely with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. This
relationship, he believed, would not only verify the legitimacy of peace research on the world
scene, but in turn, strengthen the United Nations (UN). Alcock frequently wrote to Howard
Green, Canada’s Secretary of State for External Affairs (1959-1963), and other leading
politicians to urge greater political support of the UN: “It is…of tremendous importance when
Mr. Diefenbaker singles out the World Court at The Hague as a concrete example for future
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strengthening of the U.N. Every step towards a true world authority is a step towards the ultimate
freedom from nuclear war.”62 Like many employed in peace research, Alcock was convinced
that his work would lead to the formation of a world government; if not out of desire, then out of
necessity:
It has been…suggested that total disarmament could lead to peace, without creating a supranational authority. Quite apart from the problem of reaching this condition it leaves one
unanswered question. If there is no world power to enforce this state, who is to guarantee
that no nation will rearm?63

Alcock, however, was adamant that the creation of a world government based upon international
law was the only hope to create a warless world. Only then could Canadians and others,
experience the harmony, mature relationships, and orderly resolution of conflict associated with
positive peace. Alcock confirmed this connection between world government and positive peace
in a letter to an unidentified recipient: “Your propensity for assuming that some form of super
national government is an essential antecedent to peace: yes, yes, yes, I couldn’t agree more.”64
Yet Alcock’s network of peace research institute’s never materialized, nor did his vision of
peace.
Alcock’s vision of peace (both positive and negative), was derivative of a small, but
growing peace research movement. In the early 1960s, the peace research movement was
described as nothing more than “a patch of blue sky no larger than a man’s hand.”65 Prior to the
founding of the CPRI in 1961 there were few internationally known peace research institutes.
Those that did exist included: Theodore Lentz’s Peace Research Association at Washington
University in St. Louis, Missouri; Johan Galtung’s Peace Research Institute Oslo (1959); and
Kenneth Boulding’s Center for Research on Conflict Resolution (1959), located at the University
of Michigan. It was from these leading peace researchers that Alcock’s conception of peace was
derived: “Some ideas presented here [The Bridge of Reason] may be original with the author.
Most however are not, but are a shared property with the many friends who have participated in
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discussion around the topics of war and peace.”66 Despite his lack of originality, it is important to
note that science as a tool for peace was a new idea in Canada. Peace research was an alternative
to the dominant conception of peace in Cold War Canada, and thus, a challenge to the status quo
that Alcock felt defined the United Church’s desire to “securing peace and harmony through
location of the broadest, least contentious common ground.”67
Churches were unequivocally champions of peace in the postwar and Cold War era. In
1948, the World Council of Churches declared at their Amsterdam Assembly that war was
contrary to their core beliefs and principles. The Anglican Church made a similar proclamation
at their Eighth Lambeth Conference that same year: “Christians must hate war and everything
that makes for it as utterly incompatible with the teaching and example of Jesus Christ.”68 The
statements of the World Council and Anglican Church, however, came two years after the United
Church of Canada “emphatically condemned war as incompatible with the mind of Christ.”69
Significantly, this resolution of the United Church’s General Council was only the first of many
it would make that denounced war and all its trappings. In 1954 the General Council argued for
the prohibition of thermo-nuclear bombs by international agreement; in 1956 it lobbied the
Canadian government to use its influence to have nuclear test explosions banned; and in 1958 the
Council renounced war as an instrument of national policy. To attain peace the United Church
also believed that relationships among human beings had to change. Peace was not the absence
of war or simple harmony between nations, but a concept based upon mutual understanding,
freedom from want, and social justice: “The church’s task is to build knowledge, sacrificially,
personal relations of understanding and respect and social orders of justice and freedom which
make real the Gospel of Peace.”70 Consequently, it appeared as if the United Church
conceptualized peace in the same positive terms as Alcock. The Church, however, did part from
Alcock and the CPRI about how to preserve negative peace and to achieve positive peace.
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To maintain negative peace, the United Church pursued a policy that mirrored and
mimicked the foreign policy of Canada’s government: the continued support and reliance on
strong military forces and alliances. If Alcock believed in science as a panacea, the United
Church believed in the panacea of military strength. And central to its belief in military might,
was the acceptance of nuclear weapons and the endorsement of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), as noted by leading Church officials in 1963: “The United Church
supports Canadian membership in the UN, NATO, and NORAD, the policy of a credible
deterrent, and does not oppose nuclear weapons on Canadian soil, or for our forces in Europe.”71
Although a minority of the United Church might have been disappointed by this statement and
its accompanying sentiments, it should not have come as a surprise to them. The church’s policy
of military strength and defense as peace had been echoed in the pages of The United Church
Observer for some time.
In 1959, A.C. Forrest, long-time editor of the Observer, waxed poetic about NATO’s
noble qualities: “To most persons NATO is a military sounding word. But to those of us who sat
through its Atlantic Congress last month, it sometimes seemed like an international missionary
meeting of high-minded men, determined to help all peoples achieve a decent standard of living
in human dignity and individual freedom.”72 One year later, another article appeared in the
magazine extolling the virtues of NATO, and in this case, its policy of arming its troops with
nuclear weapons. Willson Woodside, the author of the article, was not nearly as infatuated with
NATO as Forrest, nor naïve enough to forget the true nature of the military organization. Yet as
historian Dan Gorman notes, Woodside was a proponent of technocratic liberalism, which
included an “optimistic faith in progress and reform, in which talented individuals worked
through existing institutions to benefit society.”73 Consequently, Woodside vigorously supported
NATO and argued that nuclear deterrence was critical to maintaining peace: “Let us not delude
ourselves with the notion that…by weakening the alliance [with obsolete weaponry,] which
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alone has prevented the Communist wave from inundating all Europe we are striking a blow for
peace. Peace will not be won so easily - or so cheaply.”74
It was, however, a 1963 Observer editorial that epitomized the United Church’s concept
of negative peace and its desire to maintain the status quo. The anonymous editorial, entitled
“Defense: We’ve Made a False Moral Issue of Nuclear Weapons on Canadian Soil,” argued that
the Diefenbaker government should be ashamed for not accepting American nuclear warheads:
“It is expensive, embarrassing, and confusing to us, frustrating to our defence forces, and
irritating to Americans, to have these expensive squadrons stationed in the north with inefficient
armament. … By her no-nuclear-weapons-on-Canadian-soil policy she is failing to make her
proper contribution to keeping an attack from being decisive.”75 The response to the editorial
was swift. Within weeks of its editorial, “Defense,” letters began arriving at The Observer’s head
office. The first letters to arrive were full of outrage and contempt for the editorial, and
consequently, the United Church. Fred W. Taylor of Vancouver, BC, among others, criticized
what he viewed as the spineless nature of the editorial: “In your headline you speak of ‘false
morals’, is there anything more false or cowardly than a person writing an article of this kind and
not having the courage to sign it?”76 Other readers were disappointed in the obvious political
nature of the editorial, unhappy with what they perceived as propaganda: “The editorial
‘Defense’ could be written by a political robot; it is not the thinking of a moral human being.”77
Most complainants, however, were simply disappointed in what they viewed as the Church’s
lack of commitment to its religious foundation: “Since when do commitments to a man-made
organization like NATO take precedence over an individual Christian’s commitment to his
conscience trying to do God’s will in each situation which confronts him?”78 These few
dissenting voices, however, were soon lost in a sea of conformity.
There were many members of the United Church who agreed with the editorial,
highlighting the divide not only among members of the United Church, but arguably within
Canadian society too. The early letters critical of the Church were soon dwarfed by those that
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arrived later, lauding the magazine, the editorial and its unknown author. Most of these letters
congratulated the magazine for its leadership and the editorial’s author for his, or her, bravery.
J.O. Betts praised the editorial while simultaneously denigrating anyone who opposed her or the
Church’s position on peace: “Certainly it is high time someone with courage hit a note of sanity.
Don’t let letters and name-calling from a noisy minority…shut you up. … What higher aim is
there for a church paper than clarifying the daily issues and inspiring men to stand upright and
strong?”79 Just as Alcock employed rational thought and reason in his defence of peace research,
so too did writers such as Ben Dorgelo; but on this occasion, he wrote in defence of nuclear
weapons: “I was astonished to read the emotional outpour of letters in opposition to your fine
editorial ‘Defense.’ The real Christian and moral issue is prevention of war by any means. … I
admire the “common sense” attitude taken.”80 Yet it is not surprising that so many Church
members took this position, as it mirrored the stance of the Canadian government and in fact,
much of the Western world.
Indeed, many United Church ministers also agreed with the General Council’s support of
NATO and the concept of nuclear deterrence. One minister who preached the gospel of nuclear
deterrence to his congregation every Sunday was Dr. Reverend Allen R. Huband of Westminster
United Church in Winnipeg, Manitoba. Although not an outright proponent of nuclear weapons,
Huband viewed them as the only means to secure peace: “We may hope that as long as we have
[nuclear] superiority, an enemy will not strike…. Being defenceless is an invitation to
conscienceless men to attack.”81 But it was not just local ministers who supported these policies
or who believed in the panacea of military strength. Leading Church figure, Reverend Dr. J.R.
Mutchmor also rejected the “unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons and a neutralist course
for Canada,”82 and advocated that Canadian troops in NATO be equipped with nuclear weapons.
Ministers such as Huband, Mutchmor, and others like them set the tenor for the entire Church.
Preached from the pulpit and espoused in its monthly magazine, it is little wonder that many
Church members endorsed the status quo and military preparedness, when it came to maintaining
negative peace.
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The United Church also differed significantly to Alcock in how it hoped to attain positive
peace. Whereas scientific internationalism was at the heart of Alcock’s concept of peace, the
Church ultimately hoped to achieve peace through religion. Wilfred C. Lockhart, Moderator of
the United Church of Canada noted:
The naïve assumption accepted by so many that we little men and women of the world will
one day live in amity together…. This is fantasy, because although we have the imagination
to conceive Utopia, we do not have the personal resources to attain it. We can attain it only if
our belief in an eternal Father provides the dynamic we need to overcome our selfishness, or
if our commitment to Christ provides us with the love which we do not possess within
ourselves.83

In trying to preserve its foundational place in society, the Church was hostile to Alcock’s concept
of internationalism. And it was this hostility, combined with its acceptance of nationalism (that
is, military alliances and nuclear weapons) that Alcock found particularly galling.
Alcock believed that nationalism was the “virus of war”84 and the greatest obstacle to
peace. According to Alcock, Canada’s mainstream churches, especially the United Church, were
an impediment to peace during the Cold War. Alcock argued that the Church taught children
nationalism, and as a result, prejudice and narrow-mindedness:
His church teaches him sectarianism and various articles of dogma in place of the message of
universal love. Not only are other people different but they are unsaved… A consistent set of
“dogmatic” values guide him in his daily life and instruct him in his selection of whom to
love and whom to hate.85

He was not alone in this conviction. An anonymous United Church editorial argued that the
Church was responsible for teaching nationalism, for preaching xenophobia and divisiveness,
rather than harmony and acceptance: “Christianity has always tended to divide men into the
saved and unsaved, sheep and goats, wheat and tares, Christian and non-Christian.”86 The
consequence, Alcock believed, was that Canadians perceived themselves as more virtuous and
worthy than other nationalities. This superiority complex, combined with intolerance to
difference, made it hard to preserve negative peace, but almost impossible to achieve positive
peace.
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To substantiate his claims against the United Church and other religious denominations
as harbingers of nationalism, Alcock cited the 1962-1963 Attitude Study conducted by the CPRI;
the organization’s first major peace research project. In a 90-item questionnaire, the Study
surveyed its participants’ opinions and responses to questions on subjects that included, but were
not limited to: the United Nations, foreign aid, communism and the Cold War, nuclear arms, and
Canada’s armed forces. The organization polled 1000 randomly selected Canadian voters from
every province and territory. In addition, they also polled: 150 teenagers, 190 financial
contributors to the CPRI, 48 prominent Canadian businessmen, 48 labour/union leaders, and 48
politicians from the political parties represented in Canada’s House of Commons.87 The rationale
for the CPRI’s Attitude Study was simple and straightforward: they believed that Canadian
society was underutilizing the tools available to them in its pursuit for peace, particularly the new
technology of opinion research. The purpose of the Attitude Study was threefold:
(i) to determine with scientific validity just what Canadian attitudes are on questions of
defense, international affairs and disarmament; (ii) to determine the sources of information
and levels of knowledge on which such attitudes are based; (iii) to relate attitudes on these
questions to occupational, educational, geographic, and other background desires.88

The results of the Study were initially published piecemeal in Canadian newspapers. Not long
afterwards, they were published fully in a book, In Your Opinion: Leaders’ and Voters’ Attitudes
on Defense and Disarmament, Volume 1 (1963) by university social scientists, John Paul and
Jerome Laulicht.
Alcock and the CPRI’s Attitude Study concluded that Christians were more “war-like”
than non-Christians, causing shock, outrage, and controversy across Canada. Describing
Christians as “war-like,” Alcock meant an “attitude toward conventional defence forces
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(Christians want them more than atheists), towards nuclear weapons (Catholics want them more
than Protestants, and Protestants more than agnostics) and towards co-existence with
Communism.”89 According to the CPRI’s Study, Christians were in favour of nuclear weapons
for Canada, were unconcerned by their spread, and distrusted any conciliatory policy towards
communist states.90 The Attitude Study also concluded that church-going people’s sense of
responsibility towards war and peace was no greater than non-church goers: “Church-goers
showed the same tendency to believe in military might rather than the power of love. For a
church which is founded on the teachings of Jesus, these findings should come as a shock.”91 The
CPRI’s findings, or rather Alcock’s conclusions, are somewhat misleading and disingenuous. Of
the 1,484 people surveyed, only 95 claimed no church affiliation or refused to answer the
question: a mere 6% of those polled.92 Such a small number is hardly a reliable sample size to
validate the accusations that Alcock makes against Canadian Christians. More importantly, it can
be safely assumed that the majority of Canadians in 1963 went to church on Sunday and selfidentified as Christian. It would have been more accurate and appropriate for Alcock to conclude
that Canadians, not Christians, were “war-like.”
Many Canadians, including those of the United Church, were angered by what they
viewed as Alcock’s slanderous conclusions. Within days of the Attitude Study’s publication,
angry letters flowed into The United Church Observer magazine office, attacking Alcock and the
CPRI. In one letter, Stewart Clysdale (Board of Evangelism and Social Service, United Church
of Canada), argued that Alcock’s work was blinded by his bias against religion, and more
specifically, the Church: “Dr. Alcock draws an invalid conclusion from disappointment with the
response of church people to his appeal for research funds. He concludes they are not interested
in peace. Unfounded assertions such as this will discourage support.”93 In another letter,
Reverend G.M. Richardson accused Alcock and the CPRI of practicing pseudo-science:
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By what twisted logic does Norman Z. Alcock call the activities of the Canadian Peace
Research Institute “scientific research” into the causes and prevention of war? Genuine
scientific research would study the facts…all the Canadian Peace Research Institute has done
is conduct a sociological survey to see how various types of people feel about war!94

Alcock may or may not have been biased against the United Church as Clysdale suggests, but
Reverend Richardson’s claims that he and the CPRI practiced pseudo-science are unfounded.
Public opinion polls were viewed by the scientific community as a legitimate means to measure
what was popular or acceptable in society, no matter how fleeting those opinions may have been.
“Attitude Studies,” wrote peace research pioneer Kenneth Boulding, “are clearly relevant to the
investigation…of the international system which bear upon the decision-making process. There
are…many publics, and the problem of whose attitudes…are important and how the various
publics react on each other is still largely unresolved.”95 Even if the conclusions Alcock derived
from the Study were biased or misguided, it does not make the results any less factual or opinion
research less legitimate.
The CPRI, in fact, went to great lengths to ensure the legitimacy of its Attitude Study
with both the Canadian public and within the scientific community. At the head of the project
were two university professors and social scientists, Drs. John Paul and Jerome Laulicht. Both
were considered experts in the new technology of opinion research, especially Dr. Laulicht.
Combined, both men spent more than 1500 hours designing the Study and another 600 hours on
pilot tests, including eleven revisions to the questionnaire before it was delivered to the Canadian
electorate. The professors also spent over 6000 hours to tabulate the Study’s answers with the
help of a state-of-the-art I.B.M. computer at the University of Toronto.96 In addition, the CPRI
contracted Canadian Facts Limited, a commercial survey firm, to conduct the field work for their
study. A leader in its field, Canadian Facts Limited carried out a similar type of work for
companies such as the Canadian Gallup Poll. To maintain neutrality and to ensure that
respondents were not prejudiced prior to answering the questionnaire, the CPRI requested all
Canadian Facts pollsters to mention neither “peace” nor “war” when introducing themselves.97
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Those who were polled were randomly chosen. Seventy percent of those surveyed lived in urban
areas, while thirty percent in rural Canada. The Study was bilingual, with one in four respondents
French-speaking. It was critical, according to Dr. Paul, that the opinion poll be accessible to all
Canadians: “One problem was to develop a questionnaire which would be intelligible and
acceptable to a Newfoundland fisherman, a Toronto banker, and an Albertan rancher.”98 In spite
of the Attitude Study’s obvious legitimate methods, questions remained about its validity.
Critically, the United Church continued to question Alcock’s conception of peace and his social
science methodology to achieve it.
Ultimately, Alcock and the CPRI were constrained by their lack of legitimacy in
Canadian society. Their association with communism markedly hindered Alcock and the CPRI,
as did their decision to challenge the status quo. Not only did they challenge ideological
convictions, they provided new, social scientific ideas and options such as the Attitude Study as
to how peace might be attained: “The unique feature of peace research is…the immediate search
for alternatives, thus invoking Utopian ideas, making them researchable and possible as options
for policy.”99 The result of their unyielding adherence to their beliefs and convictions was rather
predictable. Without any major funding sources or public recognition, the CPRI, throughout its
history, was short of money. In 1964, only thirty months after the CPRI’s founding, Alcock was
quoted as saying: “We [the CPRI] have reached a plateau. … We are living hand-to-mouth.”100
Its only other major project, besides the Attitude Study, was the creation of the Peace Research
Abstract Journal (PRAJ). The PRAJ provided peace scholars with short, 100 to 200 word
abstracts on articles and books related to war and peace. At the end of the day, the actions of
Alcock and the CPRI could never match its vision of peace.
Unlike Alcock and the CPRI, the Church’s attempt to attain peace was hindered by its
desire to retain its legitimacy and authority in Canadian society. Anxious over its role in society,
the Church was a pillar of the Cold War Consensus. Unwilling to abandon its rigid belief system,
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the Church was unable to embrace new ideas such as peace research or world government. Thirty
years after the United Church’s resolutions condemning his peace activism and the Canadian
Peace Congress, James Endicott continued to urge the Church to embrace, positive, peaceful
alternatives: “The most urgent need facing the church is to develop a strong crusade for peace,
justice and social righteousness which will end the threat of nuclear war and bring about peaceful
co-existence. It can be done.”101 In spite of Endicott, Alcock, and other people’s urgings, the
Church was unwilling to declare “loyalty to humanity above all other loyalties,”102 and were
thus, incapable of realizing their own conception of a peaceful world.
In 1965, Norman Alcock posed two simple questions to the readers of The United Church
Observer: “Can religion and science mix? … Can peace “research” co-exist with religion?”103 To
his dismay the answer seemed to be no. This unsatisfactory reply was the result of the Cold War
battle for legitimacy among science, religion, and peacemaking. When Alcock opened the doors
of the CPRI in 1961, little did he anticipate the controversy his organization would cause. The
CPRI hoped to create a new science of peace, but the peace movement was widely believed to be
a communist-front and the CPRI was viewed by the Canadian public with apathy and prejudice.
Moreover, the word’s ideological implications placed Alcock and the CPRI on the “wrong side”
of the Cold War: “One of the constant obstacles we have is being labeled by the academics and
the government as a little too far left.”104 His unwillingness to denounce the nation’s enemies
also drew the ire of the United Church of Canada and religion, communism’s so-called greatest
enemy. It was, however, Alcock’s rigid belief in science as the path to peace that really upset the
United Church. According to Alcock, scientists were ideally trained to find solutions to war and
peace because they approached “a problem objectively…unhampered by emotional pressures,
political pressures, economic pressures.”105 Although Alcock’s vision was abstract and vague,
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the Church attacked Alcock and the CPRI, concerned that science would challenge and usurp the
rightful place of religion in society.
While both sides could agree on the goal to attain positive peace, neither side could agree
on the method to achieve their particular visions. Alcock and the CPRI were interested in
developing new international systems that would lead to a more equitable, less dangerous world.
The United Church supported military strength, NATO, and the Cold War consensus; it rejected
transformation, integration, and co-existence. Instead of working together, both Alcock and the
Church attacked one another, preferring to live within a binary system of us vs. them, unwilling
to accept there could be different, but equally acceptable methods to achieve peace. In the end,
neither side accomplished what they set out to do. Alcock and the CPRI lacked the legitimacy to
effect any significant change, while the Church and many Christians were reluctant to construct a
“theology for the future,”106 that disrupted their comfortable place in society. Ultimately, peace
was the primary casualty of the Cold War, “tarred with the branch of illegitimacy: disloyalty,
subversion, connections to an external enemy.”107
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Conclusion
In his book, The Manly Modern: Masculinity in Postwar Canada (2007), historian Christopher
Dummitt writes that the early Cold War period marked a “highpoint” in Canadian history.1
Following the Second World War, Dummitt notes that Canada experienced domestic stability
and harmony, and that it was an era of “affluence, scientific development, and the emerging
welfare state.”2 Canadians felt both socially and economically secure. Abroad, Canada
established itself as international leader in diplomacy, security, and peace. The country was an
active participant in the global community, including prominent roles in both the UN and NATO.
As a result, it is often argued that all levels of Canadian society benefitted from Canada’s
international prestige and domestic prosperity.3 This interpretation has contributed to the myth of
Canada as a “peaceable kingdom.” There is some truth to this myth. Many Canadians, including
those examined in this study, supported the UN and other multilateral organizations to tackle
global problems such as poverty, gender inequality, and disease. Combined with the country’s
post-1957 commitment to peacekeeping, historians, and society as a whole, have perpetuated the
belief that Canada is a “special and superior nation.”4 Many Canadians believe that their country
is unwavering in its devotion to peace. Yet, the government’s pursuit of security and stability
often clashed with the promotion of human rights and the quest for nuclear disarmament.
According to the definition of positive peace employed in this study, postwar Canada was not a
“peaceable kingdom.”
The Canadian narrative of a tolerant, peaceful nation ignores the realities of a Cold War
society characterized by anxiety, fear, and repression. Faced with the aggressive, subversive
nature of the Soviet Union and communism, Canada and the West embraced a militarized, liberal
internationalist conception of peace that emphasized collective security and the use of force to
ensure each nation’s survival. Although the Canadian government endorsed peace, it acted as if it
was preparing for war. Not only did Lester Pearson and other politicians use fear to justify their
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commitment to NATO and the Western military alliance, they also used the argument of security
to rationalize Canada’s support of the nuclear deterrent, and eventually, the 1963 acquisition of
nuclear weapons: “Peace and survival today depend less on independence than on
interdependence. We believe Canada, as a member of the Western alliance, must contribute to an
effective defence against nuclear attack. The Liberal party believes every Canadian should live in
freedom, dignity, and security.”5 Canada’s “liberal democracy” did not countenance alternatives
to its hegemonic, negative conception of peace. Those Canadians who proposed or envisioned a
positive definition of peace were treated as dangerous threats to the stability of the nation.
Contrary to the dominant historical narrative, Cold War Canada should not simply be
characterized as a period of prosperity and progress. Rather, as Rabbi Abraham Feinberg writes,
“the record of peace-efforts in Canada is not a success story.”6
There were a number of reasons why positive conceptions of peace failed in Cold War
Canada. The primary reason is ideological. Early in the postwar period, the word “peace”
became identified with communism. In part, this association was the result of the Soviet Union’s
misappropriation of the term for propaganda purposes and its sponsorship of international peace
organizations. The crucial factor that linked peace to communism was Canada and the West’s
tendency to view Cold War society as a series of strict binary categories, including its belief that
the world was divided into two, separate camps: the West versus the East. As a result, Canadian
peace activists who opposed Canada’s dominant liberal order and conception of peace were
viewed as outsiders, labelled naïve, communist “dupes.” As historian Lawrence Wittner notes,
Canadian “peace activists acquired a debilitating Communist stigma”7 during the Cold War.
Apart from James Endicott and the CPC, however, very few activists fit this pejorative depiction.
Even though individuals like Brock Chisholm, Ursula Franklin, and Norman Alcock stressed coexistence with the Soviet Union and other communist nations, many Canadians who advocated
peace were also decidedly anti-communist. Communism, activists argued, was no more likely
than capitalism to build a bridge to their positive vision of peace. Canadian peace activists, as a
whole, believed that “peace is not an ideological question, as the government of Canada claims it
5
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is.”8 Nevertheless, postwar propaganda equating peace with communism ensured that the
average Canadian citizen abandoned the peace movement, guaranteeing the movement and its
adherents would be subject to “constant vilification.” Throughout the Cold War, the Canadian
peace movement was consequently a minority of the population, albeit a vocal one. Yet, the
marginal nature of the peace movement ensured that its positive visions of peace failed to alter
the Cold War’s status quo or challenge the West’s dominant conception of peace.
Due to the negative, ideological association of peace, few Canadian politicians were
willing to support the peace movement. Their opposition, however, was not simply rooted in
ideological considerations. The visions of peace explored in this study directly challenged the
authority of the state and/or many of the country’s traditional, cherished values. Canada’s
provincial and federal governments, as a result, were the principal obstacles to positive
conceptions of peace during the Cold War and each vision of peace examined was actively
opposed, blocked, or ridiculed by the state. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, for example, the
Ontario provincial government rejected Feinberg’s plea for ecumenical brotherhood in favour of
implementing the Drew Plan: a rigorous curriculum of Christian religious education to be taught
to both the province’s primary and secondary school students. Most Ontarians could not
countenance the notion that Christianity share the spotlight, or in this case, the classroom, with
“inferior” religions. Similarly, Brock Chisholm’s vision of peace was also dismissed as immoral
and radical. In Canada’s House of Commons, members of parliament smugly belittled
Chisholm’s call for sound mental health and labelled him an “iconoclast” for rejecting the
Church and morality as the basis of peace. Judy LaMarsh, Minister of National Health and
Welfare, refused to read Ursula Franklin’s Federal Brief on Nuclear Fallout Monitoring in
Canada because it challenged her department’s authority, and Norman Alcock’s CPRI received
no support from the Canadian government whatsoever.
It was, however, Lester Pearson, who was the Canadian peace movement’s chief political
opponent. Revered in Canada as a prophet of peace, Pearson was deeply “partisan for the West in
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the Cold War”9 and committed to maintaining the era’s status quo. Pearson was complicit in
Canada’s decision to initially abstain from voting for the UDHR in the UN General Assembly in
December 1948. John Humphrey’s inclusion of economic, social, and cultural rights in his draft,
and subsequently, the final UDHR, was derided by Pearson and other Canadian politicians as
being too close to Soviet ideals and values. Much more problematic was Humphrey’s desire to
protect these “new” rights under international law. This revolutionary transformation of the law
would have required the Canadian government to provide its citizens with rights and services it
was as yet unwilling to do. Ultimately, the UDHR did not, in Pearson’s opinion, contribute to
Canada and the West’s military security, and thus, peace. In subsequent years, Pearson continued
to attack the peace movement in both the House of Commons and in the press. James Endicott
and the CPC, in particular, bore the brunt of Pearson’s verbal assaults, often labelled by the
“practical” politician as naïve, subversive, and communist. If Canadian peace activists were
unable to achieve their particular vision of peace during the Cold War, it was due to “the absence
of [political] machinery rather than the absence of motive power.”10 The Canadian government’s
actions made it acceptable to equate peace with communism, to label peace activists as traitors,
and ultimately, ensured that notions of positive peace never fully gained traction in Canadian
society.
Positive visions of peace also failed because of the inherent contradictions contained
within them. Feinberg envisioned peace as fraternity and community and fought passionately
against bigotry across Canada, be it religious, racial, or ideological. But after the Second World
War, Feinberg could not accept Germany into his brotherhood of man. Feinberg viewed
Germans as a menace to world peace, convinced of their innate militarism and anti-Semitism.
The contradiction in Feinberg’s vision of peace mirrors the paradoxes within Canada’s
disorganized and disunited peace movement. Plagued by discrimination and prejudice, many of
Canada’s peace activists, including Alcock, desired to appear respectable. In his desire to be a
legitimate force for peace in Cold War Canada, Alcock distanced himself from fellow peace
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activists such as Franklin and VOW, which ironically, comprised one of his few allies. In the
end, however, the Canadian peace movement and its ideas of positive peace failed because they
rejected the leading, negative definition of peace espoused by the government and questioned
many of Canada’s time-honoured belief systems. Activists stressed communication and coexistence to settle disputes, rather than promote the nuclear deterrent to maintain peace or
security. Without the support of Canadian citizens, the government, or even from fellow peace
activists, positive peace itself became a casualty of the Cold War.
In postwar Canada, most Canadians accepted the country’s dominant liberal
internationalist foreign policy, including the government’s commitment to NATO and collective
security to maintain peace. Despite this widely agreed upon definition of peace, there is not a
distinctly Canadian conception of peace, different from its North Atlantic neighbours, in
particular, the U.S. and Great Britain. In spite of Pearson’s Cold War wish that “we want our
own kind of peace, brought about in our own way,”11 the Canadian government and the
country’s peace movement can be characterized by their staunch adherence to internationalism.
Although both the government and movement wanted to create a better, more peaceful world, the
former’s conception of internationalism was principally muscular and the latter’s benevolent.
Nevertheless, as a result of their commitment to internationalism, the government and peace
movement adopted a transnational approach to peace. For example, before becoming prime
minister, Pearson, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, argued that Canada’s participation
in multilateral, intergovernmental organizations was key to the country’s negative peace and
security. Canada eagerly joined, among other organizations, the UN and its specialized agencies
in 1945, NATO in 1949, and remained an integral part of the Commonwealth in the postwar
period.
The Canadian peace movement was also directly influenced by internationalism and
transnational trends in positive peace. Different strands of internationalism, in fact, were at the
heart of each individual’s vision of peace: Zionist (Feinberg), medical (Chisholm), legal
(Humphrey), nuclear disarmament (Endicott), feminist (Franklin), and scientific (Alcock). While
each vision was unique to Canada, the individuals were often inspired by their immediate
colleagues or by fellow peace activists from around the globe. Like the Canadian government,
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Chisholm and Humphrey chose intergovernmental organizations – the WHO and UN Division of
Human Rights respectively – as the vehicle for their internationalism and activism. But unlike
the government, both men hoped their visions of peace would be universal and transcend the
state. Decades after he wrote the first draft of the UDHR, Humphrey discussed the truly
international nature of the document: “This Declaration…is not the work of one man or even of
two or three men ... It is the work of hundreds, indeed of thousands, of people and it represents a
synthesis of the ideas and convictions of the millions of people of all races and nationalities who
spoke through them.”12 Humphrey argued that the transnational character of the UDHR was
critical to its success. If the Declaration was connected to a particular person, country,
government, or ideology, the document risked losing its universal character, and thus, its
influence.
Humphrey, however, was not the only peace activist whose vision was influenced by his
international peers. Many Canadian peace activists in the postwar period also joined or created
international nongovernment organizations to realize their visions of peace. The antiwar and
nuclear disarmament policies of Endicott’s CPC were largely a by-product of its association with
the World Peace Council. The growth of the peace movement in the late 1950s and the
emergence of popular Canadian nuclear disarmament groups such as VOW was a reaction to the
1957 formation of SANE in the United States and the CND in Great Britain. And Alcock’s
creation of the CPRI in 1961 was motivated by the founding of similar, established peace
research organizations in Norway, Japan, and the United States. Interestingly, most of these
nongovernment organizations were portrayed, or thought of, as hostile to the state because their
conception of internationalism and peace conflicted with that of the Canadian government. But
in reality, the peace movement hoped to work with the state to achieve their goals, and like the
government were inspired by contemporary, transnational trends in peace.
In addition to its internationalist outlook and transnational approach, the postwar peace
movement can be distinguished by a number of factors. The Canadian peace movement can be
identified by its readiness to connect peace with social justice and reform. Each activist studied
in this dissertation was committed to changing human behaviour; they were, as historian Mark
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Mazower argues, dedicated to mankind’s “collective emancipation.”13 Each vision of peace,
consequently, attempted to ensure that all Canadians could reach their full potential by
safeguarding their rights, removing the roots of inequality from society, and fighting against
prejudice. Rabbi Feinberg’s vision of peace, for instance, focused on eradicating Canada’s
religious and racial barriers, which he felt were an obstacle to brotherhood and social harmony.
Humphrey urged the Canadian government to protect and promote every person’s human rights
and fundamental freedoms. He campaigned for the promotion of economic and social rights, that
previously unprotected created marked disparity among Canada’s different classes, races,
religions, and genders. And Franklin’s feminist conception of peace was rooted in her
determination to achieve social justice, in particular, equality for women throughout Canada and
the world.
The social commitment of those explored in this study was evidenced by their active
pursuit of peace. In a postwar booklet outlining its mission statement, values, and platform for
peace, the World Peace Council succinctly noted that “the essence of the Peace Movement is
action.”14 It was this belief, in part, that attracted Endicott to the organization in the late 1940s,
as it meshed with his Christian upbringing and the commitment of the social gospel to create the
Kingdom of God on earth. Franklin was similarly inspired by the Quaker conviction to “speak
truth to power.” As a result of her faith, Franklin pursued her vision of peace in her daily life, not
worried that her radical point of view and opinions might offend her colleagues, peers, or even
the Canadian government. Likewise, Brock Chisholm enthusiastically joined the WHO to
implement his vision of peace and Alcock created the CPRI to realize his. By actively practicing
what they preached, each individual examined understood that peace was as much a process and
not simply a goal to be achieved or maintained. The Canadian peace movement, thus, recognized
that to achieve the government’s negative peace, it must first eliminate structural violence to
obtain positive peace.
The postwar Canadian peace movement can also be characterized by its link to religion
and science. Peace, just as prior to the Second World War, remained a religious concern
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following the conflict. Two case studies’ visions of peace, Feinberg and Franklin, were directly
tied to their religious beliefs. The two peace activists believed that Judaism and Quakerism,
respectively, promoted community, cooperation, and compassion: each trait an essential
ingredient to a peaceful world. In addition, Endicott’s vision of peace was also highly influenced
by his religious upbringing, his time as a minister of the United Church of Canada, and as a
Christian missionary in China. Endicott, however, resigned from the United Church because he
felt that the Church would rather uphold the status quo than fight for positive conceptions of
peace. Similarly, Chisholm argued that organized religion was a major cause of the intolerance
that led to wars and conflicts. Chisholm’s vision of peace rejected religion in favour of a nonsectarian, rational approach to conflict resolution. In the same vein, Alcock’s vision of peace also
rejected religion for an apparent unbiased scientific approach to peace. Neither Alcock nor his
chief rival, the United Church, deemed science and religion as compatible, especially in regard to
peacemaking. Franklin’s vision of peace, however, highlights the limitations to both Alcock and
the Church’s definitions of peace. In her executive role at VOW, Franklin’s twin peace research
projects on radioactive fallout utilized both her skills as a highly trained scientist and were
inspired by her Quaker faith. In Canada’s postwar peace movement, both religion and science
were driving forces. Peace, ultimately, meant something different to each individual examined in
this study, yet their visions shared many commonalities, bridging their activism and bringing
them together in search of a better future.
The Canadian historiography is inundated with books about war. The few historians who have
written about peace do so from the dominant, negative conception historically espoused by the
state. Yet, as this study attempts to highlight, the story of peace in Canada is incomplete. This
dissertation ends in 1963, but the story of peace in Canada is ongoing. This dissertation is the
first study dedicated to ideas of positive peace in postwar and early Cold War Canada. It is not,
however, a grand, sweeping narrative of the people, groups, or issues that comprised the
Canadian peace movement during this time. Rather, this dissertation marks an entry point for
other Canadian peace historians. The study’s biographical approach means that there is still a
great deal of material to explore from 1945 to 1963.15 Moreover, each chapter, explores only one
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phase of that particular individual’s peace activism. Although Feinberg’s vision of peace
remained rooted in the idea of brotherhood, his activism transitioned over time. Like many other
Canadian peace activists, Feinberg’s focus in the early 1960s turned to nuclear disarmament. By
the mid-1960s, he was a fierce critic of the Vietnam War and later in life he became a proponent
for “Grey Lib,” a movement to bolster the rights of senior citizens. Likewise, Franklin’s peace
activism evolved through the years. Though she never left VOW, she did eventually step down
as the organization’s research director to focus on her career as a professor at the University of
Toronto. At that time, Franklin turned her attention to the association between peace and
technology, and specifically delved into how technology affected human relationships: a subject
that ultimately dominated her later work and activism. Humphrey’s post-UN vision of peace
remained grounded in the realization of human rights through international law, but his attention
and activism shifted away from the UN. He was a member of the Royal Commission on the
Status of Women in 1967 and also helped found the Canadian branch of Amnesty International.
For all the peace activists explored in this study, their peace activism went through multiple
phases.
This dissertation also provides a basis to study and better understand Canadian
conceptions of peace during the second half of the Cold War (1963-1989). Like the activism of
the individuals studied in chapters one through six, the Cold War is made up of different phases,
most of which “spill over” from one period to the next. The issues and non-violent methods
employed by Canada’s postwar, early Cold War peace movement survived their era. In the late
1970s and early 1980s, for example, nuclear disarmament once again became the leading issue of
the international peace movement. Leading the Canadian charge for disarmament were
organizations such as Project Ploughshares, Operation Dismantle, and Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War. All three groups, and many others, just as those peace activists
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before them, publically protested that nuclear weapons could only lead to death, not security, or
peace. And although some Canadians still characterized peace activists as naïve and subversive,
nuclear disarmament in the 1980s was widely accepted as a legitimate concern. As a result,
Canada’s conception of peace experienced a slight shift in emphasis or rather, a “passive
revolution.” To retain its hegemony and power, Ian McKay argues that the “liberal state,” or in
this case, the Canadian government, “executed far-ranging changes in its social and political
project to ‘include’ some of those [peace activists] previously excluded, with the quid pro quo
that they divest themselves of the most radical aspects of their oppositional programs.”16 Canada
never abandoned its militaristic, liberal internationalist conception of peace during the Cold War.
Yet, by 1984, Canada had divested itself of nuclear weapons, although its troops remained under
NATO’s “nuclear umbrella.” Consequently, the nuclear disarmament movement quietly petered
out by the end of the decade. The era, however, also introduced Canada to new conceptions of
peace. If future historians are so inclined, there are numerous Canadians whose visions of peace
deserve consideration.17
Ultimately, through the lens of collective biography, this dissertation has endeavoured to
research and examine positive conceptions of peace in postwar Canada, and consequently, has
attempted to portray a nuanced picture of the Canadian peace movement from 1945 to 1963.
Historian Amy Staples writes that the narrative of peace during the Cold War is “more often than
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not…a story of unfulfilled dreams.”18 Indeed, the individuals explored in this study were
unsuccessful in achieving their positive visions of peace, but they and the Canadian peace
movement should not be dismissed because of their “limitations” and “imperfections.” Rather,
each individual studied, and the peace movement as a whole, have had a lasting impact on
Canadian society. As Ursula Franklin notes, “step by bloody step,”19 peace activists confronted
the Canadian government’s belief that peace must be preserved through fear, repression, and if
necessary, violence. Instead the peace movement challenged many of Canada’s ingrained
principles, values, and beliefs, and argued that peace could be attained through negotiation,
communication, tolerance of the Other, and justice. Although they faced almost constant
disappointment, the Canadian peace movement and its supporters were ahead of their time. Their
positive visions of peace are timeless and still relevant today. By historicizing their conceptions
of peace and how Canadians responded to them, it becomes easier to understand how Canada
defines peace today. In a world where war trumps peace, terrorism has replaced communism as
the “enemy” of the West, and a state-centred, negative, militarized conception of peace still
dominates the thinking of the Canadian government and much of society, the messages of the
postwar peace movement still resonate to this day. Under such circumstances, these “radical
visions” must not be forgotten, but rather, as Jay Winter argues, “The visions of men and women
who dared to think differently, to break with convention, to speculate about the unlikely in the
search for a better way, are intrinsically worth recalling.”20
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